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Abstract 
 
The thesis examines the extent to which Mercosur member states can establish a common 
approach to regional development, and what Mercosur can learn from the European Union 
experience of regional development funds. 
Through an extensive statistical analysis this thesis maps and profiles regional disparities in 
Mercosur in order to expose the nature and scale of the regional development challenge faced 
by the region.  
It argues that the creation of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund (MRDF), although not 
the sole solution, is one way forward towards the reduction of regional disparities.  
The thesis then proposes a theoretical framework which can be employed to account for 
prospective policy transfers between two supranational associations such as the EU and 
Mercosur.  
A critical analysis of the EU regional development fund experience leads the thesis to propose 
that there are some key EU principles which Mercosur can apply.  
Finally, the thesis discusses the objectives and main characteristics of a MRDF in terms of 
how it might best address the needs of the Mercosur less developed regions.  
 
 
Síntesis  
 
Esta tesis evalúa hasta qué punto los países miembros del Mercosur tienen la capacidad de 
establecer pautas en común hacia el desarrollo regional, y lo que éste a su vez puede aprender 
de la experiencia de la Unión Europea acerca de los fondos de desarrollo regional. 
Por medio de un análisis estadístico, este trabajo desarrolla mapas y examina las diferencias 
regionales en el Mercosur con el fin de plantear la naturaleza e importancia de estas 
diferencias regionales. 
Argumenta también que la creación de un Fondo Mercosur de Desarrollo Regional (FMDR) 
aún si no es la única solución, es un paso adelante hacia la reducción de dichas diferencias 
regionales. 
La tesis así mismo propone un marco teórico que permite analizar prospectivamente la 
transferencia de políticas entre dos asociaciones supranacionales como la UE y el Mercosur.  
Un análisis detallado de los fondos de desarrollo regional de la UE permite considerar 
principios fundamentales de la UE que el Mercosur podría llevar a cabo. 
Finalmente, se analizan los objetivos y características principales de un FMDR para suplir 
óptimamente las necesidades de las regiones menos favorecidas del Mercosur. 
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CHAPTER  1..   INTRODUCTII ON  
 
The thesis examines the extent to which Mercosur member states can establish a 
common approach to regional development, and what Mercosur can learn from the European 
Union experience of regional development funds. 
This introductory chapter first presents the reasons for which this research work has 
been undertaken. In a second section it discusses the research design, that is the hypotheses, 
the methodology of the research; its originality; the sources of information; the fieldtrip 
research; and the outline of the content of the thesis. 
THE REASONS FOR UNDERTAKING THIS RESEARCH 
In 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Asunción, 
which  initiated the Mercosur process of integration which aimed at creating a Common 
Market of the South (Mercado Común del Sur – Mercosur). Unlike other processes of 
integration, such as the European Union in Europe or the Andean Pact Community in Latin 
America, after ten years of integration the Mercosur member states have not yet established a 
common approach to reduce regional development disparities. 
After examining regional development problems and issues in Mercosur member 
states, this thesis analyses the extent to which these member states can establish a common 
approach to regional development, in particular a regional development fund, and the extent 
to which the longer established EU experience of regional development funds can be 
transferred to Mercosur. Although no official active process of policy transfer has yet been 
initiated, key Mercosur policy-makers interviewed have shown a clear interest in the EU 
regional development funds experience.  
Three sets of reasons underlie the decision to study this research topic. The principal 
set of reasons is related to personal interests in regional integration and development issues. A 
second set of reasons is related to the deep interest of the author in Mercosur. The third reason 
for the study is the desire to offset the existing lacunae on these matters within the academic 
literature. 
From Africa to Latin America: personal views on development and regional 
integration 
The difficulties that some countries have in overcoming their problems of economic 
and social development have been an issue for concern since childhood. Having grown up 
mostly in Africa, in an environment of people working for international and non-
governmental aid organisations, exposure to the difficult fight towards development gradually 
increased. Consequently, a strong personal interest in the social and economic development 
issues faced by third-world countries emerged.  
This interest has shifted over the past few years from Africa to Latin America. During 
personal academic research, another strong interest arose towards regional economic 
integration since these processes arguably contribute directly and indirectly to the economic 
and social development of countries. Since a considerable number of processes of regional 
integration have been started in Latin America over the last fifty years, this continent offered 
greater opportunities for research on that topic than Africa where fewer integration processes 
have occurred. Thus, the thesis focuses on Latin America because this continent faces similar 
problems of socio-economic development to Africa, but offers more possibilities of research 
on regional integration. 
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Previous research and work experience led to the study of the different processes of 
regional integration in Latin America, such as the Central American Common Market 
(CACM), the Andean Pact, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)1 and Mercosur. This 
latter process of economic integration – initiated by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
– attracted attention since it seemed a promising initiative, in spite of presently undergoing a 
significant economic and political crisis and still facing a considerable number of challenges. 
Challenges confronted by Mercosur 
One of the difficulties faced by Mercosur, a relatively ‘young’ process of integration 
since it was only started in 1991, is the extreme disparities that exist between the different 
geographic regions of the Mercosur territory. Whereas a  few regions, mostly situated along 
the coast and around the economic centres, are highly developed and industrialised, others are 
still facing significant problems of development being in a peripheral situation and subsisting 
mostly on traditional forms of agriculture. 
Since it is a real challenge for every Mercosur country to reduce these socio-economic 
disparities, it can be discussed whether adopting a common approach to regional economic 
development at a supranational level – in addition to the national level, not instead of it –  
could arguably help the most backward regions catch up with the more developed regions.  
Mercosur, having been created recently, has a limited experience. In the interests of 
time and money Mercosur could look for lessons to learn from ‘an elder brother’, from 
another process of integration with better experience in the field of regional development. As 
a proverb says, “learn from the experience of others: you cannot live long enough to make all 
their mistakes”. The prime supranational association which comes to mind is the European 
Union. Indeed, in addition to being the most long-standing and successful process of regional 
integration, the EU has been managing various regional development initiatives during the 
past few decades. The EU could therefore provide Mercosur policy-makers with enough 
comparative material to consider, explore and assess. 
Moreover, since its creation, Mercosur has often studied the EU and various forms of 
international technical cooperation were set up between the two supranational associations to 
help Mercosur learn from the EU experience. It is therefore possible to consider that 
Mercosur countries might learn some key lessons from the EU experience in using and 
managing regional development funds, and adopt some of its successes within their own 
territory, taking into account the specific local conditions. 
The existing lacunae in the academic literature 
At the time of writing, Mercosur is at the early stages of its process of integration and 
has consequently not yet adopted any form of regional development policy. It is therefore 
timely to assess and analyse the prospects for a more active approach to regional development 
policy on the part of Mercosur, and whether it is possible to transfer the EU regional 
development experience to Mercosur. Moreover, as interviews with Mercosur officials 
revealed, policy makers are interested in learning from the EU experience in regional 
development policy. 
In addition, from an academic perspective, until now the academic world has 
undertaken relatively limited research with few publications on Mercosur. Presumably, the 
main reason is the recent creation of Mercosur and not a lack of interest from academic 
researchers. Some research has been undertaken by international organisations on 
                                                
1 The CACM was created on the 13th of December 1960, the Andean Pact on the 26th of May 1969 and the 
CARICOM agreement was signed on the 4th of July 1973. 
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development aspects in Latin America, such as the InterAmerican Development Bank or the 
World Bank. Yet, what has been done does not analyse the possibility for Mercosur countries 
to establish a common approach to regional development. Moreover, more often than not, the 
publications by these international organisations reflect work carried out from a practical 
point of view, rather than from an academic standpoint.  
Likewise, the literature has only recently begun to analyse policy transfers. Within this 
field of social science, the theme of transfers between supranational associations has not been 
investigated yet. Moreover, there has been little work on the analysis of the extent to which 
policy can be transferred, before the transfer is to take place, and which explores the factors 
that need to be taken into account in such a prospective policy transfer. 
There is consequently a real vacuum in the academic literature on the specific topic of 
the transferability of the EU experience in regional development funds for Mercosur, a gap 
that this research fills. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The thesis examines the extent to which Mercosur member states can establish a 
common approach to regional development, and what Mercosur can learn from the European 
Union experience of regional development funds. 
Hypotheses and methodology 
The research is based on the following three hypotheses which are tested:  
1. It is possible for Mercosur to reduce significant regional disparities by complementing 
the activities of existing development agencies through the establishment of a 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund. 
2. It is possible to design a prospective policy transfer framework to determine what 
lessons and under which circumstances Mercosur could transfer the extensive 
experience of the EU in regional development funds to design its own common 
approach. 
3. It is possible to adapt the lessons learned from the EU within the Mercosur context to 
define the priorities and main characteristics of the Mercosur Regional Development 
Fund. 
To test these three hypotheses, the research proceeds in several steps which are 
synthesised in Figure 1.1 below. As it shows, the thesis first analyses and quantifies regional 
development disparities within Mercosur member states. It is the significance of these 
disparities that justify Mercosur member states in looking to the EU for lessons in establishing 
a common approach to regional development. As Rose highlights, “there is no point in 
looking abroad for a remedy if you don’t know what the problem is at home”2. 
This analysis of the regional development situation in Mercosur is achieved through 
the comparison of socio-economic statistics of the different administrative regions of 
Mercosur. This statistical analysis highlights and discusses the significance and nature of the 
regional disparities. 
                                                
2 Rose Richard, Ten steps in learning lessons from abroad, Future Governance Paper 1, Lessons from 
Comparative Public Policy, October 2001, University of Strathclyde, Strathclyde, p.6. 
 5
Such regional disparities can, arguably, be the source of dissatisfaction within civil 
society, as people living in less prosperous regions desire similar opportunities and levels of 
development to other regions. This situation is not new since regional disparities have always 
existed within Mercosur countries, and policy makers have always attempted to homogenise 
their territory by assisting the development of the less prosperous regions. 
However, the statistical analysis suggests that the existing agencies that have been set 
up have not been able to successfully reduce regional disparities. In such a case, “routine [the 
policies already implemented] is disrupted and policymakers can no longer operate on the 
assumption that what was satisfactory before is still satisfactory”3. It is clear that something 
needs to be done. After having described the principal development agencies active in 
Mercosur, and their lack of success to reduce regional disparities, it is therefore possible to 
discuss whether it is possible for Mercosur policy makers to develop a common approach to 
regional development to complement the existing array of instruments. This discussion, based 
upon the opinions of 137 Mercosur policy makers interviewed during three fieldtrips in 
Mercosur4, leads to the conclusion that it would be beneficial for Mercosur to establish a 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund to tackle the problem of regional disparities. 
In developing a new policy, however, it can be argued that to reduce dissatisfaction, 
policy makers can take three possible courses of action. They can either consider past or 
present policies and learn from their mistakes; innovate by developing a new and original 
policy; or learn from the policies implemented in other countries. These three courses of 
action are respectively defined in this thesis as looking backward, forward, or across.  
It is clear that Mercosur policy makers cannot look backward since, at the Mercosur 
level, no regional development policy has been implemented. It is possible for policy makers 
to look forward and to design an innovative common approach to regional development. 
However, generally, “instead of new knowledge, policy makers prefer the assurance of doing 
what has worked before, or been effective elsewhere”5. It can thus be argued that the option of 
looking across, that is learning from another’s experience, offers significant advantages.  
To learn from the experience of others, the thesis analyses the current policy transfer 
literature and discusses how existing conclusions and frameworks can be adapted to account 
for prospective policy transfers between supranational associations. However, most of the 
work on policy transfer analyses transfers which have taken place. Very little work has been 
done on prospective policy transfers. 
As a consequence, the thesis develops a framework to account for a ‘future’ transfer of 
policy. This framework is then applied to explore the critical factors for a successful transfer 
of policy from the EU to Mercosur. This prospective policy transfer framework leads to the 
argument that, for a policy transfer to be successful, it would be advisable for Mercosur to 
learn from the fundamental principles which underlie the EU experience in regional 
development funds. 
The thesis therefore presents an analysis of the past fifty years of EU regional policy, 
describing its general evolution and focusing specifically on its fundamental principles. In 
Rose’s words these are the ‘observable characteristics of an effective programme’ in the EU. 
                                                
3 Rose Richard, What is lesson-drawing?, Journal of Public Policy II.1, 1991, Cambridge University Press, 
Belfast, p.11. 
4 See the fourth sub-section below for more information on the fieldtrips and interviews. 
5 Rose Richard, What is lesson-drawing?, Journal of Public Policy II.1, 1991, Cambridge University Press, 
Belfast, p.10. 
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This leads to a detailed discussion of each of the principles since they would be the source of 
inspiration for Mercosur policy makers when designing an MRDF. 
As shown in Figure 1.1 below, the thesis draws together the findings, that is the type 
of development assistance required by Mercosur’s less developed regions as well as the 
lessons which might be transferred from the EU experience to Mercosur. This enables some 
priorities and characteristics of the Mercosur Regional Development Fund to be suggested 
that might best contribute to the reduction of development disparities.  
Figure 1.1. Methodology to test the three hypotheses of the thesis 
Research undertaken  Outcome  Outcome 
 Hypothesis 1  Hypothesis 3  
Analysis of regional 
disparities in Mercosur 
    
  There are significant 
regional disparities 
within Mercosur 
  
Description of existing 
development agencies 
    
  These agencies are 
numerous, but 
insufficient to reduce 
regional disparities 
 
Analysis of the 
possibility for Mercosur 
to develop a common 
approach to regional 
development 
   
  Mercosur could establish 
a MRDF 
 
 Hypothesis 2   
Literature review on 
policy transfers 
   
  The literature focuses on 
retrospective policy 
transfers between states 
 
Creation of a framework 
for prospective policy 
transfers between SA 
   
  Mercosur can learn from 
the EU experience in 
regional development 
funds 
 
It is possible to 
define the 
priorities and 
characteristics 
of a MRDF 
considering the 
state of regional 
development 
and the lessons 
learned from the 
EU 
Analysis of the EU’s 
experience of regional 
development funds, 
specifically focusing on 
its underlying principles
    
  It would be advisable for 
Mercosur to learn from 
the EU’s principles 
  
 
It is important to note that the thesis is open to criticism. A first criticism can be that 
the thesis is future oriented, that is, it is concerned about something that does not exist, 
namely the transfer of EU regional development experience to Mercosur to create a MRDF. 
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However, since “it compares observable characteristics of an effective programme in one 
country [the EU regional development fund experience] with observable conditions in another 
[Mercosur]”6, the thesis is scientifically justified according to Rose.  
Secondly, it can be criticised for being speculative since the priorities and 
characteristics that are suggested in the thesis contain an element of speculation. This can be 
argued to be contrary to the practice of traditional academic enquiry. However, it should be 
noted that the suggestions refer to the experience of the EU and consider the specific 
Mercosur context. As Rose suggests, this limits the element of speculation in the research 
since it is bounded:  
“Any prescription for action is necessarily speculative since it is about the future, and evidence 
is about the past. A lesson uses evidence about what has happened in one country’s programme 
in the past to formulate hypotheses about how it will work here in future. In this way, the 
inevitable element of speculation is bounded by empirical observation of an existing 
programme”7. 
A third criticism relates to whether the findings of the research reflect personal 
preferences of the author. It should be noted that the suggestions reflect the results of 
statistical analyses and the views of the 137 policy makers interviewed. The suggestions are 
therefore not personal preferences, but are scientifically reasoned conclusions which are the 
outcome of the analysis. The scientific basis of prospective policy transfers is well argued by 
Rose:  
“Lesson-drawing is scientific in the original sense of the Latin root, scientia, to know or to 
understand things. Understanding is arrived at through a process of empirical observation”8.  
“The analysis of public policy is more akin to epidemiology than to rocket science. An 
epidemiologist not only interprets biomedical symptoms of individuals in terms of universal 
principles, but also examines contextual variations in the incidence of these symptoms in order 
to find the most effective response”9. 
Originality of the research 
Since regional development funds have been established in various places around the 
world during the past few decades, such funds have already been the topic of a considerable 
number of studies and analyses by international institutions, national governments and 
academic researchers. However, this research makes an original contribution to the existing 
literature in at least six aspects. 
Firstly, there is a considerable number of publications on national regional 
development funds within EU countries10. However, these funds are managed and financed by 
the different governments and applied within their boundaries to solve their regional 
economic problems. In contrast to this, the thesis focuses solely on supranational regional 
development funds, within the EU as well as in the Mercosur.   
                                                
6 Rose Richard, What is lesson-drawing?, Journal of Public Policy II.1, 1991, Cambridge University Press, 
Belfast, p.23. 
7 Rose Richard, Ten steps in learning lessons from abroad, Future Governance Paper 1, Lessons from 
Comparative Public Policy, October 2001, University of Strathclyde, Strathclyde, p.17. 
8 Rose Richard, Ten steps in learning lessons from abroad, Future Governance Paper 1, Lessons from 
Comparative Public Policy, October 2001, University of Strathclyde, Strathclyde, p.5. 
9 Rose Richard, When all other conditions are not equal: the context for drawing lessons, Studies in Public 
Policy n°366, 2002, University of Strathclyde, Strathclyde, p.4. 
10 For example, different national strategies for regional development are discussed in Alden J. and Boland P., 
Regional development strategies: an European perspective, Regional Policy and Development Series n°17, 1996, 
Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London, p.322. 
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Secondly, the establishment of a regional development fund at the Mercosur level has 
not yet been critically analysed, either by the academic world or by international development 
organisations. Some studies were begun by the governments of the member states in the mid-
1990s when they first considered transforming an existing fund, the Fonplata, into a Regional  
Development Bank. However, these studies were rapidly stopped due to a lack of political 
motivation. There are very few documents available about these negotiations, none of which 
were published.  
Thirdly, an essential part of the thesis is based on the statistical analysis of Mercosur 
regional data. This has enabled the production of a map showing the relative regional 
disparities in Mercosur. Such a map of regional development has, at the time of writing, not 
yet been encountered in the existing literature. 
Fourthly, the approach to the topic is both quantitative and qualitative. Indeed, the 
argument of the thesis is partly based on an extensive analysis of statistical economic and 
social data from Mercosur regions. This statistical analysis is complemented by an interview 
survey with decision-makers within Mercosur which sheds a different light on the topic. 
Fifthly, there is a need for a more comprehensive theoretical framework for the study 
of public policy transfers in an international setting. Although some material exists, this 
research aims to make a contribution – even if a modest one – to the elaboration of a broader 
conceptual understanding of the dynamics of public policy transfers between supranational 
associations, and to determine the factors which most likely contribute to the success of such 
policy transfers. The thesis offers a framework which can be used to analyse policy transfers 
before they take place.  
Finally, this thesis is prospective and future-oriented. Its objective is not to undertake 
research for its own sake, but to offer Mercosur policy makers a preliminary study of what 
they could learn from the experience of the EU in regional development funds to create their 
own mechanisms to reduce regional disparities. This approach is supported by Rose who 
gives great importance to the active and prospective role of policy transfer research:  
“Lesson-drawing is practical; it is concerned with making policies that can be put into effect 
[…] Learners are not passive pupils but policy-makers actively trying to formulate or decide 
about a programme […] The primary demand of policy-makers is not for after-the-fact 
evaluation but for before-the-fact assessments that indicate whether a proposed programme 
will increase or decrease satisfaction”11.  
Sources of information 
Three principal sources of information were consulted in order to undertake the 
research. Each of these sources sheds a particular light on the topic of research. 
The first source of material comes from the analysis of raw data and figures related to 
the economic conditions within Mercosur. The interpretation of these statistical results 
represents a subjective approach to the topic since it is the author’s interpretation of some 
data. The data necessary for conducting such an analysis were mostly provided by the 
statistical offices of the Mercosur member states. Some data also came from internal reports 
published by the two supranational associations and by other institutes, such as the United 
Nations, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Inter-
American Development Bank, which have studied the socio-economic situation of the 
member countries of the EU and Mercosur. 
                                                
11 Rose Richard, Ten steps in learning lessons from abroad, Future Governance Paper 1, Lessons from 
Comparative Public Policy, October 2001, University of Strathclyde, Strathclyde, pp.1, 3 and 17. 
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A second source of information is the interviews carried out during the two fieldtrips 
with key decision-makers on Mercosur or development issues. This source accounts for the 
opinion of those who daily work on issues related to regional development and Mercosur. 
Since these interviews are an essential aspect of the research work, the next sub-section is 
specifically dedicated to the fieldtrip aspect of this research. 
Finally, the third source of information results from a review of the literature which 
has been so far published on Mercosur and on policy transfers. Probably because of the recent 
creation of Mercosur, few publications exist on Mercosur, and none has been found relating to 
the possibility of creating a regional development fund. Authors have been much more 
prolific when it comes to the EU and its regional policies. A second field of literature on 
which this thesis is based relates to policy transfers. Although this literature is extensive when 
referring to policy transfers which took place between governments, very few works have 
been published on prospective transfers or on policy transfers between supranational 
associations. These different fields of literature referred to in the thesis enable to take account 
of the analyses already undertaken by researchers, which therefore offers a foundation on 
which to elaborate this research. 
These three sources of information give more perspective to the research since the 
topic is then analysed from different point of views: that of the author, that of key Mercosur 
decision-makers, and that of the academic world. 
The fieldtrips to Mercosur: the foundation of the thesis 
To enrich the research material used within the thesis and to test the ideas, it was 
necessary to obtain the views of some Mercosur decision-makers and key actors on the topics 
related to the creation of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. It would have been 
possible to collect these opinions through a survey questionnaire which would have been 
emailed to the respondents. However, for six reasons it was considered preferable to collect 
these opinions through interviews conducted directly and on site with the respondents. 
A first reason for conducting interviews and not sending out questionnaires was that it 
would have been more difficult to obtain answers through email. The response rate for postal 
questionnaires is indeed recognised to be extremely low. It is clear that most respondents 
would have waited until they had spare time to answer it, and would have always postponed 
the task. Moreover, filling in a questionnaire would have been in some cases more time 
consuming for respondents since they would need to qualify their arguments and develop 
their opinions in writing, while oral interviews can be less time-consuming. The responses 
were often obtained within a quarter of an hour, although on average the interviews lasted 
approximately one hour.  
Secondly, for some respondents, especially those higher in the hierarchy, there might 
also be an issue of confidentiality. The interview approach would safeguard the respondent 
since the interviews were not recorded. This also allowed respondents to freely express their 
views since there would be no ‘proof’ that they had imparted confidential information or non-
governmental views on the topic. Written answers through email or recorded interviews 
would certainly have contained more official and less controversial views on Mercosur and its 
member states. 
Thirdly, by sending the questionnaires by email there was also the risk that some key 
decision-makers contacted, such as ministers and their deputies, would have transferred the 
responsibility for answering the questionnaire to other ministry officials. Although it 
sometimes happened that the ministers who were contacted for interview asked their advisors 
or directors to replace them, a few of these key decision-makers agreed to be interviewed. 
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Fourthly, there was an issue of the language that was to be used in the interview. 
Obviously, all the respondents did not speak English. As the following table shows, the 
interviews were conducted in four different languages, and only 7% of the interviews were in 
English. It would therefore have been necessary to send the questionnaires at least in Spanish 
and Portuguese to make sure all respondents could understand the questionnaire. Through oral 
interviews it was possible to adapt and use the language preferred by the respondent.  
Table 1.1. Language in which the interviews were conducted 
 Language of interviews Percentage 
 Spanish Portuguese English French Total Spanish Portuguese English French Total 
Argentina 26 1 0 0 27 96 4 0 0 100
Brazil 15 25 5 2 47 32 53 11 4 100
Paraguay 27 0 2 0 29 93 0 7 0 100
Uruguay 17 0 2 0 19 89 0 11 0 100
Total 85 26 9 2 122 70 21 7 2 100
 
Fifthly, direct interviews have an essential advantage over survey questionnaires. This 
is that interviews enable more interaction with the respondents, which allows for new ideas to 
spring up during the conversation and for new questions to be asked. Interviews allow the 
questionnaire to be adapted to the respondent, to their past experience in relation to the topic 
and their present responsibilities.  
Finally, interviews enabled excellent contacts to be developed with respondents 
interested in the creation of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. This led to the co-
writing of a publication and to participate in a conference of Mercosur academic specialists. 
Some steps were also taken with an official from a Paraguayan ministry towards designing a 
consultancy project to draw up an official proposal for a Mercosur Regional Development 
Fund, a proposal which would have been discussed within the Mercosur decision-making 
bodies. However, for financial and administrative reasons, this consultancy project had to be 
abandoned. It can be argued that such a relation with the respondents would not have been 
possible through questionnaires sent by email. 
 
These six reasons clearly suggest that direct interviews with respondents were 
preferable to postal questionnaires. Therefore, during the three years of this research, two 
fieldtrips were completed within Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, the Mercosur 
members. In addition, a third trip, only to Paraguay, was undertaken to participate in a 
conference on Mercosur at the invitation of one of the interviewees. Three objectives were set 
before undertaking these fieldtrips. 
A first objective was to access regional Mercosur statistical data and recent literature 
on Mercosur which was not available in Europe or through the internet. Moreover, through 
the interviewees it was possible to have access to some unpublished material, such as internal 
documents. 
A second objective was to get to know some of the people living in Mercosur, their 
way of thinking and their culture, as well as their opinion on their governments, on the 
economic situation and on the Mercosur process of integration. The objective was not to write 
a thesis while ‘locked away in an ivory tower’, but through taking into consideration the 
characteristics of the countries and the views of the people studied within the thesis. It was 
therefore necessary to go to Mercosur and ‘take the pulse’ of its people. 
The third and main objective was to conduct interviews with many key decision-
makers. This enabled the unpublished and unexpressed opinion of people working on 
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Mercosur and development issues to be accounted for. These interviews also provided the 
opportunity for views on the proposal to create a Mercosur Regional Development Fund and 
for the author’s conclusions about this to be challenged. In addition, fieldtrips enabled up-to-
date information on Mercosur to be collected. Indeed, since the Mercosur process of 
integration has evolved very rapidly, information which is available through publications has 
rapidly become rather obsolete.  
This explains why the fieldtrip phase was done in two stages. The first fieldtrip, during 
five months in 2000, was longer than the second trip, which lasted three months in 2001. The 
first trip took longer because the author had no contact with people in decision-making circles 
and it took time to identify the key decision-makers to interview. Moreover, the second 
fieldtrip to Mercosur allowed the thesis to be updated by incorporating the latest information 
on Mercosur. The second trip, undertaken during the 2001 Argentinian economic and political 
crisis, enabled to include the opinion of the interviewees on Mercosur at a time when its 
future did not appear too bright.  
In addition to these two fieldtrips, a third trip to Mercosur was completed in May 
2001. This was to present a paper on the Mercosur Regional Development Fund at a 
conference organised by the Consejo Latino Americano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO – 
Latin American Council on Social Sciences) on Mercosur. Although no interviews were 
conducted with decision-makers at that time, it enabled the testing of some of the conclusions 
of this thesis with Latin American academic researchers who are specialised in studies of 
Mercosur. 
Since Bolivia and Chile are Mercosur associate members which could participate in a 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund, interviews with some key decision-makers in both 
countries were considered at the outset of the study. However, the idea had to be abandoned 
because of a lack of time and of financial resources. Future research should nonetheless 
consider interviewing Bolivian and Chilean decision-makers since their opinion might 
provide new and original perspectives on creating a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. 
During the two fieldtrips, a total of 137 people were interviewed, which represents 
approximately 123 hours of interviews. However, only 122 interviews are taken into account 
in the thesis because the 15 other respondents could devote only little time to the interview. 
While this time was sufficient to exchange some general views on the research topic, there 
was too little time to ask the interviewee the specific questions on which the thesis is based 
(see Appendix A1.2 for the questionnaires). The interviews conducted are presented in Table 
1.2 below according to the country of interviewee and to the fieldtrip. The interviewees are 
then classified according to gender in Table 1.3. More details on the identity of the 
interviewees are given in Appendix A1. However, when reasons of confidentiality apply, 
interviewees are not identified when quoted in the text. 
Table 1.2. Number and duration of interviews made during the two fieldtrips in 
Mercosur countries 
  Fieldtrip 1 Fieldtrip 2 Total
Argentina  N° of persons 9 19 28
 Time* 7:20 15:00 22:20
Brazil N° of persons 21 30 51
 Time* 18:35 29:50 48:25
Paraguay  N° of persons 21 17 38
 Time* 20:35 15:35 36:10
Uruguay N° of persons 6 14 20
 Time* 4:40 11:20 16:00
Total N° of persons 57 80 137
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 Time* 51:10 71:45 122:55
* Time: duration of the interviews in hours : minutes 
 
Table 1.3. Interviewees according to gender 
 N° of interviewees Percentage 
 Male Female Total Male Female Total
Argentina 17 11 28 61 39 100
Brazil 36 15 51 71 29 100
Paraguay 30 8 38 79 21 100
Uruguay  13 7 20 65 35 100
Total 96 41 137 70 30 100
 
With regard to the composition of the interviewees, the issue of a Mercosur Regional 
Development Fund is considered from the point of view of actors and decision-makers with 
different backgrounds. It was consequently decided to interview, in each Mercosur member 
state, people working on Mercosur or development aspects, from different types of 
institutions, and at different hierarchical levels within these institutions. On the one hand, 
ministers and their close advisors were interviewed since they have a broad understanding of 
the issues at stake, are aware of the final objectives of the Mercosur, and are part of the 
Mercosur negotiations. On the other hand, interviewing officials at a lower level of the 
hierarchy introduces the opinion of people working on specific issues on a daily basis. Such 
people are aware of technical details which might be overlooked in the broad picture but 
which might have significant consequences. 
The interviews were conducted within different institutions in order to account for the 
different interests at stake. In each country many interviews were conducted in the institutions 
which are at the heart of the Mercosur process of integration, that is the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Integration 
(whenever this Ministry existed), the Presidencies and the Central Banks. Indeed, for 
example, the executive organ of Mercosur, the Common Market Group, is composed of eight 
representatives which must come from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Economy, and 
from the Central Banks of each member state. 
Moreover, since this thesis focuses on the creation of a development fund, it was 
necessary to interview development specialists working in Ministries related to development 
topics such as infrastructure, energy, education, health, development, and also in the national 
and international organisations based in these Mercosur countries.  
Thirdly, it was decided to interview people who had been conducting research, 
whether for private consultancy agencies or for universities, on Mercosur or on development 
issues in Mercosur.  
Fourthly, economy being at the heart of the Mercosur process of integration and being 
a core aspect of development, private sector representatives, from chambers of commerce or 
from trade unions, were interviewed to obtain their opinion on regional development issues at 
the Mercosur level.  
Fifthly, a few political representatives, that is either deputies or senators, as well as 
their advisors, were interviewed. However, for the time being, their role is still minor at the 
Mercosur level. 
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Finally, a number of people working on Mercosur or development issues in other 
institutions than those mentioned above were interviewed.  
To facilitate comparisons of the opinions of the interviewees, the respondents were 
grouped into ten different categories defined by the nature of their profession or occupation 
and the institution for which they work: 
1. Central Banks; 
2. Research Institutes (both public and private), Universities; 
3. International organisations (e.g. the InterAmerican Development Bank - IDB), 
development banks (e.g. the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
- BNDES), ministries of development; 
4. Economy (e.g. ministries of economy, industry, trade, but also trade unions, chambers 
of commerce); 
5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
6. Infrastructure (e.g. ministries of transportation, energy); 
7. Social (e.g. ministries of education, health); 
8. Representatives (i.e. deputies and senators); 
9. Integration (i.e. ministries of integration); 
10. Others.  
Outline of the thesis 
To test the three hypotheses the research is undertaken in three stages. The first stage 
analyses the nature of regional disparities within Mercosur and discusses whether it is 
possible for its member states to create a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. This would 
complement existing institutions and reduce regional disparities (first hypothesis). The second 
stage proposes a theoretical framework for analysing policy transfers. This forms the basis for 
the analysis of what lessons and under what circumstances the experience of EU regional 
development funds might be transferred to Mercosur (second hypothesis). The third stage 
explores how an efficient regional development fund might be designed for Mercosur (third 
hypothesis). 
The thesis is presented in ten chapters. These are grouped into five parts: the 
introduction, parts which cover the three stages discussed above, and finally the conclusion. 
The first part of the thesis is composed of three chapters. These introduce the research 
topic, define the key concepts, examine the theoretical contributions and present the two 
processes of integration under consideration. This present chapter, Chapter 1, introduces the 
reader to the research topic and the objectives of the thesis. Chapter 2 defines the essential 
terms and concepts related to regional integration which are used in the thesis. Finally, 
Chapter 3, presents the evolution and structure of the two supranational associations analysed 
in the thesis, that is the European Union and the Mercosur. 
The second part of the thesis is composed of Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 analyses 
regional development within Mercosur and describes the relative development gaps which 
exist between the advanced and backward regions of Mercosur. It draws on a statistical 
analysis of socio-economic data to highlight the differences in development across Mercosur. 
This analysis allows, as a conclusion, the drawing up of maps which summarise the relative 
levels of socio-economic development in Mercosur regions.  
Chapter 5 describes in a first section the principal existing development agencies 
operating in Mercosur. It then considers the options open to Mercosur to establish a common 
approach to regional development, which demonstrates the case for the establishment of a 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund which would complement the existing institutions. 
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The third part of the thesis, composed of Chapters 6 and 7, analyses to what extent 
Mercosur can learn from the EU. The first chapter, Chapter 6, presents the policy transfer 
literature and adapts it to account for a prospective policy transfer from the EU to Mercosur. 
The second chapter, Chapter 7, presents an overview of the evolution of regional development 
funds in the EU. It then critically assesses EU experience in order to determine, according to 
the conclusions of Chapter 6, what aspects of EU regional development funds could be 
transferred to Mercosur. 
The fourth part of the thesis, composed of two chapters, explores the characteristics of 
a Mercosur Regional Development Fund, according to the development disparities established 
in Chapter 4; the existing development agencies already operating in Mercosur described in 
Chapter 5; and the lessons which can be learned from the EU as argued in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Chapter 8 explores the priorities for a Mercosur Regional Development Fund, and Chapter 9 
analyses the key characteristics of a MRDF.  
Chapter 10 presents the conclusion. Chapter 10 briefly revisits the three hypotheses, 
indicates the contribution of the thesis to academic knowledge, discusses some of the 
limitations of the research, and suggests directions for future research. 
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Partly as a response to globalisation, which has been characterising the world 
economy for the past few decades, many governments throughout the world have begun a 
formal process of economic integration with some of their neighbours. “Regional integration 
in Latin America has become an important answer to the challenges of the management of 
globalisation as well as the consolidation of the neo-liberal reform trajectory”12. Regional 
integration is a political response to an economic change. When independent states share 
some common characteristics and interests, it is often considered advantageous to form an 
association. This enables countries to acquire more strength to defend their political and 
economic positions within the world economy. Accordingly, the world is being progressively 
divided into a number of large economic regions. Some key examples are the European Union 
(EU), the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). Each of these are organised internally, by establishing common norms and 
institutions to control the gradual integration of the national economies of their region, and 
externally, by defending common positions on the international scene, an example being in 
World Trade Organisation negotiations. 
This chapter aims at presenting the concepts related to regions and supranational 
associations. The first section defines some key related concepts, before the second section 
analyses the different categories of supranational associations.  
DEFINITIONS 
The concept of a ‘region’ is employed at length throughout this thesis which is focused 
on two geographic ‘regions’ of the world. Since this word is very ambiguous and covers 
different concepts in the English language, it is absolutely necessary to define it precisely so 
that the reader will have an understanding of how the term is used in the thesis. There are also 
some concepts which meaning derives from the word ‘region’ and which therefore require a 
precise definition. These are the concepts of ‘regional policy’ and ‘regional association’. 
Region 
What is a ‘region’? 
According to the dictionary, the term ‘region’ refers to a continuous surface of land 
with certain characteristics, whether human or natural. Leaving aside the ‘natural’ 
characteristics, there are two main kinds of regions which are of interest for this thesis.  
A region can first be defined as the unit into which countries are divided for 
administrative or historico-cultural purposes. For various reasons, such as the decentralisation 
of the power of the state or the development of local governance, most governments have 
adopted an administrative division of their country into smaller homogeneous units of 
territory. These ‘regions’ have different denominations depending on the countries in which 
they exist, such as ‘Région’ in France; ‘Land’ in Germany and Austria; ‘Province’ in Belgium 
and the Netherlands; ‘Suuralueet’ in Finland; and ‘State’ in the USA or Brazil.  
Some of these administrative regions have been created on the basis of ancient cultural 
or historical distinctions which existed within the country; that is, people speaking the same 
                                                
12 Phillips Nicola, ‘The future of the Political Economy in Latin America’, in Stubbs Richard and Underhill 
Geoffrey, Political economy and the changing global order, 2nd edition, 2000, Oxford University Press, p.286. 
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dialect, having a similar past and culture. For example, the people of the island of Corsica, 
which is a French region, have a geographical continuity (they live on an island), a similar 
past, as well as a language and a culture of their own. However, this is not always the case 
and it sometimes happens that the administrative division does not take into account these 
historico-cultural aspects. As Temple says: 
“Can a region be defined in terms of some generally acceptable straightforward quantitative 
measure such as population size, income or rates of internal economic activity? The answer 
tends to be negative: the definition of a region remains essentially complex and qualitative in 
many respects, influenced by convention and custom as well as by administrative convenience 
or even – sometimes – economic cohesion”13. 
Since each country has its own background and political culture, the appreciation of 
what constitutes a region differs greatly from one state to the other. There does not exist one 
globally accepted definition of this term. Regions therefore differ considerably when different 
factors are taken into account, such as population, geographical size, the competencies 
ascribed to the regional authorities, or the economic situation. Such dissimilarities exist 
between regions within the same country and in different countries. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, Scotland is the largest in terms of geographical size while the South East is the 
largest when it comes to population. 
However, the term ‘region’ not only refers to these internal units of a country, but also 
to a group of neighbouring countries which have some characteristics in common. This 
characteristic can be natural such as a sea, a mountain, or a desert, which can form natural 
regions, such as the Sub-Saharan region14, or the Mediterranean region15 for example. 
However, these regions will not be considered in this thesis, this because its topic is focused 
on regions sharing common socio-economic characteristics and resulting from a political 
process started through human will. Such regions are created when the governments of 
geographically adjacent nations decide to recognise officially the existence of common 
characteristics and/or objectives among their countries, and set up common means and 
policies to develop this similarity. 
The term ‘region’, thus, can refer at the same time to a sub-national unit (an intra-
national division) as well as to an international entity (a supranational division or group of 
countries). For example, France is part of a supranational ‘region’ (the European Union) but is 
itself composed of 22 ‘regions’16. As a consequence, the world can be divided in regions, 
themselves sub-divided in countries which are composed of internal regions which regroup 
local areas. This can be schematised in two different ways, as shown in Figure 2.1: 
Figure 2.1. Two representations of the division of the world into regions and countries17 
World 
Region Region 
Country Country Country 
Region Region Region Region Region Region 
Local Local Local Local Local Local Local Local Local Local Local Local 
 
                                                
13 Marion Temple, Regional Economics, 1994, St Martin's Press, New York, p.5. 
14 A region of Africa composed of the countries which are situated on the southern limit of the Sahara desert. 
15 A region composed of all the countries having a maritime border on the Mediterranean sea, whether they are 
European, African or Middle-Eastern countries. 
16 The French territory is divided in 22 ‘Régions’, which are themselves divided in 100 ‘Départements’.  
17 These figures were created by the author to illustrate the different meanings of the term ‘region’. 
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In order to avoid any kind of confusion, it is necessary to use an adjective to help 
make the distinction. The administrative divisions of a country can be called ‘administrative 
regions’ or ‘internal regions’ whereas the international groupings of countries can be 
characterised as ‘supranational regions’.  
Regions in statistics 
Much of the research in this thesis is based on the comparison of the social and 
economic statistics of different regions, both internal and supranational, in order to show the 
differences that exist between these. It is therefore necessary to have good statistical 
instruments as well as precise definitions of the territory, or region, that are covered by the 
statistics given. 
At the European Union level, although there are a few problems and conflicts over 
some definitions, the matter is largely settled. Following negotiations with the European 
Office for Statistics (Eurostat) all members have adopted a common set of rules to divide the 
territory into a Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units (NUTS). Accordingly, each 
country is divided into different statistical regions, each of them being sub-divided again. 
The largest territorial unit is called ‘level 0’ and covers each member state. Composed 
of 15 member states, the EU is thus divided into 15 NUTS 0. Each country is divided further 
into NUTS 1 regions, which correspond to their largest administrative regions, ‘Land’ in 
Germany, or ‘Standard Region’ in the UK. NUTS 2 areas are smaller territorial units such as 
`Regierungsbezirke' in Germany. Although in theory the classification goes down to NUTS 
level 5, in general level 3, ‘Kreise’ in Germany or ‘County’ in the UK, is the smallest 
territorial unit for which data is published. Small countries are different. For example, 
whereas the whole territory of Ireland is considered as a NUTS 2 region, Luxembourg 
appears at all NUTS levels. The economic territory of the European Union is subdivided into 
77 regions at NUTS 1 level, 206 regions at NUTS 2 level and 1031 NUTS 3 regions. 
This division into NUTS has been widely used since 1988 not only for statistical 
reasons, but also within Community legislation. For example, as will be shown later in 
Chapter 7, some EU regulations concern specifically NUTS 2 or NUTS 3 regions. 
The matter is much more complex when it comes to Mercosur countries since there are 
statistical problems at two levels. Firstly, the Mercosur states have a rather limited statistical 
knowledge at the level of their internal regions. There are very few statistics available, 
whether in the economic or social field, when it comes to their internal regions. For example, 
at an interview with a respondent at the Paraguayan Central Bank who was asked about the 
existence of regional statistics within Paraguay, it was made clear that these were non-existent 
and that they would have to be constructed. 
Region 
State 
R 
R
R
L L 
L L 
Region 
Region 
State 
State 
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Another problem which Mercosur member states face is that, like the European 
Community at an earlier stage, their statistics have not yet been harmonised. Each country has 
its own methods of calculating statistics and definitions of the terms, which renders any type 
of comparison difficult, if not impossible. Argentina and Brazil have begun to solve this 
problem, with the help of Eurostat, by harmonising macroeconomic statistical methods. The 
aim was to publish a comparative statistical study by the end of 2001, but the deadlines were 
not met. The process will later be completed with Paraguay and Uruguay joining in the 
exercise. This is a very significant step since without common statistical tools it is impossible 
to assess effectively the situation of the countries and their administrative regions, an essential 
requirement to be able to implement socio-economic policies to effectively help the most 
backward areas. 
Regional policy  
Having defined the term of region, it is now possible to focus on a derived concept, 
that of regional policy. The concept of regional policy is so deeply interrelated with that of 
regional development that both terms are generally used interchangeably. It is first necessary 
to precisely define regional policy, before the rationale underlying its implementation is 
discussed. Finally, it is of importance to highlight the difference between the concepts of 
regional development and that of sustainable development. 
Defining regional policy  
Within the existing literature on regional policy it is possible to encounter six different 
definitions of this concept. These highlight some common characteristics which can then be 
used to draw a consensual definition of what is a regional policy.  
1. OECD, 1977: “The ultimate objective of regional policy is to reverse the cumulative 
decline of the depressed areas by creating a rate of economic growth sufficient to secure 
full employment and which can be sustained in the long run without continued resort to 
regional policies”18. 
2. Molle et al, 1980: “It is the presumption of most if not all regional policies that well-being 
can be increased by decreasing the disparity between regions”19. 
3. Hansen et al, 1990: “Regional policy constitutes any and all conscious and deliberate 
actions on the part of government to alter the spatial distribution of economic and social 
phenomena, including population, income, government revenues, production of various 
goods and services, transport facilities, other social infrastructure, and even political 
power”20. 
4. Temple, 1994: “The aim of regional policy is the attainment of a more efficient and/or 
equitable interregional distribution of economic activity”21. 
5. Moussis, 1994: “The notion of regional development, aiming at the creation, maintenance 
and management of localisation conditions for economic activities, is a post-war concept. 
It stems from the observation that, contrary to given natural factors such as climate, 
geography and mineral resources, economic conditions for localisation can be influenced 
by a deliberate policy undertaken by official authorities. […] The main objective of 
Community regional policy is the reduction of existing regional disparities and the 
prevention of further regional imbalances by transferring Community resources to problem 
regions”22. 
                                                
18 OECD, Report on methods of measuring the effects of regional policies, 1977, OECD, p.16. 
19 Molle Willem, Van Holst Bas, Smit Hans, Regional disparity and economic development in the European 
Community, 1980, Saxon House, Westmead, p.70. 
20 Hansen Niles, Higgins Benjamin, Savoie Donald J., Regional policy in a changing world, 1990, Plenum Press, 
New York, p.2. 
21 Temple Marion, Regional Economics, 1994, St Martin's Press, New York, p.225. 
22 Moussis Nicholas, Handbook of European Union, 1994, Edit-eur, Rixensart (Belgium), p.99. 
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6. Vanhove, 1999: “Regional economic policy or regional planning includes all forms of 
public intervention intended to ameliorate the geographical distribution of economic 
activities; in reality regional policies try to correct certain spatial consequences of the free 
market economy in order to achieve two interrelated objectives: economic growth and 
improved social distribution”23. 
Referring to these six definitions, there seems to be a number of common 
characteristics between their opinions on what is a regional policy: 
1. It reduces regional disparities (Molle et al, Moussis) 
2. It alters spatial distribution (Hansen et al, Temple, Moussis, Vanhove) 
3. It assists the economic development of the less prosperous regions (OECD, Temple, 
Moussis, Vanhove) 
4. It assists the social development of the less prosperous regions (Hansen et al, 
Vanhove) 
5. It is a direct and deliberate policy (Hansen et al, Moussis)  
6. It is adopted by public authorities (Hansen et al, Moussis, Vanhove) 
These six common characteristics can be combined to draw a consensual definition of 
a regional policy. A policy implemented by public authorities can thus be considered as 
regional if it deliberately and willingly aims to alter the spatial distribution of socio-economic 
factors to reduce regional disparities24 by promoting the economic and social development of 
the less prosperous regions of an area. 
The rationale for implementing regional policies 
Since this thesis is about the adoption of policies to promote the regional development 
of less prosperous areas in the EU and in Mercosur, it is worth searching the existing 
literature to find the reasons for which a public authority, whether a state or a supranational 
body, would wish to adopt such regional policies.  
According to Martin, there are four reasons for which a government would decide to 
adopt regional policies:  
1. “Flattening ‘unjust’ spatial income distributions (equity or fairness argument). 
2. Easing adjustment problems for economies undergoing major transformations or economic 
shocks. 
3. Welfare increases due to the activation of previously unused factors of production. 
4. Optimising the spatial allocation of production (for example, by internalising external 
agglomeration effects).  
[…] Summing up, it is very difficult to find clear economic rationales in favour of regional 
policy. Equity arguments for regional policy are certainly more powerful than efficiency 
arguments”25.  
                                                
23 Vanhove Norbert, Regional Policy: A European approach, 1999, Ashgate, Aldershot (UK), p.57. 
24 The thesis uses the term regional ‘disparities’ and not ‘inequalities’, ‘discrepancies’, ‘imbalances’, or 
‘disequilibria’ because it shares the view of Molle et al: “The latter two words [imbalances and disequilibria] 
refer to the state of a dynamic system and suggest that such a system could be inherently unstable. The structural 
and dynamic view which both words imply seems at odds with the objective of this study, which is to describe 
analytically the situation actually existing at some points in time, and its development through time, without 
going into the causes of either or into the implications for the regional system. The more static notions of 
‘inequality’, ‘discrepancy’ and ‘disparity’ suit that objective better; of these we discard ‘inequality’ because of 
its moral overtones; of the other two we prefer the word ‘disparity’ because it is the one most commonly used” 
(Molle Willem, Van Holst Bas, Smit Hans, Regional disparity and economic development in the European 
Community, 1980, Saxon House, Westmead, p.69). 
25 Martin Reiner, The regional dimension in European public policy: convergence or divergence?, 1999, 
MacMillan Press Ltd, London, p.71. 
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The same Martin, in another publication, highlights four reasons for which the EU 
would adopt regional policies at the supranational level:  
1. “The ‘financial targeting’ argument: because poor member states are unable to target their 
regional problems themselves, the EU has to provide the necessary resources. 
2. The ‘vested interest’ argument: the solution to regional problems in one member state will 
also be beneficial for other member states. 
3. The ‘effects of integration’ argument: because the benefits of integration are not evenly 
spread across the EU, a redistribution mechanism is required.  
4. The ‘effects of other EU policies’ argument: since the regional benefits of other policies 
such as the Common Agricultural Policy are not spread evenly, the relative losers should 
be compensated by means of EU regional policy”26. 
Referring to a 1981 publication of Molle and Cappelin, Vanhove distinguishes three 
different rationales in adopting regional policies at the EU level:  
1. “The ‘compensational or neo-classical approach’ suggests that regional policy is primarily 
motivated by the need to compensate a member state for the disadvantages of membership.  
2. The rationale of the ‘redistributive approach’ is that of achieving a more equal distribution 
of resources through growth from which all parties will benefit.  
3. The third approach to regional policy is the ‘endogenous-growth policy approach’ […] the 
disparities in income or unemployment are not the main indicators of a ‘problem region’ 
but the ‘unbalanced’ use of local resources in the various regions”27. 
The ultimate goal of EU regional policies is therefore to assist the convergence of 
levels of socio-economic development among the EU regions, in order to have a stable and 
harmonised Union. In this, the thesis agrees with Temple that “active regional policy 
measures designed to draw their economies towards economic convergence are an essential 
prerequisite if the long-term goal of a community with a unified economy and single currency 
is to be attainable”28. 
Considering these different reasons for which regional policies could be adopted, 
Delors, as President of the European Commission, defined three types of regional policies29: 
1. ‘Neo-classical’ regional policies. These are designed to compensate for institutional 
rigidities which limit the mobility of factors of production. They can for example consist 
of regional employment premiums or investment grants. 
2. ‘Keynesian’ or ‘demand-side’ regional policies. They are designed to sustain income and 
demand, such as budget equalisation transfer systems. 
3. ‘Decentralised supply-side’ regional policies. This third type of regional policies aims at 
improving the resource base of the region through subsidised investments in physical 
infrastructure and human capital, but also through incentives to encourage local initiative, 
such as business centres or incubator houses.  
Differentiating regional development from sustainable development 
To end this sub-section on regional policy, a brief consideration should be made to 
highlight that the thesis does not focus on ‘sustainable development’ issues in Mercosur but 
on ‘regional development’. Although both concepts are deeply related, they are dissimilar and 
imply different perspectives. The objective of regional policy, as argued above, is to reduce 
existing regional disparities and prevent new regional disparities. Such a goal might be 
                                                
26 Martin Reiner, Regional policy in the European Union, 1999, Centre for European Policy Studies, England, 
p.76. 
27 Vanhove Norbert, Regional Policy: A European approach, 1999, Ashgate, Aldershot (UK), p.439. 
28 Temple Marion, Regional Economics, 1994, St Martin's Press, New York, p.245. 
29 Quoted in Vanhove Norbert, Regional Policy: A European approach, 1999, Ashgate, Aldershot, p.344. 
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achieved through different means, one of them being to assist the sustainable development of 
less prosperous regions. As highlighted by Roberts, sustainable development is but one of the 
tasks of regional policy: 
“Taken together, the three principles of sustainable development, subsidiarity and spatial 
integration define the tasks for regional planning, and offer a style that will endure. Taking 
each in turn: 
Sustainable development addresses the questions of economic, social and environmental 
exclusion, both within the present generation and in the future. 
Subsidiarity answers the question of democratic exclusion and empowers the stateless nations 
and regions of Europe. 
Spatial integration addresses the question of spatial exclusion that threatens both the well-being 
of remoter regions and the harmonious development of the European Union itself”.30 
Regional associations 
Being a significant term in relation to the research of this thesis, ‘regional association’ 
also has to be defined. Its precise definition is made even more necessary by the fact that, 
originally, it was a very vague and general term. However, since this term is very useful for 
this research, it is necessary to specify its meaning. 
The ‘classic’, and generally accepted definition of a regional association is the 
gathering of the countries of a supranational region into a formal framework to achieve some 
common objectives. Since these associations refer to supranational regions and not 
administrative regions, this thesis will use the term ‘supranational association’ instead of 
‘regional association’. This will ensure that there is no possible confusion in the mind of the 
reader between supranational associations and the type of associations working at the 
‘administrative region’ level.  
According to this definition, a considerable number of bodies could be considered as 
being supranational associations, such as scientific or cultural organisations, or even the 
United Nations Organisation if the world were to be considered as one large region.  
This ‘classic’ definition of a supranational association, as such, is not particularly 
useful because it is far too general and vague. For this reason, a few restrictions need to be 
added in order to make it more precise and employable throughout the thesis. 
The term supranational association is therefore used in this thesis to designate a group 
of countries which have a geographical proximity and which decide through a process of 
regional economic integration to share some common rules, and sometimes common 
institutions, with the principal aim of achieving economic goals. This definition of 
supranational associations, however, does not exclude associations which have many and 
diversified objectives, be they social, cultural, educational, military, health, or political, as 
long as these are secondary compared to the economic aims. 
This definition means that the expression of supranational association is sufficiently 
precise to ensure a common and similar understanding of that term. It does not include all 
kinds of associations or regional groupings which exist in the world, but is still general 
enough to encompass all the initiatives of regional economic integration which have been 
taking place over the last few decades.  
                                                
30 Roberts Peter, Strategies for the stateless nation: sustainable policies for the regions in Europe, Regional 
Studies vol. 31.9, Regional Studies Association, 1997, Regional Studies Association, England, p. 881. 
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Having defined some of the concepts based on the word ‘region’ which are being used 
at length hereafter, the thesis now turns in the next section to consider the different categories 
of supranational associations. 
THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF SUPRANATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
In a thesis focusing on supranational associations it is necessary to describe the 
different types of supranational association and the forms of institutions which are based on it 
and which have been, or could be, created by countries.  
Before a process of regional integration begins, the future member countries are 
sovereign and independent nations. They may, however, have economic cooperation 
agreements with their future partners. But the responsibility of conducting the business of the 
nation lies within the realm of each government. As governments begin a process of 
economic integration, these countries gradually lose part of their sovereignty. This 
sovereignty is transferred to common institutions and is dependent on the agreement of other 
members, although it still formally belongs to each country. 
According to the general trends existing in the literature discussed in this section31, 
governments which decide to begin a process of economic integration have a choice between 
four different levels of integration, each one representing a step towards deeper integration. 
The first stage is the creation of a free trade area. The next step involves the establishment of 
a customs union, which might be followed in a third stage by a common market. The final 
level of economic integration is considered to be an economic union. 
It is possible to add to these four stages of integration a fifth stage which is generally 
overlooked in most of the literature. This level is different for two reasons. First, unlike the 
other four, it is so far a theoretical stage since no supranational association has ever attained 
such a level of integration. Secondly, this stage implies a stronger and deeper political 
integration on top of economic integration. This fifth level of integration is what will be called 
here the federal union. 
It can be seen that, while governments might aim for one of the more integrated levels, 
in practice they go through the consecutive stages and integrate progressively. This is 
necessary since there are a considerable number of reforms to undertake. To seek a higher 
level might prolong the process since it takes time for all countries to agree on all necessary 
aspects of legislation governing integration.  
These five levels of integration are described separately. In each case, they are defined 
and characterised, and the implications they have for the member states are highlighted. 
Free trade area  
In its document entitled Regional integration and developing countries, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  (OECD) characterises the free 
trade area by the “removal of barriers to trade in goods and services between partner 
countries”32. Two kinds of obstacles exist between countries and must disappear in order to 
achieve a free trade area.  
                                                
31 See principally: De Almeida-Medeiros M., O Mercosul no limiar do século XXI, 2000, CLACSO and 
CORTEZ, Sao Paulo, p.45.  
Molle W., The economics of European integration, 1994, Dartmouth, Aldershot. 
OECD, Regional Integration and Developing Countries, 1993, OECD, Paris, p.22. 
32 OECD, Regional Integration and Developing Countries, 1993, OECD, Paris, p.22. 
 24
The first – and most obvious – obstacle is the tariffs set up by a country on imported 
products, resulting in an increase in the price at which these goods are sold on the national 
market. This is often used as a tool by governments to protect their national industries from 
international competition since home produced goods can be sold on the market at lower 
prices than the imported counterparts. Very high tariffs were often established in Latin 
American countries in the decades following the Second World War because of their import 
substitution model of development. This model involves setting up high tariffs on most goods 
in order to help the development of national industries to give them the time to adapt to 
international competition before gradually opening borders to outside goods. 
The second kind of barrier which a government can create to protect its national 
industries, and which must disappear in a free trade area, are the non-tariff barriers. These 
barriers are “whatever administrative, financial, or any other kind of means by which a 
signatory country unilaterally decides to block or make difficult trade with other countries”33. 
They are thus very various and can be, for example, technical norms (which a product should 
comply with before it can be sold on the market), sanitary norms for agricultural goods, or 
administrative procedures which could impede free trade. 
 The objective of a free trade area is, by eliminating these two kinds of barriers, to 
facilitate the exchange of goods and services between its member countries. This offers a 
number of benefits for the members of such an area, such as an increase in production, a 
reduction of prices, an increase in investment, and more political weight. 
 A first advantage is an increase in production. Since there are no obstacles between the 
different markets, the consequence is the creation of a larger market and a boost to demand. 
Moreover, as explained by the theory of comparative advantage, first formulated by Ricardo 
in the early nineteenth century34, each economy will start to specialise production in the fields 
at which it is best. Each economy will import from its partners the goods it cannot efficiently 
produce. In a free trade area there are no extra costs for the importation of these goods. The 
specialisation promotes technological progress and innovation, which in turn increases overall 
production.  
 A second benefit is the reduction of prices, which leads to an improvement of the 
living standard of the population. The decrease in prices is due to scale-economies and the 
lowering of the unit-cost of production attendant on the increase in production. Moreover, 
according to the law of supply and demand, an increase in production theoretically implies a 
reduction of prices, at least in the short term. In the long term, however, according to the 
theory developed by Say35, an increase in demand leads to a rise in price, back to the previous 
level; it is not the price but the quantity of goods produced which is affected. 
 A third advantage is the attraction of investment to these economies; companies 
knowing that they will have access to a wide and secured market will more readily invest. 
This is true for investment of national origin as well as for foreign direct investment (FDI). 
 Finally, although a free trade area may be an economic creation, there are also political 
benefits for the member countries. A free trade area will enable a group of countries to have 
more weight on the international scene since they will adopt a common position. An example 
of this was the EU during the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. 
There is also often some political capital which can be gained by member governments 
amongst their own population through establishing a free trade area. In a time of economic 
                                                
33 Personal translation from a text found in 2001 on the webpage of the Uruguyan site of the Comisión Sectorial 
para el Mercosur on: http://www.comisec.gob.uy/mercosur/español/htm/wmerco.htm. 
34 D. Ricardo, On the principles of political economy and taxation, 1817, London. 
35 This theory is encountered in J. B. Say’s Traité d’économie politique, 1803, Horace Say, Paris. 
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crisis it shows that the governments are concerned about the economic situation and that they 
are taking action to improve it. As Peña points out, “[t]his is the source of Mercosur’s mass 
appeal: sub-regional integration is synonymous with change and the future”36. 
 Apart from the important and sometimes insurmountable problem of the loss of 
sovereignty for member states, a free trade area has two negative aspects. Firstly, because of 
the elimination of tariffs on intra-regional trade, there is an automatic reduction of state 
revenue. It follows that, if governments want to continue to provide social services, they 
either have to raise revenue through indirect taxes (such as Value Added Tax - VAT), this 
coming from increased production, or they will have to raise the level of direct taxation. 
 A further disadvantage is described by Viner in his seminal work The customs union 
issue as “trade-diversion”37. Taking a global perspective, Viner considers that the creation of a 
free trade area does not always have positive effects on trade. While the expansion of trade 
might occur, which would be beneficial since there would be an increase of global welfare, 
there might also occur what he calls “trade-diversion”. This means that there is no overall 
increase in trade, the only evolution is a change of trade flows. To illustrate this case of 
“trade-diversion”, a model can be considered with three national economies A, B and C, and a 
good called ‘x’. A and C produce the good x. B imports x from C. If A and B create a free 
trade area, both will benefit from it since B will import x from A, the good being cheaper 
because there are no tariffs on the goods. For A, this signifies an increased production of x 
through a larger market, and therefore reduced unit costs. But in such a case there is no trade 
creation. This situation has advantages on a regional basis (for A and B), and a loss for C, but 
there will be no gains from a global point of view38; it is a zero-sum game. 
 The creation of a free trade area is the first step towards integration. Usually, this step 
does not necessitate the creation of any particular common institutions with any specific 
competencies. The general decisions made for the benefit of the free trade area can be adopted 
through inter-governmental negotiations. It is then the responsibility of each country, through 
its national legislation, to eliminate the barriers that exist in relation to the trade with its 
partners. However, most free trade areas have a minimal institutional structure, at least to 
afford an official representation to their members, to facilitate the flows of information 
between the countries, and to ensure that each government is doing what it should. The 
institution need not necessarily have the means to coerce a member state into adopting 
policies, but could be able to inform the other members so they can act accordingly, 
especially when one state transgresses the rules of the free trade area. 
Customs union  
 The customs union is the second level of integration. Writers such as Willem Molle39 
consider it appropriate to establish a distinction between two sub-levels, the incomplete 
customs union and the complete customs union40. This distinction does not seem too useful. 
Since all customs union have the same objectives, and sometimes the same policies, they can 
be considered as a single group.  
 This second level of integration is built on the first level. In simple terms, a customs 
union can be defined as “a free trade area plus the application by each partner country of a 
                                                
36 Felix Peña in Prospects for the processes of sub-regional integration in Central and South America, 1992, 
Publisher unknown, Madrid, p.98. 
37 Viner J., The customs union issue, 1950, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York. 
38 This is a personal example describing schematically the concept of trade-diversion as presented by Viner. 
39 Molle W., The economics of European integration, 1994, Dartmouth, Aldershot. 
40 De Almeida-Medeiros M., O Mercosul no limiar do século XXI, 2000, CLACSO and CORTEZ, Sao Paulo, 
p.45. 
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common external tariff against all third countries”41. Creating a common external tariff means 
that the governments of the member countries of the union decide to adopt the same tariffs for 
each good, tariffs which become generally lower than those the member countries had before 
the creation of the union.  
 Countries which create a free trade area often decide to proceed to this second level of 
integration for two reasons. First, this is because it stops the by-passing of tariffs and laws 
which might happen within a free trade area. To explain this case, it is useful to consider a 
country A where a company needs to import a good for production, the cost of which is 
increased by the tariffs imposed by A. A free trade area is set up between country A and 
country B. If the tariffs set up by B for that good are lower than A's, the company will import 
the good through B, paying the lowest tariff, and then move the good from B to A without 
paying anything extra due to the free trade area. Becoming a customs union and adopting a 
common external tariff, A and B will impose the same tariffs, and the company will have to 
pay them. 
The second incentive for creating a customs union instead of keeping a free trade area 
lies within the logic of economic integration. One of the reasons for integration is to liberalise 
trade between the members of the supranational association. It is commonly believed that 
liberalisation is the best approach to secure economic development. The adoption of a 
common external tariff provides the member states with external encouragement to adopt 
tariffs lower than those applied before and signifies a step towards liberalisation. 
 When moving from a free trade area to a customs union, it is clear that members give 
away some of their sovereignty since they lose control on the fixing of tariffs. The creation of 
common institutions often appears more necessary at this stage of integration. These do not 
have to be all powerful, but need to have the role of facilitating inter-governmental 
negotiations and helping to harmonise policies between the different member states. 
Common market  
 The third level of integration, based on the preceding one, is the common market. 
Similarly to a customs union, Willem Molle42 creates a distinction which does not seem 
necessary; that of a complete and an incomplete common market. So far, very few regional 
integration processes have reached this level of integration, the European Union being the 
most accomplished one. 
 A common market can be defined as a stage which “extends upon the coverage of a 
customs union to include the liberalisation of factor movements within the market”43. This 
definition implies the liberalisation of all factors of production such as labour, technology and 
capital. Member states must eliminate all barriers which exist on the movement of these 
factors, in order to promote their liberalisation at an intra-regional level. Such barriers are 
often of a legislative nature and tend to be protective. For example, a government will not be 
able to have discriminatory laws in order to favour its national labour force compared with 
that of its partners. 
 There are many factors which tilt the balance in favour of creating a common market 
over a customs union. This third stage of integration entails a greater liberalisation, which it 
can be argued encourages intra-regional competition and offers competitive advantage on 
international markets. The free movement of labour results in a better division of the labour 
force and facilitates the spread of knowledge, experience and technical know-how throughout 
                                                
41 OECD, Regional Integration and Developing Countries, 1993, OECD, Paris, p.22. 
42 Molle W., The economics of European integration, 1994, Dartmouth, Aldershot. 
43 OECD, Regional Integration and Developing Countries, 1993, OECD, Paris, p.23. 
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the region. Free movement of capital is beneficial for the economy since it permits easier 
investment within the common market. 
 Such a level of integration being reached, it becomes essential for the member states to 
constitute a common institutional body. There is indeed a need for ensuring the follow-up of 
adopted decisions and to guarantee the application of common norms in all the member states. 
Only independent institutions would have the capacity to play such a role. Inter-governmental 
bodies, which are often non-permanent, would not be able to deal with all the fields of 
competence which would come under the jurisdiction of such bodies. 
Economic union 
The economic union is the fourth and most advanced stage of economic integration. It 
differs from a common market in the fact that member states would decide to harmonise 
economic policies. With the gradual establishment of an Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), the European Union is the only example of a process of regional integration well 
engaged on this path.  
 There is no economic difference between a common market and an economic union; it 
is more a political evolution. For this reason, some authors consider that both stages 
correspond to the same level of integration and do not differentiate between them. “[I]n 
practice, the distinction between a common market and an economic union is economically 
unimportant since the mobility of factors in the former creates de facto harmonisation 
pressures which are called for in the latter. […] both terms are used interchangeably”44. In 
spite of this opinion it appears necessary that a distinction should be maintained since the 
political step which has to be taken by the member states which recognise de jure their 
legislative and political harmonisation cannot be considered negligible. 
At this level of integration, the member states need to have a strong institutional body 
with extended competencies. Such institutions are responsible for guaranteeing the process of 
integration and, mostly, must have the power to impose regulations, or at least guidelines in 
their fields of competence to fully harmonise the different national legislations. 
Federal union 
 On top of these four levels generally recognised as stages of integration, a fifth can be 
added. It is purely theoretical since no countries are engaged in this process so far. This level, 
which implies political integration on top of economic integration, could be called a 
“complete union”45. By analogy to existing federal states, which it would resemble partially 
(although existing federations started from a different approach), it seems more appropriate to 
describe this stage as a ‘federal union’.  
 At this level, the different members give away to some common institutions a large 
part of their sovereignty, not only on economic matters but also on political matters, for 
example on foreign policy and defence. Member states would still have some autonomy in 
most matters but would always be limited by the common institutions, in the same way as a 
federal state is limited by national or regional institutions. 
When taking into consideration the high degree of sovereignty that such a federal 
union represents, as well as the difficulty with which states consent to the loss of each parcel 
of sovereignty, it seems that this level of integration might remain theoretical for some time, 
although it might not be for ever. 
                                                
44 OECD, Regional Integration and Developing Countries, 1993, OECD, Paris, p.23. 
45 This is the term used by W. Molle, The economics of European integration, 1994, Dartmouth, Aldershot. 
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This second section has described the theoretical and practical differences which exist 
between the five levels of economic and political integration. As states evolve towards a 
greater integration, they arguably pass from one level to the next one. In most cases of 
regional integration, governments try to first complete one level before proceeding to the next 
one. As such, regional integration can be equated to building a house: it is necessary to start 
from the first level and to complete each step in order to have a stable and solid foundation on 
which to construct the next levels. 
* 
* * 
This second chapter of the thesis has introduced some of the key concepts related to 
regions and supranational associations. The following chapter continues by introducing the 
reader to the two supranational associations studied within the thesis. Chapter 3 explains the 
reasons underlying the choice of the European Union and of Mercosur and then briefly 
describes the evolution, the objectives and the institutional structures of the process of 
integration in each locality. 
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CHAPTER  3..   THE  SUPRANATII ONAL  ASSOCII ATII ONS::   
THE  EU  AND  MERCOSUR  
 
Having defined the key concepts related to regional integration, it is necessary to 
conclude the thesis’ first part by introducing the two supranational associations studied. A 
first section below describes the reasons why the EU and Mercosur were selected for study. 
Two further sections are dedicated to each of these supranational associations and describe the 
general evolution and the institutional structure of the EU and of Mercosur. It should be noted 
that these are general descriptions of the EU and Mercosur, and that the more specific issues 
around the experience of EU regional development funds are discussed in Chapter 7. 
THE RATIONALE FOR CHOOSING THE EU AND MERCOSUR 
By studying policy transfers between supranational associations, the thesis analyses 
the extent to which an embryonic supranational association can learn from the regional 
development experience of a more integrated supranational association. Before the research 
can begin, it is necessary to explain the rationale which underlies the selection of the 
European Union and Mercosur as the two supranational associations to be studied. This first 
section explores this issue before it moves on to look at both the EU and Mercosur in greater 
detail. 
The choice of the European Union as the example of the more integrated supranational 
association to be looked at in this study was easy to make. The EU is one of the oldest and, so 
far, the furthest developed in the process of regional integration in the world. Indeed, 
compared with other supranational associations, the EU has had a relatively long history of 
integration and has gained much experience in diverse fields of common policies. Since the 
EU has been implementing regional development funds for the past few decades, an historical 
perspective can be taken in the analysis and assessment of these funds. Moreover, this 
regional development experience having been thoroughly researched and documented, a 
sufficient quantity of material is available about these activities.  
While discussing the development of regional policies in Russia, Artobolevskiy 
highlighted different  reasons because of which he considered that “western regional policy” 
could be an example. Among these reasons, two can clearly read across and support the use of 
the EU as an example for Mercosur: 
“[I]n the course of the operation of regional policy over 60 years, virtually every possible 
problem and type of territory has been encountered. The regional problems in Russia are not 
fundamentally new and unique, and western counterparts can easily be found for the majority 
of them (although clearly not all). […] 
[A] range of ‘success stories’ can be included on the ‘credit side’ of western regional policy: 
the decentralisation of the largest agglomerations; the development of new towns and other 
growth poles; the economic growth in a number of depressed areas. Even the failures of 
regional policy – such as the development of certain depressed and underdeveloped territories 
– are of great practical interest. The underlying reasons for the failure can be established, or an 
understanding can be gained from the impossibility of economic growth in certain types of 
territory even despite the provision of state assistance.”46  
 
                                                
46 Artobolevskiy Sergey, Regional policy in Europe, 1997, Regional Policy and Development n°11, Regional 
Studies Association, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London, p.144. 
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The choice of the second, less integrated, supranational association was more difficult 
to make since there are more eligible candidates. Two main criteria were considered when 
defining which supranational association should be studied. Firstly, such an association 
needed to have been created recently so as to be in the first stages of its process of integration. 
Had it been another highly integrated supranational association, much experience would 
already have been accumulated. There would therefore be less value in exploring the benefit 
to be derived from the experience of learning from another supranational association. 
The second criterion to take into account was that this supranational association, in 
spite of its youth, had to be pursuing a process of integration. A regional development fund 
(RDF) cannot be adopted by all types of supranational association since there needs to be a 
minimal common institutional structure with enough power to set up regional policies. A 
supranational association pursuing a process of integration which only aims to create a free 
trade area – such as the North Atlantic Free Trade Area for example – had to be discarded.  
The Common Market of the South, the Mercado Común del Sur – Mercosur, perfectly 
matched these two criteria. Created in 1991, it is still in the early stages of integration. 
However, as its name suggests, it aims to create a common market. So far, and in spite of the 
recent crises, this supranational association seems successful, at least compared with the 
previous initiatives which have been adopted by Latin American countries over the past five 
decades. As this process of integration proceeds, the need for a RDF might become necessary 
in this part of the world where economic disparities are more considerable than in the 
European Union. Since Mercosur countries are inexperienced in this field, it might be 
advisable for these countries to consider the funds which have already been established by 
other supranational associations. They will be able to learn from this past experience. 
Mercosur corresponds to these two essential criteria. However, it also offers an 
advantage for this research in the differences it has vis-à-vis the EU. Indeed, the EU can be 
characterised as a large supranational association of fifteen industrialised members, at present, 
whereas Mercosur is only composed of four members and two associated countries, all of 
them emerging economies. Moreover, whereas the EU possesses institutional structures which 
are competent in a number of fields at adopting common policies which are automatically 
implemented in member countries, the Mercosur institutions are for the time being very light 
and have no autonomous decision-making procedures. All its policies are decided during 
inter-ministerial meetings and are applied by each state according to its own national rules. 
As will be shown in the policy transfer framework developed in Chapter 6, these 
dissimilarities have to be taken into account because they might render the adoption, even 
after adaptation, of the EU experience of regional development funds to Mercosur more 
difficult. However, these differences also give a broader scope to the use of the results of this 
research. If they highlight certain RDF characteristics which can be applied in Mercosur as 
well as in the EU, although a few modifications might have to be made, they might also be 
suitable for adoption by other supranational associations. 
A final reason for choosing these two supranational associations is the fact that, since 
the creation of Mercosur in 1991, its members have often been inspired by the previous 
experience of the EU. The latter has also supported Mercosur institutions by sharing its know-
how on diverse problems in relation to integration. For example, on the 29th of May 1992 
representatives from the Commission of the EU and the Mercosur Council signed an Inter-
institutional Cooperation Agreement, providing for the creation of a Joint Advisory 
Committee to set up ways for the EU to share its knowledge on integration through training 
and technical assistance. This support is also financial. The following year, on the 30th of July 
1993, the European Commission decided to give Mercosur 3.95 million ECU to provide for 
institutional support, training, and information on the importance of regional integration 
procedures.  
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THE EUROPEAN UNION 
This second section aims to present enough information about the European Union to 
give a minimum understanding of its establishment, its institutions, its objectives and its 
instruments47. The EU being so complex it could be, and has been, the topic of a series of 
books. Since the EU itself is not the topic of this thesis, it is only necessary to consider the 
most essential elements that need to be known for a basic understanding of this supranational 
association and its powers.  
The origins of European integration 
The idea of integrating the economies of European countries goes as far back as the 
fourteenth century when Pierre Dubois proposed the creation of an European Confederation. 
This concept reappeared in the seventeenth century with William Penn and at the end of the 
nineteenth with Proudhon. 
However this project had to wait until the post world war two period to become 
reality. At that time there was a spirit of internationalism among the Allies, which led to the 
creation of international organisations such as the United Nations and the International 
Monetary Fund. Moreover, European countries had to cooperate to benefit from the financial 
aid offered by the US in its Marshall aid plan. 
Within this environment, on the 9th of May 1950, the French Foreign Minister Robert 
Schuman made a declaration in which he invited Germany and other European countries to 
form a common market in coal, iron and steel48. The reasons underlying this declaration were 
both political and economic. The aim was to stimulate economic growth through heavy 
industries as well as to tie all the member countries’ output in such a way that that of 
Germany could never be used again to wage a war. In his declaration, Schuman considered 
that this European integration should be progressive and that it might include other areas of 
production and other members. Even though Germany was the principal addressee of this 
speech, Schuman did not fix any frontiers to his idea of an integrated Europe. 
Following this event, on the 18th of April 1951, France, West Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Paris instituting the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The treaty came into force on the 25th of July 1952. The 
UK had been invited to join but refused, mostly because it rejected the idea of transferring 
some of its sovereignty to a  supranational institution.  
This Treaty instituted a supranational administration called the ‘High Authority’. This 
was to control the customs union that had been created for these products. The general 
policies and objectives of the High Authority were defined by a Council of the Community, 
composed of a representative of each member state, and by what can be seen as an embryonic 
European Parliament. There was also an European Court of Justice which was to operate in 
cases of legal problems arising from the implementation of the laws of the Community.  
The High Authority had the power to dictate quotas on national output to regulate 
production and to establish a range of prices; it also had to guarantee competition in these 
products was free. On top of this role, it adopted two types of policies to alleviate the 
                                                
47 Details about the evolution of the EU, described in the second section of Chapter 3, can be encountered in 
most publications related to the EU. For example: 
Archer C., Butler F., The European Community, Structure and Process, 1992, Pinter Publishers, London, p.200. 
Molle Willem, The economics of European integration, 1990, Dartmouth, Aldershot, p.547. 
Moussis Nicholas, Access to European Union law, economy and policies, 9th edition, 1999, European Study 
Service, Rixensart (Belgium), p.584. 
48 The full text of the declaration can be encountered on www.europa.eu.int. It was downloaded in 2000. 
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unemployment caused by the closure of mines: re-adaptation (training and re-housing of 
redundant workers) and re-conversion (encouraging investment and the creation of new 
industries in mining area). Between 1954 and 1965, US$98 million were spent on the re-
adaptation of 315,000 workers, while funds for re-conversion summed to US$104 million 
between 1961 and 196749. These payments were generally matched by the national authorities 
concerned. It can be considered to represent the beginning of an European regional 
development fund.  
The European Communities 
After the establishment of the ECSC, the six member states attempted to create an 
European Defence Community and an European Political Community, but both failed, mostly 
due to French reluctance. However, in 1955, negotiations were started with the intention of 
forming a common market and an atomic energy community. These talks were successful and 
led on the 25th of March 1957 to the signing of the Treaty of Rome by the six ECSC 
members50. The treaty came into force on the 1st of January 1958. 
The Treaty of Rome led to the existence of three separate but parallel communities: 
the ECSC for coal and steel; Euratom for atomic energy, its official name being the European 
Atomic Energy Community – EAEC; and the European Economic Community – EEC – for 
the creation of a common market among ‘the Six’.  
To achieve this common market, the member states agreed to reduce progressively 
their internal tariffs on all goods in order to reach duty-free trade within the customs union. 
This was completed in 1968. Non-tariff barriers were to disappear through legal and 
administrative harmonisation. Moreover, the ‘Six’ agreed on a common external tariff which 
was set at approximately the average of their individual rates.  
The EEC promoted a free market and competition for almost all goods, with one 
noticeable exception, that is agriculture. Since this sector represented a substantial part of 
national income and employment, it was strongly protected by a Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). Among other aspects, this policy guaranteed high domestic prices, strong protection 
against imports, and quotas to limit overproduction. In theory, it was and still is a form of 
regional policy to help backward rural areas. 
The Treaty of Rome provided for the creation of a large institutional structure with a 
number of powers. At the beginning, each Community was administered separately, at least 
until the Brussels Treaty of the 8th of April 1965 which merged the three executive bodies. 
Consequently, after 1965, there were only four institutions. Firstly, the Council of Ministers, 
which was the policy-making body. It was composed of the representatives of the member 
governments and was responsible for deciding the main political guidelines for the action of 
the European Communities. Secondly, the European Commission, which succeeded to the 
High Authority, was the executive organ, responsible for the implementation of the policies 
decided at the European level. It was composed of independent administrators nominated by 
the Council of Ministers. Thirdly, the European Parliament was there to represent the interests 
of the people but had very few powers. It was composed of representatives elected by the 
Parliaments of the member states. Finally, there was a Court of Justice of the European 
Communities which was there to solve any legal problems which might arise from the 
implementation of European decisions. Since this structure has been modified, it is not further 
detailed, so as to describe only the latest and still existing institutions. 
                                                
49 Hallett Graham, Randall Peter, West E.G., Regional Policy for ever?, 1973, p.64. 
50 Once again, UK had been invited to join and participated in the negotiations, but finally did not sign the 
Treaty. 
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In the early 1970s the EC went through a first wave of enlargement. On the 1st of 
January 1973, three member states of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA)51 joined the 
original ‘Six’: England, Ireland and Denmark. Negotiations were intense for this wave, 
especially with regard to the UK since it asked for a number of concessions. Two series of 
talks had previously failed, in 1962 and 1967.  
The second wave of enlargement took place southward. Greece entered the EC on the 
1st of January 1981 and was shortly followed by Spain and Portugal on the 1st of January 
1986. This new enlargement was of a different nature from the previous one since it 
concerned relatively poor countries and new democracies. As it will be discussed further 
down in Chapter 7, this became a significant milestone in the process of establishing 
European regional development policies. With the accession of these countries, the common 
institutions needed to strengthen existing policies with new means to help the development of 
the backward internal regions of the new members. 
The Single Market 
The early 1980s saw a pause in the process of European integration. National 
economies were still stagnating after the two oil shocks of the 1970s, and so the 
representatives in the Council of Ministers were more preoccupied by their national problems. 
Moreover, the process of integration itself seemed to have reached a hiatus since the 
achievements were less than the hopes aroused by the Treaty of Rome. 
To counter this downturn, the European Commission, more independent from local 
concerns, started to reflect on the need to renew integration. In 1985, Commissioner Lord 
Cockfield proposed in a White Paper a programme aiming to complete the European internal 
market by the end of 1992. Even though these propositions consisted in a larger transfer of 
sovereignty from national to European institutions, they were accepted by the member states. 
The Single European Act (SEA) was signed on the 17th and 28th of February 1986, in 
Luxembourg and The Hague. It became effective in 1987. 
This treaty revised the existing dispositions in relation to the European Communities, 
creating one European Community, and included new resolutions for the creation of more 
political cooperation among member states. In particular, it made official the periodic 
meetings of Heads of Governments of the member states52 that had been taking place since 
1974. These meetings became the European Council. 
It also aimed to improve the decision-making procedures within European institutions. 
For example, it recognised the abandonment of unanimity voting, which had prevailed until 
then within the Council of Ministers, for a system of qualified majority or normal majority 
voting for most decisions53. 
                                                
51 The EFTA was created in 1960 by European countries favourable to free trade but hostile to supranational 
institutions: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK. It installed a free trade area for 
manufactured goods and a few primary goods. 
52 The French President is the only Head of State to participate in this meeting (the other countries are 
represented by their Head of Government). This is due to a French peculiarity: since 1870 the President heads 
the weekly Council of Ministers. The French Prime Minister is sometimes invited to the European Council, 
especially in periods of cohabitation, that is when the French President and Prime Minister are from different 
political parties, as was the case in 1986-1988, 1993-1995, and 1997-2002. 
53 The principle of equal sovereignty was abandoned to take into account the differences existing between the 
member states. Each state represents a certain number of votes to give it more or less weight reflecting its size. 
Germany, UK, Italy and France have 10 votes; Spain 8; Belgium, Portugal, Greece and The Netherlands 5; 
Sweden and Austria 4; Ireland, Denmark and Finland 3; and Luxembourg 2. To accept a proposition of the 
Commission, the Council of Ministers should reach a minimum of 62 votes out of the 87 possible. To adopt any 
other decision, the same quota is required, but those 62 votes should represent at least ten member states. 
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But the principal objective was of course economic since the SEA aimed to complete 
the European internal market to create a common market. It therefore confirmed the necessity 
to remove all barriers which hindered the “four freedoms of movement”, those of goods, 
services, capital and people. Indeed, in 1985 there were still a considerable number of 
obstacles to such movement. Non-tariff barriers were limiting the movement of goods, such 
as internal customs formalities and different technical standards. There were distortions to 
competition because of state aids to industry and public purchases which favoured the home 
over the European market. Finally, national legislation in relation to the market was very 
different among member states; the use of indirect taxes, laws relating to companies and 
banks, problems of trade marks, and so on. To solve these problems the SEA provided for the 
increased harmonisation of national regulations. Each member state was to recognise the 
others’ rules and to eliminate all contradictions. 
The European Union 
In the early 1990s, under French and German influence, the European Community 
went through another evolution. France was urging for the creation of an European Monetary 
Union, which the Germans would only accept if it were to go hand in hand with deeper 
political integration. The Treaty resulting from these negotiations was signed by the member 
states in Maastricht on the 7th of February 1992 and became effective on the 1st of November 
1993. This step is the last significant milestone for European integration since it not only 
completed the Treaty of Rome, which had already been amended by the SEA, but extended it 
with new roles and consolidated institutions. To highlight the rupture it represented compared 
to the Treaty of Rome and the SEA, it gave a new name to the process of integration. The 
term European ‘Community’ was abandoned for that of European ‘Union’ (EU). 
This European Union went through a new phase of enlargement on the 1st of January 
1995 with the entry of three other EFTA countries into the European Union: Austria, Finland, 
and Sweden. After negotiations were started for their accession, Norwegian and Swiss 
electorates refused to join the EU54. 
New objectives for a deeper integration 
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty was innovative in a number of ways since it stated that the 
final aim was to create an European Political Union. To facilitate this political integration, 
two new pillars were added to the earlier European Community, which includes the three 
historic communities (see Figure 3.1 below for a schematised description). The first being a 
common policy for external relations and security matters (the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy – CFSP), as well as the harmonisation of judicial and home affairs (Community of 
Home and Judicial Affairs – CHJA)55. 
Those two new branches of the EU are still in their early stages of implementation, 
especially the CFSP. Indeed, it is only recently that the Spaniard Javier Solana has been 
designated as the first ‘Mr. CFSP’ to head this Common Foreign and Security Policy, even 
though his role and competencies are still rather vague. Moreover, as was shown during the 
recent Yugoslav conflict, it is very difficult for all the member states to reach a common 
position. The CHJA is also a difficult task since it implies the harmonisation of national 
legislation, especially on matters related to immigration and refugees, which are a very 
sensitive topic for European countries. 
                                                
54 Despite its constitutional limits ,which ensure its neutrality by prohibiting its membership to international and 
supranational organisations, Switzerland had indeed started negotiations to join.  
55 Respectively articles J. and K. of the 1992 Treaty. 
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Another major characteristic of the Maastricht Treaty is its objective of creating an 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Since 1969 there have been a number of projects to 
fix exchange rates and to evolve towards a single currency. However they have all failed. So 
far, this EMU is rather more successful since the ‘Euro’, the single currency, has been used 
since 1st of January 1999 in the countries which have joined the EMU, although it was only in 
mid-February 2002 that national currencies were definitively abandoned for the Euro. Four 
EU members (Denmark, Greece, Sweden and UK) did not take part in adopting this common 
currency. This is either because they could not, since to enter the EMU there are five strict 
criteria that need to be adhered to, or because they did not want to. The UK is an example of 
the latter category. It is attached to its currency and prefers to ‘wait and see’ whether it is 
advantageous for it to join. The establishment of the EMU is supported by the creation of an 
European Central Bank which has been instituted to ensure price stability. It is directed by a 
Governing Council composed of six members of the Executive Board and the governors of 
the Central Banks of the eleven EMU members. 
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Figure 3.1. A schematised history of  the European Union56 
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The institutional structure 
The Maastricht Treaty adopts the same administrative structure as defined in 1957 and 
1986, but it enlarges and specifies the competencies of each body. The European Union has 
five main bodies, each of them representing a specific aspect of EU authority and having well 
defined powers57. These are the Council of Ministers, the European Council, the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. There are also two 
                                                
56 Schematised summary of European construction made by the author. 
57 For more detailed or updated information on the institutional structure of the European Union, please check its 
website: www.europa.eu.int.  
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smaller consultative bodies, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions. 
 
The Council of Ministers is the decision-making body. It fixes the principal guidelines 
for action. It is composed of a representative from the government of each member state. Its 
composition varies in relation to the agenda. There are Councils of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, of Agriculture, of Industry, and so on. The presidency of the European Council 
changes every six months (art.146.2) with each member state taking a turn. It is possible for a 
member state deliberately to miss its turn of presidency, as Portugal did for its first turn. The 
presiding state is expected to give impetus to the development of the EU, and it usually tries to 
promote policies which it considers important. 
The majority voting system installed by the SEA has been maintained. Only 62 votes 
out of 87 are necessary for the adoption of a proposition. Unanimity voting is only required in 
three cases:  
1. For matters of a constitutional character such as the mode of election of the Parliament 
(art.138.3); agreements with third countries (art.238); or the official EU languages; 
2. For matters highly sensitive to member states such as the tax system (art.99 and 
100A); socio-economic cohesion (structural funds); and environment or research;  
3. To order a pause in the progress of integration or to reverse this in areas related to the 
free movement of capital (art.70); transport (art.76); or state subventions (art.9). 
 
The European Council can be compared to a special Council of Ministers, when the 
Heads of States meet, generally twice a year. It nonetheless has to be considered separately 
because of its specific characteristics. First, it was not part of the original institutional 
structure, but was added later on. Secondly, it brings together the most important national 
authorities to discuss a wide range of topics, thus promoting cooperation at the highest level. 
It can also ask the Commission to propose policies to the Council of Ministers so they can be 
adopted by this institution, or adopt decisions on its own. For example, it is the European 
Council which launched the European Monetary System by a decision in 1978. Finally, it has 
a role of arbitration and can solve problems in the cases where no consensus can be reached at 
lower levels of decision-making. At first this body had difficulty in finding its place in the 
original structure because it took away some of the competencies of other bodies, such as the 
Council of Ministers and the Commission, but it is now well integrated. 
 
The third institution of the EU is the European Commission. It is currently composed 
of twenty Commissioners appointed by the member states for a five-year term which can be 
renewed. The Commissioners are each responsible for one or more areas of European policy, 
for example agriculture or foreign affairs. They are responsible as a group to the European 
Parliament which has to approve each new Commission and which can provoke the 
resignation of all the Commissioners, with a qualified majority of two thirds. This has only 
happened once so far in March 1999. 
Being a permanent institution, independent from the member states, the Commission 
represents the common interest of the EU as a whole and not the interests of the different 
member states. The Commission has consequently four main roles:  
1. The Commission is the only body able to initiate EU policy. This it does by proposing 
decisions to the Council of Ministers. Even though the Council of Ministers, as well as 
the European Parliament, might ask the Commission to prepare a proposition on a 
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specific topic, respectively art.152 of the Treaty of Rome and art.138B of the Treaty of 
Maastricht, the Commission is responsible for its content.  
2. The Commission guarantees the implementation of the decisions and the application 
of the Treaties within member states (art.169 of the Treaty of Rome). Whenever 
necessary, it can ask the Court of Justice to settle a legal matter.  
3. Since the SEA, the Commission is the principal holder of the executive power. 
However, the Council of Ministers has a few competencies of execution in sensitive 
fields.  
4. The Commission possesses a status recognised by international law. In specific fields, 
it can represent its member states in international negotiations and sign agreements 
with third countries. It also maintains a diplomatic representation within 105 countries. 
 
The fourth common institution of the EU is the European Parliament (EP). This 
represents the interests of the people within the process of integration. Currently, since the 
most recent enlargement, there are 626 European Deputies who represent the population of 
the fifteen member states58. At first, these Deputies were elected by national Parliaments. At 
present, according to art.138.3, there is a uniform voting system by universal suffrage. 
However this is not fully operational and procedures still vary from one member state to the 
other. The President of the EP is elected at the beginning of the term of office of the 
Parliament, with an alternation after two and a half years after agreement between what are 
the two main political groups in the Parliament59. 
The European Parliament faces difficulties that its national counterparts do not 
experience. It recognises and operates in eleven official languages. Moreover, since unanimity 
has never been reached on its location, it is split between Strasbourg, where the Parliament 
meets; Brussels, where it meets in commissions or political groups; and Luxembourg, where 
its General Secretariat is located. 
In the beginning, the European Parliament had very few responsibilities. These were 
gradually increased through different reforms and the successive treaties. Currently, it has 
powers in three main areas. First, in conjunction with the Council of Ministers and the 
Commission, it participates in the elaboration of European decisions. There are four very 
complex procedures which describe the progress of proposals between the three bodies until 
their adoption. Depending on the type of proposals, Parliament has a role of consultation, of 
amendment, or of co-decision with the Council (art. 189). 
The EP also plays a significant role in the adoption of the EU budget60. It participates 
in the definition of the budget, but only has the final say on non-obligatory expenditures 
(art.203). The Commission fixes a rate of marginal augmentation to control the budget, a rate 
which can only be increased if there is an agreement between the Council and the Parliament 
(art.203.9). Lastly, the Parliament can reject the budget. In such a case, until an agreement is 
reached, European institutions work on a month-to-month basis. Each month they can only 
spend a twelfth of their previous budget (art.204). The budget is relatively small. In 1995 it 
                                                
58 Belgium has 25 deputies,  France 87, Germany 99, Italy 87, Luxembourg 6, The Netherlands 31, Denmark 16, 
Ireland 15, England 87, Greece 25, Portugal 25, Spain 64, Austria 21, Finland 16 and Sweden 22. 
59 When the European Deputies met the first time, they sat according to political affinities and not nationalities. 
As a result, there are two main political groups: the European Socialist Party and the European Popular Party. 
60 EU institutions acquired budgetary independence from their member states by disposing of their own 
revenues. These were provided for by art.201 of the Treaty of Rome, but were only defined by a decision of the 
Council of the 21st April 1970. They are the revenues from customs, agricultural contributions (difference 
between national and international agricultural prices that needs to be paid by an importer of world agricultural 
products), a percentage of Value Added Tax in each member states, and since 1988, a percentage of the GDP of 
each state. 
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represented a total of 89 billion ECU, which is around 2% of national budgets. However, this 
gives some significance to the Parliament since it has an indirect right of access to most 
policies adopted at the European level, including those decided by the European Council. 
The third and last main competence of the European Parliament is its role of control. Like 
its national counterparts, the Parliament disposes of specific procedures which enable it to pose 
questions to the executive. Moreover, it can set up commissions of investigation if this is 
required by a quarter of its members (art.138C). Finally, as seen recently, in March 1999, it can 
force the Commission to resign. 
 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the fifth body of the EU institutional structure. It 
is composed of fifteen judges, each one being appointed by a member state, and nine attorneys 
(art.164s). The judges are nominated for a renewable term of six years, the Court being partially 
changed every three years. The President of the Court is elected by the judges for three years but 
has no particular role to play in the operation of the ECJ. 
This institution so far has limited powers. Its only, but essential, role is to ensure “the 
respect of law in the interpretation and the implementation of the Treaty” (art.164). Only the 
member states or the European Parliament can present a case to the ECJ. The Commission can 
only do so when states do not respect their commitments and refuse to obey in spite of the 
warning of the Commission (art.169). This was recently the case in 2001 when France refused to 
lift its embargo on British beef. The judgements of the Court of Justice are mandatory for 
everybody. It also has the right to fine states if governments do not comply rapidly with the 
orders of the Court. 
The Court has competence for all matters related to the three European Communities, to 
the CHJA, and for articles L to S of the Treaty (art.L). It follows that it is not responsible for 
matters relating to fundamental rights which are stated in articles A to F. In spite of these limits, 
the Court has increased its power through constructive judgements in which it extrapolates from 
a particular situation to cover other aspects of law. This was for example the case in the 
judgements given on the affairs of ‘Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen’ a case heard on 5th of February 1963 in which the ECJ recognised the direct effect 
of Community law on national legislative systems. A further example is the case heard on 15th of 
July 1964, ‘Costa v. ENEL’, which established the principle of the inherent supremacy of 
Community law over national law. 
 
On top of these five main institutions, there are two smaller bodies that need to be briefly 
described since they can play a role in regional development. These are the Committee of the 
Regions (art.198B) and the Economic and Social Committee (art.196). Both were created to 
allow the representation of their respective interests at the European level. The first Committee 
has been the result of the increasing significance given to internal regions within EU policy, 
especially in countries which have a federal structure, such as Spain and Germany. It replaced in 
1993 the existing Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities. It is composed of 222 
members, and 222 alternates, which are elected or appointed members of local or regional 
bodies61. The Committee of the Regions is consulted by the Council and the Commission on 
issues related to education and youth; culture; public health; trans-European networks; 
employment policy; social policy; environment; vocational training; and transport. The 
Economic and Social Committee is there to represent the interests of socio-economic actors at 
the European level. Both Committees have a marginal direct importance since they only have an 
                                                
61 Williams R.H., European Union spatial policy and planning, 1996, Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd, London, 
pp.43-45. 
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advisory and consultative role. However, they are the domain of pressure groups which influence 
indirectly the policies adopted by the other decisional bodies. 
 
From the above description, it can be concluded that it appears that the European 
Union is the outcome of a process of integration which has been afforded by its member states 
a large institutional structure and a considerable number of competencies through the transfer 
of sovereignty to administer its affairs. This has not been the case for Mercosur. 
MERCOSUR 
Mercosur has relatively recently been established (1991). It therefore has undergone a 
less complex evolution than the European Union. The analysis of its main constitutive treaties 
allows the description of its objectives as well as the institutional structure and the 
instruments it has been endowed with.  
Since the Second World War there have been many attempts at economic integration 
between the different countries of the Latin American continent. The best known attempts are 
the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Central American Common Market 
(CACM), the Andean Pact and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)62. Most of these 
attempts have failed, or at least have not achieved all the objectives which had been 
established by their constituting treaties. However, they show the real interest of Latin 
American governments in regional integration. Moreover, participation in regional integration 
processes has been considered positive for their national economies both according to the 
import-substitution model of development63 and to the liberal models which were adopted in 
Latin America over the second half of the twentieth century. These attempts at integration 
were also facilitated by the relative cultural and linguistic homogeneity of this region64.  
This Latin American interest paved the way for the creation of Mercosur. The Treaty 
of Asunción which created Mercosur in 1991 makes an explicit reference in its preamble to 
the development of regional integration in Latin America and to the inclusion of Mercosur 
within the framework established by the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) in its 
1980 Treaty of Montevideo65. The LAIA is a ‘nursery’ where countries are given help, advice 
and a framework in order to assist them in creating, maintaining and developing regional 
integration initiatives. The LAIA is thus either described as a “‘common house’ for all the 
economic integration processes under development in the region”66 or as “a social club 
                                                
62 The LAFTA treaty was signed on the 18th of February 1960 and later replaced by the Latin American 
Integration Association (LAIA) on the 15th of August 1980. The CACM was created on the 13th of December 
1960; the Andean Pact on the 26th of May 1969; and the CARICOM agreement was signed on the 4th of July 
1973. 
63 This model of development implies setting up high tariffs on most imported goods in order to help the 
development of national industries and to give them time to adapt to international competition before opening 
the borders to outside goods. The creation of a free trade area reinforces this distinction between the goods 
produced inside the area and those from the outside. 
64 Unlike the members of the European Union who have to deal with eleven different languages, Mercosur 
members only have to handle Spanish and Portuguese which are very similar. 
65 LAIA members are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. 
66 Prospects for the processes of sub-regional integration in Central and South America, 1992, Publisher 
unknown, Madrid, p.99. 
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dedicated to the development of integration”67. The Mercosur Treaty is consequently 
registered by the LAIA as the 18th Economic Complementarity Agreement (ACE n°18)68. 
In order to have a full understanding of Mercosur, it is necessary to go back to the 
series of economic cooperation agreements adopted by the governments of Argentina and 
Brazil between 1985 and 1991, since they comprise the backbone on which Mercosur was 
built. Once these various agreements have been described, it is then possible to analyse the 
Treaty of Asunción, by considering the objectives set by the members, as well as the 
institutions and the instruments established to achieve these objectives. Finally, in order to 
obtain a complete picture of Mercosur, the two additional Protocols of Brasilia and Ouro 
Prêto which modify substantially the Treaty of Asunción are looked at.  
Cooperation between Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s 
Mercosur is the result of the deepening of the integration process which was started 
between Argentina and Brazil in the mid-1980s. During most of the nineteenth and twentieth 
century, the relations between these two countries had been marked by a strong rivalry over 
which would play the role of regional power in Latin America69. These tensions often led to 
diplomatic disputes, such as the one resulting from the Itaipu Hydroelectric Project in the 
1970s70. In the mid 1980s, after decades of dictatorship, democracy returned in these two 
countries. Raúl Alfonsín Foulkes and Tancredo de Almeida Neves were respectively elected 
in Argentina on the 10th of December 1983 and in Brazil on the 15th of January 1985. 
Following this democratisation, military, security and strategy matters were given a secondary 
importance compared to the economy, finance and trade, which then enabled the 
consideration of economic cooperation between the two countries71. 
In November 1985, the Presidents of Argentina and Brazil, the deceased Tancredo de 
Almeida Neves being replaced by his former Vice-President José Sarney, met and decided to 
develop cooperation between their two countries. This was given status in a Declaration of 
Political Intention. 
The following year, in July 1986, a Programme of Integration and Cooperation 
between Argentina and Brazil (PICAB) was signed, which is the first step towards the future 
creation of Mercosur. The objective of this programme was to establish a gradual and flexible 
integration between the two economies. This was done through specific agreements being 
made for each industrial sector, and to help improve their international competitiveness 
through scale economies. It was a framework treaty which aimed to facilitate the conclusion 
of other agreements that were to be negotiated on a sector-by-sector basis; no common bodies 
or policies were created. Between 1986 and 1988, within this framework, twenty-two 
protocols were signed between Argentina and Brazil concerning different economic areas 
                                                
67 Personal translation from C. Vaitsos, Crisis en la cooperación económica regional, 1978, ILET, Mexico, p.19. 
68 For a complete list of all the Economic Complementarity Agreements registered by the LAIA, it is possible to 
consult their webpage at: http://www.aladi.org/. This information dates back to early 2000. 
69 For example, just after their independence in the early nineteenth century these two countries went to war 
against each other for the control over Uruguay. 
70 Paraguay and Brazil had a common project to create a hydroelectric plant on the Paraná River at Itaipu. This 
decision, taken without the consent of Argentina, affected the latter’s own plans for hydroelectric projects on the 
river. 
71 This idea of the important role of democratisation for regional integration has for example been developed by 
A. Vasconcelos, Director of the Portuguese Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais in his article 
entitled ‘The prospects for Mercosur: some remarks’, published in Prospects for the processes of sub-regional 
integration in Central and South America, 1992, Madrid, p.123-129. 
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such as agriculture, capital goods, automotive industries, nuclear industries, and 
biotechnologies72. 
A new step was taken by Argentina and Brazil when their governments signed in 
November 1988 a Treaty of Integration, Cooperation, and Development. Indeed, with this 
treaty, it was decided to go further than just pure economic cooperation and to start a process 
of regional integration. The objective of the treaty was the creation within ten years of a 
common market between the two countries. This agreement stated that the two countries were 
to proceed step-by-step. They first were to establish a free trade area by reducing 
progressively taxes and tariffs on bilateral trade, and then to create a common market. This 
was approved by both National Parliaments in August 1989. 
In July 1990, the two newly elected Presidents of Argentina and Brazil, namely Carlos 
Menem coming into power in Argentina in May 1989 and Fernando Collor, elected in Brazil 
in December 1989 and replaced by José Sarney in 1990, adopted the Buenos Aires Act. In this 
Act, they ratified the 1988 Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development, but modified 
it substantially. They reaffirmed the aim of creating a common market, but cut the deadline by 
four years. The bilateral common market was to be effective by the 31st of December 1994. It 
was also decided at that time to invite Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay to join the process of 
regional integration. Chile refused the invitation because it was hoping to negotiate some 
agreements with the US and Canada, hoping to be part of what became the North American 
Free Trade Area (NAFTA). 
The last step prior to the creation of Mercosur was taken in November 1990 when an 
Economic Complementarity Agreement was adopted by Argentina and Brazil73 as a 
consequence of the Buenos Aires Act. This agreement provided the technical steps which 
were to be adopted by the two countries in order to achieve the creation of a free trade area. It 
planned a 40% cut in tariffs on bilateral trade with automatic reductions every six months 
until a zero tariff was reached by the 31st of December 1994. Exceptions were agreed by both 
governments on a number of products, the number of which had to be reduced by 20% each 
year. Non-tariff barriers were also to be eliminated by the end of 1994. The measures stated in 
the Economic Complementarity Agreement were to be implemented as soon as January 1991 
by each of the two countries. 
The Treaty of Asunción 
On the 26th of March 1991, after the conclusion of negotiations between the 
governments of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, the Treaty of Asunción, the 
constitutive treaty of the Mercado Común del Sur, was signed. It came into force on the 29th 
of November 1991 and is valid indefinitely. The analysis of this treaty below is threefold. The 
main goals assigned by the signatories are enumerated before the institutions and the 
instruments set up to achieve these objectives are described. 
Objectives 
The Treaty of Asunción establishes a period of transition which was to last until the 
effective creation of the common market on the 31st of December 199474, the main objective 
of Mercosur. In the first article of the treaty there are four examples of intermediate goals, 
these giving hints at the kind of instruments Mercosur was to have at its disposal, and which 
constitute first steps towards the common market: 
                                                
72 Mytelka L., South-South cooperation in a global perspective, 1994, OECD, Paris. 
73 This agreement has been registered by the LAIA as ACE n°14 on the 20th of December 1990. 
74 Article 3 of the Treaty of Asunción. 
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1. “The free movement of goods, services and factors of production between the countries 
[…]; 
2. The creation of a common external tariff and the adoption of a common commercial policy 
applied to third countries or groups of countries, as well as the coordination of policies in 
regional and international meetings relative to trade and economy; 
3. The coordination of macroeconomic and sector-based policies between the members on 
external trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal, monetary […] in order to ensure equal 
conditions of competition between the member states; 
4. The commitment of the member states to harmonise their legislation in the necessary 
fields in order to consolidate the process of integration”75. 
The Preamble of the Treaty also enumerates some of the objectives the four countries 
hoped to achieve as a result of regional integration and the accomplishment of a common 
market. The first paragraph states that integration will allow an enlargement of their national 
markets, which is fundamental “to accelerate their process of economic development with 
social justice”. Mercosur is also a means for its members to strengthen their position on the 
international scene, especially in relation to the economy, at a time when large economic 
zones are being created76. In the sixth paragraph, the member countries consider that 
Mercosur is a means to “promote the scientific and technological development of the member 
states and to modernise their economy to increase the supply and the quality of goods and 
services available in order to improve the living conditions of their population”77. 
These objectives can be encountered frequently within other supranational 
associations. But what is striking in the case of Mercosur is the short timetable established by 
the members. Such rapidity is mostly explained by the existence of a strong political will in 
each member state, as well as by the lessons learned from the integration of the European 
Union and from the past attempts at regional integration in Latin America. Concerning the 
rapidity of this integration, Peña, the Argentinian Under-Secretary for Integration, wrote in 
1992: 
“The current working timetable seems short, but several factors should be kept in mind: this 
integration process is intended to be permanent; there is only limited time available to 
introduce the drastic economic changes needed by any country wishing to compete in the 
world economy; four years is not a short period of time if one considers the progress made 
between Argentina and Brazil in the run-up to the Mercosur, and particularly on trade over the 
past two years. […] When considering timetable viability, we must bear in mind that the 
member governments assume the Mercosur integration process to be irreversible. This implies 
they have ruled out the possibility of extending the schedules for trade liberalisation and for 
setting up a customs union” 78. 
Institutions 
These objectives having been set, the Treaty of Asunción creates in its second chapter 
an “organic structure” which is in charge of the application of the treaty and of the different 
protocols adopted during the transitory period. Compared to other regional integration 
associations, which have developed since their early years a vast institutional common body 
such as the EU or the Andean Pact, the one set up for Mercosur by its members is very light. 
Indeed, since the beginning, the priority has been given to economic progress based on 
political will and economic pragmatism. A high degree of institutionalisation was considered 
                                                
75 Personal translation from the original text which can be found on the internet database of the IADB at 
www.database.iadb.org/intalbim/. Website accessed in March 2000. 
76 Third paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty of Asunción. 
77 Personal translations from the original text found on internet in 2000 at the Uruguyan site of the Comisión 
Sectorial para el Mercosur on www.comisec.gob.uy/document/. 
78 Prospects for the processes of sub-regional integration in Central and South America, 1992, Publisher 
unknown, Madrid, p.103, 105. 
 45
as something which could endanger or slow down economic integration because it would 
introduce an excessive bureaucracy.  
The Treaty establishes three bodies: the Common Market Council (Consejo del 
Mercado Común – CMC); the Common Market Group (Grupo Mercado Común – GMC); and 
the Administrative Secretariat (Secretaría Administrativa del Mercosur – SAM). 
The Council is the supreme institution of Mercosur since it is where the policies are 
defined and the decisions are taken to ensure the creation of the common market79. Its 
members are the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Economy of each member state who 
meet whenever necessary. They can invite other Ministers, or persons of ministerial level, to 
participate in their meetings. Once a year, the Council meets in the presence of the four 
Presidents of the member states. The Presidency of the CMC rotates every six months 
between the members according to alphabetical order. 
The Common Market Group is the executive organ of Mercosur80. It has to ensure the 
application of the Treaty and the decisions taken by the Council within the different member 
states. It also has the right of initiative. It can propose policies which will then be discussed 
and adopted by the CMC. It can create Work Sub-Groups (Sub-Grupos de Trabajo – SGT) 
which are specialised in different fields in order to help it in its task. The Fifth Annex to the 
Treaty enumerates ten such SGT, a list which can be, and has been, modified81. The GMC is 
made up of four permanent members and four substitutes which must come from the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Economy, and from the Central Banks of each state. 
The main role of the Administrative Secretariat (SAM) is to help the GMC. It has its 
headquarters in Montevideo (Uruguay), and is the only permanent Mercosur institution. Its 
main role is to keep and archive the documents and decisions generated by the CMC and the 
GMC. It also has a role in information provision, both intra-regionally within the member 
states, and extra-regionally towards third countries. 
Thus, in spite of the huge task being undertaken, Mercosur members have created a 
very limited institutional structure to implement common decisions. The policies and 
decisions are adopted through inter-governmental negotiations between the parties and are 
applied by each state individually through their own national legislative procedures. Unlike 
the European Union, which has the European Commission to make decisions on behalf of the 
EU, there is no independent institution which can make the same for Mercosur. The 
institutions are there to facilitate negotiations, to ensure a continuity in the integration process 
and to guarantee the application of the decisions by all members.  
Instruments 
The Treaty of Asunción sets up four main instruments which the member states and 
the Mercosur institutions must use in order to achieve intermediate goals and the final 
objective which is the creation of a common market.  
The First Annex to the Treaty establishes a plan to reach free trade (Programa de 
Liberación Comercial) by the 31st of December 1994 for Argentina and Brazil. Paraguay and 
                                                
79 Articles 10 to 12 of the Treaty of Asunción. 
80 Articles 13 and 14 of the Treaty of Asunción.  
81 The original domains of the different sub-groups were: 1) Trade; 2) Customs; 3) Technical regulations; 4) 
Financial affairs; 5) Land transport; 6) Sea transport; 7) Industrial policy and technologies; 8) Agriculture; 9) 
Energy; and 10) Coordination of macroeconomic policies. This original list has much evolved over the years, 
some sub-groups being added (such as one on Labour, Work and Social Security, and another on 
Communications), others being merged (Land and Sea Transport). These examples date back to 2000, but the 
present sub-groups can be found on the internet on the SAM website: 
http://www.algarbull.com.uy/secretariamercosur/GMC.HTM.  
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Uruguay have an extra year to reach the zero tariff on intra-regional trade82. This process is 
the successor of the November 1990 Economic Complementarity Agreement adopted by the 
governments of Argentina and Brazil. Within the Annex, a distinction is made between two 
kinds of products, general products and special products. The general products are submitted 
to a progressive, linear and automatic reduction of their tariffs, starting by a decrease of 47% 
on the 30th of June 1991 and followed by a fall of 7 points every six months, and 11 points in 
the last six months, this in order to achieve a zero tariff on the 31st of December 199483.  
Some products, because they represent essential elements or shares of the production 
of the member states, enumerated in a List of Exceptions84, have a special regime. Argentina 
has a list of 394 products, Brazil 324, Paraguay 439 and Uruguay 96085. The number of goods 
included in these lists was to be reduced each year by 20%, in order to achieve a zero tariff on 
such goods by December 1995 for Paraguay and Uruguay and by December 1994 for 
Argentina and Brazil86. In August 1994, in Decision 22/94, some of the deadlines were 
postponed. By the 1st of January 1995 only approximately 90% of the goods traded intra-
Mercosur were to be duty-free. Meanwhile the other goods saw their protection extended until 
the 1st of January 1999 for Argentina and Brazil or 2000 for Paraguay and Uruguay, and were 
to go through a process of progressive, linear and automatic reduction of tariffs until the 
deadlines were reached. 
A matter for concern in the creation of the free trade area was also the non-tariff 
barriers. These were to be removed by the 1st of January 1995 to allow the free circulation of 
goods and services between the member countries. Decisions and Resolutions were adopted 
between 1991 and 1993 to achieve this goal. Whereas Resolution 62/93 (in 1993) eliminated 
all non-tariff barriers, others had more specific aims such as the harmonisation of norms in 
relation to vehicles (Resolution 09/91), to food (Resolution 03/92), to medicine (Resolution 
04/92)87, and so on. 
In order to create a customs union, a prior stage to setting up the common market88, it 
was necessary for the members to adopt a common external tariff89, the second instrument at 
the disposal of Mercosur. The procedure to create it was implemented in December 1994. 
Without going into too many technical details, it can be said that the main characteristics of 
the external tariffs were similar to the process adopted for intra-regional tariffs. In this case 
the general goods had a fixed tariff which came into effect on the 1st of January 1995. The 
other goods which were particular to the national economies had specific deadlines, 
depending on the products and the countries concerned. This time, the same rules applied to 
Uruguay as to Argentina and Brazil, which had until 2001 to bring down to the common 
external norm the tariffs of their 300 protected goods; whereas Paraguay had special treatment 
                                                
82 The same rules and quotas are applied to the four countries, but Uruguay and Paraguay could start 
implementing them with a one year delay compared to Argentina and Brazil 
83 Due to their November 1990 Agreement, Argentina and Brazil had adopted on the 1st January 1991 a 40% cut 
in their tariffs on bilateral trade which was to be followed by automatic reductions of 7 points every six months 
and which resulted in the June 1991 47% cut decided in the Treaty of Asunción. 
84 Article 6 of the Treaty of Asunción.  
85 Source: the January 2000 Uruguyan site of the Comisión Sectorial para el Mercosur on 
www.comisec.gob.uy/document/tratadoa/asuncion.htm.  
86 The four member states do not have the same deadlines because these reductions started in December 1990 for 
Argentina and Brazil as a consequence of their November 1990 Agreement. 
87 Mercosur Resolutions and Decisions can be found on the website of the Consejo Argentino para las 
Relaciones Internacionales at: http://www.intr.net/mercosur/. 
88 See Chapter 2. 
89 First article of the Treaty of Asunción.  
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having 399 items and until 2006 to reach the common external tariff90. This reduction is being 
done through progressive, linear, automatic steps. 
However, because of the economic recession that Mercosur countries have suffered 
since 1999, the process of integration was brought to a stand-still and all the deadlines of 
these agendas were postponed. 
 
In order to determine whether a good can be classified as being produced in Mercosur 
or outside the region, the members have adopted a General Regime on Origins, and which 
constitutes the Second Annex to the Treaty of Asunción. This describes what should 
characterise the goods, which are being produced and/or transformed in the different 
countries, as being of Mercosur origin, and exempts them from tariffs when being traded 
intra-regionally. 
 
A third instrument Mercosur members have made available is the coordination of 
macroeconomic policies. This requires continuous negotiations between the representatives of 
the member states, given the institutional structure of Mercosur. Since there is no supra-
national body, all decisions have to be reached by a consensus achieved through negotiations 
between the members.  
 
The last instrument strengthens the coordination of macroeconomic policies. It 
concerns the incentive to facilitate the harmonisation of members’ different legislation 
necessary for integration. Indeed, within the provisions of the Treaty, the member 
governments recognise that they have to harmonise national norms. This ensures that there are 
no contradictions in the law between the different countries, at least in economic, trade, 
financial and any other Mercosur fields of competence. 
These last two instruments describe in general terms the process which should be 
adopted by the member countries in order to guarantee the success of integration. They ensure 
through negotiations and consensus that national policies are coordinated and the different 
legislations harmonised.  
The additional Protocols 
The Treaty of Asunción charged the member states with negotiating additional 
Protocols on several specific matters which would complete the decisional and institutional 
structures created. The two most significant are the Brasilia Protocol of 1991 and the Ouro 
Prêto Protocol of 1994, this because of their effects on the institutional structure of Mercosur, 
and therefore on the means it has at its disposal to achieve its objectives. 
The Brasilia Protocol 
According to the third article of the Treaty of Asunción, the CMC adopted on the 17th 
of December 1991 the Decision 01/91 relating to the solution of controversies, and which is 
known as the Brasilia Protocol. This Protocol establishes procedures to solve the problems 
arising between members with regard to “the interpretation, the application or the non-respect 
of dispositions included within the Treaty of Asunción, the agreements consequent from this 
                                                
90 IRELA, Mercosur: Prospects for an emerging bloc, Dossier n°61, August 1997, IRELA, Madrid, p.6. 
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Treaty, as well as of the Decisions of the Common Market Council or of the Resolutions of 
the Common Market Group”91. 
In such cases, three possible ways to solve a controversy are provided. The first stage 
is one of direct negotiations between the countries concerned with the problem92. This is not 
allowed to take more than fifteen days, unless the different parties agree to extend the limit. In 
the case of failure of these negotiations, the second stage is reached. This entails the 
intervention of the Common Market Group93. The controversy is submitted to the GMC, 
which has a maximum of thirty days to hear the different parties and to find a solution. 
So far, all controversies have been solved through these first two stages. However, if 
the solution proposed by the GMC is rejected by one of the parties, the party can decide to 
take it to a Tribunal set up through the Administrative Secretariat94. This is an ad hoc 
Tribunal which is specially created for the occasion, and which is established in one of the 
states party to the case. It is made up of two judges, one for each party of the controversy, and 
presided over by a third judge who is a national from a different member state, and who is 
accepted by both parties. The judges are selected from a list of ten judges who have been 
designated in advance by each government. If the Tribunal is not constituted within fifteen 
days, the Secretariat has to proceed to the nomination of the judges. The Tribunal then has 
sixty days, with an extra thirty days being possible, to give its judgement, which is final and 
mandatory. The Parties are allowed fifteen days following the judgement in which to ask the 
Tribunal for clarifications. After this, the Tribunal is dismantled. 
This controversy settling system is also open to individuals95. They first have to 
submit their problem to their national GMC representation, which, if it believes the complaint 
is admissible, will take the case. The procedure is similar to the that described above. 
This Brasilia Protocol is significant since it facilitates the equal and smooth 
implementation of the regional integration process in all the member states at the same time. 
Before its application, had a government refused to take the necessary measures to make a 
Mercosur Decision or Resolution efficient and legally binding within their legislative system, 
members had no means of coercion to ensure adoption. It is clear that the process of regional 
integration could have been endangered at any time by any of the member states’ 
governments. 
The Ouro Prêto Protocol 
On the 17th of December 1994 the governments of the member states adopted the Ouro 
Prêto Protocol. This was the result of the “extraordinary meeting to determine the final 
institutional structure of the administrative organs of the Common Market, as well as the 
competencies of each and their decision-making procedures” planned by article 18 of the 
Treaty of Asunción. This Protocol complements the institutional structure established in 1991, 
by creating three new bodies, the Mercosur Trade Commission, the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee, and the Economic-Social Advisory Forum, on top of the three existing bodies, 
which benefit in an increase in competence of Mercosur96. 
                                                
91 Personal translation of the first article of the Brasilia Protocol, which can be found at 
www.database.iadb.org/intalbim. This website was accessed in 2000  
92 Articles 2 and 3 of the Brasilia Protocol. 
93 Articles 4 to 6 of the Brasilia Protocol. 
94 This complex procedure is described in the articles 7 to 24 of the Brasilia Protocol. 
95 Brasilia Protocol, articles 25 to 32. 
96 For more details and updated information on the institutional structure of Mercosur, please check its website: 
www.mercosur.org.uy.  
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The CMC is basically the same. It remains the supreme body of Mercosur which 
defines the political guidelines for the integration process and takes the Decisions, which are 
mandatory for all members, to ensure the accomplishment of the Treaty of Asunción. Its 
composition is also similar. Its competencies are clearly enumerated in article 8: to ensure the 
respect of the Treaty of Asunción and its Protocols; to formulate the policies necessary for the 
creation of the common market; to exert the international personality of Mercosur, which has 
been only recognised in article 34 of this present Protocol; to negotiate and sign treaties with 
third countries; and to nominate the Director of the Mercosur Administrative Secretariat. 
The Common Market Group (GMC) has not much changed. However, article 15 states 
that the Resolutions it adopts are mandatory for the member states. Moreover, its roles are 
precisely enumerated: it is to propose projects of Decisions to the CMC; to ensure the 
application of the Decisions of the CMC; to negotiate agreements with third countries, within 
the limits of a delegation of competence made by the CMC97, and so on. In case of 
authorisation by the CMC, the GMC has also the authority to adopt the budget or financial 
resolutions following CMC guidelines. 
The Mercosur Administrative Secretariat (SAM) preserved its role of keeping and 
archiving the legislative acts passed by the institutions of Mercosur. It also has to help in the 
organisation of different meetings of the other Mercosur bodies. As a consequence of its role 
of information provision, the SAM is also responsible for the editing of the Mercosur Official 
Buletín since its first publication on the 1st of June 1997. 
The Mercosur Trade Commission (Comisión de Comercio del Mercosur – CCM) has 
the role of supervision in the application of common trade policy instruments amongst the 
Mercosur members and towards third party countries. According to article 19, it is also 
responsible for all matters related to tariffs, the common external tariffs, and can propose new 
norms to the GMC. In its fields of responsibility, the CCM is the institution responsible for 
the consideration of the complaints formulated by member states or individuals, following the 
procedures established by the Brasilia Protocol. This institution is made up of four permanent 
representatives and four substitutes from each member state and is coordinated by the Foreign 
Ministers. It can formulate Propositions, which are not binding, but can also formulate 
Directives, which are mandatory. It meets at least once a month, and whenever asked by one 
of the members through the GMC. 
The Joint Parliamentary Committee (Comisión Parlamentaria Conjunta – CPC) is the 
“institution representing the Parliaments of the member states within Mercosur”98. It is 
composed of sixteen representatives from each country who are designated by their national 
Parliaments. This consultative body promotes legislative coordination and harmonisation 
between the countries, but is also there to facilitate the adoption by the national Parliaments of 
the measures adopted by the institutions of Mercosur. It can adopt Recommendations for the 
CMC through the intermediary of the GMC. 
The last institution created by this Protocol is the Economic-Social Advisory Forum 
(Foro Consultivo Económico-Social – FCES). This body, which represents the economic and 
social sectors within Mercosur99 is composed of nine delegates from the private sector and the 
union representatives of each country. It is consulted on economic and social issues to give an 
advisory opinion through Recommendations to the GMC. 
                                                
97 These are the main roles assigned to the GMC. The complete list is included in article 14 of the Ouro Prêto 
Protocol. 
98 Article 22 of the Ouro Prêto Protocol. 
99 Article 28 of the Ouro Prêto Protocol. 
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The Ouro Prêto Protocol does not only describe the institutional structure of Mercosur. 
It also confirms in its articles 43 and 44 the system of controversy solution established by the 
Brasilia Protocol. It also describes the procedure of implementation of the norms adopted by 
Mercosur institutions100. Once a norm has been adopted, it is the members’ responsibility to 
have their national systems adopt it according to their own procedures. As soon as this stage 
of national adoption is completed, the member governments have to inform the Secretariat. It 
lets the other members know that others have adopted the norm. The norm only comes into 
force simultaneously in each member state thirty days after this communication from the 
SAM. 
 
As the foregoing has shown, similar to most other regional integration processes, 
Mercosur is proceeding on a step-by-step basis. Started as economic cooperation between two 
countries, that is Argentina and Brazil, it became a project for a free trade area including two 
additional countries, Paraguay and Uruguay, followed by a customs union, and it is finally 
hoping to become a common market. Mercosur seems to have passed each stage of regional 
integration. But what is striking in this evolution is its speed. In a dozen years it evolved from 
the Argentina-Brazil Cooperation Agreement of 1985 to the creation of an almost complete 
customs union between four countries. This is the case at least in theory; while most of the 
necessary norms and decisions have been adopted, there are still a number of exceptions and a 
lack of implementation in the different member states. However, it is still evolving towards its 
final objective: a common market. 
Because of the large range of objectives and instruments, there are many different 
subjects which are still being dealt with by Mercosur. However, there is one great absentee: 
the social dimension. Indeed, the FCES represents the economic interests of the private sector 
and of the trade unions, not the people. Moreover, none of the main constituent texts mention 
the role of the population within this new economic region, nor do they make a reference to 
the impact Mercosur is supposed to have on society, except for the indirect allusion made 
through the improvement of the general well-being through economic development. During 
its first years of existence Mercosur has only been the fruit of the work of a very small 
political and economic elite, especially in the dynamic border regions. The people in the north 
of Brazil are more concerned in trade with neighbouring countries than in relations with 
Uruguay. The major part of the population is unaware of the on-going changes and of the 
impacts on everyday life. 
* 
* * 
To conclude this chapter, it is possible to compare the EU and Mercosur by 
summarising in Figure 3.2 the main characteristics of their integration and their principal 
institutions.  
                                                
100 Ouro Prêto Protocol , article 40. 
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Figure 3.2. The EU and Mercosur: a comparison of the process of integration and their 
institutions 
  European Union Mercosur 
Beginning of 
integration 
18/04/1951 26/03/1991 
Present stage of 
integration 
Towards the Economic 
Union 
Between the free trade area and 
the common market  
Process of 
integration 
Number of 
members 
15 states 4 states, 2 associates 
Decision-Making European Council 
Council of Ministers 
Common Market Council 
Executive European Commission Common Market Group 
Mercosur Trade Commission 
Legislative European Parliament Joint Parliamentary Committee 
Judiciary European Court of Justice Ad-hoc Tribunals 
Consultative 
Bodies 
Committee of the Regions 
Economic and Social 
Committee 
Economic-Social Advisory 
Forum 
 
Institutions 
Administrative 
tasks 
European Commission Mercosur Administrative 
Secretariat 
 
Chapter 3 concludes the first part of the thesis. This first part introduced the research 
topic in Chapter 1; discussed key concepts in Chapter 2; and described in the present chapter 
the evolution, the objectives and the institutions of the EU and of Mercosur. The thesis now 
moves on to the second part composed of Chapters 4 and 5. The former, Chapter 4, analyses 
the extent and nature of the regional disparities within Mercosur. Chapter 5 argues that 
existing development agencies have not been entirely successful in reducing regional 
disparities and that their action could be complemented by the implementation of a Mercosur 
common approach which could take the form of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. 
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CHAPTER  4..   THE  REGII ONAL  DEVELOPMENT  GAP  
 
Chapter 4 highlights the disparities in development that exist among the internal 
regions of Mercosur. The chapter presents an analysis of the statistics that are available in 
order to show which regions are least developed and which are most developed. This enables 
a map of Mercosur to be drawn showing the different levels of regional development. 
It should be noted that, since the objective of this chapter is to statistically analyse 
regional disparities in Mercosur, it tackles different types of development disparities but does 
not focus on poverty-related issues. Indeed, this research is not intended as a contribution to 
the blossoming literature associated with the new global concern for poverty reduction, which 
approaches the issue from a different perspective and would therefore imply other policy 
solutions. 
The statistical analysis which follows is undertaken in three steps. Firstly, the 
difficulties encountered during the data collection as well as the methodology used for 
statistical comparisons are described. Secondly, after a brief general introduction to Mercosur 
countries in the second section, three different types of development gaps are highlighted. 
These are the economic, the infrastructural and the social gaps, which are respectively 
analysed in the third, fourth and fifth sections. Finally, in the last section, the indicators 
analysed are combined to produce an overview of the scale of disparities among the regions 
of Mercosur countries. It should be noted that the data analysed in this chapter are made 
available in detailed statistical tables and through Mercosur maps in Appendix A2. 
COLLECTING AND COMPARING MERCOSUR REGIONAL DATA 
Before starting the analysis itself, it is important to discuss the difficulties related to 
the selection, the collection and the comparison of the statistics which are used throughout 
Chapter 4 to highlight the disparities of levels of development in the internal regions of 
Mercosur countries.  
It should be noted that this statistical analysis includes data not only from the four 
Mercosur members (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), but also from the two 
associate members (Bolivia and Chile). Two principal reasons underlie this decision. Firstly, 
it might take a few years to establish a common Mercosur approach to regional development. 
Chile and Bolivia might thus have become full members by then and would have to be 
included in the analysis. Secondly, it is worth noting that, with the Mercosur four members, 
Bolivia is already taking part in a development fund called the Fonplata which might be a 
base on which to develop a common regional development approach, as will be argued in 
later chapters101. Although the following analyses are developed on a Mercosur 6 basis, the 
data for a Mercosur 4 situation are presented in each table.  
Therefore, the internal regions considered during the following statistical analysis are 
determined according to the administrative divisions of each of the six Mercosur countries. 
Since there is not enough precise data to undertake analyses for different regional levels, as is 
done in the EU with the different NUTS categories102, only the largest national internal 
                                                
101 See in particular the first section of Chapter 5 on Fonplata and the first section of Chapter 9 on the possible 
transformation of Fonplata. 
102 See Chapter 2 for a more precise definition of the EU NUTS categories. 
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division is employed for the analysis. The following are considered as ‘regions’: the 24 
Argentinian provinces; the 27 Brazilian federal states103; the 18 Paraguayan departments; the 
19 Uruguayan departments; the 9 Bolivian departments and the 13 Chilean regions. This sums 
up to a total of 110 Mercosur regions. 
The selection of indicators 
There is a considerable number of ways to measure levels of development around the 
world. Some analyses only focus on one indicator, in general the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita, which is supposed to be the most complete indicator of development. Other 
development studies aim to create indexes of development which combine various indicators 
to account for the different aspects of the development issue. As described in Chapter 7 
below, the main indicator used within EU regional funds is the level of GDP per capita to 
define the regions necessitating most assistance. However, in some specific cases, other 
indicators such as unemployment rates are also used. 
Creating a Mercosur map of regional development based only on GDP per capita 
disparities was considered insufficient since this indicator does not account for many aspects 
of development, such as unpaid labour and self consumed agricultural production. Therefore, 
in order to have a broader view of regional development in Mercosur, various other indicators 
were considered to analyse three aspects of development, to highlight the different types of 
regional gaps which are to be examined in Mercosur. These three categories of development 
are related to the economy, infrastructure and social. The latter is itself divided into three sub-
categories which are health, education and poverty. 
Among the indicators most commonly used to measure aspects of development in 
countries, a list of twenty possible indicators was established across these three categories to 
shed some light on development disparities within Mercosur. This is recognised as an 
ambitious list. These indicators are enumerated in Figure 4.1 which briefly describes the 
reasons underlying their choice. More comments on the indicators are made later in the 
chapter. 
                                                
103 It should be noted that the 27 Brazilian federal states are regrouped into five larger administrative regions, 
that is North, Northeast, Central West, South and Southeast. However, these five regions are too large to allow 
meaningful comparisons with the regions of the other members. 
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Figure 4.1. Twenty possible development indicators 
Economic development : 1. Regional exports. In addition to being an important aspect in a common 
market, they can represent the well-being of the economy, its production and 
its openness towards the rest of the world. Their distribution between 
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors also describes the structure of the 
economy. 
 2. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This is an indicator commonly used 
around the world to characterise the economic attractiveness of a country / 
region since investments show the existence of a satisfactory environment 
and capital inflows into the region. 
 3. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. This is the most used indicator 
when making comparisons of the wealth of countries. 
 4. Activity rate. This shows the importance of people being economically 
active.  
Infrastructure development:  5. Road network density. This is vital to allow transportation of goods and 
people across the territory, which is necessary for any economic activity.  
 6. Electricity consumption per capita. High consumption can account for an 
important economic activity, since companies are important electricity 
consumers to power their production, and for a sign of better living 
conditions since private electricity consumption is higher when homes have 
electrical appliances such as television and fridge.  
 7. Telephone lines. As for the previous indicator, being an important element 
for companies and a non-vital object in houses, this can reflect the economic 
situation of a region and the well-being of people. 
 8. Household connection to drinking water. This is related to the well-being of 
households in hygiene terms and has consequently an indirect impact on 
health. 
 9. Household connection to waste removal facilities. This is selected for its 
impact on hygiene and indirectly on health. 
Social development: 
- Health: 
 
10. Child mortality. This is often used to characterise the efficiency of the 
medical system in countries. 
 11. Number of doctors per inhabitant. This represents the accessibility of people 
to a doctor, therefore to a medical consultation and treatment. 
 12. Number of consultations. This highlights how often people see a doctor, 
which implies having access to one, but also having the means or the public 
service to pay for the service. 
 13. Number of hospital beds. This represents the hospital infrastructure of a 
region by showing its capacity to accommodate sick people. 
 14. Life expectancy at birth. This represents the overall effects of medical care 
on people since the better the medical system the longer they will live. 
- Education: 
 
15. Number of primary and secondary school students within the population. 
This shows how much people are accessing basic education. 
 16. Number of years of study. This represents how much education people have 
received through schools. 
 17. Literacy rate. This is the overall result of educational policies since it 
highlights the percentage of the population which is literate. 
- Poverty: 
 
18. Human Development Index (HDI). This was created by the United Nations 
to characterise the level of development in countries around the world. 
 19. Unsatisfied Basic Necessities (UBN). This index represents the percentage 
of the population which does not have access to at least one basic set of 
characteristics. These can vary according to definitions and can include 
quality of housing, education, and so on. 
 20. Poverty rate. This represents the proportion of the population living in 
poverty conditions, however defined. 
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The difficulty with infrastructure development indicators 
Before further analysis of the possible development indicators in Mercosur, it is 
necessary to pause to clarify an essential issue related to infrastructure development. This is 
because there are different possible interpretations for this term of ‘infrastructure’.  
In a December 2000 report the IDB identifies four categories of infrastructure104: 
1. Economic infrastructure includes transport, energy and telecommunications. This 
category groups infrastructure relating to the transport of people and goods, of energy, 
or of information. Renaming it “transport infrastructure” seems therefore more 
appropriate. 
2. Social infrastructure includes dams, irrigation canals, networks of drinking water and 
sewers, education, and health. 
3. Environmental infrastructure refers to parks and nature reserves.  
4. Infrastructure linked to information and knowledge, which includes cable TV and 
satellites.  
 
Although many different aspects are covered by the same term, the development of 
infrastructure in poor regions generally focuses mostly on transport infrastructure. For 
example, as discussed in Frame 4.1 below, South American countries recently, in 2000, gave 
a new impetus to the physical integration of the continent through axes of development. The 
type of development projects which were to be financed within this framework are mostly 
related to the transport infrastructure. Moreover, Ministries of Infrastructure, wherever they 
exist, are generally competent only for matters of transport infrastructure, not for social 
aspects of development. 
For this reason, the statistical analysis which follows in the present chapter does not 
employ the same distinctions as that of the IDB within the category of infrastructure 
development. As it can be noted from the indicators presented in Figure 4.1 above, it has been 
decided to consider as infrastructure development indicators those related to all types of 
transport. These infrastructure indicators are related to the transport of goods and people (road 
network); of electricity (electricity consumption); of information (telephone lines); of 
drinking water (domestic connection to drinking water); and of waste (domestic connection to 
waste removal facilities). Other indicators which the IDB would have classified as social 
infrastructure, such as those related to health and education, are considered in a category on 
its own, one composed of social development indicators. 
 
                                                
104 IDB, Un nuevo impulso a la integración de la infraestructura regional en América del Sur, December 2000, 
IDB, Washington DC, p.13.  
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Frame 4.1. South American new impulse for axes of development 
 
In 2000 all the South American governments decided to act jointly to give a new impulse to 
infrastructure integration in their subcontinent.  
The idea underlying this project is based on the hypothesis that it is possible to determine 
throughout the territory axes of development which should be assisted to promote the 
development of the subcontinent. 
As the IDB suggests, “spatial interaction gives birth to flows, which generally do not circulate 
freely through the territory but through the existing infrastructure networks. The flows 
considered are those of goods, persons, information, electrical energy, gas and oil. These 
flows, by dint of circulating through the infrastructure networks generally consolidate their 
movements on a few sections, leading to the creation of corridors. At a regional scale, 
considering that these corridors favour the economic and social development of the areas they 
go through, they can be real axes of integration and of development, constituting a first rate 
tool to organise the organisation of the territory.”105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Committee of Technical Coordination (Comité de 
Coordinación Técnica – CCT) was set up by the 
IDB, the CAF, and the Fonplata to define these 
continental axes of development and find solutions 
to finance these projects in the coming years. In a 
preliminary work, this CCT identified twelve axes 
of integration and development106: 
1. Mercosur axis: São Paulo - Montevideo - Buenos Aires - 
Valparaiso  
2. Andean axis: Caracas - Bogotá - Quito - Lima - La Paz  
3. Inter-oceanic axis: São Paolo - Campo Grande - Santa 
Cruz - La Paz - Ilo/Matarani/Arica/Iquique 
4. Axis Venezuela - Brazil - Guyana - Suriname  
5. Multimodal axis Orinico - Amazon - Plata 
6. Amazon axis: Brazil - Colombia - Ecuador - Peru 
7. Atlantic maritime axis 
8. Pacific maritime axis 
9. Axis Neuquén - Concepción  
10. Axis Porto Alegre - Jujuy - Antofagasta  
11. Axis Bolivia - Paraguay - Brazil  
12. Axis Peru - Brazil: Acre - Rondonia
                                                
105 IDB, Un nuevo impulso a la integración de la infraestructura regional en América del Sur, 2000, IDB, 
Washington DC, p.14. The diagram is a reproduction of the one presented in p.14. Personal translation. 
106 CCT, Plan de acción para la integración de la infraestructura regional en América del Sur, 4th and 5th of 
December 2000, CAF/IDB/Fonplata, Montevideo, p.9. The map is a self-made approximation. 
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Data collection problems 
Data were sought through four different channels. First, the internet sites of the six 
national institutes of statistics were searched for regional information107. Since not all data 
were available through this mean, other websites were searched for specific indicators, for 
example, the sites of ministries of health or education, or those of national electric or 
telephone companies for these specific data. Thirdly, people in these national institutes, 
ministries and companies were contacted by fax or email to ask for the information that was 
lacking. Finally, further data were collected during the two fieldtrips to the four Mercosur 
countries, and the statistical offices, the specific ministries and a few research institutes were 
visited. 
The results of the quest for Mercosur regional statistics are synthesised in Table 4.1 
which shows, with an ‘X’, the indicators which exist at the regional level in the six countries 
considered. For this table, as for the following ones, abbreviations are used to designate the 
six Mercosur states. AR stands for Argentina, BR for Brazil, PY for Paraguay, UY for 
Uruguay, BO for Bolivia, and CL for Chile.  
Table 4.1. Availability of regional statistics 
 Indicators AR BR PY UY BO CL 
Economy Exports X     X 
 Foreign Direct Investment      X 
 GDP per capita X X   X X 
 Activity rate X X X X X X 
Infrastructure Access to drinking water X X  X X X 
 Connection to telephone X X  X X X 
 Connection to waste removal facilities X   X X X 
 Electricity consumption per inhabitant X X X X X  
 Road network X X X X X X 
Health Child mortality X X    X 
 Life expectancy at birth X X  X X  
 N° of consultations per inhabitant X X   X  
 N° of doctors per inhabitant X X  X X X 
 N° of hospital beds per inhabitant X X X X X X 
Education Literacy rate X X X X X X 
 N° of students X X X X X X 
 Years of study  X    X 
Poverty Human Development Index  X    X 
 Unsatisfied Basic Necessities X  X X   
 Poverty rate  X X  X X 
N° of indicators for which regional data were available 16 16 8 12 14 16 
 
As this Table shows, none of the six countries had regional data for all of the 20 
indicators. Regional data were available in all Mercosur countries for only five of these 
twenty indicators.  
                                                
107 The Instituto Nacional De Estadística y Censo en Argentina (INDEC - http://www.indec.mecon.ar/), the 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística in Brazil (IBGE - http://www1.ibge.gov.br/ibge/default.php), the 
Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas y Censos in Paraguay (DGEEC - 
http://www.dgeec.gov.py/index.htm), the Instituto Nacional de Estadística in Uruguay (INE - 
http://www.ine.gub.uy/), the Instituto Nacional de Estadística in Bolivia (INE - http://www.ine.gov.bo/) and the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas in Chile (INE - http://www.ine.cl/). 
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It became evident during these statistical searches that most indicators were only 
available at the national level, and sometimes for the main cities, which excludes de facto all 
the rural areas. For some indicators the national data are divided into sub-categories, not 
according to regions but between urban and rural areas. This was especially the case for 
infrastructure indicators. National data could also be divided between male and female 
populations, mostly for health and education indicators. In Uruguay, statistics often separated 
data for the department including the capital city of Montevideo from the “interior”. 
Because of the absence of much regional information, the list of indicators analysed 
had to be reduced. Consequently, twelve indicators were selected. They are those for which 
regional information existed within at least four countries, and for which national data could 
be taken as surrogates by considering the other countries lacking regional data as 
homogeneous and attributing the value of the national average to each of its region: 
- Economic development:  
1) GDP per capita  
2) Activity rate 
- Infrastructure development:  
3) Road network 
4) Electricity consumption per inhabitant 
5) Connection to telephone 
6) Connection to waste removal facilities 
7) Access to drinking water 
- Social development:  
8) Number of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants 
9) Number of hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants 
10) Life expectancy at birth 
11) Number of students  
12) Literacy rate. 
Data analysis problems 
Once the statistics were gathered, it was possible to start the analysis and comparison. 
However, six principal difficulties arose during this work.  
Firstly, when comparing data from different countries or periods of time, there are 
differences in the definitions and the methods of calculation. For example, there exist many 
definitions and ways of calculating activity and literacy rates throughout the world. The 
distinctions render precise comparisons difficult.  
Moreover, secondly, there is the problem of data reliability since some countries have 
difficulties collecting and analysing their statistics, especially at regional level. This is 
especially the case in the developing world where statistical institutes sometimes lack the 
sufficient resources, qualified technicians and precise tools.  
A third limitation to statistical comparisons lies in the analysis of the data. The 
numbers themselves do not represent much but have to be interpreted. This is a  subjective 
task since a number can be understood in a considerable number of ways. For example, is an 
increase in the number of divorces positive, from the point of view of the liberalisation of 
women, or negative when considering  the impact on the family? 
Fourthly, it was found in a few cases that, not only did the countries have different 
methods for defining an indicator, but within a same country the data were not calculated in 
the same way for each region. For example, one table encountered with data on the Gross 
Domestic Product of Argentinian regions between 1991 and 1996 gave data either in units, 
 60
thousands or millions, and were shown either in current prices, in 1986 prices, or in 1993 
prices. 
A fifth difficulty which arose is related to the comparison of some indicators, for 
example the GDP, which are calculated in financial terms. The problem is that most Mercosur 
countries have been in the past financially unstable and experienced high inflation and a 
number of currency changes. The most noticeable example is that of Brazil which had five 
different currencies between 1989 and 1994108 and which had an inflation rate of 2,112% in 
1994109. 
The last and most important difficulty is related to the dates of the regional data 
available. When these regional data exist, they often date back to an old census. 
Consequently, the situation described by the data is slightly out of date and will have evolved. 
However, in the absence of any more recent data, the only possibility is to use statistics of the 
early or mid 1990s. 
Moreover, ideally, it is necessary to compare data for the same year for each region. 
However, this is not possible since the six countries do not undertake the process of 
population census and statistical analyses every year nor at the same time or periodicity. 
Table 4.2 describes the dates of the data analysed hereafter in the chapter. 
Another complication raised in relation to dates is that, apart for very few indicators, 
these regional data were given only for one date, the one of the most recent census. Two 
consequences follow from this lack of statistics over time. Firstly, it was impossible to show 
the evolution of these data over the past ten years, since the creation of the Mercosur. The 
statistical analysis could not be dynamic but had to be a snapshot of the development situation 
in Mercosur at a given time. Secondly, it was impossible to extrapolate the data for the same 
year for all indicators. This was because data were available for different dates. 
Table 4.2. Dates of regional data by indicator and by country 
 Indicators AR BR PY UY BO CL 
GDP per capita 1995 1997 1999 1999 1997 1999 Economy 
Activity rate 1991 1998 1992 1996 1995 1999 
Access to drinking water 1998 1997 1996 1996 1997 1992 
Connection to telephone 1997 1996 1992 2000 1996 1999 
Connection to waste 
removal facilities 
1998 1998 1996 1996 1997 1992 
Electricity consumption 1996/1995* 1999 1997 2000 1999 1999 
Infrastructure 
Road network 1999 1997 1997 1998 1997 1997 
Life expectancy at birth 1998 1997 1997 2000 1999 1995 
N° of doctors  1998 1997 1997 1998 1997 1997 
N° of hospital beds  1995 1997 1997 1998/1993* 1998 1997 
Literacy rate 1991 1997 1992 1996 N/A** 1992 
Social 
N° of students 1997 1999 1996 1998 1997 1997 
* The information found included data of two different years, depending on the regions. 
** The document including these data did not give any indication concerning the date of these statistics. 
 
These limitations reinforce the idea that it should be a priority for Mercosur members 
to harmonise their statistics to further their integration and their common approach to 
                                                
108 The Cruzado (Cz$) until the 15th of January 1989, the Cruzado Novo (NCz$) until the 15th of March 1990, the 
Cruzeiro (Cr$) until the 31st of July 1993, the Cruzeiro Real (CR$) until the 30th of June 1994, and the Real (R$) 
since then. 
109 Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, Avança Brasil: Development structures for 
investment, 2000, Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, Brasilia, p.8. 
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economic and social issues. For this reason the Mercosur members have decided, with the 
help of Eurostat, the European statistical institution, to attempt harmonisation of their main 
macroeconomic indicators. It might take much more time however before they start 
considering the issue of regional statistics. 
In conclusion it is clear that because of all these constraints, it is necessary to be 
cautious when considering the following statistical analyses and to be aware of the 
limitations. The aim of this chapter is to give at least some indication of which regions are 
facing major problems of lack of development and what type of assistance they would require 
to counter these problems. Once precise and harmonised data are available throughout 
Mercosur, it will be possible to undertake a more precise statistical analysis. 
The comparison of Mercosur regional data 
It is important to note that this Chapter 4 departs from the rule according to which 
each table, diagram and map should indicate its sources and dates. This principle was waived 
to facilitate the reading of the chapter since each table gathers data coming from at least six 
different sources and for different years. The data presented in the following tables are always 
the most recent which could be found through the different sources. The list of all the sources 
of information used for these statistical analyses, as well as the dates for each statistical series 
are available in Appendix A2. 
It should also be noted that, to facilitate the reading of this chapter, most of the data 
given in the detailed tables are rounded up when quoted in the text. 
The following abbreviations are used within most tables and figures presented in this 
chapter: AR stands for Argentina; BR for Brazil; PY for Paraguay; UY for Uruguay; BO for 
Bolivia; CL for Chile; M4 for Mercosur composed of its members, namely Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay; and M6 for Mercosur including the two associates, that is M4 
countries plus Bolivia and Chile. 
Comparing regional data with Mercosur average 
In order to allow comparisons, though they cannot be too precise given the statistical 
limitations previously mentioned, a simple statistical method has been adopted. This 
statistical method is highly inspired from the one used by the European Union to characterise 
the levels of development of its regions. Moreover, this method was discussed with two 
statisticians, two cartographers and a geographer, these last three experts having an extensive 
experience of analysing and comparing statistical data to produce maps. They all agreed that, 
considering the flaws inherent in the regional data available, there would be no interest in 
using more sophisticated statistical methods than the one employed hereafter. 
For every indicator considered, the data were collected at the level of the different 
internal regions from the national statistical institutes of each member. Each data is compared 
as a percentage of the total or average of 1) the national data; 2) the ‘Mercosur 4’ data; and 3) 
the ‘Mercosur 6’ data. This basic comparison, which has been in use in the EU for the past 
decades with regional data being compared to the EU average, highlights the significance of 
the gap existing between the less developed regions and the most advanced ones110.  
To calculate the Mercosur average, two methods are possible (see Frame 4.2). On the 
one hand, the basic arithmetic mean could be calculated. This represents the addition of the 
value of the data of each region divided by 110, which is the number of Mercosur regions. 
This method could not be used because of the differences intrinsic to the regions. It would 
                                                
110 The terms ‘significant’ and ‘significance’ are used in this chapter to refer to statistical significance. 
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imply that the same weight is given to the data of a region inhabited by 20,000 people and to 
one where 35 million live. 
The alternative method is the weighted arithmetic mean. This is calculated by 
multiplying the data value of each region by its population (or territory in the case of road 
infrastructure) and then dividing this result by the total population (or territory).  
Frame 4.2. Calculating the Mercosur averages 
X being the average; nk the population / territory size of region k; Xk the value of the indicator 
studied for region k; and the total of regions being 110; the two formulas are the following: 
(X1+X2+…+X110) Formula 1: X = 110 
   
(n1X1+n2X2+…+n110X110)Formula 2: X = (n1+n2+…+n110) 
 
 
This second method, which was the one chosen, considers the significance of each 
region compared to the whole of Mercosur. Obviously, one consequence of this method is that 
Brazil influences greatly the Mercosur average since it represents such a large share of its 
territory and population111. 
The degree of homogeneity of regional data 
To show the degree of regional homogeneity for each indicator, two methods are 
employed. 
First, for each indicator, a diagram shows the distribution of the regions of each 
country according to the value of the indicator as a proportion of the Mercosur 6 average. The 
data are presented in categories representing 25%, ranging from 0-25% to more than 400% 
depending on the indicators. 
It can be seen that if the regional values of an indicator are homogeneous and close to 
the Mercosur average, the diagram obtained will be similar to the first example given in 
Figure 4.2. It shows that all regions exhibit an indicator which represents between 75% and 
125% of the Mercosur 6 average.  
The second example of Figure 4.2 shows on the contrary an indicator for which there 
are significant disparities between the regions. Indeed, the diagram being more spread, it 
shows that many regions, especially Argentinian regions, have an indicator representing 
between 0% and 25% of the Mercosur average, but that other regions can have indicators 
equivalent to more than 400% of the Mercosur average. 
                                                
111 See the second section of Chapter 4. 
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Figure 4.2. Examples of the distribution of the regions of each country according to the 
value of an indicator compared to the Mercosur 6 average 
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A second tool to highlight the degree of homogeneity and to allow further statistical 
analysis, is the use of average and standard deviations for each indicator. As detailed in Frame 
4.3, the average deviation is “calculated using the absolute values of the deviation scores”. 
The standard deviation shows the dispersion of data in a statistical series. It is calculated “by 
taking the square root of the variance”112. 
Frame 4.3. Calculating the average and standard deviations113 
X is the average, as calculated above (see Frame 4.2); nk the population (or territory size) of 
region k; N the sum of the nk; Xk the value of the indicator studied for region k; and the total 
of regions being 110; the formulas are the following: 
Σ (nk *  | Xk – X | )Average deviation 
(Ad) Ad = N 
   
Σ {nk *  ( Xk – X )² }Standard deviation 
(Sd or σ) Sd = √( N )
 
 
                                                
112 Both definitions are extracted from Vogt W. Paul, Dictionary of statistics & methodology: a non technical 
guide for the social sciences, 2nd ed. 1999, Sage Publications, London, p.173 and 274. 
113 Kahn Martine, Statistiques et probabilités, 1988, Les éditions Foucher, France, p.45-48. 
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The deviations are not calculated using the absolute data of each region itself, but 
using the data in relative terms compared to the Mercosur 6 average, which allows 
meaningful cross-comparisons between each indicator’s deviations. The deviations 
consequently represent the distribution of the regional data vis-à-vis the Mercosur 6 average. 
The higher these deviations are, the more significant is the spread of the data for the indicator 
selected and the higher are the regional disparities. 
Defining a threshold to consider a region as being relatively less developed  
It is necessary to determine a threshold after which a region could be characterised as 
being relatively less developed and which could become a geographic priority for a Mercosur 
Regional Development Fund. Within European Regional Development Funds, a region is 
considered as being relatively less developed if it has a GDP per capita lower than 75% of the 
EU average, which gives it the right to receive assistance from the Funds.  
It was decided to apply the EU approach to Mercosur. Consequently, for each 
indicator analysed, the regions having an indicator below 75% of the Mercosur 6 average are 
‘below the threshold’ and can be considered as being relatively less developed.  
This 75% threshold however really needs to be flexible. Indeed the statistics are not 
sufficiently reliable to interpret them strictly. Given the significant limitations which exist in 
the data, the comparisons will not be too precise. Moreover, some regions at the threshold 
might be either below or over it, depending on whether data are compared to Mercosur 4 or 6. 
The use of these different statistical tools of data dispersion and methods for making 
comparisons of indicators makes it possible to analyse the twelve development indicators that 
have been selected. These highlight the different types of regional gaps which exist in 
Mercosur. 
MERCOSUR TERRITORY AND POPULATION 
Before analysing the regional disparities which exist for the twelve indicators selected, 
it is necessary briefly to highlight the disparities in territory and population which exist 
between Mercosur countries and regions to put the following analyses into the appropriate 
context, and to assist a wider understanding of development issues in Mercosur. This is 
necessary before any other statistical analyses can be undertaken since the following data 
comparisons are calculated in relation to population or territory. 
The map of Mercosur (Map 4.1) shows clearly that the difference in size between its 
members is striking. Paraguay and Uruguay seem compressed by the weight of Argentina and 
Brazil.  
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Map 4.1. Mercosur countries in South America 
 
As detailed within Table 4.3 and represented in Figure 4.3, Brazil represents the lion’s 
share of the territory and population of Mercosur. To compare the two extremes, Brazil is 
almost 50 times larger and more populated than Uruguay. When Bolivia and Chile are 
considered within a Mercosur 6 situation, their medium size diminishes the great divide 
between the two large and the two small countries of Mercosur 4. However, added together 
the four smallest countries only represent 17% of Mercosur territory and 13% of Mercosur 
population. This is in both cases less than the share of Argentina. 
Table 4.3. Mercosur territory and population 
Territory as a % of Population as a % of  Territory km² Population114 DensityPop/km² Mercosur 4 Mercosur 6 Mercosur 4 Mercosur 6
Argentina 3,761,274 34,768,457 9.2 29 26 17 15
Brazil 8,547,403 160,710,275 18.8 66 58 79 71
Paraguay 406,752 5,085,328 12.5 3 3 3 2
Uruguay 175,016 3,163,763 18.1 1 1 2 1
Bolivia 1,098,581 7,767,060 7.1 N/A 8 N/A 3
Chile 754,905 15,010,755 19.9 N/A 5 N/A 7
Mercosur 4 12,890,445 203,727,823 15.8 100 88 100 90
Mercosur 6 14,743,931 226,505,638 15.4 N/A 100 N/A 100
 
                                                
114 1995 data for Argentina; 1997 population for Brazil, Paraguay, and Bolivia; 1996 data for Uruguay; 1999 
data for Chile. For the dates of the data presented in future tables in this chapter, please refer to Table 4.2 or to 
Annex 2. 
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Figure 4.3. Mercosur 6 total territory and population 
These disparities do not exist just at the national level. Such disproportion are also 
encountered at the regional level. Some regions such as the capital cities often count as 
independent regions although geographically speaking they are small. For example, the cities 
of Buenos Aires and Asunción respectively only represent 200 km² and 117 km². Compared 
to these regions, there are regions such as the Amazonas in Brazil which – with its 1.6 million 
km² – represents by itself about 12% of Mercosur territory. This is 13,500 times more than the 
region of Asunción (see Appendix A2 for the complete statistics). 
Population wise, large differences appear among regions, especially between the 
metropolitan areas and the less populated rural areas. In Argentina, the province and city of 
Buenos Aires represents almost half of the total population. This is similar to Chile where 
Santiago accounts for 40% of the population. In Brazil, the situation is slightly different; the 
region of the capital represents only 1.2% of the population. This can be explained by the fact 
that Brasilia was built from nothing in the 1960s in the centre of the country. Most of the 
Brazilians live in the Southeast Great Region, which includes the states including economic 
centres such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. This Southeast region represents 43% of the 
population of Brazil. Other regions are almost empty, essentially due to climatic or natural 
reasons such as the Andes, the Amazon forest, and the Antarctic region. 
By compiling territory and population data, it is possible to calculate the population 
density of these countries and regions. The seven densest regions of Mercosur are, in that 
order, Buenos Aires (15,000 inhabitants per km²), Asunción, Montevideo, Santiago, Brasilia 
district, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. These regions represent five of the six capital cities and 
the two most important economic centres of Brazil. The four largest regions of Mercosur115 
have a small population, due to harsh geographic, natural or climatic conditions, and therefore 
exhibit a density as low as 0.1 inhabitant per km². 
Since the statistical analysis undertaken in the coming sections refers to specific 
regions of Mercosur member states, it seems useful to give a map of the regional divisions of 
each Mercosur member state (see Map 4.2 below). 
                                                
115 Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands in Argentina (1 million km²), Amazonas, Pará and 
Mato Grosso in Brazil (respectively 1.6, 1.3 and 0.9 million km²). 
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Map 4.2. Administrative regional divisions in Mercosur countries 
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This second section only aimed to highlight the disparities which exist among 
Mercosur countries and regions in relation to basic characteristics such as territory and 
population. These two indicators are now used within the following statistical analyses to 
allow wider comparisons between the regions to identify, first, the economic gap between 
regions, followed by the infrastructure and social gaps. 
THE ECONOMIC GAP 
As discussed above, only two economic indicators were selected to represent 
economic disparities among Mercosur regions. These are the GDP per capita and the activity 
rate. 
GDP per capita 
The Gross Domestic Product per capita is the first indicator which is used to highlight 
the regional disparities of Mercosur. The GDP is the total value in money terms of the 
production of a country or region in a year. It measures the income received by all the 
economic actors living in that country or region. Since the mid twentieth century this 
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indicator is the most widely used and recognised indicator to characterise the level of 
economic development and wealth of a nation116.  
In spite of its wide use, four limitations have to be considered when using GDP. First, 
as an economic indicator it is incomplete since it does not take into account unpaid labour, 
such as domestic and voluntary work, nor black-market labour, which can be very significant 
in some countries. An example is Paraguay. Moreover, secondly, it measures income and not 
wealth, for example already owned houses and cars. Thirdly, GDP does not include 
agricultural or other production which is self-consumed or bartered, which can be very 
significant in poor rural areas. Finally, financial data are comparable with difficulty since 
local prices need to be converted at official rates to a common currency. The US dollar is used 
in the present case. However it is important to note that this might introduce biases. Indeed, a 
devaluation of the national currency would mean a diminution of GDP compared in dollars 
without any real change taking place117. 
Before analysing the regional disparities in GDP per capita within Mercosur countries, 
it is useful to have a brief look at the national data. As shown in Table 4.4, there is an 
important gap which separates Bolivia and Paraguay from the other four countries. Whereas 
both have a GDP per capita which respectively are equivalent to 17.5% and 32.7% of the 
Mercosur average, GDP in the other countries is either slightly below it or well above the 
average. Argentina has a GDP per capita nine times that of Bolivia.  
Table 4.4. GDP per capita: Mercosur national averages 
 GDP/capita compared to (%)
 
GDP/cap 
(US$) Mercosur 4 Mercosur 6 
Argentina 7,855 149.6 155.3
Brazil 4,781 91.1 94.5
Paraguay 1,652 31.5 32.7
Uruguay 6,240 118.9 123.4
Bolivia 882 N/A 17.5
Chile 4,600 N/A 91.0
Mercosur 4 5,250 100.0 103.8
Mercosur 6 5,058 N/A 100.0
 
An analysis of the regional GDP per capita highlights more disparities within 
Mercosur (see Appendix A2.2.1 for more details). Since no regional data were available for 
Paraguay and Uruguay, the following analysis assumes that the countries are homogeneous 
and that the national indicator is applicable for all the regions. This explains why the regional 
indicators for these two countries appear within the same percentage ranges in the following 
table and figure. The situation is different in Bolivia where regional data exist, but the country 
is in any case homogeneous. 
Using the formula detailed above118, the average and standard deviations for the 
regional GDP per capita in Mercosur are respectively 45 and 57. This implies that there are 
important disparities among the regions since, on average, the regional GDP per capita is 45 
                                                
116 For example, every year international organisations such as the World Bank publish the classification of 
world countries according to their GDP per capita. 
117 For example, in 1955, the income per capita of Argentina was of 6,437 pesos. During most of the year the 
official exchange rate to the dollar implied an income per capita of US$858. Near the end of 1955, there was an 
official devaluation of the peso to the dollar: without any real change in income, the per capita income decreased 
to US$358. 
118 In the first section of Chapter 4. 
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points distant from the Mercosur average. As shown in Table 4.5, the average deviation is 
much more significant in Brazil and in Argentina than in the other countries. It is of course 
zero for Paraguay and Uruguay since these countries were considered to be homogeneous 
because of the lack of regional data. 
Table 4.5. GDP per capita: average deviations by country 
 AR BR PY UY BO CL M6
GDP/capita 37.5 41.3 0.0 0.0 19.2 28.6 44.7
 
The significance of the distribution of regional GDP per capita is confirmed in Figure 
4.4. It appears from the figure that 60 of the 110 Mercosur regions have a GDP per capita 
lower than 75% of the Mercosur 6 average, whereas only 17 of them are above the 125% 
threshold. Out of these 17, 12 are Argentinian, 3 Brazilian and 2 Chilean. The fact that a non-
negligible number of regions appear within the 100% – 125% range is essentially due to the 
assumption of homogeneity of the 19 Uruguayan departments. Whereas the region with the 
lowest indicator, Potosí in Bolivia, has a GDP per capita which represents only 10% of the 
Mercosur average, the region of the City of Buenos Aires is the highest at 430%. 
Figure 4.4. Distribution of the regions according to their GDP per capita compared to 
Mercosur average  
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These 60 regions with a GDP per capita below the threshold have an average GDP per 
capita equivalent to 44% of the Mercosur 6 GDP per capita. As said above in the first section, 
the 75% threshold needs to be interpreted flexibly. Therefore, as shown in Table 4.6, two 
Argentinian regions, those of Catamarca and Salta, are slightly above the 75% limit, but are 
considered to be amongst the regions under the threshold since their data are lower than 75% 
of the Mercosur 4 average. 
These 60 regions contain 40% of Mercosur’s population; that is, about 88.4 million 
people. This share of the population would have been much higher if densely populated urban 
regions did not have, in general, higher GDP per capita than the rest. For example, with 3 
million people, more than 1% of the Mercosur population, the city of Buenos Aires has the 
highest GDP per capita. With 35 million inhabitants, the region of São Paulo represents more 
than 15% of the Mercosur population with a GDP per capita higher than 150% of that of 
Mercosur (see Appendix A2.2.1 for a complete statistical table and a map on regional GDP 
per capita). 
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Table 4.6. GDP per capita: Mercosur regions below the threshold  
  Regional data as a % of 
  Population 
GDP/cap 
(US$) Nation M 4 M 6 
BO Potosí 746,618 483 54.7 N/A 9.6
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 677 76.7 N/A 13.4
BO La Paz 2,268,824 777 88.1 N/A 15.4
BO Beni 336,633 865 98.0 N/A 17.1
BO Cochabamba 1,408,071 885 100.3 N/A 17.5
BO Tarija 368,506 954 108.1 N/A 18.9
BO Pando 53,124 1,090 123.5 N/A 21.6
BO Oruro 383,498 1,107 125.4 N/A 21.9
BO Santa Cruz 1,651,951 1,203 136.3 N/A 23.8
BR Maranhão 5,349,575 1,222 25.6 23.3 24.2
BR Piauí 2,758,129 1,352 28.3 25.8 26.7
BR Tocantins 1,096,967 1,384 28.9 26.4 27.4
CL De La Araucanía 846,000 1,575 34.2 N/A 31.1
PY Total Paraguay 5,085,328 1,652 100.0 31.5 32.7
BR Paraíba 3,433,234 1,796 37.6 34.2 35.5
BR Alagoas 2,754,697 1,843 38.6 35.1 36.4
AR Santiago del Estero 700,114 1,979 25.2 37.7 39.1
AR Formosa 447,094 2,031 25.9 38.7 40.2
BR Roraima 258,088 2,126 44.5 40.5 42.0
BR Ceará 7,010,107 2,214 46.3 42.2 43.8
BR Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 2,228 46.6 42.4 44.0
CL De Los Lagos 1,028,200 2,229 48.5 N/A 44.1
BR Pará 5,724,140 2,268 47.4 43.2 44.8
BR Acre 504,489 2,296 48.0 43.7 45.4
CL Coquimbo 553,400 2,463 53.6 N/A 48.7
CL Del Biobío 1,874,100 2,568 55.8 N/A 50.8
BR Sergipe 1,662,168 2,570 53.8 49.0 50.8
BR Bahia 12,697,007 2,572 53.8 49.0 50.9
CL Del Maule 889,800 2,616 56.9 N/A 51.7
BR Pernambuco 7,548,183 2,740 57.3 52.2 54.2
AR Jujuy 555,097 2,830 36.0 53.9 56.0
BR Rondônia 1,289,365 2,872 60.1 54.7 56.8
AR Chaco 895,900 2,947 37.5 56.1 58.3
BR Goiás 4,629,154 3,055 63.9 58.2 60.4
CL De Aysén 90,800 3,073 66.8 N/A 60.8
CL Valparaíso 1,507,100 3,148 68.4 N/A 62.2
AR Corrientes 857,685 3,259 41.5 62.1 64.4
CL Del Libertador 758,400 3,287 71.5 N/A 65.0
BR Amapá 402,557 3,344 70.0 63.7 66.1
BR Mato Grosso 2,335,344 3,459 72.4 65.9 68.4
AR Tucumán 1,216,623 3,611 46.0 68.8 71.4
AR Salta 958,094 3,826 48.7 72.9 75.7
AR Catamarca 289,212 3,873 49.3 73.8 76.6
 Mercosur 4 73,099,706 2,338 N/A 44.5 46.2
 Mercosur 6 88,414,566 2,232 N/A N/A 44.1
The whole of Paraguay (in italics) is included due to the homogenisation of data 
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Activity rate 
The activity rate is the second indicator used to show the state of regional economic 
disparities in Mercosur. This rate is the number of people economically active as a percentage 
of the population of working age, that is generally the people more than 15 years old. Since 
the following activity rates are calculated through different methods, it is necessary to handle 
the following data with care. 
A difference of definition which is worth noting is the age at which a person is 
considered to be able to be economically active. Whereas it is 15 years old in Chile, it is 10 in 
Brazil and Paraguay. The implication is not only statistical. It reveals much about the socio-
economic situation of the country. Indeed, when people are considered economically active at 
a young age, it can imply that the economic situation is so difficult that to survive even 
children need to leave aside their education to work to assist their families. 
Likewise, in some countries, such as in most of Europe, there is an upper age limit to 
economic activity, often 65 years old. This is the age at which most people are considered as 
being no longer economically active but to be retired. As a result these older people are not 
included in the statistics. In these six countries of Mercosur the statistics do not include such 
upper limits. This might imply that the elderly need to work because their pensions are 
insufficient or non-existent. 
At the national level, the gap in the activity rate is not too wide. Table 4.7 shows that 
the country with the lowest activity rate is Paraguay with an indicator representing 80% of the 
Mercosur average. This is not too surprising and the possible reasons explaining this are 
twofold. First, it might be due to the economic situation of this country. More likely, this is 
the logical consequence of the fact that most economic activity in Paraguay is ‘informal’. 
Some estimates suggest that informal activity accounts for as much as half of the economy. 
The World Bank estimated in 1999 that the share of the informal economy was 40% of the 
total economy, composed of the traditional informal sector (25%), retail tourism trade (6%) 
and wholesale smuggling (9%)119. What is also remarkable is that Bolivia, which is also in a 
difficult economic situation and which has the lowest GDP per capita of Mercosur, is the 
country with the highest activity rate, that is 120% of the Mercosur average. This difference 
between Paraguay and Bolivia could be a result of different treatment of the informal 
economy or of family workers in the statistics. 
Table 4.7. Activity rates: Mercosur national averages 
 National activity rate  
as a % of 
 
Population in 
age of economic 
activity* 
Population 
economically 
active 
Activity rate 
(%) 
Mercosur 4 Mercosur 6 
Argentina 23,288,242 13,202,200 56.7 95.5 95.6 
Brazil 127,717,163 76,885,732 60.2 101.4 101.5 
Paraguay 2,949,099 1,396,733 47.4 79.8 79.8 
Uruguay 2,525,651 1,440,489 57.0 96.0 96.1 
Bolivia 3,722,699 2,654,960 71.3 N/A 120.2 
Chile 10,720,180 5,826,960 54.4 N/A 91.6 
Mercosur 4 156,480,155 92,925,154 59.4 100.0 100.1 
Mercosur 6 170,923,034 101,407,074 59.3 N/A 100.0 
* Population over 14 for Argentina, 10 in Brazil and in Paraguay, 12 in Uruguay, 15 in Bolivia and in Chile. 
                                                
119 Gonzalez José Antonio, Thobani Mateen, Paraguay Country economic memorandum: macroeconomic 
policies to reactivate growth, March 1999, World Bank, Washington DC, p.A-63. 
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When standard and average deviations are calculated, it confirms that, as at the 
national level,  there is very little difference between the regions. They are respectively 8 and 
6, which is very small compared to the values of the standard and average deviations for GDP 
per capita which respectively reached 57 and 45120. As shown in Table 4.8, the countries 
where regional disparities are the highest are Paraguay and Chile which both have average 
deviations higher than those at Mercosur level. 
Table 4.8. Activity rates: average deviations by country 
 AR BR PY UY BO CL M6
Activity rate 2.6 5.0 8.4 3.9 3.9 7.4 6.0
 
The analysis of the activity rate at the regional level confirms that there are few 
disparities between regions and the Mercosur average (see Appendix A2.2.2 for all the 
regional data and a map). Only 39 regions of 110 have an activity rate higher than the 
Mercosur average. Apart from three Bolivian regions, those of Tarija, Beni, and Pando, these 
39 regions are all included within the 100-125% range above Mercosur average. 
The majority of the Mercosur regions, 71 of them, have indicators lower than the 
Mercosur average. However, as highlighted in Figure 4.5, most regions have an indicator not 
too inferior to that of Mercosur, since only 10 are below the 75% threshold.  
Figure 4.5. Distribution of the regions according to their activity rates compared to 
Mercosur average 
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On top of these ten regions that are below the 75% threshold, an eleventh one, that of 
Guairá, which is at the threshold can be included. As shown in Table 4.9, these eleven regions 
are Paraguayan. These regions have an average activity rate equivalent to 72% of that of 
Mercosur and account for about two million people. It represents 40% of the population of 
Paraguay but less than 1% of the total Mercosur population. 
                                                
120 See the third section of Chapter 4. 
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Table 4.9. Activity rates: Mercosur regions below the threshold 
  Regional rate as a % of 
  
Total 
population 
Population in age of 
economic activity 
(>10yrs) 
Population 
economically 
active 
Activity 
rate (%) National M 4 M 6 
PY Misiones 98,607 62,111 25,225 40.6 85.8 68.4 68.5
PY Concepción 185,496 111,513 46,231 41.5 87.5 69.8 69.9
PY Caazapá 141,559 86,280 35,937 41.7 88.0 70.1 70.2
PY Cordillera 215,663 141,038 59,230 42.0 88.7 70.7 70.8
PY Alto Paraguay 13,831 8,698 3,660 42.1 88.9 70.9 70.9
PY Boquerón 35,241 21,534 9,192 42.7 90.1 71.9 72.0
PY Paraguarí 247,675 147,817 63,189 42.8 90.3 72.0 72.1
PY Ñeembucú 86,965 51,617 22,378 43.4 91.5 73.0 73.1
PY San Pedro 332,926 186,500 81,051 43.5 91.8 73.2 73.3
PY Caaguazú 442,161 260,225 114,510 44.0 92.9 74.1 74.2
PY Guairá 173,668 112,699 50,128 44.5 93.9 74.9 75.0
 Mercosur 4 1,973,792 1,190,032 510,731 42.9 N/A 72.3 72.3
 Mercosur 6 1,973,792 1,190,032 510,731 42.9 N/A N/A 72.3
 
A map of regional economic development in Mercosur 
To conclude this section on regional economic development gaps within Mercosur, it 
is useful to look at the regions which have at least one of the two economic indicators below 
75% of the Mercosur average.  
These regions are detailed in Table 4.10. As the table shows, out of the 110 Mercosur 
regions, 49 have one economic indicator below the 75% threshold and 11 have both. These 
regions respectively represent 38% and less than 1% of the Mercosur population. 
Table 4.10. Economic development: Mercosur regions with at least one economic 
indicator below the threshold  
 
Mercosur regions according to the n° of  
economic indicators below 75% of Mercosur average 
 N° of economic indicators 
 1 2 
N° of 
regions Population
% of national 
population 
Argentina Catamarca 
Chaco 
Corrientes 
Formosa 
Jujuy 
Salta 
Santiago del Estero 
Tucumán 
 8 5,919,819 17 
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Table 4.10 (continued) 
 
Mercosur regions according to the n° of  
economic indicators below 75% of Mercosur average 
 N° of economic indicators 
 1 2 
N° of 
regions Population
% of national 
population 
Brazil  Acre 
Alagoas 
Amapá 
Bahia 
Ceará 
Goiás 
Maranhão 
Mato Grosso 
Pará 
Paraíba 
Pernambuco 
Piauí 
Rio Grande do Norte 
Rondônia 
Roraima 
Sergipe 
Tocantins 
 17 62,094,559 39 
Paraguay Alto Paraná 
Amambay 
Asunción 
Canindeyú 
Central 
Itapúa 
Pdte. Hayes 
Alto Paraguay 
Boquerón 
Caaguazú 
Caazapá 
Concepción 
Cordillera 
Guairá 
Misiones 
Ñeembucú 
Paraguarí 
San Pedro 
18 5,085,328 100 
Uruguay None None 0 0 0 
Bolivia Beni 
Chuquisaca 
Cochabamba 
La Paz 
Oruro 
Pando 
Potosí 
Santa Cruz 
Tarija 
 9 7,767,060 100 
Chile Coquimbo 
De Aysén 
De La Araucanía 
De Los Lagos 
Del Biobío 
Del Libertador 
Del Maule 
Valparaíso 
8 7,724,087 51 
N° of 
regions 
49 11 60 N/A N/A 
Population 86,617,061 1,973,792 N/A 88,590,853 N/A 
% of M6 
population 
38 1 N/A 39 N/A 
This table enables an economic development map to be drawn for the six Mercosur 
countries (see Map 4.3). The map represents for each region the number of economic 
indicators which are below the 75% threshold. 
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Map 4.3. Mercosur regional economic development gaps 
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As the map shows, whereas none of the Uruguayan regions have economic indicators 
below the 75% threshold, all the Paraguayan and Bolivian departments have at least one 
economic indicator below this threshold. It is worth noting that all the eleven regions with 
both economic indicators below the threshold are Paraguayan. 
As highlighted in Map 4.3, only parts of the three other Mercosur countries have at 
least one economic indicator below the 75% threshold. As the previous table indicates, 51% 
of the Chilean population lives in eight regions having one economic indicator below the 75% 
threshold. These regions are all in the centre of the country. Indeed, the only regions with no 
economic indicator below the threshold are, in addition to the region of the capital city, those 
of the extreme south and extreme north of the country. More than half of Brazilian regions, 
seventeen of them, have one economic indicator below the 75% threshold. As shown in Map 
4.3, these regions, which represent 39% of the population, account for the whole of the 
Northeast, of the North, Amazonas excluded, and two states of the Centre West. Eight 
Argentinian regions have one economic indicator below the threshold. They are all situated in 
the north of the country and account for 17% of the population. 
THE INFRASTRUCTURE GAP 
The thesis now turns to look at disparities in terms of infrastructure provision. 
To describe the infrastructure development disparities among Mercosur regions, five 
indicators are considered. As explained in the first section, included here are road network 
density, electricity consumption, number of telephone lines, domestic connection to drinking 
water, and existence of waste removal facilities in houses. 
Road network 
The first indicator which is taken to symbolise the level of infrastructure development 
in Mercosur countries is their road network, that is the number of kilometres of roads, not 
necessarily paved, per 1,000 km². Roads being a widely used transportation infrastructure to 
carry goods and people across Mercosur territory, the importance of the network and the 
quality of the roads, that is the percentage of paved roads, are good indicators which can 
highlight infrastructure disparities between the different regions. 
First, from looking at national statistics (see Table 4.11), it is evident that there are 
significant disparities at this level among Mercosur members. Indeed, whereas Brazil has an 
average of almost 200 km of roads per 1,000 km², the road network of Argentina is twenty 
times less dense. Comparing these results to the Mercosur 6 data, they respectively 
correspond to 150% and 8% of this Mercosur average (126 km per 1,000 km²). The size of 
this gap can partially be explained by the importance given by Brazil to transportation 
infrastructure during the recent past while Argentina stopped its public financing of road 
construction. Argentina had previously a national fund for roads which was financed by taxes 
on petrol. The four other members are all below the Mercosur average. Whereas Chile is 
slightly underneath it, the indicators for Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia are at less than half of 
that of Mercosur. Brazil having an indicator much higher than the others and such a large 
territory, it pulls up the average leaving the other countries far behind. 
However, although Brazil has a dense road network, the state of the road network is 
not as good as in other countries since only 9% of the roads are paved, with asphalt or 
concrete, while in Argentina this percentage rises to 81%. The country with the lowest 
percentage of paved roads is Bolivia with only 6% of its network. The percentage in the other 
countries is between 13% and 28% (see Table 4.11). 
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Table 4.11. Road network density: Mercosur national averages 
 National road density 
as a % of 
 
Territory 
(km²) 
Total km of 
roads 
Road density 
(km per 1,000 
km²) 
% of paved 
roads 
Mercosur 4 Mercosur 6
Argentina 3,761,274 38,371 10.2 81.0 7.6 8.1
Brazil 8,547,403 1,658,677 194.1 9.1 144.7 153.7
Paraguay 406,752 23,515 57.8 13.3 43.1 45.8
Uruguay 175,016 8,660 49.5 27.8 36.9 39.2
Bolivia 1,098,581 53,468 48.7 5.7 N/A 38.5
Chile 754,905 79,077 104.8 17.2 N/A 83.0
Mercosur 4 12,890,445 1,729,223 134.1 10.8 100.0 106.2
Mercosur 6 14,743,931 1,861,768 126.3 11.0 N/A 100.0
 
Before analysing the regional statistics, a look at the standard and average deviations 
for these data shows the significance of the regional disparities. Indeed, out of the twelve 
indicators analysed, road network density has the highest deviations. The average deviation is 
111 and the standard deviation reaches 170. As shown in Table 4.12, the average deviation in 
each member state is lower than that at the Mercosur level. Brazil has by far the most 
significant regional disparities when it comes to road network. 
Table 4.12. Road network density: average deviations by country 
 AR BR PY UY BO CL M6 
Road network 50.4 93.5 74.6 43.3 66.7 75.9 110.7 
 
The significance of these disparities are highlighted in Figure 4.6. Only 34 regions 
have a road network which is similar to or more dense than the Mercosur average. Among 
these regions, six of them, all in Brazil, have indicators which represent more than four times 
the Mercosur average. One of these six regions, Paraná, stands at more than a 1,000% of the 
Mercosur average. At the other end of the spectrum, 68 regions are below the 75% threshold. 
Although it represents 79% of the Mercosur 6 average, the Paraguayan region of Amambay is 
included because it is below the 75% threshold in a Mercosur 4 situation (see Table 4.13 
below).  
Figure 4.6 shows that, apart from the range that is 0-25% of the Mercosur average, the 
regions are evenly distributed between 25% and more than 400%. This graphically highlights 
the extreme diversity of the road networks situation throughout Mercosur. The exception of 
the first category (0-25%) is mostly due to the presence of the whole of Argentina which 
swells it. 
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Figure 4.6. Distribution of the regions according to their road density compared to 
Mercosur average 
 
As shown in Table 4.13, the 69 regions with a road network indicator which is below 
75% of the Mercosur average are composed of the 24 Argentinian regions, 8 Brazilian, 9 
Paraguayan, 17 of the 19 Uruguayan, 6 of the 9 of Bolivia and 5 of the 13 Chilean regions. In 
Argentina the data of the City of Buenos Aires are extrapolated from those of the Province of 
Buenos Aires which includes it. 
The Argentinian case is mostly due to a lack of public support to road infrastructure at 
the national level, but also due to natural constraints such as the Andean mountains in the 
west and the harsh climatic conditions of the Arctic south. Indeed, the Mercosur region with 
the least dense road network is that containing Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and South 
Atlantic Islands; this represents 0.7% of the Mercosur average.  
In Brazil, limited road infrastructure occur in the 7 regions of the North and the Mato 
Grosso (Central West). They are all slightly populated regions, at 3 persons per km² in 
average, and are where the Amazon forests and rivers render road construction very difficult.  
In the case of Paraguay most of the regions that have a road network representing less 
than 75% the Mercosur average are border regions. This is surprising since traditionally 
border regions are interfaces between countries and consequently regions where means of 
communication are well developed.  
In Uruguay, the only two regions which are not below the 75% threshold are the 
capital city and an adjacent region. Being mostly urban areas, these regions have better road 
networks than the rest of the country. 
In Bolivia, the three regions which are not below this threshold are at the centre of the 
country. The roads connecting the different regions and neighbouring countries, for example 
the highway linking Argentina and Peru passing through these regions, contribute to their 
relatively better level of road network while the rest of Bolivia has an underdeveloped road 
infrastructure, below the 75% threshold.  
Finally, in Chile, the five regions below the 75% threshold are at the extremes of the 
country. These are the three regions of the north and the two of the south. These last two 
countries, Bolivia and Chile, also have to contend with the Andean mountains which, as in the 
case of the Amazon, has a direct negative impact on the development of road networks.   
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The majority of the Mercosur territory suffers from road infrastructure 
underdevelopment, that is below the threshold (see complete statistical tables and map in 
Appendix A2.3.1). These 69 regions represent 70% of the Mercosur territory. This can be 
explained by the presence among these of the four largest regions of Mercosur – i) Amazonas, 
ii) Pará, iii)Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands, and iv) Mato Grosso – 
which account for almost 5 million square kilometres, a third of Mercosur. However, since 
these infrastructurally underdeveloped regions are not densely populated, only a fourth of 
Mercosur population is found in this area. These regions have a road network which only 
represents 22% of the Mercosur average, which shows the significant gap which separates 
them from the rest of the territory. 
Table 4.13. Road network density: Mercosur regions below the threshold 
  Regional road density as a % of 
  
Population Territory (km²) 
Km of 
roads 
Paved 
roads
(%) 
Road density 
(km per 
1,000 km²) Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Tierra del Fuego, 
Antarctica and South 
Atlantic Islands 
89,992 1,002,445 908 24.3 0.9 8.9 0.7 0.7
BR Amazonas 2,460,434 1,577,820 6,034 28.2 3.8 2.0 2.9 3.0
AR Catamarca 289,212 102,602 891 82.0 8.7 85.1 6.5 6.9
AR San Juan 555,223 89,651 827 88.6 9.2 90.4 6.9 7.3
PY Alto Paraguay 13,831 82,349 802 0.0 9.7 16.8 7.3 7.7
AR Santa Cruz 181,198 243,943 2,392 43.3 9.8 96.1 7.3 7.8
AR Chubut 399,125 224,686 2,275 64.7 10.1 99.3 7.5 8.0
AR Santiago del Estero 700,114 136,351 1,464 90.8 10.7 105.3 8.0 8.5
AR La Pampa 282,356 143,440 1,589 85.5 11.1 108.6 8.3 8.8
AR Chaco 895,900 99,633 1,112 70.3 11.2 109.4 8.3 8.8
AR Mendoza 1,508,959 148,827 1,727 90.9 11.6 113.8 8.7 9.2
AR Río Negro 559,590 203,013 2,382 66.0 11.7 115.0 8.7 9.3
AR Salta 958,094 155,488 1,889 61.2 12.1 119.1 9.1 9.6
BR Amapá 402,557 143,453 2,012 11.1 14.0 7.2 10.5 11.1
AR Jujuy 555,097 53,219 754 61.9 14.2 138.9 10.6 11.2
BR Acre 504,489 153,149 2,266 21.2 14.8 7.6 11.0 11.7
AR Buenos Aires 16,407,287 307,771 4,690 100.0 15.2 149.4 11.4 12.1
AR Córdoba 2,929,734 165,321 2,526 100.0 15.3 149.8 11.4 12.1
BO Beni 336,633 213,564 3,294 2.2 15.4 31.7 N/A 12.2
AR Neuquén 463,266 94,078 1,568 87.6 16.7 163.4 12.4 13.2
AR San Luis 321,890 76,748 1,294 100.0 16.9 165.3 12.6 13.4
AR Formosa 447,094 72,066 1,310 55.0 18.2 178.2 13.6 14.4
AR Entre Ríos 1,069,102 78,781 1,460 100.0 18.5 181.7 13.8 14.7
AR Santa Fe 2,949,050 133,007 2,479 96.2 18.6 182.7 13.9 14.8
AR La Rioja 247,575 89,680 1,727 78.1 19.3 188.8 14.4 15.3
AR Corrientes 857,685 88,199 1,761 100.0 20.0 195.7 14.9 15.8
BO Pando 53,124 63,827 1,276 2.6 20.0 41.1 N/A 15.8
BR Roraima 258,088 225,116 4,868 15.3 21.6 11.1 16.1 17.1
AR Tucumán 1,216,623 22,524 507 89.2 22.5 220.7 16.8 17.8
UY Salto  117,597 14,163 328 30.5 23.2 46.8 17.3 18.3
CL De Aysén 93,636 107,567 2,552 6.2 23.7 22.6 N/A 18.8
CL De Magallanes 156,530 132,033 3,250 12.9 24.6 23.5 N/A 19.5
BO Santa Cruz 1,651,951 370,621 9,134 9.9 24.6 50.6 N/A 19.5
BR Pará 5,724,140 1,253,164 34,344 9.9 27.4 14.1 20.4 21.7
AR Misiones 884,291 29,801 839 76.3 28.2 276.0 21.0 22.3
PY Pdte. Hayes 77,145 72,907 2,066 27.7 28.3 49.0 21.1 22.4
UY Lavalleja  61,085 10,016 288 68.1 28.8 58.1 21.4 22.8
PY Boquerón 35,241 91,669 2,678 4.5 29.2 50.5 21.8 23.1
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Table 4.13 (continued) 
  Regional data as a % of 
  
Population Territory (km²) 
Km of 
roads 
Paved 
roads
(%) 
Road density 
(km per 
1,000 km²) Nation M 4 M 6 
UY Treinta y Tres  49,502 9,529 280 41.1 29.4 59.4 21.9 23.3
UY Paysandú  111,509 13,922 431 14.8 31.0 62.6 23.1 24.5
UY Durazno  55,716 11,643 362 34.3 31.1 62.8 23.2 24.6
UY Artigas  75,059 11,928 394 26.4 33.0 66.8 24.6 26.2
UY Cerro Largo  82,510 13,648 485 0.8 35.5 71.8 26.5 28.1
UY Tacuarembó  84,919 15,438 558 15.4 36.1 73.0 26.9 28.6
CL Antofagasta 462,286 126,049 5,563 26.2 44.1 42.1 N/A 35.0
UY Rivera  98,472 9,370 438 0.0 46.7 94.5 34.8 37.0
UY Río Negro  51,713 9,282 447 24.8 48.2 97.3 35.9 38.1
PY Ñeembucú 86,965 12,147 657 3.4 54.1 93.5 40.3 42.8
UY Flores  25,030 5,144 279 29.7 54.2 109.6 40.4 43.0
UY Soriano  81,557 9,008 513 25.0 56.9 115.1 42.5 45.1
PY Misiones 98,607 9,556 614 22.3 64.3 111.2 47.9 50.9
UY Rocha  70,292 10,551 682 25.1 64.6 130.6 48.2 51.2
UY Florida  66,503 10,417 686 15.2 65.9 133.1 49.1 52.2
BO La Paz 2,268,824 133,985 9,096 6.4 67.9 139.5 N/A 53.8
BO Tarija 368,506 37,623 2,694 9.3 71.6 147.1 N/A 56.7
PY Canindeyú 133,075 14,667 1,056 0.0 72.0 124.6 53.7 57.0
UY San José  96,664 4,992 389 74.3 77.9 157.5 58.1 61.7
CL Tarapacá 385,620 59,099 4,621 23.7 78.2 74.6 N/A 61.9
UY Maldonado  127,502 4,793 382 41.6 79.7 161.1 59.4 63.1
PY Alto Paraná 595,276 14,895 1,207 7.6 81.0 140.2 60.4 64.2
PY Caazapá 141,559 9,496 793 2.0 83.5 144.4 62.2 66.1
CL Atacama 269,047 75,176 6,366 15.4 84.7 80.8 N/A 67.1
BO Oruro 383,498 53,588 4,580 6.9 85.5 175.6 N/A 67.7
UY Colonia  120,241 6,106 531 20.7 87.0 175.8 64.8 68.9
BR Tocantins 1,096,967 278,420 24,766 6.0 89.0 45.8 66.3 70.4
BR Mato Grosso 2,335,344 906,806 82,875 4.8 91.4 47.1 68.1 72.4
BR Rondônia 1,289,365 238,512 22,433 6.3 94.1 48.5 70.1 74.5
PY Amambay 127,011 12,933 1,289 10.1 99.7 172.4 74.3 78.9
 Total Mercosur 4 51,524,422 9,028,283 236,604 20.1 26.2 N/A 19.5 20.8
 Total Mercosur 6 57,954,077 10,401,415 289,030 18.6 27.8 N/A N/A 22.0
 
Consumption of electricity 
A second indicator used to represent regional disparities in infrastructure development 
in Mercosur is electricity consumption, that is total electricity consumption divided by the 
population. As briefly described in the first section, this indicator has two parts. High 
consumption appears to imply first that people are connected to the electricity distribution 
network. This suggests that they have goods requiring electricity such as light, TV and fridge, 
which imply better living conditions. However, high consumption also signifies that there are 
companies using electrical power for machines, and this suggests a certain level of economic 
development. 
Beginning the analysis with a look at the national statistics, there immediately appears 
a gap between Paraguay and Bolivia on the one hand and the other member countries on the 
other. Indeed, as Table 4.14 shows, whereas the four other countries have a superior 
electricity consumption per capita, which stands at 158% in the case of Chile, or have a 
slightly inferior consumption compared to the Mercosur average, such as Argentina with 
86%, Paraguay and Bolivia are considerably below this average, with respectively 48% and 
29%. In addition to having a low electricity consumption per capita, these two countries are 
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characterised by a high percentage of residential utilisation, respectively 46% and 39%, 
Uruguay being the only other country with such a high percentage. These two indicators 
indirectly highlight that both Paraguay and Bolivia are relatively poor and less industrialised 
than the other Mercosur countries. 
Argentina and Brazil are very similar. Their consumption per capita is almost the 
same, close to the Mercosur average, and both have a residential consumption representing 
about a third of the total. It shows that both have relatively well-off populations and are well 
industrialised. 
In spite of having the highest electricity consumption per capita of Mercosur, Uruguay 
and Chile are very different, as highlighted by the percentage of residential consumption. This 
percentage being very high in Uruguay, it shows its lack of industrialisation, especially 
compared to Chile where the residential consumption percentage is the lowest in Mercosur. 
Table 4.14. Electricity consumption per capita: Mercosur national averages 
 National consumption per capita as a % of 
 
Total 
Population 
Total 
consumption 
(MWh) 
Residential 
consumption 
(%) 
Consumption 
per capita 
(kWh) Mercosur 4 Mercosur 6 
Argentina 34,768,457 45,281,477 34.0 1,302.4 87.1 85.8 
Brazil 160,710,275 249,099,000 32.6 1,550.0 103.7 102.1 
Paraguay 5,085,328 3,737,828 46.0 735.0 49.2 48.4 
Uruguay 3,163,763 6,378,284 45.5 2,016.0 134.9 132.8 
Bolivia 7,767,060 3,420,910 38.6 440.4 N/A 29.0 
Chile 15,010,755 35,911,000 16.2 2,392.4 N/A 157.6 
Mercosur 4 203,727,823 304,496,588 33.3 1,494.6 100.0 98.5 
Mercosur 6 226,505,638 343,828,498 31.6 1,518.0 N/A 100.0 
 
Calculating the average and standard deviations for the electricity consumption 
confirms that regional disparities are rather significant. The value for these two deviations are 
respectively 36 and 44. The average deviation of Chile is null since, due to a lack of regional 
statistics, its 13 regions were considered to have the same indicator (158%). Paraguay is by 
far the country with the highest average deviation. It is also the only country with a deviation 
higher than that of Mercosur. 
Table 4.15. Electricity consumption per capita: average deviations by country 
 AR BR PY UY BO CL M6 
Electricity Consumption 28.9 34.2 55.4 19.4 31.9 0.0 36.4 
 
When looking at the regional disparities (see also Appendix A2.3.2 for a complete 
statistical table and map on electricity consumption), it appears that only 34 regions have an 
electricity consumption per capita higher than the Mercosur average. The region with the 
highest consumption is that of Maldonado in Uruguay, with 209% of the Mercosur average. 
This number of 34 regions is slightly biased and overestimated because of the homogenisation 
of Chile. 
As represented in Figure 4.7, 71 regions have a level of consumption of electricity per 
capita which is lower than the Mercosur average, with indicators which are as low as 0.1% of 
Mercosur average in Santiago del Estero in Argentina. Out of these, 59 have an indicator 
lower than 75% of this Mercosur statistic: 14 in Argentina, 17 in Brazil, 16 Paraguayan, 3 in 
Uruguay and the whole of Bolivia. It should be noted that the data for Asunción are 
extrapolated from those of Central which include it. Moreover, in the case of Bolivia, since 
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data were available only for an area comprising Tarija, Beni and Pando, it was assumed that 
each of these three regions had the same indicator value. 
Figure 4.7. Distribution of the regions according to their electricity consumption per 
capita compared to Mercosur average 
 
The fact that the whole of Bolivia and Paraguay are below the 75% threshold, with the 
exception of the Central and Asunción departments in Paraguay – both representing 87% of 
the Mercosur average – has been previously explained during the analysis at the national 
level. The three Uruguayan departments below this threshold, Artigas, Durazno and 
Tacuarembó, are situated in the centre and the north of the country and are essentially rural 
areas, which may explain their lower consumption. 
In Argentina, most of the regions which are underneath the 75% threshold are in the 
northwest, a few others being in the centre and the south. They are essentially rural and 
mountainous areas, which renders the task of connecting people and businesses to electricity 
networks harder. More than half of the Brazilian regions have an electricity consumption per 
capita less than 75% of the Mercosur average. They are part of the North, Northeast and 
Central West areas, which are the relatively less developed regions of Brazil and where the 
Amazon forest is a natural obstacle to any kind of infrastructural development. 
As Table 4.16 shows, the population of these 59 regions add up to 78 million people, a 
third of that of Mercosur. Their average consumption of electricity per capita only represents 
half of that of the Mercosur average. 
Table 4.16. Electricity consumption per capita: Mercosur regions below the threshold 
  Regional consumption per capita as a % of 
  
Population Consumption (MWh) 
% of 
residential 
consumption
Consumption 
per capita 
(kWh) Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Santiago del Estero 700,114 344 57.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1
AR Catamarca 289,212 2,941 3.1 10.2 0.8 0.7 0.7
PY Boquerón 35,241 2,001 31.6 56.8 7.7 3.8 3.7
BO Potosí 746,618 82,328 24.8 110.3 25.0 N/A 7.3
PY Alto Paraguay 13,831 1,761 55.8 127.3 17.3 8.5 8.4
PY Caazapá 141,559 20,265 67.8 143.2 19.5 9.6 9.4
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 103,969 38.0 189.1 42.9 N/A 12.5
PY San Pedro 332,926 65,102 61.2 195.5 26.6 13.1 12.9
PY Paraguarí 247,675 61,335 61.4 247.6 33.7 16.6 16.3
PY Canindeyú 133,075 39,203 42.5 294.6 40.1 19.7 19.4
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Table 4.16 (continued) 
  Regional consumption per capita as a % of 
  
Population Consumption (MWh) 
% of 
residential 
consumption
Consumption 
per capita 
(kWh) Nation M 4 M 6 
PY Caaguazú 442,161 148,565 47.1 336.0 45.7 22.5 22.1
BR Piauí 2,758,129 948,000 62.8 343.7 22.2 23.0 22.6
BO Cochabamba 1,408,071 519,365 41.9 368.9 83.8 N/A 24.3
BO La Paz 2,268,824 938,444 49.0 413.6 93.9 N/A 27.3
PY Guairá 173,668 73,201 22.8 421.5 57.4 28.2 27.8
PY Itapúa 454,757 191,893 51.6 422.0 57.4 28.2 27.8
BR Tocantins 1,096,967 467,000 58.2 425.7 27.5 28.5 28.1
PY Cordillera 215,663 92,238 67.2 427.7 58.2 28.6 28.2
AR Jujuy 555,097 247,542 54.0 445.9 34.2 29.8 29.4
PY Amambay 127,011 57,670 49.0 454.1 61.8 30.4 29.9
PY Concepción 185,496 87,402 26.9 471.2 64.1 31.5 31.0
BO Oruro 383,498 190,867 21.7 497.7 113.0 N/A 32.8
BR Acre 504,489 261,000 66.3 517.4 33.4 34.6 34.1
PY Ñeembucú 86,965 45,778 29.5 526.4 71.6 35.2 34.7
AR Formosa 447,094 248,374 N/A 555.5 42.7 37.2 36.6
BR Paraíba 3,433,234 2,021,000 41.4 588.7 38.0 39.4 38.8
BO Santa Cruz 1,651,951 1,032,518 42.3 625.0 141.9 N/A 41.2
BR Rondônia 1,289,365 853,000 57.7 661.6 42.7 44.3 43.6
BR Ceará 7,010,107 4,681,000 41.9 667.8 43.1 44.7 44.0
AR La Rioja 247,575 172,829 59.9 698.1 53.6 46.7 46.0
PY Alto Paraná 595,276 419,769 47.3 705.2 95.9 47.2 46.5
AR Corrientes 857,685 608,650 N/A 709.6 54.5 47.5 46.8
BR Amapá 402,557 290,000 68.6 720.4 46.5 48.2 47.5
AR Tucumán 1,216,623 881,514 44.0 724.6 55.6 48.5 47.7
BO Tarija-Beni-Pando 758,263 553,418 18.9 729.9 165.7 N/A 48.1
AR Misiones 884,291 667,790 27.3 755.2 58.0 50.5 49.8
BR Pernambuco 7,548,183 5,777,000 43.5 765.4 49.4 51.2 50.4
AR Chaco 895,900 685,880 49.9 765.6 58.8 51.2 50.4
BR Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 2,044,000 39.9 773.9 49.9 51.8 51.0
BR Roraima 258,088 202,000 72.3 782.7 50.5 52.4 51.6
AR Santa Cruz 181,198 144,530 47.4 797.6 61.2 53.4 52.6
PY Misiones 98,607 82,125 28.0 832.9 113.3 55.7 54.9
BR Amazonas 2,460,434 2,053,000 44.0 834.4 53.8 55.8 55.0
BR Bahia 12,697,007 12,124,000 25.7 954.9 61.6 63.9 62.9
BR Mato Grosso 2,335,344 2,367,000 49.4 1,013.6 65.4 67.8 66.8
AR San Juan 555,223 576,487 40.9 1,038.3 79.7 69.5 68.4
UY Artigas  75,059 77,975 49.5 1,038.9 51.5 69.5 68.4
BR Alagoas 2,754,697 2,871,000 23.1 1,042.2 67.2 69.7 68.7
BR Sergipe 1,662,168 1,737,000 29.8 1,045.0 67.4 69.9 68.8
PY Pdte. Hayes 77,145 80,735 15.3 1,046.5 142.4 70.0 68.9
BR Goiás 4,629,154 4,857,000 46.5 1,049.2 67.7 70.2 69.1
AR Entre Ríos 1,069,102 1,128,432 30.2 1,055.5 81.0 70.6 69.5
UY Durazno  55,716 59,135 57.9 1,061.4 52.7 71.0 69.9
AR La Pampa 282,356 300,256 46.5 1,063.4 81.7 71.2 70.1
BR Mato Grosso do Sul 1,985,579 2,136,000 46.6 1,075.8 69.4 72.0 70.9
UY Tacuarembó  84,919 95,913 50.0 1,129.5 56.0 75.6 74.4
AR Córdoba 2,929,734 3,345,182 26.4 1,141.8 87.7 76.4 75.2
 Mercosur 4 70,154,811 56,401,816 37.6 804.0 N/A 53.8 53.0
 Mercosur 6 77,921,871 59,822,726 37.7 767.7 N/A N/A 50.6
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Telephone lines 
The number of telephone lines in service is a third good infrastructure indicator. As for 
electricity consumption, it can give indications about: 
1. The level of development of infrastructure since the telephone network needs to be 
built;  
2. The quality of life since, not being considered an essential good, the presence of a 
telephone in a house represents a ‘luxury’;  
3. The economic situation since it is difficult for businesses to work at a scale larger than 
the local level without a telephone line.  
The analysis of national statistics (see Table 4.17) shows that, as for electricity 
consumption, Paraguay and Bolivia are below the Mercosur average. Their data respectively 
correspond to 20% and 36% of the Mercosur average of 129 telephone lines per 1,000 
inhabitants. The same reasons apply to explain this low indicator, that is high poverty and a 
weak economy. Whereas Brazil is slightly below the Mercosur average, Argentina, Uruguay 
and Chile have indicators much higher. The country with the most telephone lines per 1,000 
people is Uruguay. This may be explained by the relative richness of this country, since it has 
the second highest GDP per capita of Mercosur121, and its small size which render the 
construction of the infrastructure less costly.  
Table 4.17. Telephone lines per 1,000 persons: Mercosur national averages 
 Country data as a % of 
 Population 
Tel lines in 
service 
Tel lines per 
1,000 people Mercosur 4 Mercosur 6 
Argentina 34,768,457 6,824,425 196.3 155.2 152.0 
Brazil 160,710,275 17,888,211 111.3 88.0 86.2 
Paraguay 5,085,328 127,894 25.1 19.9 19.5 
Uruguay 3,163,763 931,713 294.5 232.8 228.1 
Bolivia 7,767,060 364,075 46.9 N/A 36.3 
Chile 15,010,755 3,108,799 207.1 N/A 160.4 
Mercosur 4 203,727,823 25,772,243 126.5 100.0 98.0 
Mercosur 6 226,505,638 29,245,117 129.1 N/A 100.0 
 
Before going further in the analysis, it is necessary to note that, since no departmental 
statistics were available for Paraguay, the country has been considered homogeneous and its 
19 regions were given the national average.  
For this indicator the average and standard deviations are significant. They are the 
third highest among the twelve indicators analysed. They respectively represent 46 and 58 
points. In considering the national average deviation, as detailed in Table 4.18, it appears that 
the regional disparities are approximately the same in all Mercosur countries. Paraguay is 
excepted because of its hypothesised homogeneity. Indeed, the average deviation of Mercosur 
countries for telephone lines ranges between 27 and 37. 
Table 4.18. Telephone lines per 1,000 persons: average deviations by country 
 AR BR PY UY BO CL M6 
Telephone lines 
per 1,000 persons 
35.8 37.1 0.0 27.4 31.8 35.9 45.6 
                                                
121 See the third section of Chapter 4. 
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Only 43 regions have an indicator higher than the Mercosur average. Maldonado, in 
Uruguay, is the region with the highest indicator since, with one telephone line for every two 
persons, it represents more than 380% of the Mercosur average. These 43 regions comprise 12 
Argentinian regions, 3 in Brazil, the 19 Uruguayan departments and 9 Chilean regions. 
Out of the 67 regions in which the indicator is lower than the Mercosur average, 53 are 
below the 75% threshold. As highlighted in Figure 4.8, these 53 regions include the whole of 
Paraguay and of Bolivia, as well as 9 regions of Argentina, 16 of Brazil and 1 of Chile. The 
region with the lowest indicator is that of Pando in Bolivia which only reaches 12% of the 
Mercosur average. 
Figure 4.8. Distribution of the regions according to their number of telephone lines per 
1,000 persons compared to Mercosur average 
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The situation of Paraguay and Bolivia does not require any comment since their case 
was briefly explained in the national level analysis. The region of Chile which is slightly 
below the 75% threshold of the Mercosur average is that of Del Maule. There are no 
particular geographic or natural reasons which could explain this since it is not an isolated 
region but close to the capital city. The 9 Argentinian regions with lower indicators are all 
located in the north of the country, a traditionally poorer area of Argentina. In the case of 
Brazil, the regions concerned are the whole of the North, Roraima excepted, and of the 
Northeast as well as Mato Grosso in Central West. They are all relatively poor areas where 
infrastructure development is difficult because of the forests and rivers of the Amazon basin.  
As calculated within Table 4.19 below, the 53 regions whose indicator of telephone 
lines per 1,000 persons is lower than 75% of the Mercosur average represent 35% of the total 
population, that is more than 80 million people. Their average number of telephone lines per 
1,000 persons only represents 44% of the Mercosur average. More information on these 
regional data and a map are available in Appendix A2.3.3. 
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Table 4.19. Telephone lines per 1,000 persons: Mercosur regions below the threshold 
  Regional data as a % of 
  
Population Telephone lines in service
Telephone lines 
for 1,000 people National M 4 M 6 
BO Pando 53,124 851 16.0 34.2 N/A 12.4 
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 13,108 23.8 50.9 N/A 18.5 
PY Total Paraguay 5,085,328 127,894 25.1 100.0 19.9 19.5 
BO Cochabamba 1,408,071 36,481 25.9 55.3 N/A 20.1 
BO Potosí 746,618 23,991 32.1 68.6 N/A 24.9 
BR Maranhão 5,349,575 172,482 32.2 29.0 25.5 25.0 
BR Tocantins 1,096,967 38,502 35.1 31.5 27.7 27.2 
BO Beni 336,633 12,958 38.5 82.1 N/A 29.8 
AR Formosa 447,094 18,444 41.3 20.8 32.6 32.0 
BO Tarija 368,506 17,010 46.2 98.5 N/A 35.8 
BR Piauí 2,758,129 128,359 46.5 41.8 36.8 36.0 
BR Pará 5,724,140 278,306 48.6 43.7 38.4 37.7 
BR Pernambuco 7,548,183 374,712 49.6 44.6 39.2 38.4 
BO Oruro 383,498 19,680 51.3 109.5 N/A 39.7 
BR Rondônia 1,289,365 70,188 54.4 48.9 43.0 42.2 
BR Alagoas 2,754,697 151,377 55.0 49.4 43.4 42.6 
AR Jujuy 555,097 32,166 57.9 29.2 45.8 44.9 
AR Santiago del Estero 700,114 40,815 58.3 29.4 46.1 45.2 
BR Paraíba 3,433,234 206,945 60.3 54.2 47.6 46.7 
BO La Paz 2,268,824 138,228 60.9 130.0 N/A 47.2 
BO Santa Cruz 1,651,951 101,768 61.6 131.4 N/A 47.7 
BR Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 165,262 62.6 56.2 49.5 48.5 
BR Sergipe 1,662,168 105,327 63.4 56.9 50.1 49.1 
BR Bahia 12,697,007 820,418 64.6 58.0 51.1 50.0 
AR Chaco 895,900 59,935 66.9 33.8 52.9 51.8 
BR Ceará 7,010,107 503,816 71.9 64.6 56.8 55.7 
BR Acre 504,489 36,352 72.1 64.7 57.0 55.8 
AR Salta 958,094 74,036 77.3 39.0 61.1 59.9 
AR Misiones 884,291 68,878 77.9 39.3 61.6 60.3 
BR Amazonas 2,460,434 191,676 77.9 70.0 61.6 60.3 
AR Catamarca 289,212 24,333 84.1 42.4 66.5 65.2 
AR Corrientes 857,685 74,099 86.4 43.6 68.3 66.9 
BR Mato Grosso 2,335,344 202,999 86.9 78.1 68.7 67.3 
BR Amapá 402,557 36,579 90.9 81.6 71.8 70.4 
CL Del Maule 906,882 83,896 92.5 44.7 N/A 71.7 
AR Tucumán 1,216,623 114,514 94.1 47.5 74.4 72.9 
 Mercosur 4 71,557,189 4,118,414 57.6 N/A 45.5 44.6 
 Mercosur 6 80,231,131 4,566,385 56.9 N/A N/A 44.1 
The whole of Paraguay (in italics) is included due to the homogenisation of data 
Domestic access to drinking water  
The fourth indicator studied to highlight the regional infrastructure development gaps 
is the percentage of the population having access to drinking water. It is an indicator of social 
improvement, but also of hygiene. It consequently has an indirect impact on health. It is also 
an important indicator since easy connection to water leaves people time for other tasks. 
Before analysing the statistics, it is necessary to consider a difficulty which arose in 
the collection of these statistics. Data for Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile were only available 
based on the number of houses connected to drinking water, whereas that of the three other 
countries existed only in relation to people. To enable comparisons, the percentages of houses 
connected to drinking water in the first three countries mentioned were extrapolated to the 
population of these regions, to reach an estimation of the percentage of people having access 
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to drinking water in their homes (see Appendix A2.3.4 for more details on this procedure, for 
the complete statistical table and for a map). 
At the national level the disparities are not too significant. Only two countries, 
Uruguay and Chile, have a better accessibility to drinking water than the Mercosur average. 
Among the four other countries, Paraguay has the worst accessibility since its national 
average only represents 81% of the Mercosur average. 
Table 4.20. Domestic access to drinking water: Mercosur national averages 
 Country accessibility to drinking water as a % of
 
Total 
Population 
Total n° of 
houses 
Pop. or houses 
having access to 
drinking water 
% with access 
to drinking 
water Mercosur 4 Mercosur 6
Argentina 34,768,457 N/A 24,445,702 70.3 96.2 94.7
Brazil 160,710,275 N/A 118,758,834 73.9 101.1 99.6
Paraguay 5,085,328 N/A 3,051,197 60.0 82.1 80.9
Uruguay 3,163,763 970,037 808,355 83.3 114.0 112.3
Bolivia 7,767,060 1,822,785 1,296,180 71.1 N/A 95.8
Chile 15,010,755 3,101,356 2,826,298 91.1 N/A 122.8
Mercosur 4 203,727,823 N/A 148,892,172* 73.1 100.0 98.5
Mercosur 6 226,505,638 N/A 168,094,776* 74.2 N/A 100.0
* Estimated total population having access to drinking water calculated by extrapolating the percentages of 
houses having access to the total population of Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile 
 
Regional data show more significant disparities than the national ones. Before 
pursuing the analysis, it is worth mentioning that no regional statistics being available for 
Paraguay, the national average was applied to each of its regions. 
The average and standard deviations for this indicator are not too significant since they 
respectively are 18 and 22. As shown in Table 4.21, Chile is by far the most homogeneous 
country for this statistic since its average deviation is only 1. Argentina has the highest 
average deviation, which is slightly higher than that at the Mercosur level. 
Table 4.21. Domestic access to drinking water: average deviations by country 
 AR BR PY UY BO CL M6 
Access to drinking water 19.1 17.8 0.0 8.9 14.9 1.0 18.1 
 
As represented in Figure 4.9, half the regions are above the Mercosur average. They 
include the whole of Chile, most of Argentina and Uruguay, with a few Brazilian and 
Bolivian regions. The region with the highest indicator is the City of Buenos Aires which 
stands at 135% of the Mercosur average. Among the 54 regions which have a lower 
accessibility to drinking water than the Mercosur average, though this number might be 
biased by the presence of all the Paraguayan regions, only 9 are below the 75% threshold.  
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Figure 4.9. Distribution of the regions according to their domestic accessibility to 
drinking water compared to Mercosur average 
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Among the 9 regions which have an accessibility to drinking water lower than 75% of 
the Mercosur average, there is only one Argentinian province, 5 Brazilian states and 3 
Bolivian departments (see Table 4.22). The province of Misiones is far behind the other 
Argentinian regions with only 53% of the Mercosur average. One of the three Bolivian 
regions is also far below other regions since Pando represents 44% of the Mercosur average 
while the other two are closer to 70%. As could be expected, given the difficulties of 
infrastructure development and the relative poverty in the North and Northeast of Brazil, its 
five regions below the 75% threshold are situated within these two areas. 
These 9 regions have an average indicator equivalent to 56% of the Mercosur average. 
They represent 22 million people, that is about 10% of Mercosur population. 
Table 4.22. Domestic access to drinking water: Mercosur regions below the threshold 
  Regional data as a % of 
  
Population 
Population 
with access to 
drinking water
% of population 
with access to 
drinking water Nation M 4 M 6 
BR Pará 5,724,140 1,760,543 30.8 41.6 42.1 41.4 
BO Pando* 53,124 17,423 32.8 46.1 N/A 44.2 
BR Rondônia 1,289,365 443,206 34.4 46.5 47.0 46.3 
AR Misiones 884,291 348,764 39.4 56.1 54.0 53.1 
BR Acre 504,489 212,342 42.1 57.0 57.6 56.7 
BR Maranhão 5,349,575 2,273,979 42.5 57.5 58.2 57.3 
BR Ceará 7,010,107 3,484,160 49.7 67.3 68.0 67.0 
BO Potosí* 746,618 380,917 51.0 71.7 N/A 68.7 
BO Chuquisaca* 549,835 300,212 54.6 76.8 N/A 73.6 
 Mercosur 4 20,761,967 8,522,994 41.1 N/A 56.2 55.3 
 Mercosur 6 22,111,544 9,221,546 41.7 N/A N/A 56.2 
* For Bolivian regions, the population having access to drinking water was calculated by  
applying the percentage of houses having access to water to the regional populations. 
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Domestic access to waste disposal systems  
The fifth and final indicator of the infrastructure development gap is the domestic 
accessibility to waste removal facilities. As for the access to drinking water, this indicator can 
represent the quality of life and the level of hygiene which has a positive impact on health. 
For Uruguay and Bolivia a similar problem to that of accessibility to drinking water was 
encountered. To enable comparisons, the statistics for these two countries being only 
available for houses, the percentage of connection had to be extrapolated to the total 
population. 
Significant disparities exist at the national level as shown in Table 4.23. Three 
countries have a better indicator than that of Mercosur. Whereas Brazil is slightly above it, the 
difference is much bigger for Uruguay which stands at 147% of the Mercosur average. 
Similarly, among the three other countries which are below the Mercosur average, one is 
slightly below it, Bolivia with 91%, while the two others are much lower, the lowest being 
Argentina with 55%.  
Table 4.23. Domestic access to waste removal facility: Mercosur national averages 
 Country as a % of 
 
Total 
Population 
Total n° 
of houses 
Pop. or houses 
having access to 
waste disposal 
% with access 
to waste 
disposal Mercosur 4 Mercosur 6
Argentina 34,768,457 N/A 12,534,029 36.1 56.4 55.4
Brazil 160,710,275 N/A 112,497,193 70.0 109.6 107.5
Paraguay 5,085,328 N/A 2,084,984 41.0 64.2 63.0
Uruguay 3,163,763 970,037 927,761 95.6 149.7 146.9
Bolivia 7,767,060 1,822,785 1,078,154 59.1 N/A 90.8
Chile 15,010,755 N/A 12,762,546 85.0 N/A 130.6
Mercosur 4 203,727,823 N/A 130,142,086 63.9 100.0 98.1
Mercosur 6 226,505,638 N/A 147,498,749 65.1 N/A 100.0
* Estimated total population having access to drinking water calculated by extrapolating the percentages of 
houses having access to the total population of Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile. 
Before pursuing the analysis, it has to be noted that both Brazil and Paraguay had to be 
considered homogeneous since no regional data were available for them.  
As for access to drinking water, the average and standard deviations are not too 
significant. Whereas the average deviation is the same (18), the standard deviation is slightly 
more significant than for access to drinking water (26 instead of 22). Argentina and Bolivia 
are by far the countries with the highest regional disparities since their average deviations are 
much more significant than that of the other members or of  Mercosur (see Table 4.24). On 
the contrary, Uruguay and Chile are rather homogeneous countries on this indicator. 
Table 4.24. Domestic access to waste removal facility: average deviations by country 
 AR BR PY UY BO CL M6 
Access to waste 
removal facility 
34.4 0.0 0.0 1.9 27.0 1.7 18.0 
As shown in Figure 4.10, most of Mercosur regions have an indicator higher than that 
of Mercosur (see Appendix A2.3.5 for the data of each region and a map). This group is large 
since it includes 65 of the Mercosur regions. The size of the group is not only the result of the 
biased presence of the 27 Brazilian regions, but also because it comprises the whole of 
Uruguay and of Chile as well as 2 Argentinian and 4 Bolivian regions. Among the 45 regions 
which have an accessibility to waste removal facilities lower than the Mercosur average, only 
3 are not below the 75% threshold.  
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Figure 4.10. Distribution of the regions according to their domestic accessibility to waste 
removal compared to Mercosur average 
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As detailed in Table 4.25, the 42 regions below the 75% threshold include the 18 
Paraguayan departments, due to the assumed homogeneity of the country, 21 Argentinian 
provinces and 3 Bolivian departments. These regions have an average indicator which only 
represents 48% of the Mercosur average and account for 17% of Mercosur’s population, that 
is 38 million people. 
Table 4.25. Domestic access to waste removal facility: Mercosur regions below the 
threshold 
  Regional data as a % of 
  
Population 
Population 
with access to 
waste disposal
% of population 
with access to 
waste disposal Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Misiones 884,291 66,322 7.5 20.8 11.7 11.5 
AR San Juan 555,223 70,125 12.6 35.0 19.8 19.4 
AR Chaco 895,900 119,961 13.4 37.1 21.0 20.6 
AR Santiago del Estero 700,114 103,547 14.8 41.0 23.2 22.7 
AR Córdoba 2,929,734 461,140 15.7 43.7 24.6 24.2 
AR Formosa 447,094 89,642 20.1 55.6 31.4 30.8 
AR La Rioja 247,575 57,388 23.2 64.3 36.3 35.6 
AR Catamarca 289,212 67,444 23.3 64.7 36.5 35.8 
BO Potosí 746,618 178,924 24.0 40.5 N/A 36.8 
AR San Luis 321,890 93,284 29.0 80.4 45.4 44.5 
AR Santa Fe 2,949,050 862,302 29.2 81.1 45.8 44.9 
AR Corrientes 857,685 260,565 30.4 84.3 47.6 46.7 
BO Oruro 383,498 121,423 31.7 53.5 N/A 48.6 
AR La Pampa 282,356 91,653 32.5 90.0 50.8 49.9 
AR Buenos Aires 13,379,401 4,400,485 33.0 91.2 51.5 50.5 
AR Neuquén 463,266 159,039 34.3 95.2 53.7 52.7 
AR Tucumán 1,216,623 419,370 34.5 95.6 54.0 52.9 
AR Río Negro 559,590 195,185 34.9 96.8 54.6 53.6 
AR Entre Ríos 1,069,102 385,091 36.0 99.9 56.4 55.3 
AR Jujuy 555,097 207,773 37.4 103.8 58.6 57.5 
AR Mendoza 1,508,959 581,402 38.5 106.9 60.3 59.2 
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 218,049 39.7 67.1 N/A 60.9 
PY Total Paraguay 5,085,328 2,084,984 41.0 100.0 64.2 63.0 
AR Salta 958,094 439,286 45.9 127.2 71.8 70.4 
AR Santa Cruz 181,198 88,515 48.9 135.5 76.5 75.0 
 Mercosur 4 36,336,782 11,304,503 31.1 N/A 48.7 47.8 
 Mercosur 6 38,016,733 11,822,898 31.1 N/A N/A 47.8 
The whole of Paraguay (in italics) is included due to the homogenisation of data 
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A map of regional infrastructure development in Mercosur 
It is possible to compile the five infrastructure indicators analysed above to draw a 
picture of the infrastructure development gap in Mercosur. Table 4.26 enumerates the regions 
of each country according to the number of infrastructure indicators that are below the 75% 
threshold. Using this information, it is possible to draw a map of the Mercosur regions 
according to their  infrastructure development (Map 4.4 below). 
Table 4.26. Infrastructure development: Mercosur regions with at least one 
infrastructure indicator below the threshold  
 Mercosur regions according to the n° of infrastructure indicators below 75% of Mercosur average 
 N° of infrastructure indicators 
 1 2 3 4 5 
N° of 
regions Population 
% of 
national pop
Argentina Chubut 
Ciudad de 
Buenos Aires 
Tierra del 
Fuego, 
Antártica e 
Islas del 
Atlántico Sur 
Buenos Aires 
Mendoza 
Neuquén 
Río Negro 
San Luis 
Santa Fe 
Córdoba 
Entre Ríos 
La Pampa 
La Rioja 
Salta 
San Juan 
Santa Cruz 
Catamarca 
Chaco 
Corrientes 
Formosa 
Jujuy 
Santiago 
del Estero 
Tucumán 
Misiones 24 34,768,457 100 
Brazil  Goiás 
Mato Grosso 
do Sul 
Alagoas 
Bahia 
Maranhão 
Paraíba 
Pernambuco 
Piauí 
Rio Grande do 
Norte 
Roraima 
Sergipe 
Amapá 
Amazonas 
Ceará 
Mato Grosso
Pará 
Tocantins 
Acre 
Rondônia 
 
 
19 66,540,572 41 
Paraguay  Asunción 
Central 
Caaguazú 
Concepción 
Cordillera 
Guairá 
Itapúa 
Paraguarí 
San Pedro 
Alto 
Paraguay 
Alto Paraná
Amambay 
Boquerón 
Caazapá 
Canindeyú 
Misiones 
Ñeembucú 
Pdte. Hayes
 18 5,085,328 100 
Uruguay Cerro Largo  
Colonia  
Flores  
Florida  
Lavalleja  
Maldonado  
Paysandú  
Río Negro  
Rivera  
Rocha  
Salto  
San José  
Soriano  
Treinta y Tres 
Artigas  
Durazno  
Tacuarembó 
   17 1,375,871 43 
Bolivia  Cochabamba Beni 
La Paz 
Santa Cruz 
Tarija 
Chuquisaca
Oruro 
Pando 
Potosí 
 9 7,767,060 100 
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Table 4.26 (continued) 
 Mercosur regions according to the n° of infrastructure indicators below 75% of Mercosur average 
 N° of infrastructure indicators 
 1 2 3 4 5 
N° of 
regions Population 
% of 
national pop
Chile Antofagasta 
Atacama 
De Aysén 
De Magallanes
Del Maule 
Tarapacá 
    6 2,274,001 15 
N° of 
regions 
25 21 24 22 1 93 N/A N/A 
Population 13,565,914 61,632,629 31,931,091 9,797,364 884,291 N/A 117,811,289 N/A 
% of M6 
population 
6 27 14 4 1 N/A 52 N/A 
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Map 4.4. Mercosur regional infrastructure development gaps 
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As described in Table 4.26 above and highlighted in the preceding map, almost all of 
Mercosur regions have at least one infrastructure indicator which is below the 75% threshold. 
Indeed, 93 regions, inhabited by 52% of the Mercosur population, have at least one 
infrastructure indicator below the threshold.  
Out of the seventeen regions which do not have infrastructure development problems 
according to the indicators studied, two are Uruguayan. These are Montevideo, the capital, 
and Canelones, which surrounds Montevideo. Seven other regions are in the centre of Chile, 
and eight are in the South and Southeast of Brazil as well as its Federal District. These 
seventeen regions account for 48% of the Mercosur 6 population. 
The category with most regions is that of regions with one infrastructure indicator 
below the threshold. It is composed of 25 regions, half of them being in Uruguay. However, 
this category only represents 6% of the Mercosur population. In terms of population, the most 
important category is that of regions with 2 indicators below the threshold since its 21 
regions, most of them being in Brazil, account for 27% of the Mercosur population. Only one 
region, the Argentinian Misiones, inhabited by less than 1% of the Mercosur population, has 
all five infrastructure indicators lower than 75% of the Mercosur average. 
Analysing these data country by country, it appears that Chile and Uruguay have the 
best infrastructure indicators. Six regions of the former, accounting for 15% of the Chilean 
population, have a maximum of one indicator below the threshold. With the exception of Del 
Maule whose indicator below the 75% threshold is that related to telephone lines, the 
indicator of the other five regions is that of road infrastructure. In Uruguay, only three regions 
have two infrastructure indicators below the threshold, all the others have only one or none. 
These three regions, with two indicators below the 75% threshold related to road network and 
electricity consumption, represent less than 7% of the Uruguayan population. 
In Paraguay and Bolivia most regions have either 3 or 4 infrastructure indicators 
below the 75% threshold. There are only two exceptions in Paraguay, the capital city and its 
surrounding department, and one in Bolivia, Cochabamba, which only have two indicators 
below the threshold. Consequently, the two thirds of the Paraguayans and 82% of the 
Bolivians live in regions with a minimum of 3 infrastructure indicators below the threshold. It 
should however be remembered that, for three of the five infrastructure indicators, 
Paraguayan data had to be homogenised using the national average.  
Most Brazilian regions have either 2 or 3 indicators below the threshold, which 
respectively account for 24% and 12% of Brazil’s population. After Chile, it is the country 
with the smallest share of its population living in regions with at least one infrastructure 
indicator below the 75% threshold. This nevertheless represents 41% of the Brazilian 
population. 
Argentinian regions are evenly spread between the five categories, the most important 
categories being those with 3 and 4 indicators below the threshold. Both categories consist of 
7 regions which respectively represent 18% and 14% of the population. Approximately 55% 
of the Argentinian population lives in the six regions which have two infrastructure indicators 
below the threshold. The importance of this share is due to the presence in this category of the 
province of Buenos Aires where 40% of the Argentinians live.  
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THE SOCIAL GAP 
The social gap is described by the analysis of five indicators related to health and 
education.  
Health is an essential component of the development of a country since it has a direct 
impact on the happiness and well-being of a population and, from an economic perspective, 
an healthy population is key to an efficient and productive work force. Three indicators have 
been chosen to highlight the health component of the social gap. These are the number of 
hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants; the number of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants; and the life 
expectancy at birth. The first statistic gives an insight to the hospital infrastructure available 
to people in the different regions. The second data highlight the accessibility of people to a 
doctor and therefore to health care. Finally, life expectancy at birth shows the number of years 
a person is expected to live. It is often considered as an indicator of health and well-being. 
The education component is the last type of indicator analysed in this study of regional 
development in Mercosur. As highlighted in the quote below, education is a key aspect to 
development: 
“Good education reduces poverty and inequality and is essential for sustained economic 
growth. Combined with good macroeconomic policies, it is fundamental for the construction of 
democratic societies and globally competitive economies. Education triggers a series of 
benefits: it is key to creating, applying and spreading new ideas and technologies which in turn 
augment the productivity of labor; better educated women are more effective in household 
production of children’s good health and schooling. In addition, education is the ultimate 
liberator, empowering individuals to make personal and social choices. As aptly stated by 
Harbison and Myers, 1964, ‘education is both the seed and the flower of economic 
development’”122. 
 
Two indicators have been selected to identify this educational gap. The first indicator 
is the number of students registered to primary and secondary schools, which highlights the 
number of people who currently obtain access to basic education. The second indicator is the 
literacy rate. This gives an overall rating of the knowledge of reading and writing among the 
population, irrespective of age. 
Hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants 
Before analysing in depth the details of regional disparities, the national statistics 
related to the number of hospital beds are considered. As can be expected from developing 
countries, the average number of hospital beds available for 1,000 persons is relatively low. 
The country with the highest rate, Argentina, only has an average of 4.5 beds/1,000 persons 
(see Table 4.27). It is nevertheless almost seven times better than Paraguay. At the Mercosur 
level, the average is of 3 beds/1,000 persons. 
                                                
122 Development Committee, Education for dynamic economies: action plan to accelerate progress towards 
education for all, April 2002, World Bank/IMF, Washington DC, p.6. 
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Table 4.27. Hospital beds per 1,000 persons: Mercosur national averages  
Country as a % of   Total 
Population 
N° of beds 
in hospitals
Beds per 
1,000 person Mercosur 4 Mercosur 6 
Argentina 34,768,457 155,822 4.5 137.5 143.6 
Brazil  160,710,275 496,740 3.1 94.8 99.1 
Paraguay 5,085,328 3,426 0.7 20.7 21.6 
Uruguay 3,163,763 7,342 2.3 71.2 74.4 
Bolivia 7,767,060 11,548 1.5 N/A 47.7 
Chile 15,010,755 30,957 2.1 N/A 66.1 
Mercosur 4 203,727,823 663,330 3.3 100.0 104.4 
Mercosur 6 226,505,638 705,835 3.1 N/A 100.0 
 
Similarly to any of the other indicators considered so far in this statistical analysis, 
these national averages hide significant disparities between the regions (see Appendix A2.4.1 
for a detailed table and a map related to these regional statistics). The average and standard 
deviations for this indicator, respectively equivalent to 25 and 36, are relatively significant. 
Some countries, such as Paraguay, and to a lesser extent Uruguay, have significant regional 
disparities. Indeed, their average deviations are much higher than in the other countries and 
well above the level for Mercosur. The most homogeneous country is Bolivia since it has the 
lowest average deviation. 
Table 4.28. Hospital beds per 1,000 persons: average deviations by country 
 AR BR PY UY BO CL M6 
Hospital Beds 24.4 15.9 46.0 36.0 9.9 18.0 24.6 
 
The data are represented in Figure 4.11. Out of the 110 regions of Mercosur, only 20 
have a ratio representing more than 125% of the Mercosur average, whereas 61 of them are 
below 75%. If the 75% threshold was interpreted strictly, there would be only 56 regions. 
However, five other regions are included in this category because their data, higher than the 
75% threshold in a Mercosur 6 situation, are below this threshold in a Mercosur 4 situation. 
These five regions are the combined Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands 
in Argentina; Ceará and Espirito Santo in Brazil; Cerro Largo and Paysandú in Uruguay (see 
Table 4.29 below). 
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Figure 4.11. Distribution of the regions according to their number of hospital beds per 
1,000 persons compared to Mercosur average  
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The region with the highest number of beds per 1,000 persons is the city of Buenos 
Aires with an average of 7.7, which represents 245% of the Mercosur average. Out of the 20 
regions whose indicators are higher than 125% of the Mercosur data, there are 15 from 
Argentina, 3 from Brazil, and 2 from Uruguay. At the other end of the continuum, among the 
61 regions below 75% of the Mercosur data, there is the whole of Bolivia and Paraguay, 
respectively 9 and 18 regions, 12 regions of Brazil, 8 of Chile, and 13 of Uruguay and 1 of 
Argentina. Since no data were available for four of the Brazilian Northern regions, Rondônia, 
Acre, Roraima, and Amapá in Brazil, they were given the data available for this Northern 
region. 
Argentina is the country with by far the most hospital beds per 1,000 persons, not only 
as a nation but also at the regional level. Indeed, only three of its 24 provinces are below the 
Mercosur average. These are Mendoza, Neuquén, and Tierra del Fuego, Antártica e Islas del 
Atlántico Sur which respectively represent 99%, 96% and 79% of the Mercosur average. 
Since the indicator of this latter region is at the threshold in the Mercosur 4 situation, it is 
included within the list of regions below the 75% threshold.  
In contrast, Paraguay and Bolivia exhibit the worst situation since all their regions are 
below the 75% threshold. In the case of Paraguay, it is worth noting that these data are 
incomplete since their statistics account for 1,238 hospital beds in specialised hospitals, 
without specifying their location. These beds consequently had to be excluded from the 
regional comparisons, although it could have been assumed that most of these specialised 
hospital beds would be in Asunción, the capital, or in Central, the surrounding department. 
Looking more closely at the list of the 61 regions lagging behind (see Table 4.29 
below), it appears that within this group half of them are below 50% of Mercosur average. 
The region with the lowest figure is the Central department of Paraguay which, with its 0.1 
beds/1,000 persons, represents 4% of the Mercosur average. 
The group of regions below the 75% threshold, detailed in Table 4.29, represents a 
population of more than 63 million persons, that is 28% of the Mercosur population.  
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Table 4.29. Hospital beds per 1,000 persons: Mercosur regions below the threshold 
  Regional data as a % of 
  
Population N° of 
beds 
Beds per 
1,000 Nation M 4 M 6 
PY Central 1,174,212 161 0.14 20.5 4.2 4.4 
UY Canelones  443,053 106 0.24 10.3 7.3 7.7 
PY Alto Paraná 595,276 177 0.30 44.4 9.1 9.5 
PY Asunción 550,060 176 0.32 47.8 9.8 10.3 
PY Caaguazú 442,161 170 0.38 57.4 11.8 12.3 
PY San Pedro 332,926 146 0.44 65.5 13.5 14.1 
PY Canindeyú 133,075 61 0.46 68.4 14.1 14.7 
PY Itapúa 454,757 213 0.47 69.9 14.4 15.0 
PY Cordillera 215,663 125 0.58 86.5 17.8 18.6 
PY Amambay 127,011 74 0.58 87.0 17.9 18.7 
PY Paraguarí 247,675 168 0.68 101.2 20.8 21.7 
PY Misiones 98,607 71 0.72 107.5 22.1 23.1 
PY Concepción 185,496 145 0.78 116.7 24.0 25.1 
PY Guairá 173,668 137 0.79 117.7 24.2 25.3 
PY Pdte. Hayes 77,145 63 0.82 121.9 25.1 26.2 
PY Boquerón 35,241 32 0.91 135.5 27.9 29.1 
PY Ñeembucú 86,965 86 0.99 147.6 30.3 31.7 
BO Pando 53,124 54 1.02 68.2 N/A 32.6 
PY Caazapá 141,559 154 1.09 162.4 33.4 34.9 
BO Cochabamba 1,408,071 1,687 1.20 80.4 N/A 38.4 
BO Potosí 746,618 1,056 1.41 94.9 N/A 45.3 
BO La Paz 2,268,824 3,292 1.45 97.4 N/A 46.5 
UY San José  96,664 143 1.48 63.8 45.4 47.4 
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 814 1.48 99.4 N/A 47.5 
BO Santa Cruz 1,651,951 2,560 1.55 104.0 N/A 49.7 
UY Maldonado  127,502 201 1.58 68.0 48.4 50.5 
CL Metropolitana de Santiago 6,013,185 9,945 1.65 80.3 N/A 53.0 
UY Rivera  98,472 171 1.74 74.9 53.3 55.7 
UY Colonia  120,241 211 1.75 75.6 53.8 56.2 
CL Atacama 269,047 480 1.78 86.6 N/A 57.2 
BO Oruro 383,498 685 1.79 119.9 N/A 57.3 
BO Beni 336,633 604 1.79 120.4 N/A 57.5 
CL Del Libertador 778,801 1,438 1.85 89.6 N/A 59.2 
CL Coquimbo 569,825 1,107 1.94 94.3 N/A 62.3 
UY Artigas  75,059 146 1.95 83.8 59.7 62.3 
UY Tacuarembó  84,919 169 1.99 85.8 61.1 63.8 
BR NORTH 11,736,040 23,553 2.01 65.0 61.6 64.3 
CL Tarapacá 385,620 778 2.02 97.9 N/A 64.7 
UY Durazno  55,716 114 2.05 88.2 62.8 65.6 
BR Sergipe 1,662,168 3,415 2.05 66.5 63.0 65.9 
PY Alto Paraguay 13,831 29 2.10 313.0 64.3 67.2 
UY Río Negro  51,713 109 2.11 90.9 64.7 67.6 
UY Florida  66,503 141 2.12 91.4 65.0 68.0 
BR Federal District 1,875,104 4,020 2.14 69.4 65.8 68.7 
BO Tarija 368,506 796 2.16 145.5 N/A 69.2 
BR Bahia 12,697,007 28,230 2.22 72.0 68.2 71.3 
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Table 4.29 (continued) 
  Regional data as a % of 
  
Population N° of 
beds 
Beds per 
1,000 Nation M 4 M 6 
CL Del Biobío 1,915,844 4,319 2.25 109.4 N/A 72.3 
CL Antofagasta 462,286 1,048 2.27 110.1 N/A 72.7 
CL Del Maule 906,882 2,086 2.30 111.7 N/A 73.7 
UY Lavalleja  61,085 141 2.31 99.5 70.8 74.0 
UY Paysandú  111,509 267 2.39 103.2 73.5 76.7 
BR Espirito Santo 2,916,530 6,999 2.40 77.7 73.6 76.9 
BR Ceará 7,010,107 17,060 2.43 78.8 74.7 78.0 
UY Cerro Largo  82,510 201 2.44 105.0 74.7 78.1 
AR Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
89,992 222 2.47 55.1 75.4 79.1 
 Total Mercosur 4 44,547,222 87,807 1.97 N/A 60.5 63.2 
 Total Mercosur 6 63,615,772 120,556 1.90 N/A N/A 60.7 
 
Number of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants 
The second health indicator analysed is the number of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants. It 
is representative of people’s ease of access to medical advice, though distance from the doctor 
is not evident.  
A look at the national statistics detailed in Table 4.30 shows that the Mercosur average 
is very low. On average, there are less than two doctors per 1,000 people. Three of the 
countries have national averages lower than this, Bolivia and Chile exhibiting the worst 
situation with only a third of the Mercosur indicator. The country with the highest indicator is 
Paraguay, which is surprising since for most of the indicators studied so far it has often been 
below the Mercosur average.  
Table 4.30. Doctors per 1,000 persons: Mercosur national averages 
 Country as a % of 
 Population 
Number 
of doctors
Doctors per 
1,000 
persons Mercosur 4 Mercosur 6 
Argentina 34,768,457 108,800 3.1 178.4 192.0 
Brazil 160,710,275 212,932 1.3 75.5 81.3 
Paraguay 5,085,328 23,393 4.6 262.3 282.2 
Uruguay 3,163,763 12,159 3.8 219.1 235.8 
Bolivia 7,767,060 4,472 0.6 N/A 35.3 
Chile 15,010,755 7,888 0.5 N/A 32.2 
Mercosur 4 203,727,823 357,284 1.8 100.0 107.6 
Mercosur 6 226,505,638 369,644 1.6 N/A 100.0 
 
Since there was a lack of regional data in Paraguay, all its regions have been attributed 
the national average in an hypothesised homogeneity. 
Before detailing Mercosur regional data, which is available and presented in a map in 
Appendix A2.4.2, a look at the average and standard deviations for this indicator shows the 
significance of regional disparities. Indeed, both deviations are relatively significant since 
they respectively represent 54 and 88, which are the second most important for the twelve 
indicators studied. As shown in Table 4.31, Uruguay is particularly heterogeneous for this 
indicator since its average deviation is high, much more significant than the indicators for 
other countries. 
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Table 4.31. Doctors per 1,000 persons: average deviations by country 
 AR BR PY UY BO CL M6 
Doctors 48.0 41.0 0.0 66.8 14.0 12.7 54.1 
 
Almost half of the regions studied have a number of doctors per 1,000 persons higher 
than the Mercosur average (see Figure 4.12). This number is likely to be biased by the 
presence of the 18 Paraguayan departments in the 200-300% range. The other regions are 
mostly Argentinian,  21 of them. There are also 4 regions of Brazil and 8 of Uruguay. Among 
these 51 regions, the region with the highest indicator is, by far, that of the City of Buenos 
Aires which stands at 650% of the Mercosur average. The second is Montevideo with 420%, 
while all others are below 300%. 
Among the 59 other Mercosur regions which have an indicator lower than the 
Mercosur average, 49 are below the 75% threshold. The region with the lowest indicator is 
Paraíba, in the Northeast of Brazil, where it only represents 6% of the Mercosur average. 
Among these 49 regions, there are only 2 from Argentina and 4 from Uruguay, but also the 
whole of Bolivia and of Chile (respectively 9 and 13 regions), as well as 21 of the 27 
Brazilian regions. 
Figure 4.12. Distribution of the regions according to their number of doctors per 1,000 
inhabitants compared to Mercosur average 
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While the totality of Bolivia is below the 75% threshold, due to the general poverty of 
the country, the case of Chile might seem strange; being more economically developed, better 
medical indicators would be expected than these figures for the number of doctors per 1,000 
people. 
The two Argentinian regions below the 75% threshold are Formosa and Tierra del 
Fuego, Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands. However, the margin is very small since their 
indicators represent 74.5% of Mercosur average. In Uruguay, the two regions are those of 
Cerro Largo and San José, which indicator is around 70% of the Mercosur data. However, the 
Uruguayan regions of Río Negro and Rivera are included since, while they are over the 
Mercosur average, they are below that for Mercosur 4. The indicators for these Argentinian 
and Uruguayan regions are almost similar to the threshold.  
As Table 4.32 shows, the situation is more disparate among the 21 regions of Brazil. 
The only exceptions are the 4 regions of the Southeast, the Federal District (Central West) and 
Rio Grande do Sul (South). 
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These 49 regions with a number of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants lower than 75% of 
the Mercosur average account for almost half of the Mercosur 6 population (46%), that is 104 
million inhabitants. They have 7 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants, that is less than half of the 
Mercosur average.  
Table 4.32. Doctors per 1,000 persons: Mercosur regions below the threshold 
  Region compared to 
  
Population N° of doctors 
Doctors per 
1,000 persons Nation M 4 M 6 
BR Paraíba 3,433,234 327 0.1 7.2 5.4 5.8 
CL Del Libertador 778,801 270 0.3 65.4 N/A 21.3 
BR Acre 504,489 189 0.4 28.4 21.4 23.0 
BR Maranhão 5,349,575 2,023 0.4 28.6 21.6 23.2 
CL Del Maule 906,882 346 0.4 72.0 N/A 23.4 
CL Antofagasta 462,286 183 0.4 74.7 N/A 24.3 
CL Atacama 269,047 107 0.4 75.0 N/A 24.4 
BO Potosí 746,618 310 0.4 71.6 N/A 25.5 
CL Coquimbo 569,825 246 0.4 81.5 N/A 26.5 
BO Cochabamba 1,408,071 618 0.4 75.7 N/A 26.9 
BR Rondônia 1,289,365 581 0.5 34.1 25.7 27.6 
CL Del Biobío 1,915,844 940 0.5 92.6 N/A 30.1 
CL De La Araucanía 864,975 426 0.5 92.9 N/A 30.2 
BR Tocantins 1,096,967 560 0.5 38.7 29.1 31.3 
BR Amapá 402,557 209 0.5 39.3 29.6 31.9 
CL De Los Lagos 1,050,558 574 0.5 103.1 N/A 33.5 
BR Piauí 2,758,129 1,513 0.5 41.6 31.3 33.7 
BO Oruro 383,498 212 0.6 95.3 N/A 33.9 
CL Tarapacá 385,620 220 0.6 107.6 N/A 35.0 
CL Valparaíso 1,543,566 888 0.6 108.5 N/A 35.3 
CL Metropolitana de Santiago 6,013,185 3,513 0.6 110.2 N/A 35.8 
BR Mato Grosso 2,335,344 1,381 0.6 44.8 33.7 36.3 
BR Amazonas 2,460,434 1,462 0.6 45.0 33.9 36.5 
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 330 0.6 103.5 N/A 36.8 
BO Santa Cruz 1,651,951 1,009 0.6 105.3 N/A 37.5 
BO La Paz 2,268,824 1,437 0.6 109.2 N/A 38.9 
CL De Magallanes 156,530 101 0.6 121.7 N/A 39.6 
BR Pará 5,724,140 3,881 0.7 51.4 38.7 41.6 
BO Tarija 368,506 260 0.7 121.6 N/A 43.3 
BR Bahia 12,697,007 9,129 0.7 54.5 41.0 44.1 
BR Ceará 7,010,107 5,056 0.7 54.6 41.1 44.2 
BO Pando 53,124 39 0.7 126.6 N/A 45.0 
BO Beni 336,633 257 0.8 131.6 N/A 46.8 
CL De Aysén 93,636 74 0.8 149.1 N/A 48.5 
BR Roraima 258,088 222 0.9 65.2 49.0 52.8 
BR Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 2,433 0.9 69.8 52.5 56.5 
BR Sergipe 1,662,168 1,571 0.9 71.6 53.9 58.0 
BR Santa Catarina 5,032,175 4,809 1.0 72.4 54.5 58.6 
BR Alagoas 2,754,697 2,661 1.0 73.2 55.1 59.3 
BR Goiás 4,629,154 4,504 1.0 73.7 55.5 59.7 
BR Mato Grosso do Sul 1,985,579 2,062 1.0 78.7 59.2 63.7 
UY Cerro Largo  82,510 92 1.1 29.0 63.6 68.4 
BR Pernambuco 7,548,183 8,644 1.1 86.8 65.3 70.3 
BR Paraná 9,154,360 10,496 1.1 86.9 65.4 70.3 
UY San José  96,664 111 1.1 29.9 65.5 70.4 
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Table 4.32 (continued) 
  Region compared to 
  
Population N° of doctors 
Doctors per 
1,000 persons Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
89,992 109 1.2 38.7 69.1 74.3 
AR Formosa 447,094 544 1.2 38.9 69.4 74.6 
UY Rivera  98,472 123 1.2 32.5 71.2 76.6 
UY Río Negro  51,713 67 1.3 33.7 73.9 79.5 
 Total Mercosur 4 81,593,552 64,759 0.8 N/A 45.2 48.7 
 Total Mercosur 6 104,371,367 77,119 0.7 N/A N/A 45.3 
 
Life expectancy at birth 
The final indicator analysed to represent the health aspect of social regional disparities 
in Mercosur is life expectancy at birth. This indicator is the number of years a person born 
now is expected to live. It can be argued that high indicators symbolise improved living 
conditions, developed medical care, good hygiene and better work conditions. 
As seen in Table 4.33, life expectancy at birth is the indicator where the disparities are 
the smallest at the national level. All Mercosur states are very close to the Mercosur average. 
It is noticeable that Chile is the country with the highest life expectancy at birth, this despite 
having the lowest number of doctors per 1,000 persons.  
Table 4.33. Life expectancy at birth: Mercosur national averages 
 Life expectancy at birth Country as a % of 
 Population Male Female Both Mercosur 4 Mercosur 6 
Argentina 34,768,457 68.4 75.6 71.9 104.8 104.5 
Brazil 160,710,275 64.1 71.7 67.8 98.8 98.5 
Paraguay 5,085,328 N/A N/A 69.8 101.7 101.4 
Uruguay 3,163,763 69.9 77.7 73.8 107.5 107.2 
Bolivia 7,767,060 60.4 63.8 62.1 N/A 90.2 
Chile 15,010,755 72.3 78.3 75.2 N/A 109.3 
Mercosur 4 203,727,823 N/A N/A 68.6 100.0 99.7 
Mercosur 6 226,505,638 N/A N/A 68.8 N/A 100.0 
 
As Table 4.34 shows, no regional statistics were available for Paraguay and Chile. As 
done in previous analyses, both countries were considered to be homogeneous and the value 
of their national data was attributed to each region. 
The lack of disparities remarked on at the national level is confirmed by the 
calculation of the average and standard deviations for this indicator. Both deviations, 
respectively equivalent to 4 and 7, are the lowest ones obtained for the 12 indicators studied. 
As shown in Table 4.34, the average deviation of each country is less than the Mercosur 
average deviation, which stands at 3.6. Argentina and Uruguay are the most homogeneous 
countries since their average deviations are the lowest. 
Table 4.34. Life expectancy at birth: average deviations by country 
 AR BR PY UY BO CL M6 
Life expectancy 1.1 2.9 0.0 1.2 3.3 0.0 3.6 
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The homogeneity of Mercosur regions for life expectancy is also confirmed in Figure 
4.13 which shows that most of the regions are above the Mercosur average. None have an 
indicator higher than 111% of the Mercosur average, the value for Flores in Uruguay. Only 30 
regions have a life expectancy at birth lower than the Mercosur average, but none are lower 
than 82% as in Potosí in Bolivia. Among these 30 regions there are the 9 Bolivian regions, 20 
of the 27 states of Brazil and 1 Argentinian province. 
Figure 4.13. Distribution of the regions according to their life expectancy at birth 
compared to Mercosur average 
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The only Argentinian region where the life expectancy is lower than the Mercosur 
average is that of Jujuy, but the difference is too small to be significant since it is at 99% of 
the Mercosur average (see Appendix A2.4.3 for more detailed tables and for a map). The 
whole of Bolivia has low indicators, which can be explained by the fact that it is generally 
poorer than the rest of Mercosur. However, no region has an indicator lower than the 
threshold. In Brazil, the regions where the life expectancy is lower than the Mercosur average 
are those of the North and Northeast, most of the Central West and the state of Rio de Janeiro 
in the Southeast. However, the differences are minimal since the indicators of these regions 
are not lower than 90%. 
Since there are no regions with indicators lower than the 75% threshold, there is no 
need to study this indicator further. 
Students registered in primary and secondary education 
The number of students registered in primary and secondary education is one of the 
two indicators analysed to describe the educational component of the social development gap. 
Starting this analysis with the usual national overview, it appears that disparities in the 
number of primary and secondary schools students are not too significant. As Table 4.35 
shows, apart from Uruguay, no country is below the 75% threshold. The other countries all 
have between 208 and 273 students per 1,000 inhabitants (respectively Chile and Brazil), 
ranging from 81% to 106% of the Mercosur average of 257 students.  
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Table 4.35. Primary and secondary school students: Mercosur national averages 
Primary and Secondary 
school students Country as a % of  Total Population N° of 
students 
Students per 
1,000 people Mercosur 4 Mercosur 6 
Argentina 34,768,457 7,616,864 219 84 85 
Brazil  160,710,275 43,828,941 273 105 106 
Paraguay 5,085,328 1,168,296 230 88 90 
Uruguay 3,163,763 543,911 172 66 67 
Bolivia 7,767,060 1,880,554 242 N/A 94 
Chile 15,010,755 3,116,146 208 N/A 81 
Mercosur 4 203,727,823 53,158,012 261 100 102 
Mercosur 6 226,505,638 58,154,712 257 N/A 100 
 
Calculating the average and standard deviations for this indicator, it appears that both 
are relatively small since they respectively represent 14 and 17. As shown in Table 4.36, 
Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina are the countries with the highest disparities, but these are not 
too significant. The three other countries have similarly small average deviations. 
Table 4.36. Primary and secondary school students: average deviations by country 
 AR BR PY UY BO CL M6 
Primary and secondary 
school students 
9.2 11.8 12.0 5.8 5.3 3.7 14.0 
 
Disparities appear at the regional level (see Appendix A2.4.4 for further statistical 
details and for a map), where the indicators range from 151% (Amapá, Brazil) to 47% 
(Boquerón, Paraguay) of the Mercosur average. As highlighted in Figure 4.14, only 38 of the 
110 regions of Mercosur have a number of primary and secondary students per 1,000 
inhabitants higher than the Mercosur average. Out of these, seven have an indicator higher 
than 125% that of Mercosur, all of them from the great regions of North and North East of 
Brazil: Amapá, Roraima, Tocantins, Maranhão, Bahia, Acre and Pará. Among the 72 regions 
which have an indicator lower than the Mercosur average, 20 are below the 75% threshold.  
Figure 4.14. Distribution of the regions according to their number of primary and 
secondary students per 1,000 persons compared to Mercosur average 
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Apart for the region of the City of Buenos Aires, which represents 62% of the 
Mercosur average, the 19 other regions include 4 Paraguayan and 15 Uruguayan departments. 
Three other Uruguayan regions, Rivera, Tacuarembó and Salto, are included within this 
category because their data are at the 75% threshold in Mercosur 4. Consequently, as detailed 
in Table 4.37, 23 regions are considered as being below the 75% threshold. 
This group of regions with less than 75% of the Mercosur average represents a total of 
almost 6 million persons, that is 3% of the Mercosur total population.  
Table 4.37. Primary and secondary school students: Mercosur regions below the 
threshold 
  Primary/Secondary students Regional rate of students per 
1,000 as a percent of 
  
Total 
Population Total n° of 
students 
Students per 
1,000 
Nation M 4 M 6 
PY Boquerón 35,241 4,237 120 52.3 46.1 46.8 
AR Ciudad de 
Buenos Aires 
3,027,886 479,458 158 72.3 60.7 61.7 
UY San José  96,664 15,588 161 93.8 61.8 62.8 
UY Montevideo 1,344,839 218,700 163 94.6 62.3 63.4 
UY Lavalleja  61,085 9,988 164 95.1 62.7 63.7 
UY Florida  66,503 10,928 164 95.6 63.0 64.0 
UY Colonia  120,241 19,807 165 95.8 63.1 64.2 
UY Flores  25,030 4,234 169 98.4 64.8 65.9 
UY Canelones  443,053 75,937 171 99.7 65.7 66.8 
UY Rocha  70,292 12,277 175 101.6 66.9 68.0 
UY Cerro Largo  82,510 14,548 176 102.6 67.6 68.7 
UY Treinta y Tres  49,502 8,810 178 103.5 68.2 69.3 
PY Pdte. Hayes 77,145 13,746 178 77.6 68.3 69.4 
PY Amambay 127,011 22,798 179 78.1 68.8 69.9 
UY Maldonado  127,502 23,024 181 105.0 69.2 70.3 
UY Soriano  81,557 14,817 182 105.7 69.6 70.8 
UY Paysandú  111,509 20,314 182 106.0 69.8 71.0 
PY Alto Paraguay 13,831 2,536 183 79.8 70.3 71.4 
UY Durazno  55,716 10,370 186 108.3 71.3 72.5 
UY Río Negro  51,713 9,815 190 110.4 72.7 73.9 
UY Rivera  98,472 19,123 194 113.0 74.4 75.7 
UY Tacuarembó  84,919 16,649 196 114.1 75.1 76.4 
UY Salto  117,597 23,110 197 114.3 75.3 76.6 
 Mercosur 4 6,369,818 1,050,814 165 N/A 63.2 64.3 
 Mercosur 6 6,369,818 1,050,814 165 N/A N/A 64.3 
 
Literacy rate 
The last indicator studied is the literacy rate, that is the percentage of the population 
who can read and write. The age limit in the statistics varies by country from people older 
than 10 or 15 years. The proportion of older people in the population is likely to lower the 
literacy rate as schooling was less available in their school days. 
National averages of literacy rates are relatively similar (see Table 4.38). Two 
countries have literacy rates below the Mercosur average, but the lowest indicator only 
represents 91% of the average in Bolivia. Among the four countries with higher averages than 
that of Mercosur, there are few disparities since the country with the highest indicator, 
Uruguay, only represents 111% of the Mercosur average. 
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Table 4.38. Literacy rates: Mercosur national averages 
 Country as a % of 
 
Population 
over 15 or 10* 
Literate 
population 
Literacy 
rate Mercosur 4 Mercosur 6 
Argentina 22,636,845 21,721,832 96.0 109.8 109.6 
Brazil 108,033,627 92,136,609 85.3 97.6 97.4 
Paraguay 2,427,485 2,183,661 90.0 103.0 102.7 
Uruguay 2,629,654 2,549,054 96.9 110.9 110.7 
Bolivia 3,722,699 2,977,853 80.0 N/A 91.4 
Chile 10,593,668 9,788,875 92.4 N/A 105.5 
Mercosur 4 135,727,611 118,591,156 87.4 100.0 99.8 
Mercosur 6 150,043,978 131,357,884 87.5 N/A 100.0 
* Statistics in Uruguay and Chile are only available for people older than 10 years, the statistics  
of the other countries are calculated for the population older than 15. 
 
This apparent homogeneity of national data is confirmed by the average and standard 
deviations of this indicator. They respectively stand at 9 and 8, which are relatively low 
compared to the values obtained for the other indicators. As Table 4.39 shows, Brazil is the 
most heterogeneous country when analysing literacy rates. It is closely followed by Bolivia. 
Both countries have average deviations much more marked than the other countries. 
Table 4.39. Literacy rates: average deviations by country 
 AR BR PY UY BO CL M6 
Literacy rate 2.1 10.4 3.9 1.3 8.5 1.8 9.1 
 
This homogeneity at the national level disappears when the regional data are analysed 
(see Appendix A2.4.5 for more details and for a map). As shown in Figure 4.15, most regions 
have higher literacy rates than the Mercosur average. Included in the 76 regions with higher 
literacy rates, there is the whole of Argentina, of Uruguay and of Chile, plus 11 Brazilian 
states, 8 Paraguayan departments and 1 Bolivian department. 
Among the 34 regions with indicators lower than the Mercosur average, only 5 are 
below the 75% threshold. Three of them are Brazilian and two Bolivian. 
Figure 4.15. Distribution of the regions according to their literacy rates compared to 
Mercosur average  
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As detailed in Table 4.40, the three Brazilian regions below the 75% threshold are part 
of the Northeast area. This is not too surprising since it is the part of Brazil most in need of 
assistance for development. One region, Sergipe, exhibits an indicator much lower than the 
other regions since it is only 9% of the Mercosur average. The two Bolivian regions, 
Chuquisaca and Potosí, are both slightly below the threshold since they represent 
approximately 70% of the Mercosur average. These five regions with less than 75% of the 
Mercosur average represents slightly more than 11 million persons, that is almost 5% of the 
Mercosur total population. 
Table 4.40. Literacy rates: Mercosur regions below the threshold 
  Regional data as a percent of 
  
Total 
Population 
Population 
over 15 
Literate 
population
Literacy 
rate Nation M 4 M 6 
BR Sergipe 1,662,168 1,078,533 80,562 7.5 8.8 8.5 8.5 
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 252,733 152,948 60.5 75.7 N/A 69.1 
BO Potosí 746,618 361,245 223,271 61.8 77.3 N/A 70.6 
BR Alagoas 2,754,697 1,716,599 1,094,599 63.8 74.8 73.0 72.8 
BR Maranhão 5,349,575 3,210,312 2,061,852 64.2 75.3 73.5 73.4 
 Mercosur 4 9,766,440 6,005,444 3,237,013 53.9 N/A 61.7 61.6 
 Mercosur 6 11,062,893 6,619,422 3,613,232 54.6 N/A N/A 62.4 
 
A map of regional social development in Mercosur 
As for economic and infrastructure indicators, an analysis can be undertaken to bring 
together the five social indicators analysed previously to highlight social development 
disparities among Mercosur regions. The data are assembled in Table 4.41 below. These data 
are presented in the form of a map of Mercosur regional social disparities further down (Map 
4.5).  
As shown in the table, although five indicators were considered, no region has more 
than three indicators below the threshold. This is partly explained by the fact that no region 
has a life expectancy at birth below the 75% threshold, which de facto eliminates this 
indicator from consideration. Moreover, three of the five indicators, life expectancy, literacy 
rate and number of students, have low average deviations. These are respectively equivalent 
to 4, 9 and 14, and characterise a relative homogeneity of the regions for these three 
indicators. 
Table 4.41. Social development: Mercosur regions with at least one social indicator 
below the threshold 
 Mercosur regions according to the n° of social indicators below 75% of Mercosur average 
 N° of social indicators 
 1 2 3 
N° of 
regions Population 
% of national 
population 
Argentina Ciudad de Buenos 
Aires 
Formosa 
 
Tierra del 
Fuego, 
Antártica e 
Islas del 
Atlántico Sur 
 3 3,564,972 10 
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Table 4.41 (continued) 
 Mercosur regions according to the n° of social indicators below 75% of Mercosur average 
 N° of social indicators 
 1 2 3 
N° of 
regions Population 
% of national 
population 
Brazil  Espirito Santo 
Federal District 
Goiás 
Mato Grosso 
Mato Grosso do Sul 
Paraíba 
Paraná 
Pernambuco 
Piauí 
Rio Grande do 
Norte 
Santa Catarina 
Tocantins 
Acre  
Amapá 
Alagoas 
Amazonas 
Bahia 
Ceará 
Maranhão 
Pará 
Rondônia 
Roraima 
 
Sergipe 23 85,518,741 53 
Paraguay Alto Paraná 
Asunción 
Caaguazú 
Caazapá 
Canindeyú 
Central 
Concepción 
Cordillera 
Guairá 
Itapúa 
Misiones 
Ñeembucú 
Paraguarí 
San Pedro 
Alto Paraguay
Amambay 
Boquerón 
Pdte. Hayes 
 18 5,085,328 100 
Uruguay Artigas  
Flores  
Montevideo 
Rocha  
Salto 
Soriano  
Treinta y Tres 
Canelones  
Colonia  
Durazno  
Florida  
Lavalleja  
Maldonado  
Paysandú 
Tacuarembó 
Cerro Largo 
Río Negro 
Rivera 
San José 
19 3,163,763 100 
Bolivia  Beni 
Cochabamba 
La Paz 
Oruro 
Pando 
Santa Cruz 
Tarija 
Chuquisaca 
Potosí 
9 7,767,060 100 
Chile De Aysén 
De La Araucanía 
De Los Lagos 
De Magallanes 
Valparaíso 
Antofagasta 
Atacama 
Coquimbo 
Del Biobío 
Del Libertador
Del Maule 
Metropolitana 
de Santiago 
Tarapacá 
 13 15,010,755 100 
N° of 
regions 
40 38 7 85 N/A N/A 
Population 59,186,335 57,636,304 3,287,980 N/A 120,110,619 N/A 
% of M6 
population 
26 25 2 N/A 53 N/A 
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Map 4.5. Mercosur regional social development gaps 
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Most of Mercosur regions fall below the threshold on at least one social indicator. As 
the table shows, 85 of the 110 regions are characterised as such. However, these regions only 
contain half of the population. This difference can be explained by the absence, within these 
85 regions of highly populated regions like those of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, 
and Rio Grande do Sul which account for a third of Mercosur population. 
Only seven regions, which account for only 2% of the population, have the maximum 
number of three social indicators below the threshold. Four of these regions are Uruguayan, 
two Bolivian and one Brazilian.  
The categories of regions with one social indicator below the threshold, and that of 
regions with two social indicators below the threshold, both account for approximately 40 
regions and a fourth of the Mercosur 6 population. 
From a national point of view, it appears that four Mercosur countries have one or 
more social indicator below the 75% threshold in all their regions. The two exceptions are 
Brazil and Argentina. However, most of Brazil has at least one indicator below the threshold, 
with the exception of the four highly populated states already mentioned, that is São Paulo, 
Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul. Consequently, the population 
concerned represents slightly more than half of that of Brazil. Argentina exhibits much better 
social indicators since only three of its regions, which account for 10% of the population, 
have between one and two social indicators below the threshold. 
DRAWING A DEVELOPMENT MAP OF MERCOSUR 
Before concluding this chapter, it is necessary in a last section to suggest a 
combination of the twelve regional indicators analysed above, so as to draw a Mercosur map 
of regional development which represents the three categories analysed, that is economic, 
infrastructure and social development. 
It is possible to create a specific index of development by weighting the twelve 
indicators to put more emphasis on some essential aspects of development. Such an index 
could be criticised since, on the one hand, it is a subjective task to decide the coefficients to 
attribute to each indicator; and, on the other hand, creating an index implies precise 
calculations which, because of the imperfections of the statistics available, would however 
inevitably lead to imperfect results. 
However, the objective of this chapter is not to create a new index of development 
based on these twelve development indicators, but to analyse twelve regional indicators of 
development which can then be used by different researchers to develop their own indices 
according to their specific interests. It is nevertheless necessary to combine these indicators to 
draw a single Mercosur map of regional development which takes account of the different 
aspects of development.  
As a result of this, a simple method of combination is used. The basis is the number of 
indicators for which the regional data are less than 75% of the Mercosur average. The regions 
with the most indicators below the threshold are therefore defined as being relatively less 
developed within Mercosur. Since out of the twelve indicators analysed there are a maximum 
of eight indicators which are below the threshold at the same time in the same region, it was 
arbitrarily decided to define as ‘relatively less developed’ the regions which had five or more 
indicators with a value less than 75% of the Mercosur average. 
As was done above in the statistical analyses of the twelve indicators, before looking 
at regional disparities it is necessary to first consider the disparities in development at the 
national level. It is then possible to analyse the differences in development among the 
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Mercosur regions. Finally, these data are synthesised to describe, country by country, and 
then at the Mercosur level, the relatively less developed regions of Mercosur. 
Development gaps at the national level 
The following table (Table 4.42) presents for each Mercosur country the national data 
for each of the twelve indicators analysed, as well as the number of indicators each country 
has below the threshold. 
Table 4.42. National development indicators compared to the Mercosur 6 average (%) 
 Economic Infrastructure Social N° of indicators compared to M6
 
Population (m
illions) 
G
D
P/capita 
A
ctivity  rate 
R
oads 
Electricity 
W
ater 
Sew
ers 
Telephone 
H
ospital beds 
D
octors 
Life expectancy 
Students 
A
lphabetisation 
 <75%
 
 75-125%
 
 >125%
 
Total 
AR 34.8 155.3 96.0 8.1 85.8 94.7 55.4 153.2 143.6 192.0 104.5 85.3 109.6 2 6 4 12
BR 160.7 94.5 101.9 153.7 102.1 99.6 107.5 86.0 99.1 81.3 98.5 106.2 97.4 0 11 1 12
PY 5.1 32.7 80.2 45.8 48.4 80.9 63.0 19.4 21.6 282.2 101.4 89.5 102.7 6 5 1 12
UY 3.2 123.4 96.6 39.2 132.8 112.3 146.9 227.6 74.4 235.8 107.2 67.0 110.7 3 5 4 12
BO 7.8 17.4 120.2 38.5 29.0 95.8 90.8 36.2 47.7 35.3 90.2 94.3 91.4 6 6 0 12
CL 15.0 90.9 92.0 83.0 157.6 122.8 130.6 160.0 66.1 32.2 109.3 80.9 105.5 2 7 3 12
M4 203.8 103.8 100.5 106.2 98.5 98.5 98.1 98.0 104.4 107.6 99.7 101.6 99.8 0 12 0 12
M6 226.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0 12 0 12
 
Brazil is the only Mercosur country which, at the national level, has no indicators 
whose value is lower than 75% of the Mercosur average. This situation is principally due to 
the method used to compare the statistical data. Indeed, each indicator has been calculated 
according to territory or population. Brazil, accounting for 60% of Mercosur territory and 
70% of its population, has de facto the most weight in the calculation of the Mercosur 
averages for each indicator. 
At the national level, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are in a very similar state of 
development since they each have few indicators below the threshold. In Argentina, the two 
indicators below the threshold, the road network and the domestic connection to waste 
removal facilities, are related to infrastructure. Chile also has two indicators below the 
threshold at the national level but, in contrast to Argentina, these indicators are related to 
social development, that is the number of doctors and the number of hospital beds. A strict 
interpretation of statistical data indicates that Uruguay has three indicators below the 
threshold at the national level. Two of these indicators are related to social development, 
namely those related to the number of students and the number of hospital beds, although this 
last indicator is very close to the threshold since the Uruguayan average represents 74% of the 
Mercosur 6 average. The third Uruguayan indicator below the threshold is an infrastructure 
indicator, that is the road network density.  
Finally, Paraguay and Bolivia also have very similar levels of development, which are 
much lower than those of the other four countries. Indeed, both countries have six of the 
twelve development indicators below 75% of the Mercosur 6 average. According to the 
definition given above, both countries can thus be defined as being relatively less developed 
Mercosur countries as a whole.  
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Development gaps at the regional level 
Having considered the gap at the national level, it is now possible to focus on the 
disparities in development among Mercosur regions. To achieve this, it is necessary as a first 
stage to collate and combine the regional data for the twelve indicators. This is done in Tables 
4.43 and 4.44, which data are then represented in Figures 4.16 and 4.17. These data are then 
discussed country by country in the following sub-sections, before an overall look at the 
Mercosur level is taken in the last sub-section. 
Table 4.43 below brings together the data analysed in Chapter 4 to indicate for each 
region which indicators it has below the threshold, as well as the number of indicators, per 
category of development and in total, which are below the threshold. 
Table 4.43. Indicators below the threshold for each Mercosur region 
Regions which indicator is below the 75% threshold    
Economy Infrastructure Social 
N° of indicators 
below the 
threshold 
 Region Population GD
P/capita 
A
ctivity rate 
R
oads 
E
lectricity 
W
ater 
Sew
ers 
T
elephone 
H
ospital Beds 
D
octors 
L
ife 
expectancy
Students 
L
iteracy 
E
conom
y 
Infrastructure 
Social 
T
otal 
AR Ciudad de 
Buenos Aires 
3,027,886   X        X   1 1 2 
AR Buenos Aires 13,379,401   X   X        2  2 
AR Catamarca 289,212 X  X X  X X      1 4  5 
AR Córdoba 2,929,734   X X  X        3  3 
AR Corrientes 857,685 X  X X  X X      1 4  5 
AR Chaco 895,900 X  X X  X X      1 4  5 
AR Chubut 399,125   X           1  1 
AR Entre Ríos 1,069,102   X X  X        3  3 
AR Formosa 447,094 X  X X  X X  X    1 4 1 6 
AR Jujuy 555,097 X  X X  X X      1 4  5 
AR La Pampa 282,356   X X  X        3  3 
AR La Rioja 247,575   X X  X        3  3 
AR Mendoza 1,508,959   X   X        2  2 
AR Misiones 884,291   X X X X X       5  5 
AR Neuquén 463,266   X   X        2  2 
AR Río Negro 559,590   X   X        2  2 
AR Salta 958,094 X  X   X X      1 3  4 
AR San Juan 555,223   X X  X        3  3 
AR San Luis 321,890   X   X        2  2 
AR Santa Cruz 181,198   X X  X        3  3 
AR Santa Fe 2,949,050   X   X        2  2 
AR Santiago Estero 700,114 X  X X  X X      1 4  5 
AR Tierra del 
Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del 
Atlántico Sur 
89,992 
  X     X X     1 2 3 
AR Tucumán 1,216,623 X  X X  X X      1 4  5 
BR Rondônia 1,289,365 X  X X X  X X X    1 4 2 7 
BR Acre 504,489 X  X X X  X X X    1 4 2 7 
BR Amazonas 2,460,434   X X   X X X     3 2 5 
BR Roraima 258,088 X  X X    X X    1 2 2 5 
BR Pará 5,724,140 X  X  X  X X X    1 3 2 6 
BR Amapá 402,557 X  X X   X X X    1 3 2 6 
BR Tocantins 1,096,967 X  X X   X  X    1 3 1 5 
BR Maranhão 5,349,575 X    X  X  X   X 1 2 2 5 
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Table 4.43 (continued) 
Regions which indicator is below the 75% threshold    
Economy Infrastructure Social 
N° of indicators 
below the 
threshold 
 Region Population GD
P/capita 
A
ctivity rate 
R
oads 
E
lectricity 
W
ater 
Sew
ers 
T
elephone 
H
ospital Beds 
D
octors 
L
ife 
expectancy
Students 
L
iteracy 
E
conom
y 
Infrastructure 
Social 
T
otal 
BR Piauí 2,758,129 X   X   X  X    1 2 1 4 
BR Ceará 7,010,107 X   X X  X X X    1 3 2 6 
BR Rio Grande do 
Norte 
2,641,355 X   X   X  X    1 2 1 4 
BR Paraíba 3,433,234 X   X   X  X    1 2 1 4 
BR Pernambuco 7,548,183 X   X   X  X    1 2 1 4 
BR Alagoas 2,754,697 X   X   X  X   X 1 2 2 5 
BR Sergipe 1,662,168 X   X   X X X   X 1 2 3 6 
BR Bahia 12,697,007 X   X   X X X    1 2 2 5 
BR Minas Gerais 17,024,849                0 
BR Espirito Santo 2,916,530        X       1 1 
BR Rio de Janeiro 13,490,380                0 
BR São Paulo 34,899,765                0 
BR Paraná 9,154,360         X      1 1 
BR Santa Catarina 5,032,175         X      1 1 
BR Rio Grande do 
Sul 
9,776,540                0 
BR Mato Grosso do 
Sul 
1,985,579    X     X     1 1 2 
BR Mato Grosso 2,335,344 X  X X   X  X    1 3 1 5 
BR Goiás 4,629,154 X   X     X    1 1 1 3 
BR Federal District 1,875,104        X       1 1 
PY Asunción 550,060 X     X X X     1 2 1 4 
PY Concepción 185,496 X X  X  X X X     2 3 1 6 
PY San Pedro 332,926 X X  X  X X X     2 3 1 6 
PY Cordillera 215,663 X X  X  X X X     2 3 1 6 
PY Guairá 173,668 X X  X  X X X     2 3 1 6 
PY Caaguazú 442,161 X X  X  X X X     2 3 1 6 
PY Caazapá 141,559 X X X X  X X X     2 4 1 7 
PY Itapúa 454,757 X   X  X X X     1 3 1 5 
PY Misiones 98,607 X X X X  X X X     2 4 1 7 
PY Paraguarí 247,675 X X  X  X X X     2 3 1 6 
PY Alto Paraná 595,276 X  X X  X X X     1 4 1 6 
PY Central 1,174,212 X     X X X     1 2 1 4 
PY Ñeembucú 86,965 X X X X  X X X     2 4 1 7 
PY Amambay 127,011 X  X X  X X X   X  1 4 2 7 
PY Canindeyú 133,075 X  X X  X X X     1 4 1 6 
PY Pdte. Hayes 77,145 X  X X  X X X   X  1 4 2 7 
PY Boquerón 35,241 X X X X  X X X   X  2 4 2 8 
PY Alto Paraguay 13,831 X X X X  X X X   X  2 4 2 8 
UY Montevideo 1,344,839           X    1 1 
UY Artigas  75,059   X X    X      2 1 3 
UY Canelones  443,053        X   X    2 2 
UY Cerro Largo  82,510   X     X X  X   1 3 4 
UY Colonia  120,241   X     X   X   1 2 3 
UY Durazno  55,716   X X    X   X   2 2 4 
UY Flores  25,030   X        X   1 1 2 
UY Florida  66,503   X     X   X   1 2 3 
UY Lavalleja  61,085   X     X   X   1 2 3 
UY Maldonado  127,502   X     X   X   1 2 3 
UY Paysandú  111,509   X     X   X   1 2 3 
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Table 4.43 (end) 
Regions which indicator is below the 75% threshold    
Economy Infrastructure Social 
N° of indicators 
below the 
threshold 
 Region Population GD
P/capita 
A
ctivity rate 
R
oads 
E
lectricity 
W
ater 
Sew
ers 
T
elephone 
H
ospital Beds 
D
octors 
L
ife 
expectancy
Students 
L
iteracy 
E
conom
y 
Infrastructure 
Social 
T
otal 
UY Río Negro  51,713   X     X X  X   1 3 4 
UY Rivera  98,472   X     X X  X   1 3 4 
UY Rocha  70,292   X        X   1 1 2 
UY Salto  117,597   X        X   1 1 2 
UY San José  96,664   X     X X  X   1 3 4 
UY Soriano  81,557   X        X   1 1 2 
UY Tacuarembó  84,919   X X    X   X   2 2 4 
UY Treinta y Tres  49,502   X        X   1 1 2 
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 X   X X X X X X   X 1 4 3 8 
BO La Paz 2,268,824 X  X X   X X X    1 3 2 6 
BO Cochabamba 1,408,071 X   X   X X X    1 2 2 5 
BO Oruro 383,498 X  X X  X X X X    1 4 2 7 
BO Potosí 746,618 X   X X X X X X   X 1 4 3 8 
BO Tarija 368,506 X  X X   X X X    1 3 2 6 
BO Santa Cruz 1,651,951 X  X X   X X X    1 3 2 6 
BO Beni 336,633 X  X X   X X X    1 3 2 6 
BO Pando 53,124 X  X X X  X X X    1 4 2 7 
CL Tarapacá 385,620   X     X X     1 2 3 
CL Antofagasta 462,286   X     X X     1 2 3 
CL Atacama 269,047   X     X X     1 2 3 
CL Coquimbo 569,825 X       X X    1  2 3 
CL Valparaíso 1,543,566 X        X    1  1 2 
CL Del Libertador 778,801 X       X X    1  2 3 
CL Del Maule 906,882 X      X X X    1 1 2 4 
CL Del Biobío 1,915,844 X       X X    1  2 3 
CL De Araucanía 864,975 X        X    1  1 2 
CL De Los Lagos 1,050,558 X        X    1  1 2 
CL De Aysén 93,636 X  X      X    1 1 1 3 
CL De Magallanes 156,530   X      X     1 1 2 
CL Metropolitana 
de Santiago 
6,013,185        X X      2 2 
 Total  60 11 69 59 9 42 53 60 49 0 23 5     
Shaded regions are those which are considered as relatively less developed according to the definition used,  
that is the regions with five or more indicators below the threshold. 
Table 4.44 below synthesises Table 4.43 by representing, for each country the number 
of regions, and their population, in terms of the number of indicators below the threshold. 
Data are given in absolute terms as well as in percentages. These data are then represented for 
each country (Figure 4.16) and for Mercosur (Figure 4.17), this showing the share of the 
number of regions and of the population affected by the number of indicators which are below 
75% of the Mercosur average. 
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Figure 4.16. Mercosur members: number of regions and population according to the 
number of indicators below the threshold 
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Figure 4.17. Mercosur: number of regions and population according to the number of 
indicators below the threshold 
MERCOSUR
15%
15%
10%
15%
5% 4%
8%
13%
19%
17%
4%
9%
33%
1%
1%
9%
7%
15%
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
N° of regions
Population
 
 Having compiled and combined these data in the preceding tables, it is now possible to 
discuss them, country by country, and then at the Mercosur level. 
Argentina 
As shown above by Table 4.44, according to the present definition of Mercosur 
relatively less developed regions, eight Argentinian regions can be classified as such. These 
regions are Catamarca, Corientes, Chaco, Formosa, Jujuy, Misiones, Santiago del Estero and 
Tucumán (see Table 4.43). Apart for the region of Formosa which has six indicators below 
the threshold, the seven other regions have five indicators below the threshold. Given the 
indicators selected, it appears that infrastructure development is an important issue in 
Argentina since these eight regions have at least four of the five infrastructure indicators 
below the threshold. The following map of Argentina (Map 4.6) clearly shows that, with the 
exception of the region of Salta, the whole of the north of the country is defined as relatively 
less developed. 
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Map 4.6. A development map of Argentina 
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Brazil  
In Brazil, the definition used leads to the classification as relatively less developed a 
group of thirteen of the twenty-seven federal states. Most of these thirteen regions have five 
or six indicators below the threshold, with the exception of Rondônia and Acre which have 
seven indicators below the threshold (see Table 4.43 above). These last two regions account 
for 1% of the population of Brazil. As highlighted in Map 4.7, all but one of these states are 
part of the North and Northeast areas of Brazil. The exception is the Mato Grosso, an adjacent 
state which is administratively part of the Central West area. More than 43 million people live 
in these relatively less developed Brazilian regions as defined above. This represents more 
than a quarter of the Brazilian population.  
It is worth noting that Brazil is the only Mercosur country which has a few regions 
where none of the 12 indicators studied are below the 75% threshold. Only four regions are in 
this situation. These are Rio Grande do Sul in the South, and Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro 
and São Paulo in the Southeast. Being densely populated these four regions account for more 
than 75 million people, almost half of the population of Brazil and a third of the total 
Mercosur 6 population. This relative weight partly explains the lack of indicators below the 
threshold for Brazil since they had de facto a predominant influence on the calculation of the 
Mercosur averages. 
Map 4.7. A development map of Brazil 
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Paraguay  
Only two of the eighteen departments of Paraguay are not classified as being relatively 
less developed according to the definition (see Table 4.44). These are the departments of 
Asunción, the capital city, and Central, which geographically surrounds the former, as shown 
in Map 4.8 below. Among the sixteen relatively less developed departments, half of them 
have six indicators below the threshold while five other regions have seven such indicators. 
Paraguay is the only Mercosur 4 country to have regions, namely those of Boquerón and Alto 
Paraguay, with eight indicators below the threshold (see Table 4.43). These sixteen relatively 
less developed Paraguayan regions account for 3.4 million people, two thirds of the 
population. 
Map 4.8. A development map of Paraguay  
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Uruguay  
Uruguay is the only Mercosur 4 country which does not have any relatively less 
developed regions. Six of the nineteen Uruguayan regions have a maximum of four indicators 
below the threshold (see Tables 4.43 and 4.44). As represented in Map 4.9, the remaining 
thirteen regions have between one and three indicators below the threshold. 
Map 4.9. A development map of Uruguay 
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Bolivia  
The analysis of the Bolivian regions confirms the diagnosis made at the national level. 
Indeed, the whole country, its nine departments, can be classified as being relatively less 
developed according to the definition (see Map 4.10). One department, that of Cochabamba, 
is in a relatively better situation since it ‘only’ has five indicators below the threshold (see 
Table 4.43). As shown in Table 4.44, six other regions have between six and seven indicators 
below the threshold. Similarly to Paraguay, Bolivia has two regions with eight indicators 
below the threshold, the maximum reached in this study. As a consequence, all the 7.8 million 
Bolivians live in relatively less developed regions.  
Map 4.10. A development map of Bolivia  
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Chile  
As in Uruguay, none of the Chilean regions can be considered as being relatively less 
developed according to the definition. As shown in Map 4.11 below, Del Maule is the only 
region of Chile to have the maximum of four indicators below the threshold (see Tables 4.43 
and 4.44), whereas the threshold to be considered as ‘relatively less developed region’ was 
fixed at five indicators.  
Map 4.11. A development map of Chile 
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Mercosur  
Referring back to Tables 4.43 and 4.44 above, it is possible to represent in a single 
map, Map 4.12, the relatively less developed regions of Mercosur, that is those with at least 
five indicators below the threshold. These regions are: 
- In Argentina: 8 of the 24 provinces – Catamarca, Corrientes, Chaco, Formosa, Jujuy, 
Misiones, Santiago del Estero, and Tucumán.  
- In Brazil: 13 of the 27 states – Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Pará, Amapá, Roraima, 
Tocantins (the seven regions of the North), Maranhão, Ceará, Alagoas, Sergipe, Bahia 
(five of the Northeast regions), and Mato Grosso (Central-West). 
- In Paraguay: 16 of the 18 departments – Concepción, San Pedro, Cordillera, Guairá, 
Caaguazú, Caazapá, Itapúa, Misiones, Paraguarí, Alto Paraná, Ñeembucú, Amambay, 
Canindeyú, Pdte. Hayes, Boquerón, and Alto Paraguay. 
- In Uruguay: none of the 19 departments. 
- In Bolivia: the 9 departments – Chuquisaca, La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí, 
Tarija, Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando. 
- In Chile: none of the 13 regions. 
According to the definition used in this chapter, 46 of the 110 Mercosur regions can be 
characterised as economically, infrastructurally and socially relatively less developed 
compared with the rest of Mercosur (see Map 4.12). These regions represent 42% of the 
Mercosur regions, cover 54% of its territory and are inhabited by 60.5 million people, that is 
27% of the Mercosur population. 
 
 128
Map 4.12. The relatively less developed regions of Mercosur 
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* 
* * 
This chapter has presented an analysis of twelve statistical indicators to highlight the 
relative levels of economic, infrastructure and social development in the 110 Mercosur 
regions. This analysis needs to be extended in future work by including additional indicators, 
and up-to-date and harmonised regional data – assuming that they become available. 
The last section of the chapter proposed one possible method of combining and 
interpreting these data. Since the objective of the chapter was not to develop a statistical 
index, composed of the twelve indicators, a simple statistical approach was adopted. It was 
consequently and arbitrarily decided to define as relatively less developed regions which have 
at least five indicators where the value is lower than 75% of the Mercosur 6 average. 
However, this is only one possible method and data can clearly be combined differently. 
Chapter 4 should therefore be considered as a modest attempt, however imperfect, to 
analyse the levels of development in the Mercosur regions. In spite of the limits imposed by 
the data, the results of the analysis enable a map showing regional disparities to be drawn up 
and highlight the significance of regional disparities. This represents a contribution to the 
literature since, hitherto, such a map has not been available. Since this map highlights 
regional disparities, it enables a case to be built for the establishment of a Mercosur common 
approach to regional development.  
The thesis now turns to Chapter 5 to discuss the actions which have been undertaken 
to develop Mercosur and which argue in favour of the establishment of a Mercosur common 
approach to regional development. 
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Chapter 4 put forward the evidence of significant regional disparities in Mercosur. 
These disparities are a source of dissatisfaction which could lead to the sanctioning of the 
Mercosur policy makers, through elections, if they do not take action accordingly. For this 
reason, a considerable number of agencies have already been established, both internationally 
and nationally, to tackle the issue of development within Mercosur.  
However, these agencies promote the development of Mercosur but are not focused 
specifically on regional development. Both aspects are deeply inter-related since 
development, if focused on less developed areas, can de facto imply a reduction of regional 
disparities. In other words, in reality, regional development is an outcome rather than an 
intention of these agencies’ policies. The nuance, although difficult to grasp, exists. Since the 
existing agencies do not take into account the specific regional dimension of development, it 
can be argued that Mercosur, following the EU example, could develop a common approach 
to regional development, which would be specific to Mercosur and would complement the 
existing array of international and national agencies. 
The first section of this chapter therefore looks at the principal development agencies 
active in Mercosur which would need to be taken into account in designing a Mercosur 
common approach to regional development. It would indeed be more efficient for a Mercosur 
approach not to compete with existing institutions but to complement their actions.  
The chapter’s second section argues in favour of the establishment of a Mercosur 
common approach to regional development and tests the conclusions reached against the 
opinion of the Mercosur and development specialists interviewed.  
EXISTING DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS ACTIVE IN MERCOSUR 
Since the middle of the twentieth century various organisations have been set up to 
assist the development of Mercosur countries. These organisations fall into the three types of 
institution analysed in this section. The first category of institution is that of international 
organisations which finance development projects in Latin America as part of their world-
wide mandate. The second category is that of development organisations specific to Latin 
America, whose member states are principally Latin American and whose actions are focused 
on this subcontinent. The last category is composed of Mercosur national institutions which 
were created by the governments of the different members to implement development projects 
according to national policies. 
International organisations 
Over the past five decades, two categories of international organisations have been 
working on the Latin American development issue. The first category comprises international 
organisations which assist the development of Latin America as part of a world-wide 
mandate. This implies that Latin America only represents some of their members and one of 
their areas of action. The second category is principally composed of two international 
organisations which, although their membership is world-wide, specifically finance 
development projects in Latin America.  
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World-wide international organisations for development  
Among these world-scale development institutions, the principal one, and by far the 
most important, given the significance of its resources, membership and mandate, is the 
United Nations system and the myriad of organisations which compose it. Some 
organisations, such as the World Bank, are autonomous and independent but are formally and 
officially linked to the UN.  
There also exist organisations focused on one specific development sector, but which 
are present world-wide. Since agriculture represents significant shares within production, 
exports and the labour force in Latin American countries, attention is focused on one 
international organisation working on agricultural development, the Consultative Group for 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). 
The United Nations ‘galaxy’ 
Towards the end of the second world war, the ‘Allies’ attempted to design a system 
which would preserve peace across the globe through international cooperation and collective 
security. This was concretised by the establishment of the United Nations on the 24th of 
October 1945. Created by 51 countries, the UN is presently a world-wide organisation 
composed of 189 member states. 
The objectives of the UN are extremely varied. For example, among the objectives are 
peace keeping; coordination of radio frequencies; human rights promotion; stability of 
financial markets; environment protection; intellectual rights defence; poverty reduction; 
definition of safety standards for transport; consumer protection; anti-drug campaigns; 
landmine clearing; food safety and production; and so on. 
The United Nations is composed of six main bodies. These are the General Assembly, 
the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat, the International Court of 
Justice, and the Economic and Social Council. The latter body, entirely dedicated to social 
and economic development, includes nine functional commissions, which make 
recommendations on their area of responsibility, most of them dedicated to development 
aspects. The Economic and Social Council is also composed of five regional commissions, 
one of them dedicated to Latin America, the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC),  and of five standing committees123. 
One of the central mandates of the UN is the promotion of higher standards of living, 
full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development. During 
the ‘Fourth Development Decade’, defined as the 1991-2000 period, the UN prioritised four 
areas. These were poverty and hunger; human resources and institutional development; 
population; and the environment. As much as 70% of the work of the UN system was devoted 
to accomplishing this mandate. There are two types of organisations which are focused on 
development aspects. 
                                                
123 The functional commissions are: 1) Statistical Commission; 2) Commission on Population and Development; 
3) Commission for Social Development; 4) Commission on Human Rights; 5) Commission on the Status of 
Women; 6) Commission on Narcotic Drugs; 7) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice; 8) 
Commission on Science and Technology for Development and 9) Commission on Sustainable Development. 
The five regional commissions are: 1) Economic Commission for Africa; 2) Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific; 3) Economic Commission for Europe; 4) Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean; and 5) Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia.  
The five standing committees are: 1) Committee for Programme and Coordination; 2) Commission on Human 
Settlements; 3) Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations; 4) Committee on Negotiations with 
Intergovernmental Agencies; and 5) Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 
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Firstly, there are the UN programmes and funds. These work under the authority of the 
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, and embody the economic and 
social mandate of the UN. Since 1997 there exists a UN Development Group, which 
comprises all UN operational programmes and funds to improve the cooperation among them. 
This category comprises organisations such as:  
- The UN Development Programme (UNDP) which works in 174 countries to eradicate 
poverty; 
- The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) which focuses on immunisation, primary health 
care, nutrition and basic education in 150 countries;  
- The World Food Programme (WFP), which is a food aid organisation for emergency 
relief and development;  
- The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) which provides population assistance;  
- The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) which works to encourage sound 
environmental practices everywhere; 
- The UN Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) which assists people living in health-
threatening housing conditions;  
- The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which promotes 
international trade, in coordination with the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
 
The second category includes the specialised agencies. They are independent 
autonomous organisations which are formally linked to the UN System. Only the 
organisations working on development aspects are listed and briefly described below: 
- The ILO (International Labour Organisation) which formulates policies and 
programmes to improve working conditions and employment opportunities, and sets 
labour standards used by countries around the world; 
- The FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN) which works to improve 
agricultural productivity and food security, and to better the living standards of rural 
populations; 
- The UNESCO (UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) which promotes 
education for all, cultural development, protection of the world natural and cultural 
heritage, international cooperation in science, press freedom and communication; 
- The WHO (World Health Organisation) which coordinates programmes aimed to 
solve health problems and the attainment by all people of the highest possible level of 
health; 
- The IMF (International Monetary Fund) which facilitates international monetary 
cooperation and financial stability and provides a permanent forum for consultation, 
advice and assistance on financial issues; 
- The IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development) which mobilises 
financial resources to raise food production and nutrition levels among the poor in 
developing countries; 
- The UNIDO (UN Industrial Development Organisation) which promotes the industrial 
advancement of developing countries through technical assistance, advisory services 
and training; 
- The World Bank group which provides loans and technical assistance to developing 
countries to reduce poverty and advance sustainable economic growth. 
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The World Bank is looked at in depth since it represents the largest share of UN 
development assistance. In 2001, the assistance provided by the UN system to developing 
countries amounted to more than US$ 30 billion. The World Bank and the IMF alone 
accounted for US$ 26 billions124. 
World Bank 
Designed in 1944 at Bretton Woods, the World Bank was initially set up to assist the 
reconstruction of Europe after the second world war. Its first loan of $250 million was made 
to France in 1947 for post-war reconstruction. However, the objectives of the World Bank 
rapidly evolved to focus on world poverty reduction and sustainable development. Since the 
15th of November 1947 the World Bank became formally linked to the United Nations.  
The World Bank group is composed of five different institutions (information about 
these are given in Table 5.1):  
1. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which provides 
loans and development assistance to middle-income countries and creditworthy poorer 
countries; 
2. The International Development Association (IDA) which provides interest-free loans 
to the poorest countries;  
3. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) which finances private sector investment 
and provides technical assistance to governments and businesses;  
4. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) which encourages foreign 
investment in developing countries by providing guarantees to foreign investors 
against loss caused by non-commercial risks;  
5. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) which 
provides arbitration for investment disputes. 
Table 5.1. World Bank institutions’ lendings (US$ billion)125 
World Bank 
institutions 
Date of 
creation
Member 
states 
2000 
Lendings
Cumulative 
Lendings 
IBRD 1945 183 10.9 349.4
IDA 1960 161 4.4 120.3
IFC 1956 174 2.4 21.7
MIGA* 1988 154 1.6 7.1
ICSID 1966 133 - -
Total -  19.3 498.5
* Issued guarantees and not lendings 
Looking at the sectoral distribution of the world-wide lendings of the IBRD and the 
IDA, the largest sector is that related to infrastructural aspects, that is transportation, 
communication, water supply, sanitation, energy and mining, which accounts for 26% of the 
total loans. It is closely followed by the ‘Human Development’ sector which represents 22% 
of the loans.  
These proportions are different in the specific case of the lendings made to Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. Infrastructure is only the fourth largest sector with 10%, 
                                                
124 These data, the institutions described in the two categories and their brief description were found on the UN 
website in November 2001: www.un.org.  
125 All these data on the World Bank were found in the World Bank 2000 Annual Report downloaded in 
November 2001 from the internet: www.worldbank.org.  
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much behind ‘Finance & private sector development’, ‘Human development’ and ‘Public 
sector management’ which respectively account for 33%, 24% and 21% of the total lendings. 
Latin America and the Caribbean were in 2000 the region which borrowed most from 
the World Bank. This area accounts for 26% of the loans made by the IBRD and the IDA, that 
is US$ 4.1 billion. 
Other world-scale international development organisations: the CGIAR 
In addition to these international organisations which finance different development 
projects in Latin America, a number of other organisations are specific to one sector of 
development, such as health, education or agriculture. It was decided to select only one such 
organisation as an example of this category.  
As suggested above, since agriculture is so significant for Latin American economies 
and societies, it was decided to focus on the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR) since its objective is to assist developing countries around the world with 
their agricultural research and production.  
Created on the 19th of May 1971, the CGIAR originally consisted of eighteen 
members and was based on four existing international research centres. Its mission was “to 
contribute, through its research, to promoting sustainable agriculture for food security in the 
developing countries”126. 
The CGIAR now comprises 58 members which are 22 developing and 21 
industrialised countries, 3 private foundations, and 12 regional and international 
organisations. The number of international centres has been increased from the original four 
to sixteen, all based in different countries around the world and each focusing on a specific 
theme. 
Three of these research centres are based on the Latin American and Caribbean sub-
continent (LAC). These are the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (Centro 
Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz Y Trigo – CIMMYT), based in Mexico; the 
International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical – 
CIAT), based in Colombia; and the International Potato Centre (Centro Internacional de la 
Papa – CIP), based in Peru. The IPGRI (International Plant Genetic Resources Institute), 
although based in Italy, is also much involved in the LAC region due to the biodiversity 
encountered in this sub-continent. 
As shown in Table 5.2 below, the CGIAR in 1996 allocated US$ 325 million to its 16 
research centres, out of which 18%, that is US$ 58 million, were directed to Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC). The CIAT is the centre most involved in the sub-continent to which 
it dedicates 71% of its resources. This represents almost 45% of the total allocations of the 
CGIAR to the region. The CIMMYT, the CIP and the IPGRI allocated an extra US$ 18 
million, that is 31% of the resources allocated by the CGIAR to LAC.  
                                                
126 Lucerne declaration, February 1995, downloaded from www.cgiar.com in November 2001. 
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Table 5.2. CGIAR allocations to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), 1996 (US$ 
million and percentage)127 
Centres Number of centres 
Total 
Allocations 
Allocations 
to LAC 
% of centres’ 
resources to LAC
% of CGIAR 
resources 
CIAT 1 36.8 26.3 71 45
Group 1 3 69.8 18.0 26 31
Group 2 3 36.8 8.5 23 15
Group 3 2 43.3 3.6 8 6
Group 4 4 71.4 1.6 2 3
Group 5 3 67.0 - - -
Total 16 325.0 58.0 18 100
Group 1: CIMMYT, CIP, IPGRI;  
Group 2: IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute), ISNAR (International Service for National 
Agricultural Research), CIFOR (Centre for International Forestry Research);  
Group 3: ILRI (International Livestock Research Institute), ICRAF (International Centre for Research in 
Agroforestry);  
Group 4: ICARDA (International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas), ICLARM (International 
Centre for Living Aquatic Resources Management), IRRI (International Rice Research Institute), IWMI 
(International Water Management Institute);  
Group 5: ICRISAT (International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics), IITA (International 
Institute of Tropical Agriculture), WARDA (West Africa Rice Development Association). 
 
International organisations specifically assisting Latin American development  
The Organisation of American States 
Established on the 30th of April 1948 by eighteen American countries in Colombia, the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) now comprises thirty-five countries. 
Its principal axes of action are the strengthening of democracy; the protection of 
human rights; the support to peace; the anti-drug fight; the development of the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA); and the promotion of sustainable development.  
In 2001, the OAS had an approved budget of US$ 84 million, slightly lower than the 
US$ 88 million of 2000. The organisation faces significant financial problems due to 
significant arrears in the quotas of its member states. By the end of 1998 the amount of arrears 
reached a total of US$ 49 million.  
The Inter-American Council for Integral Development (Consejo InterAmericano para 
el Desarrollo Integral – CIDI) was created on the 29th of January 1996 to promote integral 
development through new forms of cooperation between the countries. For 1999 it approved 
the financing of 78 projects, 20 national and 58 multilateral, for a total of US$ 10.9 million. 
More recently, at the beginning of 2000, the OAS created the Inter-American Agency 
for Cooperation and Development (IACD). The objective of this agency was to promote new 
and more effective forms of cooperation between its member states and to enhance 
partnerships with the private sector and civil society.  
The Inter-American Development Bank 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was established in December 1959 to 
help accelerate economic and social development in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Created at first by the United States and 19 Latin American and Caribbean countries, the IDB 
                                                
127 This table was downloaded from www.cgiar.com in November 2001. 
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has since been composed of 46 members, 28 regional members, that is American countries, 
and 18 non regional members from Europe, Asia and the Middle East. 
To this Development Bank were later added two other institutions as a part of the IDB. 
The Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) was established in 1989 to promote 
economic development through assistance to small and medium size enterprises. The 
Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) was created in 1992 by some IDB members to promote 
modernisation and to ease the human and social costs of economic adjustment processes 
throughout Latin America. 
The main objectives of the IDB are poverty reduction and social equity, and 
environmentally sustainable growth. It consequently finances projects in four priority areas:  
1. “Fostering competitiveness through support for policies and programs that increase a 
country's potential for development in an open global economy;  
2. Modernising the state by strengthening the efficiency and transparency of public 
institutions; 
3. Investing in social programs that expand opportunities for the poor; 
4. Promoting regional integration by forging links among countries that develop markets 
for goods and services”128. 
 
Consequently, the projects of the IDB cover the entire spectrum of economic and 
social development. As can be understood from Table 5.3, whereas productive sectors and 
physical infrastructure were traditionally the principal destination of the resources of the IDB, 
more weight has recently been given to social sectors and public sector reform. The 1961-
2000 data indeed highlight a sharp increase in the share of the resources going to these two 
last categories to the detriment of the former.  
Table 5.3. Distribution of the IDB loans (percentage)  
Sectors129 2000 1961-1995 1961-2000
Productive sectors 11 33 23
Physical infrastructure 17 29 27
Social sectors 36 23 30
Public sector reform & others 36 15 20
 
The IDB is the principal source of multilateral financing for economic, social and 
institutional development projects in Latin America and the Caribbean. As shown in Table 5.4 
below, the total lending of the IDB over 1961-2000 represents more than US$ 106 billion for 
projects with a total cost of over US$ 263 billion. The six Mercosur countries have been a 
significant destination for these resources since loans to them represent more than the two 
fifths of all the loans made in 2000, and also of all the loans made by the IDB during its 50 
years of existence. 
                                                
128 These IDB objectives, as well as the data presented in the two following tables, Tables 5.3 and 5.4, were 
found in November 2001 in the annual report of the IDB available on the website of the organisation: 
www.iadb.org.  
129 Productive sectors: Agriculture, Fisheries, Industry, Mining, Tourism, Science and Technology. 
  Physical infrastructure: Energy, Transportation and Communication. 
  Social sectors: Sanitation, Urban development, Education, Social Investment, Health, Environment, and 
  Microenterprise. 
  Others: Reform & Modernisation of the state, Export financing, Preinvestment and others. 
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Table 5.4. Destination of yearly and cumulative loans and guarantees made by the IDB 
(US$ million)  
 IDB loans and 
guarantees 
Total cost of 
projects130 
% financed by the 
countries 
 2000 1961-2000 2000 1961-2000 2000 1961-2000
Argentina 832.0 15,753.6 1,257.7 38,962.6 33.8 59.6
Brazil 658.2 22,105.5 1,548.7 67,000.8 57.5 67.0
Paraguay 174.7 1,713.1 278.5 2,528.1 37.3 32.2
Uruguay 44.2 2,322.2 70.1 3,902.3 36.9 40.5
Bolivia 40.6 2,778.0 51.9 4,569.7 21.8 39.2
Chile 483.7 4,691.2 1,141.5 11,696.6 57.6 59.9
Mercosur 4 1,709.1 41,894.4 3,155.0 112,393.8 45.8 62.7
Mercosur 6 2,233.4 49,363.6 4,348.4 128,660.1 48.6 61.6
Total 5,266.0 106,607.1 9,762.8 263,383.2 46.1 59.5
% M4 32.5 39.3 32.3 42.7 - -
% M6 42.4 46.3 44.5 48.8 - -
 
Latin American regional organisations for development  
There are two main Latin American organisations which have an impact on the 
development of the Mercosur countries. These organisations are the Andean Development 
Corporation (Corporación Andina de Fomento – CAF) and the Fonplata. Although both are 
focused essentially on the development of Latin America, they are different from the OAS 
and the IDB previously described. Indeed, these two latter organisations are international 
organisations with non-Latin American members even though they focus on the development 
of this continent. The CAF and the Fonplata are organisations of a ‘supranational regional’131 
scale though they are only focused on the development of parts of Latin America. Both 
institutions are discussed hereafter in more depth than the previous agencies since, 
considering their scale and their scope, they could become closely related to a Mercosur 
common approach to regional development. 
The Andean Development Corporation 
The Andean Development Corporation (Corporación Andina de Fomento – CAF) is 
one of the few success stories of development funds in the continent132. 
The CAF is the financial institution of the Andean Community, a process of 
integration begun on the 26th of May 1969 to create a customs union. The Andean Community 
members are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela133. Although the CAF has been 
created as a result of another process of integration, it is of topic for this research since, 
Mercosur members being extra-regional shareholders of the CAF, the latter finances 
development projects in these Mercosur countries. 
                                                
130 Most projects are financed partly by the IDB and partly by the home countries, similar to the EU principle of 
additionality. 
131 See definitions in the first section of Chapter 2. 
132 All the data relative to the CAF were extracted in November 2001 from the 1999 report of the CAF (Informe 
1999) found on internet. 
133 It is worth noting that Chile was one of the original members but it left the Andean Community in October 
1976. Venezuela only became a member in February 1974. 
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The members of the CAF 
Indeed, in addition to the five Andean Community members, the CAF now includes 
among its members private banks of the Andean region and eleven extra-regional member 
states: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Spain, 
Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay.  
The ordinary capital of the CAF is distributed among three classes of shares: Series A, 
B, and C. Series A and B shares are subscribed by the governments of the five member 
countries of the Andean Community either directly or through designated governmental, 
semi-public or private entities with a social or public purpose. Series B shares may also be 
subscribed by individuals or private juridical persons from the Andean region, which has so 
far allowed eighteen private banks to join the Corporation. Series C shares may be subscribed 
by governments, or by public and private entities, of extra-regional members as well as by 
international organisations. 
The objectives of the CAF 
The principal objectives of the CAF are to support Latin American integration 
processes, since its extra-regional members give the CAF a continental scale, to assist 
sustainable development, trade and investment in its member states.  
To achieve these objectives, the CAF finances projects which: 
1. Promote the integration of its member states, by developing physical integration 
through improved infrastructures and promoting the development of border regions. 
2. Encourage the modernisation of the production, by helping companies modernise, 
promoting strategic alliances amongst its member states’ companies, and advising 
during the privatisation of some state-owned companies. 
3. Improve economic infrastructure, by supporting the governments which decentralise 
their economic activities and inciting the private sector participate in infrastructure 
development projects. 
4. Reform and modernise state institutions, by collaborating on the member states’ 
administrative decentralisation and assisting local and national authorities 
strengthening their institutions and democratic processes. 
5. Promote the integration of the member states’ markets of capital, by consolidating 
financial systems and national markets of capital, and developing instruments to 
promote savings and redirect them towards investment. 
The organisational structure of the CAF 
The organisational structure of the CAF is based on three principal bodies: the 
Shareholders’ Assembly, the Board of Directors, and the Office of the Executive President. 
The Shareholders’ Assembly is the supreme body of the CAF. It meets once a year on 
an ordinary basis to decide the main guidelines according to which the CAF will take action 
and to designate the members of the Board of Directors. It is composed of the shareholders of 
series A, B, and C.  
The Board of Directors is the decision-making institution of the CAF. It is composed 
of twelve members whom are designated for three years. Ten of these Directors are elected by 
the shareholders of series A and B, namely the five Andean Pact members. Another Director 
is designated by the shareholders of series C, and the last Director represents the financial and 
private institutions holding series B shares. The Board of Directors determines the policies of 
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the CAF, approves its actions and its annual budget. In 1999 the Board of Directors met three 
times.  
In 1971 the Board of Directors established an Executive Committee, composed of six 
Directors designated by the shareholders of series A and B and presided by the Executive 
President. This Committee approves financial operations which do not exceed the limits set 
up by the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors also created, in December 1996, an 
Auditing Committee. This Committee is composed of four members: the Chairman of the 
Board of Directors, the Executive President, and two Directors. Its role is to select the 
external auditors and to verify the budget and annual report of the CAF before they are 
presented to the Board of Directors and to the Shareholders’ Assembly. 
The last CAF body is the Office of the Executive President. The Executive President is 
the legal representative of the CAF and its highest-ranking managing and administrative 
authority. His main duties are to approve the strategic plans for countries and sectors along 
with the institutional structures and processes under his authority, and financial operations 
within the limits delegated to him by the Board of Directors. He is assisted by an Advisory 
Council composed of a general adviser and experts from the region's economic, financial and 
business communities. 
The financial competencies of the CAF 
Given the allocation of the resources of the CAF (see Table 5.5), it appears that two 
sectors related to infrastructure are predominant. These two sectors, which are ‘Transport, 
storing and communication’ and ‘Distribution of electricity, gas and water’, represented 42% 
of the budget approved for the execution of projects in 1999, representing respectively 402 
and 193 US$ millions. 
Table 5.5. Loans approved by the CAF by sector, 1998-1999 (US$ million and 
percentage) 
 1998 1999 
Sectors134 Total % Total % 
Economy 88.0 5.9 149.1 10.6
Infrastructure 1,140.5 76.8 594.5 42.4
Public administration 55.0 3.7 33.0 2.4
Financial intermediates 130.5 8.8 345.0 24.6
Others 70.5 4.7 279.0 19.9
Total 1,484.5 100.0 1,400.6 100.0
 
In 1999 the CAF was the first multilateral source of finance for the Andean 
Community members. It accounted for more than 40% of the total resources allocated by 
multilateral institutions to these countries. Its total assets in 1999 were equivalent to US$ 5.4 
billion with an authorised capital of approximately US$ 3 billion.  
Between 1995 and 1999, the CAF made loans for a total of almost US$ 7 billion. The 
sectors representing the largest share were infrastructure, with 57% of the total, and financial 
intermediates with 20%. 
                                                
134 Economy: agriculture, fisheries, mining, gas and oil extraction, industries, manufactures, hotels, restaurants. 
  Infrastructure: distribution of electricity, gas and water, transport, storing and communication. 
  Public administration: reform of public administration. 
  Financial intermediates: resources used through commercial banks and development banks for productive  
  sectors, and through different programmes for education, health and community development. 
  Others: Education and other social and community services. 
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The CAF approved various loans for the Mercosur members in 1999. For example, it 
loaned US$ 26 million to Brazil to finance its project entitled ‘Distribution of Electric Energy 
to the state of Roraima’. Moreover, US$ 86 million were loaned for the Venezuela – Brazil 
border road (BR174) and US$ 165 million for the Bolivia – Brazil gas pipeline. In Paraguay, 
it signed a contract for a loan to construct a Paraguay – Bolivia road (US$ 60 million), and 
approved a loan amounting to US$ 500 million for Paraguayan micro-companies.  
In addition to making loans or grants, the CAF has other means to reach its objectives. 
For example, the CAF can co-finance projects with other public or private institutions, which 
is similar to the application of the EU principle of additionality135. The CAF may also play the 
role of an investment bank or of a intermediary financial actor by agreeing credits to financial 
institutions. Some activities of technical cooperation are also financed, through loans or 
grants, by the CAF to assist innovative projects. Finally, the CAF manages various funds 
which aim to reduce poverty in the Andean region.  
The Fonplata 
The Financial Fund for the Development of the Plata Basin (Fondo Financiero para el 
Desarrollo de la Cuenca de la Plata – Fonplata) is a second example of a Latin American 
development fund which finances development projects in Mercosur states. Although created 
before the Mercosur process of integration was initiated, the Fonplata’s five members, that is 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia, are all part of Mercosur136. 
The objectives of the Fonplata 
The Treaty of the Plata Basin was signed on the 23rd of April 1969 to commonly act 
“with the objective of promoting an harmonious development and the physical integration of 
the river Plata Basin and of the areas it directly and significantly influences” (article 1 of the 
treaty). Following this treaty, the five signatory states decided, on the 3rd of June 1971, to 
create a Financial Fund for the development of the river Plata Basin. However, the Fonplata 
only became operational on the 14th of October 1976.  
The objective of the Fonplata is to “finance […] the realisation of studies, projects, 
programmes and works which aim to promote the harmonious development and the physical 
integration of the Plata Basin” (article 3 of the Fonplata constitutive treaty). The Fonplata can 
achieve this objective by granting loans, managing financial resources, and financially 
supporting pre-investment studies and technical assistance. Its priorities are the physical 
integration of its members, social development, reinforcement of the productive capacity and 
the protection of the environment. As a consequence of the first article of the Treaty of the 
Plata Basin, quoted above, the Fonplata is focused on the regions of these five members 
which are part of the Plata river fluvial basin. This area covers the basins of the rivers Paraná, 
Paraguay, Uruguay and Plata, that is approximately 3.2 million square kilometres and a fifth 
of the Mercosur 6 territory. 
The Fonplata’s organisational structure 
The organisational structure of the Fonplata is light since it is built only on three 
bodies137. The Assembly of Governors, the Fonplata’s supreme body, is composed of five 
governors, each designated by one member state, whom meet once a year in ordinary 
meetings. The Executive Directorate is the decision-making body. It is composed of five 
                                                
135 See the seventh section of Chapter 7. 
136 It is worth noting that, as it was mentioned earlier, Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay are also part of the CAF. 
137 The organisational structure of the Fonplata is detailed in articles 15 to 31 of the Fonplata constitutive treaty 
and in the Fonplata regulations. 
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directors, one from each member state, whom meet regularly according to the Fonplata’s 
activities. Both in 1998 and 1999, the Directorate met five times. Within the Assembly of 
Governors and the Executive Directorate, each member state accounts for one vote.  
Finally, the Executive Secretariat is the permanent administrative and executive body 
of the Fonplata. The Secretariat, based in Sucre (Bolivia), was composed in 1998 of ten 
international civil servants and thirty local civil servants. A project presented to the Fonplata 
for financial support is first analysed by the Executive Secretariat, which prepares a technical 
report on the project for the Executive Directorate. The decision to involve the Fonplata or not 
is taken by this latter body. 
The financing competencies of the Fonplata 
On the 31st of December 1999, the Fonplata had a capital of US$ 308 million138. The 
two largest members, Argentina and Brazil, each contributed 33% of the capital of Fonplata, 
whereas each of the three small members contributed 11%. Compared to the CAF, the 
Fonplata has a much lower financial capacity. In 1999 the CAF agreed to make loans for a 
total of US$ 1.4 billion, which is about four times more than the amount loaned by the 
Fonplata during its 22 years of existence. This small financial size is mostly due to the fact 
that the five member states refused to allow Fonplata to open itself to other private or extra-
regional members. Likewise, the Fonplata member states restrained its capacity to look for 
resources on international financial markets. Indeed, the Fonplata can manage internal and 
external loans, but only with the agreement of the member states which need to be co-
responsible. 
Another reason which might have resulted in this reduced financial capacity of the 
Fonplata might be the little confidence it inspires in its member states. Indeed, the quasi-
unanimity of the 122 decision-makers interviewed considered the Fonplata to have failed, to 
have had too limited an impact on development, and to be corrupted. It is not the objective of 
this thesis to verify or not these assertions. However, the Fonplata seems to be at the centre of 
a vicious-circle since policy-makers, considering the Fonplata to be of little use, do not want 
to increase its financial capacities and competencies, which de facto implies that the Fonplata 
is financially too limited to have a significant impact on the development of the Plata basin, 
and thus appears to be of little use. 
According to its constitutive treaty, the Fonplata can only finance part of the total cost 
of a project. Local authorities must finance a minimum of 10% of the cost, for studies and 
social projects, or a minimum of 20% of the cost for other projects. Between its creation and 
the end of 1999 the Fonplata participated in the financing of 50 projects for a total of US$ 922 
million, out of which Fonplata contributed US$ 380 million, that is 41% of the total, the rest 
of the capital coming from local authorities (35%) and other sources (24%). This Fonplata 
financial participation is thus much lesser than the theoretical maximum average of 80% or 
90% it could finance. 
The analysis of the distribution of the loans made by Fonplata between 1977 and 1999 
(see Table 5.6) makes it clear that the transportation sector, included within infrastructure, is 
predominant since it represents 33 of the 50 projects and accounts for 71.7% of the loans. 
                                                
138 All the data related to Fonplata are extracted from its website, www.fonplata.org, and from:  
Cespedes Antonio, Integration y desarollo de la cuenca del plata, 1986, Universidad Mayor de San Francisco 
Xavier, Bolivia, p.192. 
Fonplata, Memoria Anual 1999, Fonplata, 2000, Bolivia, p.122. 
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Table 5.6. Total Fonplata loans by sectors, 1976-99 (US$ thousand and percentage)  
Sectors139 N° of projects Total loans Percentage 
Economy 9 71,682.4 18.9
Infrastructure 35 273,787.8 72.3
Social 6 33,487.1 8.8
Total 50 378,957.3 100.0
 
It is also important to highlight the fact that Fonplata has principally financed projects 
in Paraguay and Bolivia, which respectively account for 33.7% and 26.3% of the resources 
loaned by Fonplata. In spite of being the largest contributors, neither Argentina nor Brazil 
have made much use of the Fonplata. This is certainly one of the origins of the bad reputation 
that the Fonplata has in these countries since there was a feeling among the Argentinians and 
the Brazilians interviewed during the fieldtrips that through the Fonplata both countries were 
financing the development of Paraguay and Bolivia.  
Some interviewees explained this by stating that both Argentina and Brazil had 
originally accepted a gentlemen’s agreement to leave access to the resources of the Fonplata 
to the countries which needed it most. This appears in article 13 of the Fonplata constitutive 
treaty which states that, when approving the financing of a project, the Fonplata should take 
into account “an harmonious geographical distribution among the Member Countries, giving 
preference to Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay”. It therefore implies that Argentina and Brazil 
have not received much loans from Fonplata because they did not ask much financial 
assistance, and not because finance had been refused. This argument can be supported by 
reference to the fact that Argentina waited until 1983 to ask the Fonplata for its first loan and 
Brazil until 1992. 
Before concluding this sub-section on the Fonplata, it should be noted that this fund 
aims to play an increasing role within the Mercosur region. To this end, since 1999, a process 
has been engaged to improve the institutional structure; to develop the Fonplata’s human and 
financial resources to increase its capacity to answer the needs of its constituting members; 
and to increase its financial support to multinational projects, environment projects, projects 
promoting exports, infrastructure projects in less developed regions, and social development 
projects.  
Mercosur national institutions for development 
The previous sub-sections have analysed some of the international organisations 
financing development projects in Mercosur countries. This sub-section concentrates on 
examples of national policies and instruments which Mercosur countries have instituted to 
reduce regional disparities. Only two countries are taken as examples. Brazil is taken because 
it is the Mercosur country which has elaborated the most various and significant instruments 
for its development. Paraguay is also looked at to highlight the actions taken by a small 
country in economic crisis to assist its own development. 
Brazil  
Brazil is certainly the Mercosur state which has taken the most initiatives at the 
national level to secure regional development. On top of traditional ministries which are in 
                                                
139 Economy: agriculture, export, manufacturing; 
   Infrastructure: communications, water resources, transport; 
   Social: education, health, sanitation, social. 
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charge of development related to education, health, economy and so on, three ministries are 
dedicated to regional development. These are the Ministry of National Integration; the 
Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade; and the Ministry of Planning, Budget and 
Management. The latest plan of action of these ministries is the programme ‘Avança Brasil’ 
(‘Brazil in Action’). To promote the development of the North, the Northeast and the Centre-
West regions, the Ministry of National Integration created various development funds. In 
addition to these ministerial actions, Brazilians have also created an important development 
bank, the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES). The following 
sub-sections are dedicated to these three types of action taken by Brazil for its development. 
Avança Brasil 
‘Avança Brasil’ is a programme of development projects which was initiated in the 
mid-1990s at the beginning of the first presidency of F.H. Cardoso. It aimed to modify the 
way government planners defined the priority projects for the development of Brazil. There 
was a fourfold approach: reduction of the number of priority projects; reorganisation of 
existing resources to assign them where they are the most needed; reduction in bureaucratic 
procedures and red tape; and, whenever possible, increase in the participation of the private 
sector in these projects140. 
A list of 42 critical projects was put together, 26 of them related to infrastructure and 
16 to social development. From 1997 to 1998 Avança Brasil channelled US$ 14.1 billion into 
basic infrastructure projects and US$ 16.6 billion into social development. 
Considered as a success by the government, the programme was extended for seven 
years, until 2007. An international consortium was given the task of determining priorities for 
this period. They examined 822 projects and gave priority to 358. These projects will 
represent by the end of 2007 a total potential investment of US$ 180 billion, most of it 
allocated to infrastructure and social development, respectively amounting to 106.3 and 64.5 
US$ billion, the rest being shared between environment, information and knowledge. 
The Ministry of National Integration development funds 
To achieve its objective of reducing regional disparities and promoting national 
integration, the Ministry of National Integration created several funds to assist the 
development of the Centre-West, the North, and the Northeast, the three Brazilian regions 
which are facing the most important development problems. There are three principal 
categories of funds: 
- The three Funds of Regional Investments (Fundos Fiscais de Investimento, also called 
Fundos de Investimentos Regionais): the Fund of Economic Recuperation for the State 
of Espírito Santo (Fundo de Recuperação Econômica do Estado do Espírito Santo – 
FUNRES); the Amazon Investment Fund (Fundo de Investimento da Amazônia – 
FINAM); and the Northeast Investment Fund (Fundo de Investimento do Nordeste – 
FINOR). The first fund dates back to 1969 while the other funds were created in 1974. 
- The three Constitutional Funds of Financing (Fundos Constitucionais de 
Financiamento): the Centre-West Constitutional Fund of Financing (Fundo 
Constitucional de Financiamento do Centro-Oeste – FCO); the North Constitutional 
Fund of Financing (Fundo Constitucional de Financiamento do Norte – FNO); and the 
Northeast Constitutional Fund of Financing (Fundo Constitucional de Financiamento 
do Nordeste – FNE). 
                                                
140 Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, Avança Brasil: Development structures for 
investment, 2000, Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, Brasilia, p.16-18. 
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- The two Regional Development Funds (Fundos de Desenvolvimento Regional): the 
Amazon Development Fund (Fundo de Desenvolvimento da Amazônia – FDA) and 
the Northeast Development Fund (Fundo de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste – FDNE). 
They are the most recent category of funds since they were only created in May 2001. 
The law n°10.251 of the 4th of July 2001 opened a special credit of R$ 770 million141 
for these two funds. 
 
Only the three Constitutional Funds of Financing, created in 1989, are described more 
in depth here. In general, the objective of these funds is to contribute to the economic and 
social development of their respective regions, principally by making loans to the private 
productive sector, especially to small and medium size enterprises, preserving the 
environment, and developing economic clusters and poles throughout the region. 
In 2001 the FCO had a budget of R$ 430.9 million. It was distributed among the four 
Centre-West regions and gave priority to Goiás and Mato Grosso which each received 29% of 
this sum. The rest was divided between Mato Grosso do Sul (23%) and the Federal district 
(19%)142.  
In the same year, the FNO had a budget of R$ 563 million, the largest share of which 
was allocated to Pará (25%). Three other states, that is Amazonas, Rondônia and Tocantins, 
received 15% each, while the three remaining states, Acre, Amapá and Roraima, each had 
10%143. 
Still in the same year, the budget of the FNE amounted to R$ 1450 million. The FNE 
is managed by the Banco do Nordeste which afforded loans of a total of R$13.2 billion during 
the five last years. This bank is the source of 79% of all investments directed to the region. 
More than a third of these loans, that is R$ 3.7 billion, were made through the different 
development programmes of the FNE144. 
The BNDES 
The Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) was 
established in the early 1950s to assist the socio-economic development of Brazil. Its mission 
statement was reformulated in 2000 to officially recognise new priorities, namely to “promote 
the development of the country, increasing the competitiveness of the Brazilian economy, 
giving priority to the reduction of social and regional inequalities, as well as to 
employment”145. 
In 2000, the BNDES disbursed R$ 23.4 billion, that is approximately US$ 12.4 billion, 
and aims to reach R$ 30 billion per annum by 2005. This 2000 figure represents a 26% 
increase compared to the 1999 figure. However, since there was a significant fall of 40% 
between 1998 and 1999, the 2000 amount is inferior to that of 1997 and 1998. The figures 
show that 37% of the amount disbursed in 2000 was used for infrastructure, while the largest 
share, 44.5%, was allocated to manufacturing industry146. 
                                                
141 In 2001, date at which data was available for Brazil, the exchange rate was approximately 2 R$ for 1 US$. 
142 Proposta de Programação 2001 of the FCO, found in 2002 on the website of the Ministry of National 
Integration. 
143 Proposta de Programação 2001 of the FNO, found in 2002 on the website of the Ministry of National 
Integration. 
144 Proposta de Programação 2001 of the FNE, found in 2002 on the website of the Ministry of National 
Integration. 
145 Personal translation. BNDES, Plano Estratégico 2000-2005, 2000, BNDES, Brazil, p.55. 
146 Personal translation. BNDES, Plano Estratégico 2000-2005, 2000, BNDES, Brazil, p.55. 
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When considering the distribution of the disbursements by great region (see Table 5.7 
below), it is striking that more than half of these disbursements were made towards the 
Southeast region. The three Brazilian regions facing most development problems, the North, 
Northeast and Centre-West regions, which represent 80% of the Brazilian territory and 43% 
of its population, only accounted for a quarter of the disbursements made by the BNDES. 
This might be explained by the fact that these three regions are little industrialised, while the 
larger share of the resources of the BNDES were allocated to the industrial sector.  
Table 5.7. BNDES disbursements by greater regions, 2000 
 Disbursements 
(R$ million) 
Percentage
North 930,185 4.0
Northeast 2,783,085 12.1
Southeast 13,008,061 56.4
South 4,260,645 18.5
Centre West 2,063,854 9.0
Total 23,045,831 100.0
 
As highlighted by this sub-section, Brazilians have created a significant toolkit of 
instruments to promote development in their country. The BNDES alone has spent twice as 
much in Brazil as has the IDB in the whole of Latin America.  
Paraguay  
After having described the Brazilian national development institutions and funds, the 
thesis now looks at Paraguay as another example of a Mercosur country development 
institutions. Paraguay was chosen because it is the Mercosur member with the most severe 
development difficulties. Its development bank is called the Banco Nacional de Fomento 
(BNF). For reasons of country and economy size, this Bank is not comparable to the BNDES 
described above. 
Created by the decree-law n°281 on the 14th of March 1961, the BNF began to be 
operational on the 20th of November 1961. Its principal objective is the “intensive 
development of the Paraguayan economy, to which end it finances general programmes and 
specific projects of development for agriculture, manufacturing, and the trade in materials and 
products originating from the country”147. 
In 1999, the BNF made loans of a total of G$ 839 billion, that is approximately US$ 
240 million. Almost half of these loans were directed to agricultural projects, while 
commercial projects represented 32% and development projects 22%148. 
It is worth noting that this development bank has been in deficit. To escape 
bankruptcy, it had to be helped by the Central Bank and by external development agencies, 
notably a Chinese agency which in 1999 transferred G$ 100 billion which passed through the 
Ministerio de Hacienda. 
                                                
147 Personal translation of the mission statement of the BNF found in November 2001 on its website: 
www.bnf.gov.py.  
148 Banco Nacional de Fomento, Síntesis de la acción institucional Ejercicio 1999, 2000, Banco Nacional de 
Fomento, Asunción, p.24. 
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TOWARDS A MERCOSUR APPROACH TO REDUCE REGIONAL DISPARITIES 
The first section of Chapter 5 has described the main agencies which finance 
development projects in Mercosur. As statistically demonstrated in Chapter 4, these 
institutions have not had too much impact on regional disparities. This second section 
therefore argues that, to efficiently reduce its regional disparities, it is necessary for Mercosur 
to develop its own agency to focus specifically on regional development.  
The argument is demonstrated in four steps. The first sub-section weighs the pros and 
cons of Mercosur adopting a common approach to solve its members’ regional disparities. 
The second sub-section analyses some of the key issues that need to be considered when 
selecting the most appropriate common approach for Mercosur. Within the third sub-section 
these key issues are used to appraise four possible types of common approach and to 
determine an optimal approach for Mercosur. Finally, the fourth sub-section analyses the 
opinions of Mercosur and the development specialists interviewed during the two fieldtrips to 
Mercosur. Two aspects are considered in this last sub-section, that is their opinions on the 
necessity of a common approach to Mercosur regional development and their opinion on the 
optimal approach for Mercosur. This allows the conclusions of the preceding sub-sections to 
be tested against the opinion of the interviewees.  
The need to adopt a Mercosur common approach to reduce regional disparities 
In spite of the institutions which already finance development projects in Mercosur 
regions, it can be argued that Mercosur countries would benefit from establishing a common 
approach to regional development.  
The first and principal reason in favour of a Mercosur common approach towards 
regional development is that the existing agencies, discussed in the previous section, are not 
‘regional development’ oriented. Moreover, since the effects of integration are dissimilar in 
each region of Mercosur, this process of integration should provide a mechanism of 
compensation or redistribution to reduce regional disparities resulting from the integration, as 
has been done in the EU.  
Other reasons also support this argument. A first series of reasons justifying the 
establishment of such a common approach is that it would complement the existing panoply 
of international and national development institutions active in Mercosur. A second set of 
reasons is based on the potential contribution of this common approach to the strengthening 
and deepening of the process of Mercosur integration. Both sets of arguments are discussed in 
turn. 
Complementing existing development actions 
Although a considerable number of institutions have been financing development 
projects in the Mercosur area for the past fifty years, there remain a few gaps which could be 
complemented by a Mercosur common approach to regional development.  
Firstly, as highlighted in this chapter’s first section, although all the development 
organisations and funds active in Mercosur consider poverty alleviation and social 
development as key objectives, they allocate a relatively small share of their resources to 
them. Table 5.8 compares the share represented by the social sector for some of the 
institutions considered previously. 
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Table 5.8. Loans made by international and national agencies by development sector 
(percentage)149 
Body150 Economy Infrastructure Social Others 
World Bank * 33 10 24 33
IDB 23 27 30 20
CAF 11 42 25~ 22
Fonplata 19 72 9 -
Avança Brasil  - 59 36 5
BNDES 45 37 4 14
Average + 22 41 21 16
* Distribution for the loans made by the World Bank to Latin America and the Caribbean, which is different 
from the distribution at the world-scale. 
~ This percentage represents the share of financial intermediaries. Only part of it was allocated to social projects, 
the rest being for economic projects. Consequently, the percentage of the social sector average should be smaller 
and that of the economic sector higher. 
+ This is a simple arithmetic average which does not consider the significance of the total sum loaned since some 
of the data account for one year, and others for a longer time period. 
 
The table shows that the maximum share allocated by these institutions for assistance 
to social projects is about one third of their expenditure. However this share can represent as 
little as 4% in the case of the BNDES which, it should be remembered, is an economic and 
social development bank. Although the averages do not have any value as such, they give an 
indication of the relative significance of spending in the different development sectors. 
Infrastructure development is by far the most assisted sector. Economic and social aspects 
come equal second, each representing half of the share of infrastructure development. There is 
therefore a clear lack of support for economic and social development which could be 
addressed by a Mercosur common approach. 
 
A second reason for the establishment of a common approach to regional development 
by Mercosur members is that, between the international and the national development 
organisations, there is room for a Mercosur common approach to regional development. It 
could be argued that the CAF and the Fonplata, which already exist, already occupy this 
institutional space. However, the CAF cannot fully occupy this position since, although it 
finances a few projects in Paraguay and in Brazil, it is above all the financial institution for 
Andean Community countries. 
The Fonplata would be in a better position to perform this role since its members are 
Mercosur countries and its actions are directed towards some of its regions. However, in its 
present state and with its present status, the Fonplata cannot fully carry out the common 
Mercosur approach to regional development. Fonplata, focused on the regions of the Plata 
river basin, is too weak and too small to be efficient for the whole of Mercosur. This 
institution could however be transformed and endowed with more competencies. As argued 
later in the first section of Chapter 9, a revised Fonplata could become a basis for a Mercosur 
common approach to regional development. 
                                                
149 Source: these data have been extracted from the previous first section of Chapter 5 and gathered in this 
summary table. Further details on any of these organisations are available in the relevant sub-sections within the 
first section of Chapter 5. 
150 These are 2000 data for the World Bank and the BNDES, 1999 data for the CAF, cumulative data for 1961-
2000 for the IDB and 1977-1999 for the Fonplata, and prospective data for the 2000-2007 plan of Avança Brasil. 
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A third reason to support the argument for a Mercosur common approach derives from 
the experience of the existing international organisations. During the early years of activity, 
international organisations became aware that financial resources for development had to be 
planned and implemented as close as possible to the local or regional actors which would 
benefit from them. It is necessary not only to facilitate the access to these financial resources, 
but also to ensure that the institution has a better understanding of the concerns and needs of 
the people and enterprises at the local level. Action taken at the Mercosur level will be closer 
to this local level than development banks based abroad and those working on a world-scale. 
 
Fourthly, there is a need for a Mercosur approach to regional development to 
counterbalance the flaw inherent in national development institutions. Most Mercosur 
members have their own institutions to reduce national development disparities. By 
definition, the poorest and least developed countries are those in most need of assistance. 
However, being poor they do not have the necessary resources to finance their development, 
such as Paraguay and its Banco Nacional de Fomento. These countries consequently need 
external assistance, to which a Mercosur approach could contribute. It is what Martin, in an 
EU context, called “the financial targeting argument: because poor member states are unable 
to target their regional problems themselves, the EU has to provide the necessary 
resources”151. 
 
Fifthly, a common approach to regional development limits the possibilities of 
competitive overbidding for funds and investment between Mercosur members and their 
regions. Without a supranational body of supervision, each country will provide the private 
sector with the best possible fiscal and financial environment to attract inward investors. Such 
a situation might lead to a competitive overbidding race which would be highly detrimental to 
all the member states since it would lead to uncertainty and allow inward investors to play one 
country off against another. A common stance can limit this overbidding by defining priority 
regions for investments.  
 
Sixthly, from a political perspective, it is important for Mercosur countries to develop 
a common approach in order to have at their disposal an alternative source of funding for 
development which would be independent of international organisations. In the present 
environment, when a Mercosur country looks for external resources to finance a development 
project, it has to turn to international organisations for assistance. Although each country 
might influence the decisions of these organisations through lobbying and internal decision-
making procedures152, the countries are automatically dependent on the goodwill of this 
organisation. If Mercosur countries developed their own approach, they would be the 
decision-makers. 
 
A seventh argument is that the existing international and national organisations which 
assist development projects in Mercosur are above all financial institutions. The consequence 
is that these organisations loan and borrow at rates which vary widely, depending on financial 
state and business confidence. In such an environment, the existence of different institutions 
is beneficial. Indeed, it instils some competition which leads each institution to improve its 
                                                
151 Martin Reiner, Regional policy in the European Union, 1998, Centre for European Policy Studies, UK, p.76. 
152 Each member country of an international organisation has a number of votes, generally according to the 
contribution made to the budget, with which it can influence the decisions adopted. 
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services to offer the best rates. Otherwise, as described by economic models, there would be a 
quasi-monopolistic situation in which the existing institution might impose its services and 
rates. 
 
Finally, a last advantage a common approach to regional development would have 
over international organisations is related to transnational projects. All international 
organisations have difficulties in financing projects involving more than one country. 
Constitutionally, these organisations can only make loans to individual states since they need 
financial guarantors for their loans. Therefore, when financing a project which affects a 
supranational region, such as that of Mercosur, the international organisations need to 
negotiate with each country individually and to share the amount loaned among the different 
participating countries. A Mercosur common approach to regional development could offer a 
double advantage for the financing of projects which involve different Mercosur countries. It 
would become an unique interlocutor both for the participating countries and for the 
international organisations contributing to its financing, which would facilitate the process of 
financing supranational development projects.  
Strengthening the process of Mercosur integration 
A second set of reasons which can be offered to justify a common approach by 
Mercosur to regional development is that doing so would deepen the process of Mercosur 
integration and diversify its competencies.  
Firstly, a common approach to regional development implies de facto the undertaking 
of new public policy harmonisation. Since the 2000 process of ‘re-launching’ (relanzamiento) 
of Mercosur153, policy harmonisation is considered as an important axis of action for the 
deepening of the process of integration. The establishment of a Mercosur approach to 
development would make it necessary for Mercosur countries to harmonise their different 
regional development policies and to coordinate the actions of their national and local 
development institutions.  
Currently, at the time of writing, each Mercosur country has its own approach to 
regional development. On the one hand, Brazil has significant development policies and 
instruments. Argentina has taken a diametrically opposed direction since in its recent process 
of liberalisation and privatisation, the Argentinian government privatised its development 
bank. Paraguay is placed in a yet different position with its significant regional problems and 
its weak development bank which can offer few resources to assist development. Finally, 
Uruguay, which is a fairly homogeneous country in a relatively better development situation 
than the others, has only a few small development funds. To adopt a common approach at the 
Mercosur level for regional development would enable the harmonisation and coordination of 
all these national initiatives. 
 
Secondly, arguably, such coordination of activity could create a habit of working 
together and of looking for common solutions to common problems, a characteristic of 
integration. This would bring member states together and overcome the tendency to 
individuality. Indeed, currently, it can be suggested  that Mercosur member states think more 
in terms of individual benefits, rather than in terms of the common good. When facing a 
problem, the first reaction of Mercosur governments is to find the best individual solution, 
                                                
153 After the standstill in the Mercosur process of integration resulting from the 1998-1999 economic crises, 
Mercosur members decided to “re-launch” their integration. But the new wave of economic crises at the end of 
2000 and 2001 brought this process to a new stop. 
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without always considering the repercussion of their decision on the other members. This 
point can be illustrated by the Brazilian, and then the Argentinian reaction to the 1998-2001 
economic crises. Both governments adopted a series of measures which, especially in the case 
of Argentina in the middle of 2001, had significant impacts on the other Mercosur countries 
and which brought the process of integration to a standstill, and even meant it took a few steps 
back. 
Giving people the habit of working together, as would be the case in establishing a 
common approach to development, contributes to the promotion of relations between them 
and to developing better mutual knowledge. Moreover, it gives decision-makers the feeling 
that they are contributing to a common good, which can only have positive impacts in their 
own countries. These actions, this community of interests, helps to develop a Mercosur entity. 
 
A third argument for Mercosur countries adopting a common approach to regional 
development is that the present process of integration lacks a social dimension. So far 
Mercosur is the result of negotiations among the political and economic elite, without much 
involvement of the people. Indeed, except for the Joint Parliamentary Committee, which has 
very limited powers, the people are not represented within Mercosur bodies.  
Moreover, apart from a few decisions related to education or health, the policies 
adopted at Mercosur level have principally been directed towards trade and tariffs, in other 
words, non-social matters. If the decision-makers wish Mercosur to receive support from the 
people, they need to adopt decisions which would have a direct positive impact on the people 
which constitute the electorate. The member states, by adopting at the level of Mercosur a 
common approach to regional development, would send a strong signal to the population 
about the possible benefits of the process of integration. 
 
Fourthly, as illustrated by the example of the European Union, in which member states 
gradually considered cohesion as a key objective, regional development disparities should not 
be overlooked within a process of integration. Tackling these would lead to greater integration 
through seeking cohesion. 
In the early stages of EU integration the issues of regional disparities were considered 
of secondary importance, as it is currently the case within Mercosur. However, as the EU 
became more integrated, member states created Structural Funds as well as a specific 
Cohesion Fund154 and cohesion officially became a key objective. For example, the 1989 
Delors report on the European Monetary Union stated that, “[i]f sufficient consideration were 
not given to regional imbalances, the economic union would be faced with grave economic 
and political risks”. It can be assumed that what Begg wrote in 1995 about the EU is also true 
for Mercosur: as the “economy becomes progressively more integrated the distribution of 
costs and benefits will become an increasingly visible political matter. Regions or social 
groups which feel that they do not share sufficiently in the gains from integration will be 
tempted to opt out, putting the whole process at risk”155.  
Since the EU gradually established cohesion and regional development policies as its 
process of integration was deepened, it can be argued that Mercosur member states, if they 
wish to pursue their integration, will need to develop a common approach to regional 
disparities. Indeed, Martin and Pearce echoed the concern that “regional transfers come to be 
                                                
154 See the fifth section of Chapter 7 for more details on this fund. 
155 Begg Iain, ‘Threats to cohesion’, in Amin Ash, Tomaney John, Behind the Myth of European Union: 
Prospects for cohesion, 1995, Routledge, London, p.120. 
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seen by some as an essential counterbalance to the effects of the single market”156. Therefore, 
if Mercosur member states hope to create a common market, the establishment of regional 
development policies and instruments might become necessary to assist the regions suffering 
most from the negative impacts of the integration process. 
 
Fifthly, unlike other examples of integration processes, Mercosur lacks a financial 
institution to counterbalance the negative impacts of the integration on the members. In other 
processes of integration, this financial institution takes the form of development funds or 
compensation funds, such as within the EU or the CAF. In Mercosur, it could take the form of 
an institution which would finance, or facilitate the financing of, development projects across 
the regions. 
 
Finally, it can be argued that Mercosur member states should rapidly strengthen their 
integration. Under strong pressure from the US, the project of a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) is underway and should be completed within a short time span. Indeed, 
begun in 1994 after the First Summit of the Americas, the FTAA should be completed before 
2005. In this context, two scenarios are possible for Mercosur.  
The first scenario is that Mercosur would not be able to surmount the crisis its process 
of integration is undergoing, and consequently the integration would not be furthered. 
Mercosur would be a free trade area, not even complete, and would de facto progressively 
dissolve within the larger area of the FTAA. The second scenario is that Mercosur members 
pursue their integration, continue the creation of a common market, and manage to keep a 
Mercosur area of more integrated countries within the FTAA. This would permit Mercosur 
members to acquire more weight to face the USA within the FTAA than if they went to the 
negotiating table individually. Indeed, it can be asked what hopes of concessions do small 
countries such as Paraguay and Uruguay have when facing the US?  
In the eventuality of the second scenario, preferred by Mercosur governments, the 
development of a common approach at the Mercosur level would be a step towards further 
integration and would contribute to create a Mercosur identity. It is this identity which will 
enable Mercosur countries to exist as a specific group of countries within the FTAA and to 
best defend their interests.  
 
To conclude on the advantages of a common Mercosur approach to regional 
development, it should be emphasised that the reasons discussed above do not imply that 
Mercosur members should adopt a common approach to replace existing international and 
national development funds. Nor does it pretend to be the miraculous solution that would 
solve all the development problems of Mercosur regions within a short time. The discussion 
demonstrates that there is a gap in the framework of financing development projects in 
Mercosur countries, a gap that could be filled by the establishment of a common Mercosur 
approach to regional development that would complement existing institutions. The next sub-
section establishes the parameters for the assessment and selection of the optimal form which 
would secure a common Mercosur approach to regional development. 
                                                
156 Martin Steve, Pearce Graham, Economic convergence or crisis management: European regional assistance in 
the UK, paper presented to the Regional Studies Association Conference, May 1995, Regional Studies 
Association, Sweden, p.3. 
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Parameters for the selection of an optimal form for a Mercosur common 
approach 
When considering the establishment of a common approach to regional development 
in Mercosur it is necessary to explore the form of such approach. According to their present 
characteristics, none of the Mercosur institutions could be given such competency. Since a 
new Mercosur body would need to be created, a number of key issues need to be taken into 
consideration to determine which institutional form would be optimal for a common approach 
to regional development in Mercosur. Eight principal parameters are suggested against which 
these forms can be assessed. 
The organisational framework 
Mercosur bodies are at the time of writing relatively small and little 
institutionalised157. In most cases, with the exception of the Administrative Secretariat, these 
bodies are not formally constituted but take the form of periodic negotiation meetings.  
In fact, most Mercosur decision-makers do not want the institutionalisation of 
arrangements because of what was called the “Brussels syndrome” by one Brazilian 
interviewee. This means that member states are worried that Mercosur institutions could 
develop too much and become as powerful as those of the European Union are thought to be. 
This feeling is mostly explicable by past negative experience of multinational and national 
organisations in Latin America. Indeed, throughout Latin America it has often happened that 
new institutions have rapidly become what are considered to be excessive rampant 
bureaucracies, run out of hand and become ‘dens’ for the relatives of decision-makers.  
In spite of this fear of over-institutionalisation, the present Mercosur structure is 
already expanding rapidly. For example, the Sub-Grupo de Trabajo 11, created in 1998 to 
handle health related issues, is already composed of sixteen commissions and sub-groups, 
each including one coordinator and one deputy. For SGT 11 alone, there are therefore thirty-
two persons working in each Mercosur country. The rapid augmentation in the number of 
SGTs and commissions, leads an increasing number of officials from national governments to 
participate in Mercosur meetings. A Paraguayan official interviewed during the fieldtrips 
reported that some of the officials were now referring to Mercosur as “Mercotour”, because of 
the travelling which resulted from the increased number of meetings due to bureaucracy. 
The objectives 
Objectives for a common approach to regional development can vary enormously. 
However, the minimal objectives would be to facilitate the harmonisation of different 
policies, such as development policies, policies related to investment facilitation, and the 
coordination of the actions of the different national development institutions. Other objectives 
could include improving the social condition of the people by financing different types of 
development projects, either economic, social and/or infrastructural.  
It can however be argued that, whatever the objectives, they should not be over-
ambitious. According to a senior official from the Paraguayan Ministry of Industry and Trade, 
for a common policy to be successful within Mercosur, a first project needs to be set up which 
has limited objectives which can be completed within one to two years. This successful 
project could then be shown to all as an example of what can be accomplished through such a 
common approach to regional development. This interviewee stressed that, if this first project 
was to have long-term complicated objectives, “people would get tired of the project and 
                                                
157 See the third section of Chapter 3. 
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progressively abandon it. Moreover, if it is not a complete success, people will reject the 
policy as a whole”158. The proposed project for a common approach to regional development 
therefore needs to be realistic and achievable in meeting the objectives of a regional policy. 
The impact of decisions 
The issue here is how the decisions adopted through a common approach to regional 
development could reach acceptance by Mercosur bodies and member states. For example, a 
form which is consultative will only have the capacity to  propose recommendations that 
might, or might not, be followed by the Mercosur decision-making bodies. On the other hand, 
if the decisions are mandatory, they will be implemented and have a direct impact on 
development in these countries. 
The financial cost 
The financial cost of the common approach to regional development should not be 
excessive since Mercosur countries are relatively poor and already highly indebted states. 
Many member states are trying to reduce their public expenditures. Argentina implemented a 
drastic governmental plan in 2000 which for example included salary cuts for public servants. 
Consequently, the Mercosur countries do not have financial resources to spare, even for their 
own regional development. Their financial situation has worsened because of the series of 
economic crises which have taken place in Mercosur since 1999. 
The financial capacities 
It would be advisable – but not vital – to consider an approach which would have a 
minimal institutional structure but which would have some financial capability. On the one 
hand, this approach would need to have the capacity to borrow money on the international 
financial markets to increase the size of its resources and, on the other hand, to issue loans 
and/or grants to finance development projects. 
The independence from the member states 
In Mercosur the issue of national sovereignty is very sensitive for most countries. This 
is especially the case for Brazil where most public officials reject the idea of the transfer of 
competencies to common supranational institutions since it would represent a loss of 
sovereignty. Consequently, the common approach to regional development should not be 
completely independent from the member states in order not to be rejected.  
However, nor should this common approach be too dependent from member states. 
Otherwise, the common body would be subjugated by the member states, and its actions 
would be subject to pressures from national or regional governments. In such a case, the 
actions of this common Mercosur approach might be determined more by political support or 
lobbying than by real needs for assistance. The decisions would consequently not be taken 
according to technical criteria but to political considerations. 
The decision-making procedures 
It is necessary for all members to participate in decision-making procedures within the 
common approach adopted at Mercosur level. This does not rule out the possibility that each 
country could have a different number of votes, according to criteria such as population size 
or financial contribution. However, each member should have the capacity to influence the 
                                                
158 Interview held in Paraguay in May 2000. 
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decisions. It is difficult to imagine that a country excluded from these procedures or having 
too minor an influence would accept participating financially in any approach. 
The supervision 
To function efficiently, this common approach will require a form which will need to 
inspire confidence in all the actors which participate in its actions. Such actors are the 
political decision-makers which implement this approach, the international financial 
institutions which are involved, as well as the population for which this approach is directed. 
It is consequently necessary to guarantee a good supervision of the actions undertaken by the 
approach selected by Mercosur so as to limit corruption and mismanagement. This 
supervision will certainly be undertaken by the different member states so as to ensure that 
their financial contribution is not misused by the others. This can be complemented by a 
supervision delegated to some other independent institution. 
 
The eight criteria detailed above can now be used to assess the different mechanisms 
which are available to Mercosur to secure a common approach to regional development, to 
determine which is the optimal approach. 
The optimal mechanism for a Mercosur approach to regional development 
There are four principal approaches Mercosur member states could consider when 
adopting a common approach to regional development. As noted above, these are 1) a think-
tank; 2) an advisory board; 3) a development fund; or 4) a development bank. To determine 
which of these options would be, in the present circumstances, the optimal approach for 
Mercosur, it is necessary to assess the extent to which each approach meets the eight criteria 
discussed in the previous sub-section. Table 5.9 below synthesises the results of the 
assessment of these four approaches before the optimal approach to regional development, the 
option which best meets the criteria, is suggested. 
A think-tank 
A Mercosur think-tank would have a valuable impact on regional disparities and could 
be given three types of responsibilities. Firstly, it could be put in charge of harmonising the 
different national legislation on regional development and of coordinating the actions of the 
national development institutes of Mercosur states. Secondly, it could contribute to 
facilitating communication and information transfers among the Mercosur member states on 
development related topics. Thirdly, it could be put in charge of drafting development related 
policies which could then be discussed and adopted by Mercosur institutions. This think-tank 
could be institutionalised as a new Work Sub-Group (SGT) within the Common Market 
Group159. It would consequently be a small forum of periodic discussions among experts of 
the different member states. 
In this eventuality, the think-tank would have no institutional structure since it would 
consist of periodic meetings of experts designated by each member state. Like other Sub-
Groups, its decisions would need to be adopted unanimously, which guarantees that every 
member has a say in the decision-making procedure. However, the think-tank as proposed is 
of a consultative nature. The difficulty with this is that it is dependent on the goodwill of 
member states and Mercosur institutions to implement its recommendations. Its decisions 
might therefore have a limited impact if they are not supported by all member states. Its 
                                                
159 For more details on Work Sub-Groups, see the description of Mercosur institutions in Chapter 3. 
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objective would be limited but achievable since it would aim to facilitate the coordination of 
the different national policies related to development aspects. 
Accordingly, its competencies would be limited since it would not have the capacity to 
manage financial resources nor to finance development projects. Financially speaking, this 
approach implies little extra cost for Mercosur members. Indeed, the personnel of this think-
tank would come from public bodies which will already be paying them. However, these 
different bodies would still have to provide for their transaction costs to enable the periodic 
meetings to take place.  
Since the members of this think-tank would work for national public institutions, they 
would have no independence from the Mercosur governments. Finally, the supervision of the 
actions of this think-tank would most certainly depend only on the Mercosur states as is the 
case with the existing Sub-Groups. However, since it would not have any financial 
competence, this lack of external supervision is not too significant since there are limited risks 
of corruption and mismanagement. 
An advisory board 
The second possible institutional approach for a Mercosur common approach to 
regional development is to establish an advisory board in the form of an ad hoc committee. 
Whereas the think-tank would be more orientated towards proposing policies, this board 
would draw up development projects and/or select among those presented by the development 
agencies of each country the projects of priority interest. Its propositions would then be 
transmitted to Mercosur institutions, and/or other international or national organisations, for 
financing. The projects endorsed by this advisory board could then be given some priority and 
some facilities for financing compared to other projects. 
Most of the characteristics of an advisory board are the same as those of a think-tank. 
Indeed, institutionally speaking, it could take the form of periodic meetings of experts from 
different national institutions, which likewise implies little extra cost for member states. Its 
impact would be limited since it would not have any financial responsibilities and it would 
not have a mandatory power but depend on the implementation and financing of its proposals 
by a third party. As with the think-tank, an advisory board would certainly be supervised only 
by Mercosur countries. Moreover, being a Mercosur institution its decisions would almost 
certainly be adopted through co-decision and unanimity. 
The first main difference between the advisory board and the think-tank lies in the 
objectives of the advisory board, that is the selection of development projects. Indeed, such 
objectives might prove to be more difficult to achieve than those of a think-tank, but are 
nevertheless manageable. The second difference is that, although this body would be 
composed of officials working for the national governments, it would have more 
independence than a think-tank. Indeed, this advisory board will necessarily have a list of 
priorities or selection criteria to take into account when choosing development projects. This 
technical point gives this body some independence since political pressures cannot influence 
the approval of a project if it does not correspond to the pre-determined priorities.  
A development fund 
Thirdly, Mercosur countries could establish a development fund. In addition to 
selecting development projects, like the advisory board, this fund would also have the 
capacity to look for resources on international financial markets and to finance the 
development projects it has short-listed. 
Although it might sound too ambitious, the scale of this objective might be reduced by 
restricting the assistance of the fund on a few specific regions or development themes, such as 
economic development, social development, or infrastructural improvements. Since this Fund 
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would aim to finance projects, it obviously would need to have some financial powers to 
manage financial resources by borrowing money on the international markets and by making 
loans or grants for development projects. These financial powers imply that this Fund needs 
to be given an international juridical personality to be recognised as an actor on financial 
markets. 
Consequently, there would need to be a minimal institutional structure for this fund to 
ensure a framework within which it would act. This structure does not need to be large, but it 
is necessary since it would be difficult to run this fund only through periodic meetings. 
Because of this structure, which needs to be created and financed, there would be a small cost 
involved in maintaining it, depending on its degree of bureaucratisation. The decision-making 
procedure internal to this fund could be conceived as co-decisional or as requiring unanimity 
to give each country influence. 
This development fund should be a body separate from existing national and Mercosur 
institutions. As a result, this fund would have some independence from the member states. 
Although originating from these national institutions, the technicians administering the fund 
would become a separate corps. It would also be independent, and have a significant impact 
within the countries, because it would be financially independent and able to finance the 
projects it considers as priorities. However this independence is relative since this fund would 
without doubt be supervised by the Mercosur member states which would want to check how 
their resources are being used. This could be reinforced by external supervision through 
yearly audits and reports from independent institutions. 
A development bank 
Finally, the most complete action Mercosur states could take to create a common 
approach to regional development is to establish a development bank. Its functions would be 
similar to that of a fund, except that it would have a larger institutional structure to support its 
actions and that it would be completely independent from the Mercosur countries. Moreover, 
it could have extra fields of competence. For example, the Paraguayan development bank160 
also manages a few thousand personal accounts and is used by the government to distribute 
pensions and other financial assistance.  
A decision to establish a development bank implies setting up from the start an 
international juridical existence and a relatively important institution to ensure that it has the 
necessary framework to support its actions. This has a direct impact on the cost of the 
approach and on the overproduction of paperwork and red tape. 
However, this body could have at its disposal all the financial tools and competencies 
necessary for the achievement of its objectives. It could therefore have a significant direct 
impact on the development of the member countries.  
This institution would be completely independent from member countries, although 
they would still have a say in its principal guidelines. Indeed, in such an eventuality, the 
member states would meet once or twice a year to define the main policies of the bank, but 
the day-to-day decisions and actions would be decided by the corps of the bank technicians. 
Another way for countries to keep control on the actions of such a bank would be through the 
supervision of its actions which would certainly complement any independent supervision 
required by the bank. 
                                                
160 For more details on the Banco Nacional de Fomento, see the first section of this chapter. 
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Defining the optimal common Mercosur approach to regional development  
Table 5.9 below summarises the discussion of the four previous sub-sections by 
briefly stating how each of the four possible institutional approaches for regional development 
fits the eight selection parameters determined above. It is then possible to suggest which of 
these possibilities would be an optimal choice for Mercosur given the present circumstances. 
Table 5.9. How do the four possible institutional forms for a common approach to 
regional development in Mercosur fit the selection parameters? 
 Think-Tank Advisory board Development Fund Development Bank 
Institutional 
framework 
 
None None Light Significant 
Objectives Policy 
coordination 
Project 
selection 
Development projects 
financing 
Development projects 
financing, bank services 
 
Impact of decisions 
 
Little impact, 
since it is 
consultative 
 
Little impact, 
since it is 
consultative 
Significant impact 
since it directly 
finances projects 
Significant impact since it 
directly finances projects  
Cost Small Small Depends on its 
objectives 
Depends on its objectives. 
High cost for the 
administration 
 
Financial capacity None None Can borrow money on 
international market 
and finance 
development projects 
Can borrow money on 
international market, 
finance development 
projects, and offer other 
services such as a 
traditional bank 
 
Independence None Average Average Independent 
 
Decision-making Co-decision Co-decision Co-decision Co-decision 
 
Supervision Undertaken by 
Mercosur  
Undertaken by 
Mercosur 
Undertaken by 
Mercosur, but external 
supervision possible 
 
Undertaken by Mercosur, 
but external supervision 
possible 
 
The establishment of a think-tank or of an advisory board might be a temporary 
solution for the short term. Indeed, they can easily be implemented since they require no 
institutions nor transfer of competencies, and represent little extra cost. Their impact can be 
positive since there is a need for policy coordination, for policies related to development as 
for any other policy fields. However, given their limited objectives and competencies, both 
solutions would have little direct impact on regional development. Consequently, they might 
be rapidly implemented as first steps towards a more complete approach. 
Creating a development bank seems too significant a step, and one that Mercosur 
countries, especially Brazil, are thought to be not yet ready to take. Indeed, it implies too 
much transfer of power, too much independence, and too important an institutional 
framework to be created in the present stage of regional integration within Mercosur.  
A Mercosur Regional Development Fund (MRDF) is an intermediate approach which 
would offer many advantages. Due to the objectives and the financial tasks of the MRDF, it 
would be an efficient tool to fight regional disparities. Because of its light institutional 
structure and its limited financial cost, it is an approach which can realistically be 
implemented within a short time span. Only its relative independence might be a concern to 
 159
the Mercosur countries, although they should consider this independence as a guarantee of 
good functioning. 
According to these key issues, it can be argued that, considering the present 
circumstances, the optimal option for Mercosur would be to establish a Mercosur Regional 
Development Fund to assist the relatively less developed regions and to reduce regional 
disparities in member states.  
Opinions of Mercosur and development specialists on the optimal Mercosur 
common approach to regional development 
The assessment of the different options available for a Mercosur common approach to 
regional development, according to the eight selection criteria discussed in the previous sub-
section has led to the suggestion that the establishment of a Mercosur Regional Development 
Fund would be the optimal approach. This sub-section tests this proposal against the opinions 
of the interviewees.  
The views of key decision-makers who are involved in Mercosur or development 
related issues were sought during two fieldtrips undertaken in the four Mercosur countries in 
2000 and 2001. The following sub-sections present the opinions of 122 respondents 
interviewed161. The interviewees were asked inter-alia three questions on the optimal 
approach for Mercosur: 1) Is a common approach at Mercosur level useful or necessary to 
reduce regional development disparities? 2) What would be the optimal approach for 
Mercosur? and 3) Is Mercosur ready for the establishment of this common approach? 
The necessity of implementing a Mercosur approach to regional development  
The 122 interviewees were asked whether they considered a common Mercosur 
approach to regional development useful, necessary, or not (for more details on the interviews 
see Annex A1). Among them, 102 gave their opinion on this issue, the others did not answer.  
Among these 102 respondents, only two, an Uruguayan economist and a Brazilian 
economic researcher, considered that Mercosur should not adopt any kind of common 
approach. The Uruguayan economist adopted a very – if not ultra – liberal perspective, and 
rejected the idea of “bureaucracies managing funds for the good of people” and was highly 
critical about Mercosur, naming it “Mercosour”. This economist justified his opinion by 
arguing that, according to him, Uruguayans generally expect everything from the state and 
rarely take personal initiatives to improve their situation. Consequently, he believed that 
creating a Mercosur Fund which could assist Uruguayans would be worse than anything since 
it would increase the expectations Uruguayans had from public institutions and would reduce 
their personal initiative. The Brazilian economic researcher was against the development of a 
Mercosur approach because, rather than creating a new Mercosur institution, he thought it 
would be better to enhance the role of the BNDES by giving it the means to finance 
development projects in other Mercosur countries, not least in order to keep this policy aspect 
under Brazilian supervision.  
Out of the remaining interviewees, 57 considered that the idea of a Mercosur common 
approach to regional development is ‘necessary’, whereas 43 defined it as ‘useful’. Figure 5.1 
clearly shows the near unanimity of the interviewees in favour of adopting a common 
approach to regional development. 
                                                
161 See Introduction and Appendix 1 for more details on the fieldtrips and the interviews. 
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Figure 5.1. The necessity of adopting a Mercosur approach to regional development by 
country (percentage of 102 respondents) 
Views on the optimal approach for Mercosur 
After the interviewees were asked about the necessity of a common approach to 
regional development, they were asked about the type of approach Mercosur should consider. 
Only the 117 interviewees who gave their opinion on this issue are considered hereafter.  
In the preceding sub-sections a list of four possible institutional forms for a Mercosur 
common approach was presented. These were the establishment of a think-tank, an advisory 
board, a development fund or a development bank. The interviewees were not given a list of 
possible answers among which to choose, but were asked an open question and were left 
entirely free to propose whatever approach they considered best. None suggested something 
similar to an advisory board. Although a few respondents considered the creation of 
something similar to what was presented above as a think-tank, it was only seen as a 
transitional measure towards the establishment of either a development fund or bank. 
Consequently, only these latter two possibilities are considered hereafter. However, as 
shown by Figure 5.2, two respondents considered a third possibility. Without giving a name 
to the type of institution they proposed, they described a cross-breed between a development 
fund and a development bank. This alternative approach would have more powers than 
traditional development funds, but a weaker institutional structure and less independence than 
development banks. 
Figure 5.2. Opinions of interviewees on the optimal approach for a Mercosur common 
regional development approach (117 respondents) 
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These two figures above highlight the preference of the interviewees for the creation 
of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. This approach, which accounts for two thirds of 
the 117 answers, was chosen as the optimal choice.  
Is Mercosur ready for the creation of a MRDF? 
Although many interviewees supported the idea of creating a Mercosur Regional 
Development Fund, most were sceptical on whether the present state of Mercosur would 
allow the establishment of a Fund. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 5.3 and Table 5.10 further 
down, most interviewees considered that Mercosur was not ready yet for such a MRDF and 
that it would be difficult, but not impossible, to establish a Mercosur Fund before certain 
reforms were completed. 
The literature on Mercosur as well as the interviews conducted reveal that, although 
some are impressed by the speed with which the process of integration has been implemented, 
many criticise the lack of robustness of the Mercosur process and institutions. For example, 
while discussing the possibility to create a monetary union in Mercosur, Phillips considered in 
2000 that “at present the Mercosur is not equipped to ‘carry’ the sort of integration that 
significant policy innovation might require. Its minimal level of institutionalisation and its 
slow progress on key (and basic) economic issues – such as trade in services, government 
procurement, intellectual property, competition policy, harmonisation of customs procedures 
and exchange rate coordination – prompt scepticism about its capacity as a modus operandi 
for collective action”162. 
Although a majority of interviewees believed a MRDF to be necessary163, they 
wondered whether it should be implemented immediately. Interviewees were therefore asked 
whether they considered Mercosur ready for such a (r)evolution in its institutional structure 
and competencies. Indeed, a MRDF implies that member states would transfer some 
sovereignty as well as, for the first time, financial competencies to a common permanent 
institution. Those interviewees who considered Mercosur not to be ready yet were asked what 
they believed Mercosur lacked before it could develop a common approach. 
Only 80 of the interviewees gave their opinion on the readiness of Mercosur and its 
member states for creating a MRDF. As shown in Figure 5.3, which illustrates the data 
presented below in Table 5.10, 59% of the respondents considered that Mercosur was not yet 
ready for this new step in the process of integration. However, almost all agreed that it should 
and could be created within a 3 to 5 years time span. Very few interviewees considered this 
project would not see daylight within another 10 years.  
Figure 5.3. The readiness of Mercosur for a MRDF 
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162 Phillips Nicola, Governance after the financial crisis: South American perspectives on the reformulation of 
regionalism, 2000, New Political Economy, vol. 5, n°3, Carfax Publishing, Philadelphia, p. 392. 
163 See the preceding sub-section. 
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Figure 5.3 clearly shows that Brazil was the only country where more interviewees 
considered that Mercosur was ready than not. However, the difference between the two 
possibilities is separated by only one response which supported the idea that Mercosur is 
ready. In Argentina and Paraguay the number of interviewees stating Mercosur to be not 
ready was twice that of those considering Mercosur to be ready. 
The 47 persons who considered that it was too early for Mercosur to create a MRDF 
were asked for the reason underlying their opinion, i.e. what was considered to be lacking in 
the existing Mercosur. Since seven respondents gave two answers, there are 54 responses to 
analyse (see Table 5.10). 
Table 5.10. The readiness of Mercosur for a MRDF 
Mercosur readiness What is lacking? (N° of answers)  
R
ea
dy
 
N
ot
 re
ad
y 
T
ot
al
 
Su
pr
an
at
io
na
lit
y 
In
st
itu
tio
na
lis
at
io
n 
M
at
ur
ity
 
Po
lit
ic
al
 w
ill
 
Po
lic
y 
co
or
di
na
tio
n 
C
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
co
ns
ci
ou
sn
es
s 
T
ot
al
 
Argentina 6 15 21 1 2 8 6 2 1 20
Brazil 15 14 29 5 3 6 1 15
Paraguay 6 11 17  1 3 4 3 11
Uruguay 6 7 13 1 1 3 2 1 8
Total 33 47 80 7 3 15 13 13 3 54
Percentage 41 59 100 13 6 27 24 24 6 100
 
As Table 5.10 and Figure 5.4 below show, with 15 answers, that is 27% of the 54 
answers, the most frequently cited problem is that Mercosur, being so recently established, 
lacks enough maturity to consider implementing a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. 
The absence of political will and of policy coordination are equally second with 24% of the 
answers each. As shown by Figure 5.4, 13% of the interviewees considered that Mercosur 
institutions should be empowered with more supranationality before thinking of creating a 
MRDF. Finally, with 6% of the answers each, the lack of collective consciousness and of 
better institutional structures accounted for the lowest number of answers. 
Figure 5.4. What Mercosur needs before creating a MRDF (percentage of 54 answers) 
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In the case of five of these six characteristics Mercosur lacks for it to create a MRDF, 
it can be argued that the interviewees were considering the problem from the wrong point of 
view. Apart from the lack of political will, it is arguably feasible to establish a MRDF in the 
current state of evolution of the Mercosur. Admittedly, ideally, it would certainly be a better 
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environment for the creation of a MRDF for Mercosur to be at a more mature stage of 
development which would have some common institutions with supranational competencies, 
and in which the national policies would be coordinated to achieve a common good defined 
by collective consciousness.  
However, in a contrary view to the opinion of the interviewees presented above, it can 
be argued that these five characteristics are not necessary pre-requisites for the creation of a 
MRDF. Indeed, instead of highlighting what Mercosur lacks before it can create a MRDF, it 
seems more appropriate to consider how the creation of a MRDF can contribute to reduce 
these deficiencies. For instance, setting up a MRDF can contribute to creating a collective 
consciousness, in particular that Mercosur member states face similar development problems 
which could be solved through a common approach. It also implies the coordination of some 
of the national development policies of the different member states. Finally, this Fund implies 
a development of Mercosur common institutions with some supranational powers and 
financial competencies. Therefore, the creation of a MRDF can contribute to the overall 
Mercosur process of integration and would represent a new step towards a maturation of 
Mercosur.  
The only exception is the political will which is a necessary pre-requisite to the 
implementation of such step. Given the present structure of Mercosur, all decisions are 
adopted through inter-governmental negotiations. It is therefore obvious that political will is 
the crucial aspect before a MRDF can be created. Moreover, since a MRDF body will act in 
partnership with member states, it is essential for the these states to support such an initiative. 
The interviews suggested that there is an increasing consciousness in decision-making 
circles that Mercosur needs to create a common institution for regional development. 
However, the interviewees considered that the necessary political will was still absent within 
the highest decision-making levels, that is amongst the Presidents of Mercosur states, to 
launch the process of establishing a common approach to regional development. In 2001 the 
subject made a quick and indirect appearance on the Mercosur agenda, in the form of an item 
on coordinating fiscal incentives for development. However, this subject lost its priority after 
the 2001-2002 economic crises which Mercosur member states have been through. As a 
Paraguayan economist said in an interview, “[W]hen the house is on fire, you do not sit down 
to make plans about the future; you concentrate all your efforts to put out the fire”. 
Mercosur member states will certainly necessitate two to three years before effectively 
creating a Mercosur Regional Development Fund, to initiate an official and open reflection on 
this subject in order to determine the specific characteristics of such a MRDF, its priorities, 
and its actions. This time-span will also allow member states to solve the present economic 
crisis and to pursue the Mercosur process of integration. 
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* 
* * 
In conclusion, as was highlighted throughout this chapter, although a considerable 
number of actions have already been implemented by international and national institutions to 
finance development projects in Mercosur countries, Mercosur lacks a common approach to 
promote regional development. The analysis undertaken concluded that, among the different 
types of approach Mercosur has at its disposal to reduce regional disparities, a Mercosur 
Regional Development Fund would be the optimal approach considering present 
circumstances. This conclusion is supported by a critical and objective analysis and by the 
two thirds of the Mercosur decision-makers and development specialists interviewed.  
Combined with the conclusions of Chapter 4, which highlighted the scale of regional 
disparities in Mercosur, this chapter supports the first hypothesis of the thesis which is that “it 
is possible for Mercosur to reduce significant regional disparities by complementing the 
activities of existing development agencies through the establishment of a MRDF ”. 
However, it seems that interviewees consider that Mercosur is not ready yet for a 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund. It can however be argued that a few years are needed 
to analyse, discuss and negotiate the creation of a MRDF, and that this will provide the 
necessary time to stabilise and strengthen the Mercosur process of integration, so as to create 
an environment favourable to the MRDF.  
Having argued the case for the creation of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund, 
the thesis now turns to its third part to analyse to what extent and under what circumstances 
Mercosur could learn from the EU’s experience. This will later allow, in the fourth part of the 
thesis, to consider these lessons when discussing the priorities and characteristics of a MRDF. 
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The thesis moves on to propose a framework for analysing the lessons that Mercosur 
might learn from the EU experience to enable it to design a Mercosur Regional Development 
Fund. The conclusions reached after this analysis at the theoretical level enable, in Chapter 7, 
a more precise scrutiny of the EU experience to be undertaken in order to determine the 
specific lessons which could be transferred to Mercosur. 
It can be argued that policy makers can take three possible courses of action to 
develop a new policy. These are defined in this thesis as looking backward, forward, or 
across. Referring to Rose, these three possibilities can be defined as follows164: 
Looking backward: “Small changes can be made in an existing programme and their 
consequences evaluated to learn, on a trial-and-error basis, what does and does not dispel 
dissatisfaction. A trial-and-error strategy is backward-facing, for nothing can be learned until 
the results of a new programme are evident”. 
Looking forward: “When old remedies become obsolete, policy-makers can look to the future, 
designing an innovative programme. By definition the workings of a new programme will be 
speculative, for it is outside the direct experience of policy makers”. 
Looking across: “Lesson-drawing is future-oriented, drawing on current experience in other 
countries to improve national policy. It offers an evidence-based alternative to developing a 
new programme”.  
It can be argued that looking across, that is learning from another’s experience through 
a policy transfer, offers significant advantages. In considering eight criteria to evaluate policy 
transfer as a method of prospective evaluation - precision, certainty of prediction, credibility, 
cost, time, ease of application, ease of explanation, and accuracy – Mossberger and Wolman 
conclude that: 
“Clearly policy transfer, when compared to more formal kinds of techniques such as social 
experiments, many forms of quasi-experiments, modelling and micro-simulations, fares poorly 
as a form of prospective policy evaluation in terms of precision and certainty of the prediction. 
The credibility criterion is somewhat difficult to apply. If policy makers understand and are 
comfortable with social sciences techniques, then more formal mechanisms are likely to be 
given greater credibility, although the fact that policy transfer involves an analogy with a 
program or policy that has actually been in place elsewhere may give it credibility that 
modelling, micro-simulation or deduction based on behavioural premises might not have. 
Policy transfer holds a substantial advantage over may more formal techniques (though not 
necessarily deduction from behavioural premises and inferences drawn from existing studies) 
with respect to cost and time. Done correctly, however, policy transfer entails considerably 
more application of both cost and time than do most of the more informal techniques 
(application of personal experience, reliance upon third party testimony or experts, 
extrapolation of present trends into the future). Policy transfer holds even greater advantages in 
terms of ease of explaining the method and its methodology in the course of policy debate. 
[…] Given the real advantages of policy transfer in terms of cost, timing, credibility, and ease 
of understanding, it is likely that policy transfer will continue to prove attractive to policy 
makers”165. 
                                                
164 Rose Richard, Ten steps in learning lessons from abroad, Future Governance Paper 1, Lessons from 
Comparative Public Policy, October 2001, University of Strathclyde, Strathclyde, p.1. 
165 Mossberger Karen, Wolman Hal, Policy transfer as a form of prospective policy evaluation, November 2001, 
ESRC, UK, p.17. 
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Before going any further it is necessary to define precisely the concept of ‘policy 
transfer’. According to Dolowitz, policy transfer is “the occurrence of, and processes involved 
in, the development of programmes, policies, institutions, etc. within one political and/or 
social system which are based upon the ideas, institutions, programmes and policies 
emanating from other political and/or social systems”166.  
Other authors, such as Rose, prefer the term ‘lesson drawing’. Although Dolowitz and 
Marsh consider that “policy transfer, emulation and lesson drawing all refer to a process in 
which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time 
and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and 
institutions in another time and/or place”167, they also write that “the term ‘lesson drawing’ 
implies that political actors or decision makers in one country draw lessons from one or more 
other countries, which they then apply to their own political system”168. ‘Lesson drawing’ is 
thus but one type of ‘policy transfer’. 
Policy transfers have often been done by force during wars and conquests, the 
conqueror coercing vassal states to adopt its policies. Sometimes this transfer is done 
willingly with states copying policies successfully implemented in other countries, in the hope 
that these successes can be repeated in their own state. 
During the twentieth century, partly due to better communication facilities, voluntary 
transfers of policy have increased. Since it became easier and quicker to learn about policies 
which have been implemented elsewhere, the temptation to adopt successes from other 
countries has become greater. Indeed, with the development of democracy, decision-makers 
have had to work within a shorter time scale. Compared to kings, despots and dictators who 
have power for life, governments are generally elected for a limited number of years and thus 
have a short term during which to implement policies which will facilitate their re-election. 
Such a time span might not be long enough for the analysis of the situation and for inventing 
solutions. The alternative is to consider what other governments have done to solve a similar 
problem and to adapt the solutions to the local environment. This leads Rose to consider that 
“lesson-drawing tries to avoid the costs of being first and of re-inventing the wheel by 
learning from the trials and errors of a programme already in operation”169. 
The analysis of the process of policy transfer in the academic world is a very recent 
development since it is only during the second half of the twentieth century that policy 
transfers have begun to be studied within the field of comparative politics. The study of 
prospective policy transfers - that is the analysis of the factors that need to be taken into 
account in making a policy transfer before the transfer takes place - is an even newer field of 
academic research. 
However, although the literature on policy transfers offers some valuable concepts and 
insights, it is limited. It is necessary to develop it further to answer the questions posed  in the 
thesis. The first section of this chapter discusses the existing literature. The second section 
uses the findings of the review as a basis to develop a framework to analyse prospective 
policy transfers and to explore the basis on which lessons can successfully be transferred 
between two supranational associations. The third section applies this framework to the 
specific case of transferring the EU experience in regional development funds to Mercosur.  
                                                
166 Dolowitz David P., Policy transfer and British social policy, 2000, Open University Press, Buckingham, p.3. 
167 Dolowitz David, Marsh David, Who learns what from whom: a review of the policy transfer literature, 
Political studies, vol 44, n°2, June 1996, Blackwell Publishers, London, p.344. 
168 Dolowitz David, Marsh David, Who learns what from whom: a review of the policy transfer literature, 
Political studies, vol 44, n°2, June 1996, Blackwell Publishers, London, p.344. 
169 Rose Richard, Ten steps in learning lessons from abroad, Future Governance Paper 1, Lessons from 
Comparative Public Policy, October 2001, University of Strathclyde, Strathclyde, p.4. 
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POLICY TRANSFERS IN THE LITERATURE 
This section reviews the existing literature on policy transfers. To present this in a 
coherent way, the thesis refers principally to the works of Dolowitz and Marsh and adopts a 
thematic approach. In 1996 these authors had already conducted a literature review. This was 
organised according to a series of questions found within the literature170. In furthering their 
research, the authors gradually developed a framework for analysing policy transfers171.  
The Dolowitz and Marsh framework (see Figure 6.1) is based on eight essential 
questions that are asked in relation to policy transfers:  
1. What are the reasons for initiating a process of policy transfer? 
2. Who are the actors, that is the people or institutions, involved in the process? 
3. What is being transferred?  
4. What is the source of the transfer? 
5. What is the significance of the ‘degree’ of transfer?  
6. What is facilitating or constraining the transfer? 
7. What are the sources of information for the principal actors? 
8. What are the reasons for any failure of policy transfer? 
In the discussion on these eight aspects of the Dolowitz and Marsh framework below, 
comments from other authors are included.  
                                                
170 Dolowitz David, Marsh David, Who learns what from whom: a review of the policy transfer literature, 
Political studies, vol 44, n°2, June 1996, Blackwell Publishers, London, pp.343-357. 
171 Dolowitz David P., Learning from America: policy transfer and the development of the British workfare state, 
1998, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, p.212. 
Dolowitz David P., Marsh David, ‘policy transfer: a framework for comparative analysis’, in Minogue Martin, 
Polidano Charles, Hulme David, Beyond the new public management: changing ideas and practices in 
governance, 1998, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp.38-75. 
Dolowitz David P., Policy transfer and British social policy, 2000, Open University Press, Buckingham, p.146. 
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What are the reasons for initiating a process of policy transfer? 
The first question Dolowitz and Marsh consider in their framework is related to the 
reasons for which actors172 initiate a process of policy transfer. Dolowitz and Marsh consider 
that these reasons can be classified along a continuum ranging from voluntary transfers to 
coercive transfers. A transfer is voluntary when the actors engage in the process willingly, 
following a rational decision and free from any kind of pressure. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, a transfer is characterised as coercive when the process of transfer is imposed by 
another actor. 
Between these two extremes, there are a number of other types of reasons for policy 
transfer. In most cases, the transfers are engaged in both for voluntary and for coercive 
reasons. As shown by Figure 6.2, Dolowitz and Marsh identify a total of seven categories of 
reasons for policy transfers running from voluntary to coercive: 1) lesson drawing; 2) lesson-
drawing (bounded rationality); 3) voluntary driven by perceived necessity; 4) transfers under 
international pressure; 5) transfers due to conditionality; 6) obligated transfers and; 7) direct 
imposition. 
Figure 6.2. Continuum of reasons for policy transfers173 
Voluntary Transfer  Coercive Transfer
 
Lesson 
drawing 
(entirely 
rational) 
Lesson 
drawing 
(bounded 
rationality) 
Voluntary 
driven by 
perceived 
necessity 
Transfers 
under 
international 
pressure 
Transfers due 
to 
conditionality 
Obligated 
transfers 
Direct 
imposition 
Voluntary transfers 
Starting by describing the more voluntary end of the continuum, there is lesson 
drawing, which is “based upon the view that actors actively, and willingly, choose policy 
transfer as a rational response to a ‘perceived problem’ or undesirable condition”174. Dolowitz 
and Marsh argue that perfectly rational lesson drawing is mostly a theoretical notion since 
actors are rarely entirely rational, since they are usually subjective in their actions and 
decisions, or might have a limited knowledge of the problem and the consequences of their 
solutions. They therefore conclude that lesson drawing is often limited by bounded 
rationality. 
When considering lesson drawing, it is necessary to refer to Rose who focuses on this 
particular aspect of policy transfers: 
“A lesson is knowledge that is instructive, a conclusion about a subject drawn after the fact 
from observation or experience […] A lesson is here defined as an action-oriented conclusion 
about a programme or programmes in operation elsewhere […] A lesson is more than an 
evaluation of a programme in its own context; it also implies a judgement about doing the 
same elsewhere. A lesson is thus a political moral drawn from analysing the actions of other 
governments”175. 
The main reason for which actors engage in a voluntary policy transfers he argues is 
related to some form of dissatisfaction with the status quo; “supporters of the dissatisfaction 
                                                
172 Actors are discussed below in the next sub-section. 
173 Based upon: Dolowitz David P., Policy transfer and British social policy, 2000, Open University Press, 
Buckingham, p.13. 
174 Dolowitz David P., Policy transfer and British social policy, 2000, Open University Press, Buckingham, p.13. 
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model presume that when governmental policies are functioning properly, there is no need to 
search for lessons; everything can operate through established routines. Only when routines 
stop providing ‘solutions’ is it necessary to search for lessons”176. Rose furthers this argument 
by specifying that dissatisfaction mostly appears due to changes in the policy environment or 
in political values.  
To reduce their dissatisfaction the actors will turn to policy transfers, but only if it is 
perceived as providing an easier or better solution than developing a new and original policy. 
Rose argues that “dissatisfaction works by sanctions. The stimulus for search comes less from 
the uncertain promise of benefits than it does from the certain threat of pain if policymakers 
do not do something to remove current difficulties […] Dissatisfaction stimulates search with 
the argument: ‘You can’t afford not to’”177. 
Cyclical political events, especially elections and annual addresses, are another reason 
for which actors might engage in a voluntary policy transfer. Indeed, at such times “actors are 
encouraged to engage in policy transfer in order to distinguish themselves from their 
predecessors and competitors”178.  
Five other political motives for which actors might engage in a voluntary policy 
transfer were highlighted by Bennett179:  
1. To put an issue on an institutional agenda: “Evidence that another country has formed a 
policy on an issue can have a persuasive impact on both activists and elites”. 
2. To mollify political pressure: When domestic pressure for action is high, “incentives might 
be quite high to utilise a program from elsewhere as a ready-made solution […] However, 
because there is insufficient time, a full appraisal of costs and benefits is unlikely”. 
3. To emulate the actions of an exemplar: “There is a distinction between slavish imitation 
[to mollify political pressure] and the borrowing and adaptation of a program because it 
provides a model, exemplar or blueprint which may be improved upon”. 
4. To optimise the search for the best policy: Lessons are searched from a multiplicity of 
sources to take the best parts of different programmes. It is a process of “mixing-and-
matching”. 
5. To legitimate conclusions already reached: Evidence that a policy has been tested and is 
successful in another country “reinforces and rationalises conclusions already reached, or 
positions already entrenched”. 
The middle ground 
Closer to the middle of the spectrum are transfers which are voluntary but driven by 
perceived necessity (Figure 6.2 above). This category includes the transfers which are 
initiated because policy-makers have the feeling that their country is becoming less 
competitive or less prosperous. Due to this psychological pressure, there is a need and a will 
to transfer policies from the more advanced countries. The same kind of psychological 
pressure can be found behind the transfers undertaken to achieve some type of international 
recognition by converging towards an existing international consensus. For example, ex-
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communist countries have adopted a number of policies similar to Western Europe, in order 
to be accepted as possible EU members. 
Further towards the coercive extremity of the spectrum are the transfers made under 
international pressure, whether political or economic. Actors feel they have to engage in a 
policy transfer because of external actors or events. This influence is a direct international 
pressure and not simply a perceived necessity. This is specifically the case when the policies 
adopted by a state produce externalities detrimental to another. 
Coercive transfers 
Still closer to the coercive extreme (Figure 6.2 above), trans-national corporations or 
international organisations might force a state to adopt specific policies if that country wants 
to benefit from their investments and/or aid. Very often, international organisations like the 
International Monetary Fund agree to make loans to countries only if they adopt some specific 
measures or policies. This is the meaning of the category transfers due to conditionality. 
Countries might also have to adopt some policies because they belong to international 
organisations or treaties. This is for example the case of the EU countries which might have to 
adopt a policy because they are EU members. Such policy transfers are characterised as being 
obligated transfers. However, there might be a degree of indirect free will in such transfers 
since countries voluntarily join such organisations and sign treaties. 
Finally, at the extreme end of the continuum are the coercive transfers, those made by 
direct imposition, when an actor is forced by another to adopt some policies. This was for 
example the case when the US wrote the Japanese Constitution after world war two. 
Who are the actors involved in the process? 
Bennett only considers two categories of actors who might be involved in a policy 
transfer, namely the elites and the activists. Dolowitz and Marsh however consider eleven 
categories of actors. These are: 1) elected officials; 2) bureaucrats and civil servants; 3) 
policy entrepreneurs; 4) networks; 5) political parties; 6) pressure groups; 7) non-
governmental organisations (NGOs); 8) corporations; 9) think tanks; 10) consultants; and 
11) international organisations. 
Firstly, and mostly, they argue there are the elected officials, such as members of 
parliament, the heads of state or of government. Dolowitz and Marsh however are not precise 
in their analysis; it can be argued that this category of actors de facto implies a democratic 
regime with elections. Elected officials are the main decision-takers and, since “their values 
give direction to public policy and their endorsement is needed to legitimate the adoption of 
programmes”180, the probability of implementing a policy without their consent is almost nil. 
The second category is composed of bureaucrats and civil servants who have a 
significant impact on the transfer since they are usually responsible for designing and 
implementing policies. Dolowitz considers that “these groups are as important as politicians 
in the policy development stage and, more important, in the implementation stage”181. 
Rose also distinguishes these two categories of actors, elected officials and 
bureaucrats, by considering that “the articulation of desires is the legitimate domain of 
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elected officials; the determination of what is possible is a primary concern of career officials 
and experts. The ideal programme is both practical and desirable”182. 
According to Dolowitz and Marsh a third group of actors includes the policy 
entrepreneurs. For Kingdon these are “people with an interest in a particular substantive area 
of policy and who are willing to invest their resources, time, energy, reputation and 
sometimes money, in the hope of a future return”183. Policy entrepreneurs have a large 
influence in the circulation of information among actors and countries. For Rose, policy 
entrepreneurs are significant actors in policy transfers because “their concern with a special 
subject… leads them to build up a nation-wide or international network of contacts that are a 
source of ideas for new programs”184.  
However Rose’s definition of policy entrepreneurs elaborates and suggests that this 
category of actors has similarities with that of networks. Networks include three sub-
categories of actors. Policy networks, that is “institutionalised relationships [developed] 
between government officials and broader societal interests within a specific policy 
domain”185, play a predominant role in placing information on the governing agenda. 
Advocacy coalitions refer to a small number of groups which enter into strategic alliances 
based upon deeply shared values or ‘fundamental ideological principles’”186. The third type of 
network is that of epistemic communities, a term coined by Haas when he wrote that “an 
epistemic community is a knowledge-based network of individuals with a claim to policy-
relevant knowledge based upon common professional beliefs and standards of judgement, and 
common policy concerns”187. 
 Political parties represent a fifth group of actors. These are usually searching for new 
successful policies to attract the electorate. Political parties can therefore be interested in 
transfers from other countries if it has a positive impact on the electorate.  
Another group of actors which by definition has a significant impact on the transfer of 
policies is that of pressure/interest groups. Their sole aim is to influence decision-making 
processes to their advantage. Non-governmental organisations, like pressure groups, 
influence the decision-makers to their advantage. National and multinational corporations are 
a further group of actors whose influence is based on lobbying activities and the information 
they provide to policy-makers, often of self-interest.  
A Think tanks is “an organisation engaged in research and the dissemination of 
research, specifically intended to influence public policy”188. Think tanks therefore have a 
significant role within the policy transfer process since their aim is to find new solutions to 
existing problems. Another group of actors is that of consultants. These are increasingly being 
asked for advice on the best policy to apply.  
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Finally, the last group of actors is that of international organisations. Their influence 
is important through their contribution to the circulation of ideas and policies. For example, as 
pointed out by Rose, the European Community “promotes comparison” since each member 
state becomes aware of the policies implemented by the other member states. Moreover, some 
international organisations have a direct impact on policy transfers. As seen earlier, some 
organisations such as the IMF or the EU have the possibility of forcing a member state to 
adopt specific policies. 
What is being transferred? 
The third aspect of policy transfers within the Dolowitz and Marsh framework 
concerns the subject to be transferred.  
Dolowitz identifies six categories of transferable subjects. As shown in Figure 6.1 
above, these are: 1) policies; 2) programmes, 3) attitudes / cultural values; 4) institutions; 5) 
ideologies and 6) negative lessons. It can be seen that thinking on policy transfers concerns 
much more than simply the transfer of policy. 
Firstly, actors can transfer policies. These are “broad statements of intention which 
represent the direction in which policy-makers wish to go”189. The actors may adopt the 
whole policy, or just transfer the policy goals, the contents or the instruments.  
Secondly, programmes can also be the object of a transfer. Programmes are the means 
and actions used for the implementation of a policy. As defined by Rose, a programme is “an 
instrument of public policy, because it is a necessary means of achieving policy intentions. 
Whereas the intentions of politicians about prosperity and equality are often vague or diffuse, 
programmes are concrete and specific”190. 
Actors may also be interested in transferring the institutional structures which enable 
the implementation of a policy in another country. The fourth and fifth items, ideologies and 
attitudes / cultural values can be transferred from one system to another. When they are 
compatible, it is often more feasible to transfer a general ideology or an attitude towards a 
problem and, then, to try to find some specific solutions for its implementation, rather than 
attempting to transfer a whole or specific policy. 
Lastly, actors can transfer negative lessons. This happens “when, drawing lessons, 
policy-makers explicitly decide to leave aspects of a policy from a foreign country out of the 
transferred model or deliberately implement a borrowed model differently”191. In other words, 
they learn from the mistakes of others so that they do not make them. 
What is the source of the transfer? 
The fourth aspect considered within the framework of Dolowitz and Marsh is the 
source of the transfer. The authors conclude that there are three principal levels of governance 
from which policies could be transferred. 
Firstly, to find transferable policies, actors might look at the local level in their country 
or abroad. They might analyse what has been done by different regions or cities in order to 
find some lessons which can be applied at the national level. While not relevant to the 
supranational case, this is especially true in the case of federal states in which the federal 
government often learns from the actions of its states. 
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The second level is the national level. Very often policy-makers look across the border 
to find successful policies which they might be able to transfer and adapt to their own 
country. As Rose points out, “it is easier to see similarities between the same policy area in 
different countries than to find similarities between social security and environmental or 
defence policies within a country”192. 
The last level is the international level. As was pointed out above, some international 
organisations have a strong impact on the spread of knowledge on policies and might even be 
in a situation to impose some on national, regional or local actors. 
On top of these three levels, another source of inspiration for policy-makers transcends 
geographical barriers, that is the past. Indeed, policy-makers can look into the past of their 
nation, or that of other countries, to find policies which could be transferred and adapted to 
present times to answer present needs. However, although Dolowitz and Marsh consider that 
“when policy makers begin searching for lessons, their own country’s past is the logical place 
to begin”193, such a transfer can be as difficult as a trans-national transfer since the context 
and the environment will have evolved. 
As highlighted by Rose, policy-makers have little time and scarce resources to reduce 
dissatisfaction. They therefore cannot afford to search everywhere for lessons, but need to 
focus on some specific sources, which often have a high degree of geographic and/or political 
proximity. Rose considers that five factors are relevant when selecting a country to learn 
from194: ideological compatibility; similarities in resources; psychological, not geographical 
proximity; availability of evidence; and interdependence. 
What is the significance of the ‘degree’ of transfer? 
Bennett considers it necessary “to distinguish clearly between knowledge of a foreign 
programme, utilisation of that knowledge, and the adoption of the same programme […] 
Utilisation is more than awareness; it implies a mobilisation of that knowledge to further 
some political aim”195. This shows that there are different degrees of policy transfers, which is 
the fifth element of the Dolowitz and Marsh framework. Indeed, a transfer might imply a 
complete transfer or a partial one. Rose identifies five different degrees of transfer which are 
copying, emulation, hybridisation, synthesis, and inspiration. Dolowitz and Marsh combine 
hybridisation and synthesis to make a single category, that of mixtures, and only consider four 
degrees of transfer.  
Firstly, copying “occurs when one country adopts a programme previously used, or in 
use, elsewhere without making any change”196. Emulation rejects copying every detail of a 
policy but “accepts that a particular programme elsewhere provides the best standard for 
designing legislation at home, albeit requiring adaptation to take different national 
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circumstances into account”197. According to Bennett, “the word ‘emulation’ is often used in 
both senses: to denote both a desire to imitate, as well as to rival or excel”198. 
Mixtures “involve combining elements of  policies and/or programmes found in two or 
more countries to develop a policy best suited to the emulator”199. Finally, inspiration is when 
actors simply look for ideas, new thoughts and procedures in other systems.  
What is facilitating or constraining the transfer? 
Many policy advisors consider that programmes are perfectly ‘fungible’. In their view 
‘one size fits all’, which leads them to expect that a programme successfully implemented in 
one country will work everywhere. Such a view is highly questionable since “public policies 
are concerned with actions of government, and every government is embedded in a specific 
context of territory, institutions and national history”200. Ten years before writing this Rose 
already considered that “lesson-drawing is contingent. One cannot borrow blindly or condemn 
blindly, for the success of a programme is affected by the specifics of context as well as 
generic attributes” and that “in cross-national lesson-drawing, some adaptation to take 
account of local circumstances will be necessary”201. 
Therefore, when considering the transfer of a policy or a programme, the framework 
suggests that actors need to consider a number of factors which might facilitate or endanger 
this process, depending on the context. Dolowitz regrouped these factors in seven categories 
(see Figure 6.1 above): 1) policy complexity, 2) past policies, 3) local circumstances, 4) 
institutional constraints, 5) structural constraints, 6) past relations and 7) language. 
Firstly, there is the complexity of the policy which could be transferred. Obviously, the 
more complex is the policy, programme or institution, the more risks there are that the 
transfer would be unsuccessful.  
Next, there are interactive effects caused by past and existing policies which might 
help or hinder the transfer of new policies. Indeed, as highlighted by Rose,  “policy makers 
are inheritors before they are choosers; as a condition of taking office they swear to uphold 
the laws and programs that predecessors have set… new programmes cannot be constructed 
on green fields”202. 
A third category of factors is composed of local circumstances or feasibility 
constraints. Indeed, there are a number of factors which might hinder the process of policy 
transfer. These include dissimilarities in fiscal and economic resources, societal values, 
political ideologies, cultural proximity, and technological abilities. 
The institutional and structural constraints are two other categories. The institutions of 
the systems concerned in the transfer have an impact on the process. If they are too different, 
there might be an extra difficulty for the successful transfer of the policy. Policy transfers 
might be influenced by whether the institutions are well organised, highly hierarchical and 
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centralised, or not. However, some authors, such as Rose, give lesser importance to this 
constraint. “Even though institutions are necessary, it does not follow that they are 
important… A new programme can usually be administered in more than one way; insofar as 
this is the case, one institution can be substituted for another”203. 
The relationship between the two systems concerned with the transfer also affects the 
process. As Minogue et al point out, “past or existing relationships can both help and prevent 
agents from looking to a different system or time for solutions”204. The last factor is language. 
Sharing the same language will promote communication and the spread of ideas between the 
actors, and thus facilitate the policy transfer. 
What are the sources of information for the principal actors? 
The seventh aspect of the Dolowitz and Marsh framework enumerates the sources of 
information available to the actors who are looking for policies to transfer to their national 
system205. There are three main sources, the principal one being the media, such as TV, radio, 
newspapers, and internet, which contribute to the spread of information throughout the world. 
The second source is composed of the reports written by the actors and others who study the 
foreign policies before considering their transfer to the national system. A third channel of 
information relates to physical encounters during meetings, conferences and visits.  
What are the reasons for any failure of policy transfer? 
The last characteristic studied within this framework is the four sets of reasons which 
might explain the failure or lack of positive success of a policy transfer. Firstly, every transfer 
is based on the hypothesis that a successful policy in one system will be as successful in 
another. Secondly, they argue that the actors interested in the transfer might not obtain all the 
information necessary to analyse the policy properly before transferring it. This case is called 
unknowledgable transfer in the Dolowitz and Marsh framework. Thirdly, there might be an 
incomplete transfer when “although transfer has occurred, crucial elements of what made the 
policy or institutional structure a success in the originating country may not be transferred, 
leading to failure”206. Finally, the transfer can be hindered when the actors do not take into 
account all the local circumstances and the environment of each system, leading to what 
proves to be an inappropriate transfer. 
A FRAMEWORK TO ANALYSE PROSPECTIVE POLICY TRANSFER BETWEEN 
SUPRANATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
The previous section has reviewed the literature on policy transfer. It is clear that 
Dolowitz and Marsh have developed the most comprehensive framework for analysing policy 
transfers. However, the literature is limited since it rarely considers prospective analyses, that 
is the circumstances under which a policy can be transferred. Rose emphasises the importance 
of prospective analyses: 
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“Most studies of comparative public policy are backward-looking, seeking to explain how 
different countries adopted particular programmes rather than indicating how one’s own 
country can apply this knowledge to improve conditions in the future […] Whereas 
retrospective evaluation identifies failings that cannot be undone, prospective evaluation gives 
warning of what to avoid”207.  
“Understanding what others do today is meant to improve conditions here in future”208. 
The study of prospective policy transfers can however be criticised because, whereas 
“retrospective evaluation has the scholarly advantage of basing conclusions on empirical 
evidence”209, conclusions arrived at through prospective research cannot be tested or verified, 
since they are related to things which do not exist or which have not taken place yet. This 
criticism has been refuted by Rose. He considers that prospective evaluation is a valid 
scientific method because “it compares observable characteristics of an effective programme 
in one country with observable conditions in another”210.  
An element of speculation is nonetheless inevitable. Since a MRDF has not yet been 
introduced, testing the appropriateness of the suggestions under all circumstances is not yet 
possible. However, this speculation is “not unbounded as in purely speculative 
prescriptions”211. 
Supporting the views of Rose, the thesis is concerned with analysing under which 
circumstances lessons can successfully be transferred between two supranational associations 
such as the EU and Mercosur. The existing literature needs to be further developed to account 
for such prospective policy transfers. Three issues need to be taken into consideration while 
developing a framework for analysing prospective policy transfers between supranational 
associations. 
Firstly, although it recognises that local or international actors can be the source of a 
policy transfer, the literature focuses principally on the national level. However, it is clear that 
supranational associations too have an interest in learning from the experience of others to 
consider what could successfully be implemented in their specific environment.  
Secondly, the literature looks at policy transfers that have taken place. Although some 
authors recognise that “lesson-drawing differs fundamentally from conventional social 
science comparisons, which concentrate almost exclusively upon after the fact 
explanation”212, most studies on policy transfers are retrospective. The literature mostly 
analyses, whether through a framework or through a specific case-study, why and how a 
policy transfer took place. In this research, the concern is to develop a framework for 
prospective policy transfers. 
Thirdly, most authors do not analyse which factors of a prospective policy transfer are 
most likely to lead to a successful transfer. 
It can be argued that, in spite of these three fundamental problems with current 
theories, the literature raises relevant points which can read across to prospective policy 
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transfers. These can be used to determine under what circumstances supranational 
associations can learn from one another.  
As Dolowitz and Marsh did in the case of the analysis of retrospective policy transfers, 
a framework analysing prospective policy transfers between supranational associations can be 
built around seven simple but crucial questions and issues (see Figure 6.3): 
Which actors are involved in the transfer? 
What type of transfer is it? 
What could be transferred? 
To what degree can the transfer be made? 
What is the source of the transfer? 
What factors would facilitate or limit the transfer? 
What sources of information could be consulted? 
Each of the seven issues of this framework are discussed in turn to determine the 
factors which might contribute to the success of the policy transfer between two supranational 
associations. The next section will then apply this framework to the specific case of 
transferring the EU regional development experience to Mercosur. 
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Figure 6.3. A framework for successful prospective policy transfers  
 Higher probability of success Lower probability of success Higher probability of failure 
Which actors are 
involved in the 
transfer? 
Elected officials  
Bureaucrats / civil servants 
Policy entrepreneurs 
Networks 
Political parties 
Pressure groups 
NGO 
Corporations 
Think tanks 
Consultants 
International organisations 
 
What type of 
transfer is it? 
Lesson drawing  
Bounded rationality 
Voluntary but driven by 
perceived necessity 
Coercive transfers: 
Direct imposition 
Obligated transfers 
Transfers due to 
conditionality 
Transfers under international 
pressure  
What could be 
transferred? 
Ideology 
Policy goals 
Policy objectives 
Policy principles 
Attitude 
 
 
Institutions 
Programmes 
 
To what degree 
can the transfer be 
made? 
Emulation 
Mixture 
Inspiration 
 Copying 
What is the source 
of the transfer? 
International  Local 
National 
Past 
 
What factors 
would facilitate or 
limit the transfer? 
Strong political will 
 
Constraints for all actors:  
- Policy complexity 
- Past policies and relations 
- Institutional structures 
- Language  
 
Constraints specific to SA: 
- Differences inherent in the 
member states 
- Differences in the processes 
of integration 
  
What sources of 
information could 
be consulted? 
Reports 
Physical encounters 
 Media 
 
Which actors could be involved in the transfer? 
In considering policy transfers between supranational associations and not states, it 
can be argued that some of the characteristics of the former imply that some of the categories 
of actors considered by Dolowitz and Marsh can be used, but that they need to be modified, in 
particular those of elected officials, bureaucrats and civil servants and political parties.  
Firstly, in relation to the category of elected officials, it should be noted that, in 
general, the decision-makers in supranational associations are not directly elected 
representatives. For example, the deputies within the Mercosur Joint Parliamentary 
Committee are designated by the national Parliaments but not elected to this position by the 
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population. The principal exception would be the European Members of Parliament who are 
directly elected by the population.  
Secondly, not all supranational associations have bureaucrats and civil servants. 
Unlike the EU, some supranational associations have no supranational bureaucracy. In 2000, 
only 27 officials worked for the SAM213, the only permanent Mercosur institution. The SAM 
officials being designated by the member states for a short period, none make a career as 
Mercosur bureaucrats.  
A last category of actor which is slightly different in the case of policy transfers 
between supranational associations and not states is that of political parties. This is because at 
the time of writing there are no supranational political parties within supranational 
associations but national parties associated around common objectives. Therefore, although 
this category of actors might participate in the spread of information and in the policy 
transfers, it does not legally exist at the supranational level.  
It should moreover be noted that each category of actors can be active at the 
supranational level or at the national level. For example, in the EU, policy transfers might 
involve EU bureaucrats as well as member state bureaucrats, the latter intervening either to 
raise the issue in the EU agenda through the national agenda, or during the implementation 
stage of the transferred policy. 
In spite of these three minor considerations, it can be seen that the different categories 
of actors suggested by the Dolowitz and Marsh framework clearly read across to prospective 
supranational policy transfers.  
The different actors can moreover be divided into two groups because they have 
different influences on a prospective policy transfer. The first group includes the elected 
officials, bureaucrats and civil servants, that is all the actors who will have a direct impact on 
the adoption and implementation of a policy, and without whose consent a policy cannot 
become operational. These are likely to ensure a higher probability of success to the policy 
transfer. In the specific case of policy transfers between supranational associations, this 
category of actors can in some cases be de facto similar to that of international organisations.  
The second category includes all the other actors listed above214, that is, the actors who 
can only orientate or indirectly influence a policy transfer. Arguably, none of the categories of 
actors would have a negative impact on the policy transfer since the policy transfer would 
arguably not be endangered by the participation of any of these actors. 
What type of transfer would it be? 
A second aspect concerns the degree of force with which the transfer is made. 
Referring to what Dolowitz and Marsh consider as the reasons for which a transfer is 
undertaken, it is very unlikely that a policy transfer between supranational associations would 
have a coercive dimension, or that it would be successful if it was coercive. 
A policy transfer would unlikely to be a direct imposition, since hitherto no 
supranational association has coercive power over another SA. The transfer could 
theoretically be an obligated transfer, a transfer due to conditionality, or a transfer under 
international pressure if the supranational associations had signed treaties necessitating such 
transfers. However, these too can be argued to be unlikely occurrences. 
Therefore, voluntary policy transfers are most likely to be the case and will have a 
greater probability of success. Such transfers could be driven by perceived necessity, if the 
                                                
213 GMC Resolution nº92/00. For more details on the Mercosur Administrative Secretariat (SAM) see Chapter 3. 
214 See the first section of Chapter 6. 
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actors of one supranational association feel less competitive. Transfers could also be the result 
of rational choices, whether purely rational, as in lesson drawing, or bounded by rationality. 
What could be transferred? 
It can be argued that the six categories of transferable subjects defined by Dolowitz 
and Marsh also apply to the analysis of prospective policy transfers between supranational 
associations. Among these however the category of negative lessons can be discarded since 
each of the other categories can be a source of transfer, whether positive or negative lessons 
are learnt. It seems to be more a category transcending the others rather than one to be 
considered on its own. 
Programmes and institutions are two categories of subjects which it can be argued are 
difficult to transfer since they are often very specific to the context of one supranational 
association. Arguably, it is policies, attitudes and cultural values, and ideologies that can be 
successfully transferred between supranational associations, particularly when other 
conditions for successful transfers are met. 
To what degree could the transfer be made? 
The different degrees of transfers established by Dolowitz and Marsh and discussed 
above can also be applied to the analysis of prospective transfers between supranational 
associations, since the degrees of transfer are similar whether the transfer takes place between 
states or supranational associations. However, some aspects will contribute more to a 
successful transfer than others. 
If the transfer is based upon copying, one supranational association will adopt a policy 
or a programme implemented in another without modifying it. Such transfers will de facto 
have a lesser probability of success because of the different contexts of each supranational 
association. It might be more successful to consider these differences and to adopt a policy 
after having adapted it according to the specificities of the supranational association adopting 
it, a procedure called emulation. 
A mixture could be successful since the transfer aims at designing the best policy 
considering policies implemented in other supranational associations. Finally, inspiration can 
arguably be the most successful type of transfer since actors only look for ideas, and combine 
these ideas and the constraints related to their specific environment to develop their policies. 
Inspiration is therefore the most flexible type of policy transfer.  
What could be the source of the transfer? 
Similarly to the Dolowitz and Marsh framework, actors can look at local, national, 
international and past sources to find lessons to transfer to a supranational association.  
Local and national sources might however prove to be problematic due to the 
fundamental differences which exist between a supranational association on one hand, and a 
state or a city on the other hand. A policy transfer might in such cases be very difficult. 
Transfers from an international source, that is from one supranational association to another 
will have a higher probability of success since they have similar characteristics. The past can 
also be a source for a transfer to a supranational association, although many are too recent to 
have a past from which they can learn. 
What factors could facilitate or limit the transfer? 
In addition to the constraints usually discussed in the literature when considering 
retrospective policy transfers, such as policy complexity, past policies and relations, local 
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circumstances, institutional structures and language, some constraints are specific to 
prospective policy transfers.  
The most crucial constraint is the existence of a will to undertake a policy transfer. 
Indeed, it is clear that if the key actors do not wish to undertake the policy transfer it is very 
unlikely that it will succeed. It is therefore not so much a constraint as a sine qua non 
condition.  
In addition, there are two key sets of constraints which are specific to prospective 
policy transfers between supranational associations. These are firstly conditions which are 
inherent in the member states, such as geography, demography or economy. Secondly, there 
are conditions which relate to the differences existing in the two processes of regional 
integration, such as the reasons for integrating, the organisational arrangements or the 
financial means.  
The list of these constraints depends on the supranational associations considered and 
the subject transferred. For example, transport infrastructure might not be a constraint when 
considering the transfer of an institutional structure.  
What sources of information could be consulted? 
The three sources proposed by Dolowitz and Marsh, that is media, reports and 
physical encounters, could be potential sources of information for policy transfers between 
supranational associations. Arguably, media would be the less trustworthy source since it 
would not imply in depth analysis of the policy or of the different contexts before the transfer. 
Therefore, a transfer based only on media would probably fail. 
APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO THE TRANSFER OF THE EU REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE TO MERCOSUR 
The previous section has designed a theoretical framework to analyse prospective 
policy transfers between supranational associations. It is possible in this third section to apply 
this framework to the specific case of transferring the EU experience in regional development 
funds to Mercosur. The seven crucial issues of the framework are discussed in turn. 
Which actors are involved in the transfer? 
In considering the specific case of Mercosur successfully learning from the EU 
experience, it is evident that the major actors to be involved in the transfer should be the 
elected officials and bureaucrats/civil servants since without their consent no transfer can be 
achieved. However, other actors can participate in the transfer to defend their views and 
develop new original perspectives on the transfer.  
What type of transfer is it? 
It is very unlikely that a transfer from the EU to Mercosur could be of a coercive 
nature. It cannot be an obligated transfer, the EU and Mercosur not having signed any treaty 
which would obligate either on issues related to regional development. It cannot be 
categorised as a transfer due to conditionality, since Mercosur faces no legal conditions 
related to regional development as imposed by the IMF or any similar organisation. Finally, 
there is no international pressure, either economic or political which would force Mercosur to 
adopt common regional development policies borrowing from the EU experience.  
Arguably, the policy transfer could be categorised as voluntary but driven by 
perceived necessity, although the necessity would not be of international origin, as Dolowitz 
and Marsh suggest, but of local origin since policy makers would engage in a policy transfer 
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to reduce their regional disparities. It is thus arguably more probable that Mercosur actors 
willingly choose policy transfer as a relatively rational answer to their needs. The EU-
Mercosur policy transfer would then be categorised as lesson drawing (whether entirely 
rational or of bounded rationality).  
What could be transferred? 
Given the significant institutional differences existing between the EU and Mercosur, 
which have been described in Chapter 3, it seems highly improbable that Mercosur, if it 
wanted, could successfully learn from the EU regional development institutions. Indeed, EU 
institutions have reached a level of bureaucratic sophistication and independence that 
Mercosur members reject in the current context. 
EU programmes215 are also unlikely to be successfully transferred since they were 
designed to suit the specific context of the EU. This is very different from the Mercosur 
context and it seems highly improbable that Mercosur could find inspiration in the details of 
EU programmes. 
Therefore, three subjects can be transferred from the EU to Mercosur. these, it can be 
argued, have a higher probability of contributing to a successful transfer of policy. First is the 
EU ideology which underpins its regional development policies. Second is the EU policies, 
which, as mentioned above, are “broad statements of intention which represent the direction 
in which policy-makers wish to go”216. It can be seen that, for a policy to be successfully 
transferred, the actors should consider as key points the policy goals and objectives, and not 
the specific means and contents. EU attitude towards regional development could also be 
considered as transferable to Mercosur.  
It is indeed arguably easier to transfer aspirations and fundamental orientations rather 
than specific technical instruments. Mercosur in this sense could learn from the policy 
principles of EU regional development and adapt them to the specific Mercosur context. It 
would then be possible for Mercosur to create specific instruments to reach these objectives 
taking account of local circumstances. 
To what degree can the transfer be made? 
It can be argued that, given the significant differences which exist between the EU and 
Mercosur, a transfer based on copying would very likely be unsuccessful. Mercosur actors 
could base their regional development policies upon the EU model, without necessarily 
copying each and every technical detail. This emulation, could be successful since it leaves a 
margin to adapt the lessons learned according to the Mercosur specificities. 
Given the disparities relating to core aspects of Mercosur and the EU, it arguably 
could be more relevant, and therefore successful, for Mercosur decision makers to look for 
new ideas, new frameworks and new procedures and thus take inspiration from the EU to 
develop their own specific instruments. 
Although it is not central to the thesis, it can be argued that Mercosur actors can also 
make a mixture and learn from the experience of the CAF and the Fonplata217 which operate 
in similar conditions to those of Mercosur. Therefore, it can be argued that for the Mercosur 
approach to be the most successful, it can principally take inspiration from the EU but also 
from similar experiences, namely those of the CAF and of the Fonplata. 
                                                
215 The term ‘programme’ refers to the Dolowitz and Marsh framework, not to the EU programmes which are a 
specific aspect of the EU regional development policy and which are discussed further below in Chapter 7. 
216 Dolowitz David P., Policy transfer and British social policy, 2000, Open University Press, Buckingham, p.23. 
217 See Chapter 5 for more information on the CAF and the Fonplata.  
 185
What is the source of the transfer? 
Since this thesis concerns a policy transfer from the EU to Mercosur, two actors of 
international status, local and national sources are de facto not relevant. The past cannot be a 
source for policy transfers since Mercosur has been set up too recently to have accumulated 
any experience on this specific policy approach. It could however be argued that Mercosur 
could look at the past of the EU experience for lessons.  
What factors would facilitate or limit the transfer? 
As established in the framework, the sine qua non condition for Mercosur to learn 
from the EU is the existence of a political will. In addition to this, other factors might have an 
influence, such as the complexity of the EU regional development policies or past relations 
between the EU and Mercosur. This sub-section focuses on the factors which are specific to 
policy transfers between these two supranational associations, that is the differences which 
are inherent in the member states and in the processes of integration. These differences are 
presented in summary form in Figure 6.5 at the end of the sub-section. 
Differences inherent in the member states 
Physical and natural characteristics 
A first essential difference that exists between the Mercosur member states and the EU 
members relates to the physical characteristics of their territories. It is important to take this 
variable into account since a MRDF can in some respects offset the economic disadvantages 
that can result from peripherality or for example from the adverse effects of mountainous or 
desert terrain. 
The EU is composed of fifteen countries which cover approximately 3.2 million km². 
In spite of its territorial scale, this territory is fairly homogeneous and principally composed 
of densely populated plains. The exceptions are a few relatively small mountain ranges218 and 
the scarcely populated north of the Scandinavian countries. The overall temperate climate 
across Europe allows for a wide variety of agricultural production. This diverse physical 
geography is taken into account within the European structural funds. Objective 6219, for 
example, was created especially to accommodate the development and structural adjustment 
of regions with low population density, that is less than 8 persons per km² 220. 
Compared to the EU, Mercosur covers a much larger territory of 12.9 million km², or 
of 14.7 million km² when the two associate members are included, which is equivalent to 
more than four times that of the EU. Moreover, Mercosur is a land of contrasts. The territory 
comprises large plains such as the Argentinian pampas, as well as the Andes, a mountain 
range separating Argentina from Chile, which stretches for more than 8,000 km and peaks at 
almost 7,000 m. Mercosur territory also includes the vast Amazon forest, as well as a desert 
arctic region in the south of Argentina. As a consequence of this variety of difficult 
geographical conditions, large parts of the territory are scarcely populated. Meteorologically 
speaking, the situation is also very varied, ranging from the cold of the arctic to desert-like 
conditions, and from temperate to tropical climates. In short, the design and operational 
aspects of a MRDF could be largely affected by the need to overcome adverse or difficult 
geographical conditions. 
                                                
218 The Alps, for example, stretch for more than a 1,000 km and peak at 4,807 m above sea level. 
219 As detailed in the fifth section of Chapter 7, EU structural funds are allocated according to geographical 
‘Objectives’. 
220 Regulation 2081/93. 
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Transportation infrastructure 
There is also a difference between Mercosur and the EU when it comes to 
transportation infrastructure. EU countries and regions are linked in a considerable number of 
ways through vast and sophisticated road, rail, air, sea and telecommunications networks, 
which allow for the easy, fast and relatively cheap transportation of goods, people and 
information.  
As the analysis of the Mercosur road network demonstrated in Chapter 4, the situation 
is much more heterogeneous in Mercosur. Some Mercosur regions have a dense 
transportation network, comparable to European standards. Most Mercosur regions, however, 
lag behind with very poor infrastructure. This can be explained partly through the lack of 
financial means, but it is also a consequence of difficult physical or climatic conditions, often 
coupled with sparse population. A MRDF would need to take account of these disparate and 
difficult circumstances in as much as the capital costs of building appropriate transportation 
networks will be considerable and demanding.  
Demographic structures 
A third dissimilarity which exists between EU states and Mercosur members and 
which has an impact on regional development concerns their demographic structures. 
As Table 6.1 and Figure 6.3 show, the population of Mercosur is much younger than 
that of the European Union. Young people (0 to 19 years old) represent two fifths of the 
Mercosur population, which is twice the percentage of young people in the EU population. 
The EU population comprises four times as many over 80 year olds as Mercosur. Whereas the 
‘0-19s’ are five times more present than the ‘over 60s’ in Mercosur (44% against 9%), they 
represent about the same share of population within the EU (respectively 22% and 21%)221. 
Table 6.1. Age groups as a percentage of the population in Mercosur and in the EU 
Age groups Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay Mercosur EU 
0-19 38.53 44.96 51.63 33.59 43.80 22.45 
20-39 28.23 31.83 29.74 28.40 31.10 30.65 
40-59 20.05 15.91 13.45 21.02 16.70 25.59 
60-79 11.64 6.53 4.62 14.53 7.56 17.57 
80 and more 1.55 0.77 0.56 2.45 0.94 3.74 
 
                                                
221 Data in the table and the figure were downloaded in 2002 from the national institutes of statistics of the 
Mercosur states and from Eurostat (see Appendix A2 for the address of the websites). The data for Mercosur 
were compiled from 1991 statistics for Brazil, and 1995 data for the three other countries. 1997 data for the EU. 
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Figure 6.4. Age groups as a percentage of the population in Mercosur and in the EU 
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Demography has a significant impact on regional development since different age 
groups contribute differently to the economy and require different types of public services. 
Generally speaking, the working population covers the age group 15 to 65 years old. The 
other age groups are rarely economically productive and are often costly in terms of public 
provision of education and health.  
Given the difference in the demographic structures of each supranational association, 
it can be argued that their populations require different types of economic and social policy 
responses. This also holds true for regional development funds if the competencies extend to 
such social issues. With a younger population, Mercosur arguably needs to focus on education 
and training for young people. Within the EU, because of its ageing population, there is a 
need to provide good structures for health and care for the elderly.  
In this case, the demographic differences will be reflected in the policy objectives of a 
MRDF. Because of the younger age profile of the Mercosur population, if the MRDF is 
designed to give priority to social projects, it may seem more appropriate to support actions 
that favour young people. 
Economic context 
A fourth difference existing between Mercosur and EU members relates to their 
economic situations. Whereas the EU is largely composed of industrialised and fully 
developed countries (although some quite wide disparities of development exist among these 
states), Mercosur is composed of developing countries with emerging economies. To 
highlight this, it is possible to consider the 1999 Gross National Income (GNI) classification 
established by the World Bank. As shown by Table 6.2, out of more than 200 countries 
considered whose GNI has been assessed, the fifteen EU member states were ranked from 1st 
rank (Luxembourg) to 49th (Portugal). In this same classification, the highest placed Mercosur 
member is Argentina in 58th position, and the least well performing state is Bolivia at 134th 
position. In this analysis, countries are defined as ‘middle income countries’ when they have a 
GNI per capita of under 1,980 US$. Consequently, Paraguay and Bolivia are the only 
Mercosur states under this threshold. 
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Table 6.2. World Bank classification of countries by GNI per capita in 1999222 
Rank Country GNI/capita Rank Country GNI/capita 
1 Luxembourg 42,930 29 Italy 20,170 
6 Denmark 32,060 39 Spain 14,800 
12 Sweden 26,750 46 Greece 12,110 
13 Germany 25,620 49 Portugal 11,030 
14 Austria 25,430 58 Argentina 7,550 
16 Netherlands 25,140 64 Uruguay 6,220 
17 Finland 24,730 70 Chile 4,630 
18 Belgium 24,650 73 Brazil 4,350 
21 France 24,170 116 Paraguay 1,560 
23 United Kingdom 23,590 134 Bolivia  990 
24 Ireland 21,470 207 Ethiopia 100 
 
A further economic difficulty related to the potential adoption of a MRDF lies in the 
conflicting economic policies adopted by Argentina and Brazil, Mercosur’s two largest 
members. Authors such as Phillips consider that “the divergence between member countries 
for much of the late 1990s was far more pronounced than convergence. Key differences in 
economic structures and policy orientations (notwithstanding a general commitment to an 
economic development model which privileges open markets) generated significant tensions 
between Argentina and Brazil especially, not only on immediate policy issues but also on 
visions of the future of the regional project”223. 
While Argentina has a far more liberalised economy, Brazil has adopted a more 
interventionist approach to industrial policy and protects its national markets from outside 
competition. “Traditionally Brazil has adopted policies which are more industrialist and more 
endogenous than has Argentina, which became extremely obvious during the presidency of 
Dr. Menem. These last few years Argentina has followed a policy of unconditional opening of 
the economy, of privatisation conducted with extraordinary speed and questionable care”224. 
Given this contrasting economic environment, the task of establishing and running a 
MRDF is likely to prove more problematic than in the present EU, where economic policies 
have been greatly harmonised by fifty years of integration. There is therefore more to do to 
improve the economic situation of these developing countries, but less resources to finance 
projects. 
Differences in the processes of integration 
In addition to the differences inherent in the member states which have been discussed 
above, there is a second series of six constraints which might influence the policy transfer 
between the EU and Mercosur. These six constraints are related to the differences in the 
process of integration. 
 
                                                
222 World Bank classification made according to the atlas method, available on its website. Mercosur countries 
are indicated in italics. Ethiopia is included in the classification to show the country with the lowest GNI per 
capita according to this classification. 
223 Phillips Nicola, Governance after the financial crisis: South American perspectives on the reformulation of 
regionalism, 2000, New Political Economy, vol. 5, n°3, Carfax Publishing, Philadelphia, p. 392. 
224 Sociedad Internacional para el Desarrollo, Mercosur, una estrategia de desarrollo: nuevas miradas desde la 
economía y la política, 2000, Ediciones Trilce, Uruguay, p.41. Personal translation. 
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Reasons for undertaking regional integration 
The first key difference between Mercosur and the EU which needs to be taken into 
account relates to the fact that these two processes of economic integration have been 
undertaken for slightly different reasons.  
Underlying the post 1945 process of integration in Europe were a number of economic 
and political factors. There was obviously a fundamental economic stimulus, since integration 
started with the creation of a common market for coal and steel. The original EU member 
states aimed to stimulate their economic growth by creating a favourable environment for the 
development of their heavy industries. In his declaration of May 1950 which initiated the 
process of integration, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman also left the door open 
for other sectors of production to be included within this common market225.  
European integration was also essentially a political phenomenon. The EU founders 
had always seen the process as preventing any new war taking place among the member 
states. Peace in Europe post 1945 was to be consolidated by creating common sets of political 
and economic interests and by developing tight-knit and mutually reinforcing 
interdependencies between member states. More practically, it was also hoped that by 
integrating industrial processes across national frontiers no single state could independently 
prepare itself to wage war. In the early years of the process of integration, these political 
motives were certainly the engine of European construction, the memory of the 1914-1918 
and 1939-1945 conflicts hanging like a sword of Damocles over the heads of European 
leaders. Indeed, according to Alan Winters, “European integration was essentially a political 
and ideological phenomenon. It was driven not by the careful calculation of economic costs 
and benefits, but by a grand vision that had fortunate economic side effects”226. 
In the case of Mercosur, there were similarly both economic and political reasons 
behind the process of integration. As with the EU, the Mercosur integration began with 
limited cooperation agreements targeted on a few specific economic sectors before 
cooperation was extended to the whole of the Mercosur economy. After the lack of success of 
the economic models adopted over the last four decades, such as the import substitution 
model of development, Mercosur policy-makers hoped that economic integration could be the 
solution to the need for improvements in economic growth. 
This economic aspect of integration went hand in hand with a triple political objective. 
Firstly, it was hoped that integration would contribute to bringing member states closer 
together by overcoming historic tensions between the two regional powers, Argentina and 
Brazil. Secondly, the integration of the member states also aimed to reinforce their position on 
the international scene so as to create a counterweight to the US on the Latin American 
continent. Thirdly, integration could serve to guarantee and protect the democratic processes 
newly revived after years of dictatorship. To this end, the Presidents of the four Mercosur 
members and two associate states signed on 24th of July 1998 the Ushuaia Protocol of 
democratic compromise. This Protocol stated that democratic institutions were an essential 
condition of participation in Mercosur and that the ‘rupture’ of the democratic order in any 
Mercosur member state would be penalised to the extent of the possible exclusion of the state 
concerned. The Protocol was put to the test in 2000 with the attempted military coup in 
Paraguay. At this time of political crisis the Mercosur member state presidents supported the 
Paraguayan government and threatened to expel Paraguay from Mercosur if a military 
dictatorship was established. 
                                                
225 See the second section of Chapter 3. 
226 Alan Winters, What can European experience teach Latin America about integration?, 1997, Working Paper 
n°215, May 1997, IDB, Washington DC, p.3. 
 190
The fear of war, which strongly motivated the European construction, being largely 
absent from the Mercosur process, can partly explain the difficulties that Mercosur had to 
overcome in the situation caused by the recent economic crises (between 1999 to the time of 
writing). Indeed, because the Mercosur integration process lacks this significant factor, 
Mercosur members in periods of economic crisis are tempted to look for any possible 
solution, even if it is at the cost of regression in the process of integration. This was recently 
the case in April 2001 with Argentina adopting trade measures which contradicted the 
Mercosur advances.  
In the early days of the EU, economic difficulties were overcome due to the fact that 
the founding states could see a common interest. However, the main drive was to protect the 
advances of integration since it was considered as a guarantee of peace. This motivation 
lacking within Mercosur, the implementation of a MRDF may be difficult. There is indeed the 
risk that, at every obstacle arising, Mercosur member states may be tempted to abandon the 
project of a common approach to resort to self-interested national policies. 
Different approaches to regional integration 
Not only did the Mercosur and the EU integration processes begin due to different 
reasons, but their approach to regional integration were and are almost diametrically opposed. 
Since the inception of the European integration process, the founding member states 
have aimed to create a broad policy base. European integration has been intended to 
encompass not only economic issues, but also social, educational, cultural, health, foreign 
affairs and institutional issues. The integration across Europe of such a diverse and wide-
ranging political agenda, implies transferring political competencies to a common set of 
institutions. Within the EU, given the number of members and the range of policies being 
tackled, member states agreed in the 1986 Single European Act to have most decisions 
adopted by a majority rather than a unanimous vote. This implies that a state can be obliged to 
adopt a policy it disagrees with.  
In contrast to this, when Mercosur states began their process of integration, they opted 
from the start for an intergovernmental system of decision-making. This intergovernmental 
approach has always implied that each state maintains its full sovereignty on all matters. Most 
economic issues are handled in common but decisions are adopted unanimously and each 
Mercosur state retains a power of veto. Mercosur has concentrated its attention essentially on 
the economic domain and the creation of a common market. In other words, with some minor 
exceptions, the Mercosur policy agenda is more limited than that of the EU. 
In spite of these different approaches to integration, they both share one goal, that is 
the creation of a common economic market among member states. However, Mercosur and 
the EU have not reached the same level of integration227. On the one hand, the EU can be 
described as a ‘common market’ which, over recent years, is progressing towards a more 
extensive form of integration, the ‘economic union’, with the creation of the European Central 
Bank, the advent of the Euro and so on. On the other hand, Mercosur is a far more recent 
phenomenon and is still struggling to complete its free trade area. 
This difference in approach is reflected in the experience of Mercosur as it faces the 
challenge to design and implement a MRDF. Since for the time being Mercosur members are 
essentially focused on broad macroeconomic issues, they do not consider the creation of a 
MRDF as a high priority, especially if such approach was to focus on non-economic aspects 
of development. Moreover, if the intergovernmental system of decision-making were to also 
                                                
227 See the second section of Chapter 2 for more details on the different stages of regional integration. 
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apply to this Mercosur Regional Development Fund, it would reduce its field of action and its 
operational independence from member states. 
Organisational arrangements 
The third circumstance to take into account in comparing the EU and Mercosur 
follows on from the preceding point and is related to the question of organisational 
arrangements.  
Given the breadth and depth of policy areas for which the EU is responsible, its 
member states have given the process of integration a relatively robust set of organisational 
arrangements in the form of common institutions able to conceive, discuss and deliver policy 
ambitions228. Consequently, the EU has developed over time a relatively capable executive 
(the Commission) and a democratic entity (the European Parliament). Other EU institutions, 
such as the Court of Justice and the Committee of the Regions, have their own body of 
permanent public servants. This institutional permanence and the quasi-independent way in 
which these institutions recruit staff strengthens their ability to act in the interests of the EU as 
opposed to those of individual member states.  
The European Commission alone employs some 20,000 people229. The Commission 
has often been criticised for employing too many people, but the size of this administration 
has to be considered in the light of the tasks with which it has been entrusted. For the purpose 
of comparison, the Commission employs fewer people than the City of Paris.  
Having opted for an intergovernmental approach, Mercosur countries have felt less 
inclined to institutionalise the process of integration to the same degree as the EU. In the spirit 
of Mercosur integration, the different representatives of the member states meet periodically 
to discuss and define the main guidelines and policies. There is no necessity for a 
supranational institution as such and the only permanent institution is the Administrative 
Secretariat (SAM). The SAM, with a small operational budget and a staff of some thirty 
people, has no power of decision-making since its sole objective is to organise and service the 
intergovernmental meetings230.  
Other Mercosur bodies are composed of temporary representatives designated by each 
state, and drawn from many levels, from President and Ministers to technicians, who meet 
periodically. Likewise, the Parliamentary Committee is composed of nationally elected 
deputies designated by national parliaments. Moreover, there is no permanent Court of 
Justice. The conflict solving happens on an ‘as and when’ basis with ad-hoc judges231. Since 
there are no permanent independent public servants, all staff assigned to Mercosur bodies and 
committees are drawn directly from each member state’s civil service. 
Arguably, in order to ensure independent and transparent decision-making, a MRDF 
requires its own non-partisan staffing arrangements. Appointing decision-makers of this Fund 
drawn directly from each national civil services would arguably not allow for a strategic 
common MRDF but would serve only to defend national interests. Were Mercosur member 
states to establish a permanent and independent structure for the management of the Fund, 
this would be a considerable challenge to the existing sets of Mercosur organisational 
arrangements. 
                                                
228 See the second section of Chapter 3. 
229 About a third of them work for translation services because of the eleven official languages of the EU. 
230 See the third section of Chapter 3. 
231 See the third section of Chapter 3. 
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Decision-making competencies and procedures 
A fourth distinction which exists between the EU and Mercosur is related to the 
normative competence of the common institutions of these two processes of regional 
integration. Differences in approach appear at three levels; the fields of responsibility of the 
common authorities; the separation of powers among the institutions; and the application of 
common norms within national legislation. 
It follows from the differences which have been previously highlighted that the 
common institutions do not have the same range of competence. On the one hand, EU 
institutions have some legally based competence in all policy areas where the EU plays a role. 
On the other hand, Mercosur institutions are currently only able to intervene in the economic 
policy area and have some limited involvement in related areas such as transport, energy and 
health. In this current context it is difficult to see where the remit for a MRDF would fit. 
Within Mercosur, the only body having some degree of decisional power is the 
Mercosur Council (CMC). The Council can adopt Decisions which are mandatory for all 
members. All the other institutions either have consultative status or only have a right of 
initiative (for example, the Common Market Group which can propose policies to the CMC 
which then takes the final decision). Within the EU, the decision-making power is shared 
between the Council of Ministers, which adopts EU Decisions; the European Commission 
which can initiate policy discussions and is responsible for the execution of common policy 
decisions; and the European Parliament, which oversees the work of the executive and, 
depending on the fields of competence, has either a consultative or a co-decision role with the 
Council of Ministers. 
The final difference in regard to decision-making procedures between the EU and 
Mercosur is related to the implementation of common rules within national legislative 
systems. All the rules and regulations adopted by the EU are directly and automatically 
transposed and enforced within the framework of national legislation. European rules and 
regulations are consequently hierarchically superior to those agreed within national 
legislation. When the EU adopts a law which ‘contradicts’ existing national laws, the former 
takes precedence over the latter. 
The situation is somewhat different within Mercosur. The decisions adopted by the 
CMC are mandatory for all members, but these decisions need to be transposed by each 
member state into its national legislative structure before they are recognised by the SAM and 
come into effect232. This procedure, which is not automatic as it is in the EU, can therefore 
take a long time and is highly dependent on each national political context. Differing national 
contexts and priorities can and do affect the debate about, and application of, Mercosur rules.  
The lack of direct enforcement of Mercosur norms within national legislation could 
make the creation and operational aspects of a MRDF extremely difficult since an individual 
state could delay or even block the decision-making process and the financing of projects. 
Financial means 
A fifth difference, which is essential to note in regard to the eventual creation of a 
MRDF, relates to the financial aspect. Since 1970, EU institutions have been accorded with 
their own resources and are financially independent from the member states. These revenues 
come from customs, agricultural contributions233, a percentage of the Value Added Tax in 
                                                
232 Article 40 of the Ouro Prêto Protocol. 
233 Agricultural contributions are the difference between national and international agricultural prices that needs 
to be paid by an importer of world agricultural products. 
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each member state, and since 1988, a percentage of the GDP of each state234. This EU budget 
is drawn up by the Commission and is agreed by the European Parliament and the Council235. 
The situation is completely different within Mercosur. Its institutions do not have their 
own revenue stream and have little power to decide overall budget matters. Moreover, 
compared to the EU budget in 2001 of 96 billion Euros, that of the  Mercosur is a financial 
‘dwarf’, with the total operational budget of the SAM amounting to approximately one 
million Euros236.  
This lack of financial means has a direct and obvious impact on the evolution of a 
MRDF. Under the present budget situation, Mercosur is not in a position to finance the 
establishment of such a Fund. If Mercosur members were to move to create a financial 
instrument for regional development, they will need to devote more financial resources to 
common institutions.  
Capabilities in ‘economic intelligence’  
A prerequisite to effective regional development policy-making is current and robust 
data on social and economic performance. Without precise statistical knowledge at the 
regional level, it is difficult, not to say impossible, to analyse the economic performance and 
hence the policy requirements of the regions. Ex ante evaluation of the impact of policy and 
programmes also relies on good data. 
To deal with this problem, EU countries have created the European Office for 
Statistics (Eurostat) in order to harmonise and improve their statistical knowledge of the EU. 
One of the first tasks of Eurostat was to harmonise the definition and the calculation of 
statistical indicators in order to enable meaningful comparisons of data between the EU 
members. Another objective was the creation of comparable local and regional data sets 
through the creation of the Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units (NUTS)237. Through 
the work of Eurostat, the EU has set in place relatively good and precise statistical tools 
offering data from local to supranational level which can assist policy-making. 
In 1835, the Chilean Andres Bello considered that “to improve the lot of the people, 
the first step is to know it thoroughly and, unfortunately, we lack statistical data!”238. As 
evident from Chapter 4, some 165 years later the statistical lacuna is still present in all 
Mercosur countries and indeed each is still struggling to establish their own statistical systems 
at a local level. Moreover, social and economic data are not yet harmonised among the 
Mercosur member states. Because of these limitations, it is naturally difficult for policy-
makers to determine the requirements of regions, and consequently to adopt appropriate 
policies.  
In considering the establishment of a MRDF, it clearly would be crucial for Mercosur 
to harmonise its statistical tools and to develop a comprehensive and comparable 
understanding of regional performance. Without this, the task of identifying priorities, 
designing appropriate policy and evaluating policy interventions will remain extremely 
problematic. 
                                                
234 These independent revenues were provided for by art.201 of the Treaty of Rome, but were only defined by a 
decision of the Council of the 21st of April 1970.  
235 Art. 203 of the Treaty of Maastricht. 
236 GMC Resolution nº01/02. 
237 For more details refer to Chapter 2. 
238 Personal translation. Original sentence: “Para mejorar la suerte del pueblo, el primer paso es conocerlo a 
fondo y, por desgracia, carecemos de datos estadísticos!”. 
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To conclude this sub-section on the constraints which might exist in transferring the 
EU experience to Mercosur, Figure 6.5 synthesises the key contextual differences there are 
between the EU and Mercosur.  
Figure 6.5. Key differences to be taken into account when considering the transfer of 
policies between the EU and Mercosur 
 European Union Mercosur  
1) Physical and 
natural 
characteristics 
Land area of 3.2 million km² 
 
Homogeneous territory 
Temperate climate 
 
Land area of 14.7 million km² (including 
Chile and Bolivia) 
Land of significant physical and climatic 
variation 
2) Transport High level of infrastructure provision 
 
Low level of infrastructure 
3) Demographic 
structures 
Ageing population  Predominantly younger population 
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4) Economic 
contexts 
15 fully industrialised and developed 
countries 
 
4 (or 6) developing countries with emerging 
economies 
1) Reasons for 
integrating 
Economic integration 
 
Prevention of wars 
Economic integration to facilitate 
development 
Stabilise democracy, counterweight to US 
 
2) Approach to 
regional 
integration 
Create a common market covering a 
wide range of policies managed by 
common institutions 
Create a common market through inter-
governmental relations in a limited number of 
policy areas related to the economy 
 
3) Organisational 
arrangements 
Permanent supranational institutions, 
having their own independent 
bureaucracies 
Few non permanent common institutions 
composed of temporarily designated officials 
 
4) Decision-
making 
competencies 
and procedures 
EU institutions competent for a 
considerable number of policy areas 
EU decisional power shared between 
the Council of Ministers, the 
Commission, and the Parliament 
EU norms directly and automatically 
enforced in member states 
Mercosur institutions competent principally 
for economic and trade related policies only 
The Mercosur Council (CMC) is the only 
institution with decisional power 
 
Mercosur norms are mandatory, but need to 
be transposed by each member in its 
legislation. Much greater room for local 
interpretation of norms 
 
5) Financial 
means 
Own independent financial resources 
Budget: about 96 billion Euros (2001) 
No independent revenues 
Budget:  about 1 million Euros 
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6) Capabilities in 
‘economic 
intelligence’ 
Developed and harmonised statistics 
at all levels (local, regional, national) 
Lack of comprehensive data within each 
state, no harmonisation of data gathering and 
interpretation between member states 
 
 
What sources of information could be consulted? 
In the case studied within the thesis, media is an unlikely source for a policy transfer 
from the EU to Mercosur. Indeed, regional development policies being very technical issues, 
it is improbable that reliable details related to such policies and programmes could be 
encountered in the media. Reports are arguably an important potential source since they can 
lead to precise and specific analyses of the characteristics and implications of the policies to 
be transferred. It is also clearly crucial to organise physical encounters to allow Mercosur 
officials to meet EU counterparts and benefit from their first-hand knowledge and experience. 
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* 
* * 
This chapter has shown that the existing literature on policy transfers is very recent 
and still limited. Moreover, hitherto the literature is focused on analysing the characteristics 
of policies which have already been transferred between states. It is however possible to adapt 
this literature, and principally the works of Dolowitz and Marsh, to develop a framework for 
analysing prospective policy transfers between supranational associations, that is a framework 
accounting for the circumstances under which a policy might successfully be transferred 
between two supranational associations. 
According to this prospective policy transfer framework, a transfer of the EU 
experience in regional development funds to Mercosur is justifiable. For this transfer to have 
a higher probability of success, it would be advisable that:  
1. Elected officials and bureaucrats are involved in the policy transfer, although other 
actors can also participate in the transfer even if they have less influence;  
2. The transfer is the result of a relatively rational choice made through lesson drawing 
or bounded rationality; 
3. Only ideology, attitudes or policy goals, objectives, or principles are transferred;  
4. The transfer is either made through inspiration, mixture or emulation;  
5. Lessons are drawn from the international level, that is from the EU; 
6. All the factors which might influence the transfer, positively or negatively, are 
considered to adapt the lessons accordingly; 
7. The lessons which are transferred are informed by reports and physical encounters. 
This framework suggests that the lessons Mercosur may learn from the EU are limited 
since only EU policy goals/objectives/principles, attitudes and ideology are suitable for 
transfer. These refer to the main principles which have guided the design and implementation 
of the EU regional development funds. With this framework in mind, the following chapter 
analyses the EU regional development funds in order to determine the fundamental principles 
underlying the EU experience which arguably could successfully be transferred to Mercosur.  
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CHAPTER  7..   A  CRII TII CAL  ASSESSMENT  OF  
EU  REGII ONAL  DEVELOPMENT  FUNDS  
 
Chapter 5 argued that it would be advisable for Mercosur to establish a Mercosur 
Regional Development Fund to reduce the significant regional disparities which were 
highlighted in Chapter 4. The preceding chapter confirmed the hypothesis that it was possible, 
under certain circumstances, for a supranational association such as Mercosur, to learn from 
another supranational association. As argued before in Chapter 3, it would be advisable for 
Mercosur to learn from the EU since it has developed through time a significant experience in 
policies and measures which aim to reduce regional development disparities.  
It should be noted that most policies adopted by the EU have an impact, positive or 
negative, on regional disparities. For example, although it has often been criticised, the 
Common Agricultural Policy contributes to finance rural development, but mostly in the EU’s 
most developed countries. Since it would be near impossible within the scope of this thesis to 
account for all the Community policies which have an indirect impact on regional disparities, 
the thesis focuses on the specific tools which have been implemented by the EU to reduce the 
observable characteristics of regional disparities, namely the regional development funds. 
Chapter 7 therefore analyses the EU experience of regional development funds in 
order to give an understanding of the complexity and length of the process which has led to 
the existing array of financial instruments.  
There are various ways of describing the EU regional development funds. For 
example, Andrew Evans in 1999239 described the complete evolution of each European fund 
one by one. This method has one principal disadvantage. With the different funds being 
analysed separately, it is difficult for the reader to understand their evolution within a broader 
historical context and thus to form an overall view. For this reason, a second approach, 
presenting the reforms in a chronological manner and describing the interrelated nature and 
effects of each regulatory reform on each fund, has been utilised here. 
It is possible to divide the past fifty years of existence of EU regional development 
funds into six time periods, and each is dealt with in a separate section below. The first time 
period covers the early years of the European process of integration, from 1951 to 1956. The 
second section covers 1957 to 1969, during which were taken the first steps towards regional 
development at the European level. The third section is dedicated to the ‘take-off’ period of 
regional development funds, that is from 1970 to 1985. Between 1986 and 1992, the period 
analysed in the fourth section, the EU regional development funds were modified 
substantially in a series of reforms. The fifth section analyses the effects of the Maastricht 
Treaty on EU regional development funds during 1993-1999. The sixth section considers 
these funds at the dawn of the 21st century.  
A final section assesses the EU regional policy experience, focusing especially on the 
different principles which underlie the EU regional development funds since, according to the 
conclusions of the preceding chapter, these principles could successfully be transferred to 
Mercosur. 
                                                
239 Evans Andrew, The EU structural funds, 1999, Oxford University Press, p.348. 
 199
1951-1956: THE EARLY YEARS 
In the early years of European integration, the EU founding fathers hoped that the 
process of integration would have a convergent effect on the European member states. 
Arguably, as a result of the common market, there would be a high level of economic growth 
which would gradually reduce the disparities existing between some regions. During this 
time, each member state retained its own regional policies and financial instruments which 
were defined and implemented at national level.  
As a result, although the need for regional development measures to offset potential 
regional disparities was officially recognised, no new instruments were either conceived or 
implemented at the supranational level to achieve this objective. Indeed, even though it was in 
breach of the general spirit of the 1951 ECSC Treaty which aimed to promote a free market, 
member states were allowed to subsidise their coal and steel industries in a few specific cases 
where the employment or the economy of a region was under persistent threat of disruption.  
The Treaty of Paris (1951) implies that nothing would, nor should, be done at the 
supranational level directly to influence the course of regional economic development, and 
likewise nothing would be done to question the prominence of national policies in this field. It 
should be remembered that in the early 1950s most national policies for regional development 
were also in the early stages of design and development. There were only relatively few 
national financial instruments with small budgets and limited objectives. 
1957: THE FIRST STEPS TOWARDS REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDS 
Although Martin and Pearce consider that “[t]he architects of the Rome treaty were 
manifestly unaware of these future trends and believed that the spillover from progressive 
political and economic integration would lead to a reduction in regional disparities”240, it can 
be argued that the Treaty of Rome represents a change of mood among member states. 
Indeed, the Treaty of Rome, which was signed in March 1957 and formally created the EEC, 
gives a higher priority to regional development, not only through ‘regionally oriented’ 
statements in the Treaty, but also through the creation of some specific financial instruments.  
The Treaty of Rome: Statements… 
A detailed examination of the text of the Treaty of Rome reveals that there is no 
section specially dedicated to the question of regional development. However, the member 
states showed their growing concerns via two specific items. In the Preamble, the Treaty 
indicated that the signatories were “[a]nxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and to 
ensure their harmonious development by reducing both the differences existing between the 
various regions and the backward of the less favoured regions”. It went on in Article 2: “[t]he 
Community shall have as its task, by establishing a Common Market and progressively 
approximating the economic policies of the member states, to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced 
expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising to the standard of living and closer 
relations between the States belonging to it”241. 
                                                
240 Martin Steve, Pearce Graham, Economic convergence or crisis management: European regional assistance in 
the UK, paper presented to the Regional Studies Association Conference, May 1995, Regional Studies 
Association, Sweden, p.2. 
241 The texts of the treaties, regulations and decisions adopted by the EU, and referred to in the present chapter, 
were encountered in 2000 on the EU internet website: www.europa.eu.int.  
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In addition to these general statements, the Treaty of Rome also makes references to 
the need for regional development in specific cases. For example, member states are allowed 
a derogation and could implement their own national policies in a few very specific cases, as 
stated by Art.92 Par.2c and Par.3: 
“The following shall be compatible with the Common Market: … aid granted to the economy 
of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany, in so 
far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by 
that division.” 
“The following shall be compatible with the Common Market: a) aid to promote the economic 
development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious 
underemployment; b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of Common 
European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; c) aid 
to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where 
such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common 
interest.” 
 
… Supported by a few actions 
But the Treaty of Rome does not limit itself to statements of principles. It establishes 
for the first time some common financial instruments for regional development. The common 
institutions of the EEC were given the capacity to act through three principal policy and 
funding channels. These concerned the activities of the European Social Fund, the European 
Investment Bank, and the Common Agricultural Policy. These are considered to be the first 
European mechanisms to finance regional development. 
 
As stated in article 117, member states agreed on the necessity to improve the working 
conditions and the standard of living of their workers. Accordingly, they provided for the 
creation of a European Social Fund (ESF) in articles 123 to 130. The objective of this fund 
was initially very broad since “it shall have the task of rendering the employment of workers 
easier and of increasing their geographical and occupational mobility within the Community” 
(art.123), and thus to overcome existing rigidities in the labour market. 
At the outset, the European Social Fund was directed to unemployed persons receiving 
vocational training, unemployed persons changing their place of residence for employment 
purposes, and workers who needed retraining. Every year, each member state was to present 
to the European Commission its estimate for financial assistance. On this basis, the ESF 
would then meet half of the cost of the state aid directed i) to the re-employment of workers 
through training or re-settlement; and ii) to help workers whose employment was threatened 
by the decline or closure of their employer. Since the Fund could only assist state measures, it 
was largely dependent on national policy frameworks which were often more short-term 
orientated and designed to solve socio-economic crises in backward regions, as opposed to 
adopting long-term structural reforms. 
 
The second instrument implemented by the EEC Treaty concerned the European 
Investment Bank (EIB). Originally, the 1956 Spaak Report242, which made recommendations 
on which member states negotiated before reaching agreement in the Treaty of Rome, 
proposed the creation of a European regional fund, but the member states finally opted for the 
formula of an investment bank, largely as the latter offered a far less interventionist approach.  
                                                
242 Intergovernmental Committee created by the Messine Conference, Rapport des Chefs de Délégation aux 
Ministres des Affaires Etrangères, Secretariat of the Committee, Brussels, 1956. 
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In terms of the Bank’s operating criteria, the Treaty states that the EIB “shall, 
operating on a non-profit making basis, grant loans and give guarantees which facilitate the 
financing of the following projects in all sectors of the economy: a) projects for developing 
less developed regions; b) projects for modernising or converting undertakings or for 
developing fresh activities called for by the progressive establishment of the common market, 
where these projects are of such size or nature that they cannot be entirely financed by the 
various means available in the individual Member States” (art.130). 
During its first years of activity, following to the letter its mission statement, the Bank 
mostly invested in infrastructure and large industrial projects (see the end of art.130 above). 
However, after a reform of its operations undertaken in 1968, loans were also made available 
to small and medium-sized enterprises.  
 
The third and last instrument implemented by the Treaty of Rome to promote regional 
development was one component part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). The CAP has been one of 
the most significant aspects of the EEC/EU given the percentage of the total Community 
budget it represented. Its aim was to increase agricultural productivity, to develop 
technological progress related to agriculture, to optimise the use of factors of production, and 
to increase the standard of living of the agricultural society in the EEC/EU. 
Accordingly, article 34.2 provides for the creation of ‘common organisations of the 
market’ for the different agricultural products. In such cases, since such organisations are of a 
trans-national nature, the member states agreed on the creation of “one or more European 
agricultural guidance and guarantee fund” (art.34.4) to help finance these common 
organisations.  
This was achieved in Community law in 1962 with the formal creation of the EAGGF 
(Regulation 25/62). Two years later this fund was subdivided into two component parts 
(Regulation 17/64). The Guidance Section was to have at its disposal one third of total CAP 
financing and to have a long-term perspective in that it should seek to modify the structural 
conditions of agricultural production. The Guarantee Section was not a policy of regional  
development since it focused largely on supporting agricultural prices, and thus was 
essentially operating against existing sets of short-term objectives and had no ‘development’ 
component.  
1970 - 1985: THE TAKE-OFF 
Over the period 1970 to 1985, member states became increasingly aware of the 
existence of Europe-wide regional disparities and, in most cases reluctantly, decided to take 
action in order to find solutions at the Community level. Three tendencies can be discerned 
during this period. Firstly, there was a consolidation and extension of existing regional 
development funds; secondly, a reinforcement of the coordination of national policies; and 
thirdly, the implementation of new and EEC-wide shared regional development funds. 
Consolidating existing regional development funds  
As demonstrated in the previous section, the Treaty of Rome had set in place three 
instruments through which EEC-wide regional development policies could be implemented; 
the ESF, the EIB and the EAGGF Guidance Section. Through the earliest phases of their 
establishment, the three instruments were subject to review and modification. 
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During 1970 to 1985, the European Social Fund went through three reforms. The first 
reform, undertaken in 1971 by Decision 71/66, aimed to reinforce the role of the fund in 
fighting unemployment. This was not only to help less developed regions fight structural 
unemployment, but also to prevent unemployment from arising in the first place. This reform 
also widened the project eligibility criteria of the fund. Regulation 2396/71 provided for 
projects which targeted the unemployed as well as the underemployed; women over 35 
desiring to retrain to return to work; and those having difficulties finding a job because of 
their age, that is workers who were too old or too young, and who lacked the necessary skills. 
This same Regulation gave priority to geographical areas which were less developed or which 
depended on declining industries.  
The second ESF reform of 1977 (Directive 77/801) put into place some relatively 
minor amendments to the operating criteria of the Fund. Its principal effect was to allow the 
Fund to target those people who were working in self-employed activities. Moreover, it 
reinforced the priority given to ‘backward’ EU regions243 which were designated according to 
specific criteria, and the ceiling of participation of the Fund in any state aid at project level 
was increased from 50% to 55%. 
The last reform the ESF went through during the 1970-1985 period was the result of a 
1983 Decision, 83/516. This modified substantially the objectives of the Fund in order to 
boost its regional impact. The aim thus became to increase the mobility of workers from 
regions or economic sectors adversely affected by Community actions and, at the same time, 
to stabilise employment by retraining workers to adapt them to market and technological 
change. The conditions for eligibility were again partly modified to take more account of the 
problem of age since assistance would now be provided to people under 25. This 
acknowledgement of the age dimension to unemployment in the early 1980s was underwritten 
by the decision to direct at least 75% of the Fund to young workers. People over 25 could also 
be eligible, but only if they corresponded to the eligibility criteria established in 1971, which 
concerned the unemployed, the underemployed, those workers whose employment situation 
was threatened by economic restructuring, or women wanting to work. 
 
The operating criteria of the European Investment Bank have also been reformed, but 
only once, in 1978, with the establishment of the New Community Instrument (NCI), 
implemented by Decision 78/870. The objective of the EIB reform was to direct EIB activity 
to complement the implementation of other Community policies, so that the Bank could better 
“contribute to greater convergence and integration of the economic policies of the member 
states”244. 
To achieve this objective, this NCI aimed to provide loans and guarantees to 
enterprises favouring employment, innovation and technological research; to projects dealing 
with energy; and to infrastructure development. All these projects were to have both a 
regional development and a technological aspect. 
 
The EAGGF-Guidance Section went through several reforms during the same period, 
although hereafter only a few of the key changes are described. A first reform, in 1970, aimed 
to reinforce the support of the Guidance Section of the EAGGF in relation to structural 
reforms in agricultural society (Regulation 729/70). Two years later, a series of reforms took 
place with the aim of augmenting the support of the Fund for the modernisation of farming to 
                                                
243 The original regions were the French Overseas Department, Greenland, Ireland, Italy’s Mezzogiorno, and 
Northern Ireland. 
244 Evans Andrew, The EU structural funds, 1999, Oxford University Press, p.214. 
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increase production and income (Regulation 72/159); to promote early retirement for farmers 
(Directive 72/160); or to help farmers retrain and move into other types of employment 
(Directive 72/161). 
In 1975, and in order to comply with the Treaty of Rome (art.42.a), the member states 
decided to increase Community help to farmers suffering from the effects of structural change 
or poor natural conditions (Directive 75/268). A further 1978 Regulation (1760/78) promoted 
the development of public infrastructure in less developed rural areas. 
Finally, in 1985, there was a significant reform of the CAP. Regulation 797/85 aimed 
to connect agricultural development with the socio-economic development of each region. 
However, in spite of these reforms, the Guidance  Section still represented only a minor part 
of overall CAP resources since most of the CAP budget remained dedicated to price support 
through the Guarantee Section. 
Coordinating national regional development policies 
Without any supranational coordination of the national regional development policies 
there was the very real risk of rampant competition between member states to provide the best 
fiscal and financial conditions to attract private investment into their respective regions. This 
type of competitive overbidding could have become highly detrimental to all the member 
states since it would have led to uncertainty and allowed inward investors to play one country 
off against another. Consequently, on the 20th of October 1971, the Council adopted a 
regulation which established what can be considered as the first attempts to coordinate 
national policies of regional development. 
The creation of the European Regional Development Fund 
Even though the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was the final 
Structural Fund to be created in 1975245, after the Guidance Section of the EAGGF and the 
European Social Fund246, it now represents the most significant fund in financial terms. 
Between 1975 and 1985 the ERDF was reformed twice, in 1979 and 1984247. The ERDF has 
five principal characteristics which are discussed in detail below. 
Principles underlying the ERDF’s actions: additionality and complementarity 
Additionality and complementarity are two notions which have underpinned the 
activities supported by the ERDF. According to the former idea, Community Funds should be 
considered as being ‘extra’, as a further source of financing for regional development within 
member countries, additional to what member states already spend on regional development. 
That is to say ERDF resources must not be used as a replacement for national investment in 
regions. The latter notion, complementarity, implies that financial help from the ERDF should 
complement and not contradict national measures. The ERDF therefore depends on a pre-
existing national assistance which is then expanded and complemented by Community Funds. 
These two principles go hand in hand and were designed to prevent governments from 
using the ERDF as a substitute for, or a reimbursement of, their existing public expenditures 
in this domain. In practice this has proved not to be the case, and most governments have 
taken the opportunity afforded by the ERDF to decrease their national contribution to regional 
                                                
245 Regulation 724/75. 
246 In 1993 a fourth Structural Fund was established to assist fisheries. It is the Financial Instrument for Fisheries 
Guidance (FIFG). However, the ERDF can be considered to be the last Structural Fund created since this FIFG 
previously existed as a sub-category of the EAGGF which gradually became independent and autonomous.  
247 Regulation 214/79 and Regulation 1787/84. 
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development. For example, Keating and Jones wrote in 1985 that “the additionality principle, 
[as] applied by all member states, means that moneys received from the [EC] fund are not 
allowed to be added to national aids but, rather, are used to reimburse them”248. 
Quotas 
At the outset within the framework of the ERDF, a system of quotas was devised for 
the distribution of the ERDF249. This quota system was believed to be equitable since it 
ensured that the regions needing the most assistance would receive it. The quota approach 
also limited the possible influence of the Commission on regional development affairs at 
national level. If member states proposed a limited number of projects, according to their own 
national criteria for regional development, which fulfilled their ERDF quota allocation, the 
Commission had little leeway to intervene (see Table 7.1 below to see the distribution of the 
quotas among the member states). 
In order to increase its own influence over the utilisation of ERDF monies, the 
Commission proposed a reform of this system. The Commission claimed that some projects, 
such as those likely to have a wider regional impact, as well as those affecting frontier areas, 
would be best financed through a set of new ‘common instruments’. To this end, the 1979 
reform divided the ERDF into two sections250. The ERDF from 1979 consequently included a 
‘quota’ section for supporting regional measures taken by national governments, operated 
according to the additionality principle, and a ‘non-quota’ section which could support 
specific Community programmes, where the Commission itself would have a greater degree 
of influence over funding priorities and decisions. In its proposal, the Commission requested 
that 13% of total ERDF resources should be dedicated to these newly created non-quota 
measures. Notably, the European Parliament believed this amount was insufficient. But, in the 
end, the decision was in the hands of the Council, which opted to allocate 5% of ERDF 
resources to non quota actions251. 
The last reform dealing with quota related issues took place in 1983. The Commission, 
in a new attempt to get more influence over the process of fund distribution, proposed to 
replace the system of quotas by a set of indicative ERDF ranges (see Table 7.1). 
Consequently, the ERDF contribution to each member state was set between a lower limit, 
which was the minimum of assistance it would get from the Fund as long as its proposals 
were eligible, and an upper limit, which was higher for each member state than the quota 
previously attributed – except for Denmark. In 1985, the sum of the lower limits amounted to 
88.63% of the ERDF. This consequently ensured a larger influence to the Commission on the 
remaining 11.37% of the funds which were not allocated according to quotas. 
                                                
248 Keating Michael and Jones Barry, Regions in the European Community, 1985, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
p.15. 
249 Article 2 of Regulation 724/75. 
250 Regulation 214/79, article 2. 
251 Vanhove Norbert, Regional Policy: A European approach, 1999, Ashgate, Aldershot, p.480. 
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Table 7.1. From quotas to ranges: ERDF assistance to member states as a percentage of 
total ERDF resources252 
1985 1986  1975 - 
1977 
1978 - 
1980 
1981 - 
1984253 Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Belgium 1.5 1.39 1.11 0.90 1.20 0.61 0.82 
Denmark 1.3 1.20 1.06 0.51 0.67 0.34 0.46 
Germany 6.4 6.00 4.65 3.76 4.81 2.55 3.40 
Greece - - 13.00 12.35 15.74 8.36 10.64 
France 15.0 16.86 13.64 11.05 14.74 7.48 9.96 
Ireland 6.0 6.46 5.94 5.64 6.83 3.82 4.61 
Italy 40.0 39.39 35.49 31.94 42.59 21.62 28.79 
Luxembourg 0.1 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.06 
Netherlands 1.7 1.58 1.24 1.00 1.34 0.68 0.91 
United Kingdom 28.0 27.03 23.80 21.42 28.56 14.50 19.31 
Portugal - - - - - 10.66 14.20 
Spain - - - - - 17.97 23.93 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 88.63 116.56 88.63 117.09 
 
Eligibility 
The Commission was concerned about the eligibility for the funds. Therefore, when 
designing the ERDF, it proposed that the less-favoured regions eligible for Community help 
should be defined by the Council according to two common criteria; that is to say that they 
should already benefit from their national system of regional development, and should have a 
GDP per capita lower than the EC average254. 
This proposal was taken into account at the time of the creation of the ERDF. Articles 
3 and 5 of Regulation 724/75 state that assistance should be allocated to regions suffering 
from serious economic disparities, especially those already considered to be priority areas by 
their governments. 
Projects eligible for support 
At its inception, the ERDF aimed to support three types of projects. The first category 
of projects supported by the ERDF were those in the manufacturing, crafts and services 
sectors255 - the latter sector needed to specifically demonstrate a direct impact on regional 
economic development or employment. These projects had to be in receipt of national 
development funds and at least ten jobs had to be created or safeguarded if these jobs were 
threatened. This last condition provided possible support to industries in the throes of 
restructuring which were laying off workers, but only as long as some of the jobs were 
actually retained. Moreover, given the size of the workforce present in small or medium-sized 
companies, they could rarely comply with the criterion of ten jobs created or safeguarded, and 
consequently had a limited access to such assistance. Finally, it was difficult for local 
economic agencies to assess the employment effect in the long term. Indeed, in 1989 the 
Court of Auditors stated that only 48% of the job creation forecasts had been met. 
                                                
252 Vanhove Norbert, Regional Policy: A European approach, 1999, Ashgate, Aldershot, p.481. 
253 From 1982 onwards, there was no longer a legal basis for the quota section. 
254 Proposal of the 31st July 1973. 
255 Regulation 724/75, article 4.1.a. 
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The second type of projects involved the development of economic and social 
infrastructure to reinforce regional growth256. Projects of this nature took up the largest share 
of the fund. These projects were initially supposed to account for less than 70% of the ERDF 
(Regulation 214/79). However, a modification in the phraseology of the text allowed this 
second category to represent more than the 70% limit first designed. 
The third category of projects concerned endogenous development to support the 
internal or endogenous development of the regions (Regulation 1787/84). To this end, the 
ERDF could support revenue as well as capital projects in areas such as technical research, 
information exchange, technical assistance, training and vocational training facilities. 
Towards a programmatic approach 
After the 1979 reform257 ERDF resources were shared between projects initiated at the 
national level by member states, which were allocated the lion’s share, and Community 
programmes initiated by the Commission. As experience of funding regional development 
projects was acquired, programme funding was given an increasing importance. Whether of 
national or EC initiative, “[p]rogramme funding was another response to the perceived needs 
both to Europeanise the ERDF and to ensure that its funds were used to pursue a properly 
thought-out strategy for regional economic development rather than support an ad hoc 
selection of individual projects”258. 
Community programmes were “a series of consistent, multi-annual measures directly 
serving Community objectives and the implementation of Community policies”259. Examples 
of Community programmes include the STAR programme, which aimed to develop services 
and telecommunication networks, and the VALOREN programme to assist backward regions 
develop and improve their energy supplies260. Another initiative, the Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes (IMP), was different from the others because these IMPs were given their own 
specific legislation in order to make them eligible for financing under all of the Structural 
Funds criteria (Regulation 2088/85). These IMPs aimed to improve socio-economic 
conditions in the Mediterranean regions. At the time of their creation (1985), IMPs applied 
essentially to Greece, but later took into account Spain and Portugal which became EU 
members the following year. 
For programmes of national initiative, two forms of programming were designed. 
Firstly, instead of presenting individual projects to be financed by the Commission, member 
states were encouraged to include these projects within a National Programme of Community 
Interest (NPCI), that is a coherent programme which would take into account the Community 
guidelines for regional development. Secondly, for areas requiring assistance from different 
EU funds, member states could present an Integrated Development Operation (IDO). 
                                                
256 Regulation 724/75, article 4.1.b. The definition of the types of infrastructure which can be assisted was 
broadened in 1979 and then in 1984. 
257 Regulation 214/79. 
258 Williams R.H., European Union spatial policy and planning, 1996, Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd, London, 
p.74. 
259 Regulation 1787/84, article 7.  
260 Both were set up in 1986 through Regulations 3300/86 for STAR and 3301/86 for VALOREN. 
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1986-1992: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT ON 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDS 
Signed on the 17th and 28th of February 1986, becoming effective in 1987, the Single 
European Act (SEA) paved the way for a major reform of Community regional development 
funds. Indeed, this treaty officially introduced the concept of ‘cohesion’ as a new and key 
objective of the process of European integration. According to Andrew Evans, ‘cohesion’ can 
be defined in a number of ways, depending on the perspective taken261. 
- From the political perspective: “cohesion may be connected with the idea of 
solidarity… to demonstrate the value of Union membership to weaker regions… it 
may be regarded as referring to the level of regional disparities which is found 
politically acceptable”. 
- From the social perspective: “cohesion may be seen as seeking the convergence of 
basic incomes and equality of access to employment”. 
- From the economic perspective: “cohesion may be regarded as designed to allow all 
regions to compete in the internal market and in the monetary union by endowing 
them with the requisite infrastructure and skills”. 
 
The 1988 reform of the Structural Funds 
The amended article 130 of the SEA involved a major reform of the Structural Funds 
and related Community instruments; a reform which was proposed by the Commission and 
adopted unanimously by the Council after consultation with the European Parliament. This 
legislative process led to the creation of a think-tank which reported its conclusions in 1987 
under the heading Efficiency, stability, and equity: a strategy for the evolution of the 
economic system of the European Community262.  
Following a number of key propositions from this think-tank, a review of the 
Structural Funds was begun in 1988. Four new principles emerged from this study. These 
concerned concentration, increased financial resources, subsidiarity and partnership, and the 
development of a programmatic approach to regional development funding. The reformed 
Structural Funds regulations were adopted in December 1988263. Each of the four new 
operating principles of the Structural Funds are discussed in detail below. 
Concentration 
The concentration of the assistance of the Funds to the most backward regions was one 
of the most revolutionary aspects of this 1988 reform. The less-favoured European regions 
were classified into five different types of regions and identified according to the precise 
nature of their economic and social circumstances. These five regional ‘types’ were referred 
to as ‘Objective’ regions. The precise revised definition of regions is set out below: 
                                                
261 Evans Andrew, The EU structural funds, 1999, Oxford University Press, pp.21-24. 
262 This document, better known as the Padoa-Schioppa Report, was found in 2001 on the EU website: 
www.europa.eu.int.  
263 Regulations 4254/88 for the ERDF, 4255/88 for the ESF, and 4256/88 for the EAGGF - Guidance Section. 
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- ‘Objective 1 regions’: regions where development is lagging. They are defined at 
NUTS 2 level as regions whose GDP per capita has been less than 75% of the 
Community average over the preceding three years;  
- ‘Objective 2 regions’: regions seriously affected by industrial decline; 
- ‘Objective 3 regions’: regions “combating long-term unemployment”; 
- ‘Objective 4 regions’: regions displaying a need to “facilitate the occupational 
integration of young people”; 
- ‘Objective 5 regions’: regions facing agricultural problems. This Objective is sub-
divided into two:  
∗ ‘Objective 5a’ for regions needing to improve agricultural structure; 
∗ ‘Objective 5b’ for regions needing assistance with the development of their rural 
areas. The criteria applied to 5b areas meant that they needed to demonstrate a 
large share of agricultural employment, a low level of agricultural income, and a 
low GDP per capita. In a few specific cases, other regions could be included in this 
Objective if an application was made by the member state and if the area met other 
criteria such as low population density, high sensitivity to changes in its 
agricultural sector (a negative impact of the Common Agricultural Policy), were 
mountainous or peripheral. 
 
The ERDF could be applied across Objectives 1, 2 and 5b, but it had the obligation to 
dedicate around 80% of its budget to Objective 1 regions. Moreover, the system of quotas was 
maintained for the distribution of ERDF within Objective 1 regions. In 1989 it was decided 
that Greece would be allocated 16.2% of the resources allocated to Objective 1, Spain 32.6%, 
France 2.1%, Ireland 5.4%, Italy 24.5%, Portugal 17.5%, and the UK 1.7%264. So far, within 
the Objectives 1 to 5 arrangements, only two funding periods have been supported, that is 
1989-1993 and 1994-1999, although some of the funds of the last period have not yet been 
spent at the time of writing. 
In spite of this effort by the EU to achieve a better concentration of assistance, 
Objective 1 regions alone nevertheless represented at this point 21.5% of the whole 
Community population, which arguably is not in keeping with the notion of a more spatially 
concentrated funding regime. 
Increased financial resources 
As the tasks faced by the Structural Funds both gradually increased and diversified, it 
became necessary to augment the financial resources to ensure that the individual financial 
instruments would have the means to accomplish the ambitions of the Community. 
Consequently, the value of the Structural Funds doubled in real terms between 1987 and 
1993, from 7.2 billion ECU to 14.5 billion ECU. 
Subsidiarity and partnership 
The 1988 reform established the critical notion of subsidiarity. This meant that the 
Structural Funds were in the future to be managed at the most appropriate and efficient 
institutional level, whether local, regional, national, or European. This application of 
subsidiarity implied the development of partnership. According to Regulation EEC 2052/88, 
partnership is a “close consultation between the Commission, the member states concerned 
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and the competent authorities designated by the latter at national, regional, local or other 
level, with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a common goal”265.  
This notion of subsidiarity was translated into the decision-making arrangements also 
for the Community programmes which were to be adopted by the Commission only after 
consultation with the newly formed Regional Policy Committee and as well as with the 
member states. 
Reinforcing the programmatic approach 
During this time period, 1986-1992, the Commission developed the principle that 
“programme financing had to replace project financing”266.  
From the perspective of the Commission, programming offered a number of 
advantages. First, it promoted a coherent, coordinated approach to regional development 
problems since it was designed with the Community and was arguably far less a patchwork of 
national measures brought together for simple ‘book keeping’ purposes. Moreover, it ensured 
to a large extent that the problems to be addressed corresponded exactly to the priority regions 
and sectors defined by the Community.  
Finally, programming favoured an integrated approach to regional development since 
it could bring a number of financial measures, through the different Structural Funds, to bear 
on specific sectoral targets. Programming offered a workable solution to tackle inter-
connected economic development challenges through an integrated approach to funding. 
A new methodology was designed so that member states could propose a coherent 
programme to be financed by EU Structural Funds. States, in partnership with regional 
authorities, drew up a development plan which highlighted their priorities. Each state then 
negotiated its plan with the Commission, the results of these negotiations being inscribed in a 
Community Support Framework (CSF). According to this CSF, the Commission selected the 
type of operational programme which should be applied. 
The programmes initiated by the Commission, although they changed their name from 
Community programmes to Community Initiatives after the 1988 reform, remained mostly the 
same. For example, STAR, VALOREN, and Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, which 
existed since 1985-1986 were pursued.  
The impact of the SEA on other instruments of regional development 
The Single European Act not only provoked a reform of the Structural Funds, but also 
of the other financial instruments such as the EIB. 
Article 267 of the SEA maintained the original objectives of the Bank, which were 
originally stated in article 130 of the Treaty of Rome, but included a final paragraph in which 
it was expressly stated that the Bank should act in conjunction with the Structural Funds and 
other Community financial instruments where its investment programmes were concerned. 
                                                
265 Regulation quoted in Bache Ian, The politics of European Union regional policy: multi-level governance or 
flexible gatekeeping?, 2000, Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield, p.74. 
266 Vanhove Norbert, Regional Policy: A European approach, 1999, Ashgate, Aldershot, p.495. 
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1993: THE POST-MAASTRICHT SYSTEM OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDS 
However significant, the 1988 reform was an unsatisfactory step in a number of 
accounts. The member states therefore took the opportunity of the 1992 re-writing of the 
treaty to pursue further reforms. The Maastricht Treaty, signed on the 7th of February 1992 
and effective from the 1st of November 1993, implied a number of modifications for the 
Structural Funds as well as for the other financial instruments. For the Structural Funds, the 
coming into being of the Maastricht Treaty coincided with the second operational phase of the 
Structural Funds from 1994 to 1999, the first operational phase having covered the 1989-1993 
period. 
Consolidating the Structural Funds 
A number of different aspects of the Funds were modified. First, a new instrument was 
created to strengthen the support of the EU to fishing industries, the Financial Instrument for 
Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). Secondly, the geographical distribution of the funds was 
reconfigured in order to increase the degree of concentration of the Funds in those places 
where need was greatest. Thirdly, the programmatic approach to funding was once more 
developed. Moreover, a new system of evaluation and assessment was developed. Once more, 
the overall resources of the Funds were increased to enhance their impact. Finally, the 
Structural Funds’ operational criteria were extended to cover new areas of intervention. Each 
of these modifications are presented in detail below. 
A new instrument: the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance 
In the early 1980s it appeared that the Guidance Section of the EAGGF was 
inadequate to deal with the problems faced by the fishing industry. Gradually, this Guidance 
component was given a particular status within the EAGGF by designing specific rules for the 
fisheries267. It was not until 1993, with Regulation 3699/93, that the Financial Instrument for 
Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) was created to provide assistance to regions in need. During the 
1993 reform of the priorities, Objective 5a regions were redefined in order to take into 
account measures to adjust fisheries structures. This development is discussed further below. 
A new geographical distribution 
To improve upon the degree of concentration, some of the Objectives of the Structural 
Funds were merged (Objectives 3 and 4 into the new Objective 3), while others were 
maintained almost in their same format (Objectives 1, 5a and 5b), and new Objectives 
created268. The modified Objectives are discussed hereafter. 
Objective 1 aimed to promote the development and structural adjustment of regions 
whose development is lagging. This Objective still represents the biggest share of EU 
assistance. Between 1992 and 1999, the resources of the Fund available for Objective 1 were 
doubled in real terms. The definition of these regions remained the same since their GDP per 
capita in purchasing-power parities had to be under 75% of the EU average during the three 
preceding years. This limit was in reality interpreted rather flexibly, and a few exceptions 
were made to include some NUTS 3 regions into this Objective269. 
Objective 2 aimed to cover the regions, frontier regions, or parts of regions, including 
unemployment areas and urban communities, seriously affected by industrial decline. This 
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area covered 15% of the population of the EU. These regions had to belong to a NUTS 3 area 
and: i) to have an average rate of unemployment during the three preceding years higher than 
the Community average; ii) to have a share of industrial employment to total employment 
equal to or higher than the Community average; and iii) to have suffered an ‘observable’ loss 
of industrial employment. 
Objective 3 aimed to combat long-term unemployment and facilitate the entry into 
working life of young people and of people excluded from the labour market. The objective 
was to complement national policies fighting unemployment. To be eligible for this 
assistance, it was necessary to target the long-term unemployed and the youth unemployed. 
Objective 4 aimed to facilitate the adaptation of workers of either sex to industrial 
changes and to changes in production systems. In particular, it targeted people needing 
retraining due to changes in their sector of activity. 
Objective 5a aimed to promote rural development by speeding up the adjustment of 
agricultural structures in the framework of the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. 
The adjustment of fisheries structures was included in this new definition. Objective 5b aimed 
to promote rural development by facilitating the development and structural adjustment of 
rural areas. To be considered to meet Objective 5b criteria, areas needed to have a low GDP 
per capita and to satisfy any two of the three following conditions: i) a large share of 
agricultural employment in total employment; ii) a low level of agricultural income; and iii) 
low population density or depopulation. In a few specific cases, other regions could be 
included in this Objective if they met other criteria; for example, if they were sensitive to 
changes in the agricultural sector due to negative impacts of the Common Agricultural Policy, 
were mountainous, were a less favoured region, or were in a peripheral situation. It is worth 
noting that most of the assistance under this Objective was directed to France and Germany. 
Objective 6 aimed to facilitate the development and structural adjustment of regions 
with an extremely low population density, that is less than eight persons per square kilometre. 
Objective 6 was created specifically for the northern regions of Sweden and Finland which 
were suffering from low population density, climatic harshness, and high peripherality. The 
rules governing Objective 1 regions were also applied to Objective 6 regions. 
 
In practice, the interpretation of these criteria by the Commission has been flexible. 
The Commission has allowed the inclusion in the Objective 1 strand regions such as Hainault 
in Belgium and France, Merseyside, the Highlands and Islands in the UK, and Flevoland in 
the Netherlands, where eligibility was marginal. Indeed, these regions suffered not so much 
from a lack of development as from industrial decline. However, designing them as Objective 
2 regions would have significantly reduced the resources which could be allocated to them. 
As in the previous programming period, each of the four Structural Funds had its own 
set of specific rules. The ERDF could only be used in Objective 1, 2, 5b and 6 regions. The 
ESF was applicable in all Objective regions except 5a. The EAGGF Guidance Section could 
be applied in Objective 1, 5a, 5b, and 6 regions. The FIFG could only be employed under 
Objective 5a conditions. 
A more programmatic approach to funding 
In addition to the Community Support Framework270 procedure, member states were 
offered a new programmatic approach for the financing of programmes of national initiative 
by the Structural Funds. This new approach, which entailed the production of a Single 
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Programming Document (SPD), aimed to reduce the length of the procedure. Like the CSF, 
the SPD was built on the proposals of a member state, according to its priorities and 
considering the EU criteria for financing, and agreed upon after negotiation with the 
Commission. However, the SPD already included the operational programmes which should 
be applied, thus saving one stage in the procedure. 
 On the 16th of February 1994 the Commission presented the Community Initiatives for 
the 1994-1999 operational period of the Structural Funds. Thirteen Community Initiatives 
were allocated ECU 13.45 billion, that is 9% of the resources of the Structural Funds. The 
Community Initiatives were defined according to seven priorities271:  
1. Cross-border, trans-national and inter-regional cooperation and networks – 
INTERREG II; 
2. Rural development – LEADER II; 
3. The most remote regions – REGIS;  
4. Employment and the development of human resources – EMPLOYMENT (NOW, 
HORIZON, YOUTHSTART);  
5. The management of industrial change – ADAPT, RECHAR II, RESIDER, KONVER, 
RETEX, TEXTILES AND CLOTHING IN PORTUGAL, and SMEs ;  
6. Development of crisis-hit urban areas – URBAN; 
7. Restructuring of the fishing industry – PESCA.  
Improving the system of evaluation and assessment 
Another main aspect of the reform which took place after Maastricht was the 
strengthening of the appraisal, monitoring and assessment of the regional development 
programmes financed by the EU272. 
The reforms insisted on the need for an ex ante appraisal of the programme. When the 
programme was in its initial design phase, its proposals had to include as much as possible a 
set of clear and quantifiable objectives. This was intended to make it easier to compare the 
end results against the original stated aims. In theory, it would be easier thereafter to decide 
whether the programme should be maintained for a further period, modified to make it more 
effective, or ultimately abandoned.  
The processes of monitoring and evaluation were somewhat similar. According to the 
text of the reform, “whereas monitoring appears to imply a mechanism of ensuring that 
national and regional authorities are doing what they said they would do, assessment implies 
evaluating whether, in so doing, the operations are achieving what they were anticipated to 
achieve in terms of overall socio-economic impact”273. The process of evaluation was to be 
carried out by national monitoring committees which comprised representatives of the 
member state, the Commission, the EIB, and in some cases regional authorities or social 
partners. On the other hand, assessment could be carried out by the Commission, the member 
state, or by third parties.  
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Increased resources 
During this second phase of operations (1994-1999), the financial resources at the 
disposal of the Structural Funds were once more augmented. The total Structural Funds 
budget was increased by 38% from 19.8 billion ECU in 1993 to 27.4 billion ECU in 1999 (in 
1992 prices)274. This increase, although not insignificant, was rather limited compared to that 
of the first phase of operation when the total funds allocated were doubled.  
This can largely be explained by the effect of the Maastricht Treaty and its 
convergence criteria. Indeed, to create an Economic and Monetary Union, member states 
agreed on a nominal and real convergence which implied a reduction, drastic for some, of 
government expenditures. This was one of the main contradictions of the EU since, at the 
same time, the same Treaty called for increased public investment in measures aimed to 
reduce regional disparity. 
Types of assistance allocated by the Structural Funds 
Each of the four Funds operated according to its own criteria, and these could also 
vary according to the Objective regions concerned275. 
The contribution of the ERDF to any project varied depending on the circumstances of 
particular regions. Whereas projects in Objective 1 areas could be financed up to 75% by the 
ERDF, with few exceptions of up to 80% or even 85% in the most peripheral Greek regions, 
other projects could only be financed up to 50%. Respecting these rates, the ERDF could 
contribute to the financing of: 
- Projects of productive investments which saved or maintained jobs; 
- Regional aid schemes of member states; 
- Regional operational programmes included within Community Support Frameworks; 
- Global grants to assist local development initiatives (e.g. for small or medium-sized 
companies); 
- In terms of the Community Initiatives (CIs), and in certain specific circumstances, the 
ERDF could also finance some types of CIs outside the Objective areas (1, 2, 5b and 
6). For example, even non-member states could benefit from this type of aid through 
Initiatives such as INTERREG (cooperation between regions, which could encompass 
border regions including those of neighbouring non-EU countries) and PHARE 
(economic restructuring in Eastern and Central Europe); 
- Integrated development operations: when projects were co-financed by two or more 
financial instruments; 
- Studies and pilot schemes, for a maximum of 1% of its budget, to assess the impact of 
EU policies and propose new investments in infrastructures; 
- Technical assistance, up to 0.5% of its budget, to help with the implementation of 
ERDF assistance. In these last two cases, studies and technical aid, the ERDF could 
finance the full cost of the projects. 
 
With regard to the ESF, priority was given to fighting unemployment. Objective 3 
regions were allocated at least 80% of the resources set aside for Objectives 3 and 4. This aid 
principally took the form of grants and operational programmes, as well as of Community 
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Initiatives. The ESF contributed to the financing of three CIs. These were EUROFORM, 
dealing with employment opportunities created by the common market; ADAPT, aimed to 
favour the spread of expertise and knowledge; and EMPLOYMENT (NOW, HORIZON and 
YOUTHSTART), to improve the functioning of the labour market. It also financed studies 
and technical assistance. 
The EAGGF - Guidance Section aimed to reimburse government expenditures in the 
rural development domain. The Fund was mostly allocated through grants and operational 
programmes, as well as through studies and technical assistance276. The FIFG, which was 
originally part of the EAGGF, basically followed the same rules, although these were adapted 
to the problem of fisheries. 
The creation of a Cohesion Fund 
Following the guidelines set down by the Maastricht Treaty, within the Protocol on 
Economic and Social Cohesion and article 130D (which became article 161 after the 1997 
Treaty of Amsterdam), the member states agreed to create a new financial instrument, namely 
the Cohesion Fund. This Cohesion Fund277 principally aimed to assist Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
and Greece to meet the necessary requirements for their participation in the EMU. 
At the time of inception of the Cohesion Fund, and in order to be eligible, a region 
needed to have a GDP per capita lower than 90% of the EU average and was required to 
implement projects which supported the process of economic convergence. This latter was the 
most critical eligibility condition. Where it was considered that the economic progress made 
was not sufficient, financial help from the Cohesion Fund could be suspended. The projects 
financed by this Fund fell into two categories; environmental protection; and the creation of 
trans-European networks.  
Because of the conditionality of this assistance, some authors such as Evans have 
argued that “the Cohesion Fund appears more an instrument of convergence than cohesion. 
As a result, cohesion efforts which are not favoured by ‘liberal market economics’ may be 
starved of resources”278.  
EU REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST 
CENTURY 
In 1999, European officials launched an important process of reflection on EU 
policies. These reflections were published in a document called Agenda 2000. One of the 
main propositions concerned the modification of development policies and funds in order to 
make them more efficient during the 2000-2006 period of implementation. 
The document clearly states that economic and social cohesion through regional 
development continues to be one of the priorities of the EU. Two principal challenges were 
defined for structural policies:  
“firstly, to improve the effectiveness of the structural policy instruments so that economic and 
social cohesion can be achieved; 
secondly, to ensure that structural policy plays a continuing role in the Union's future 
enlargement, bringing in the countries of central and eastern Europe”279.  
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As discussed in the following sub-sections, the evolution resulting from the Agenda 
2000 exercise was fourfold. It first had an impact on the Structural Funds which were 
modified to improve their efficiency. Secondly, the Cohesion Fund was similarly modified. 
Thirdly, Agenda 2000, by reaffirming the importance of regional assistance, confirmed the 
fundamental significance of the overall financial resources at the disposal of EU regional 
policy in terms the attainment of economic development objectives. Finally, Agenda 2000 has 
paved the way for the accession of the Central and Eastern European states. 
Improving the effectiveness of the Structural Funds 
Three main reforms were undertaken to render Structural Funds more efficient. Firstly, 
the Funds were increasingly targeted on the areas where they were most needed. Secondly, 
the significance of the existing principle of partnership was reinforced and broadened. Finally, 
improved financial supervision was set in train. 
A higher concentration 
To further increase the concentration of EU assistance to the needy regions, two 
actions were implemented. Firstly, a decision was taken to reduce the number of priority 
Objectives to three. 
Objective 1 was set the task of promoting the development and structural adjustment 
of regions whose development was lagging behind (where GDP per capita fell below 75% of 
the European Union average). Objective 1 also included the most remote regions, and the 
former Objective 6 regions. As in the previous years, two thirds of the Structural Funds were 
directed to this Objective, covering about 20% of the EU population. The Funds could 
contribute from 50% to 75% of eligible project costs, with exceptions for cohesion countries 
and remote regions which were respectively entitled to a maximum grant contribution of 80% 
and 85%. 
Objective 2 was set the task of contributing to the economic and social conversion of 
regions in structural difficulties other than those eligible for the new Objective 1. It included 
the regions which were formerly part of Objectives 2 and 5(b) and other areas facing the need 
for economic diversification. Some 18% of the EU population lives in these regions. The 
contribution of the Funds could amount to between 25% and 50% of the total project cost. 
Objective 3 was concerned with assisting human resource development outside the 
regions eligible for Objective 1. This comprised the former Objectives 3 and 4 regions. As for 
Objective 2, the contribution of the Funds could represent between 25% and 50% of eligible 
costs. 
Specific arrangements were put in place for regions which formerly benefited from a 
classification as Objectives 1, 2 and 5b, and were no longer eligible for Objective 1 or 2 
status.  
The second decision adopted to further increase the concentration dealt with the 
reduction of the number of Community Initiatives. Indeed, some authors, such as Bachtler and 
Michie, and Martin and Pearce, argued in the mid 1990s that, although “[Community 
Initiatives] have generated considerable interest, it has been suggested that they are too 
numerous and too small to have any significant impact on regional convergence”280. 
Consequently, the number of Community Initiatives was reduced from thirteen to four: 
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- INTERREG - to stimulate cross-border, transnational and inter-regional cooperation;  
- LEADER - to promote rural development through the initiatives of local action 
groups;  
- EQUAL - for the development of new ways of combating all forms of discrimination 
and inequality as regards access to the labour market;  
- URBAN - to encourage the economic and social regeneration of towns, cities and 
suburbs in crisis.  
 
Broadening the partnership 
Historically, EU regional policy measures had favoured the development of 
partnership between national, regional and local authorities. It was decided within the 
framework of the Agenda 2000 to pursue this notion of partnership and hence to reinforce the 
role of those agencies involved at the local level by giving them more say in the process 
through a greater degree of decentralisation in decision-making. Moreover, the type of 
eligible partners was modified to include social partners and environmental authorities. 
Improving the financial supervision 
Although the notion of additionality has traditionally been one of the core concepts of 
EU Structural Funds, there had been many cases of ‘financial irregularity’ uncovered during 
the earlier operational phases of EU regional policy. Consequently, it was decided that each 
programme should be more thoroughly evaluated ex ante, mid-term and before the end of the 
project in order to verify its bona fides, its functioning from an audit perspective and that the 
principle of additionality was being respected in practice on the ground.  
A performance reserve was also provided for. This was to be allocated to regions half-
way through the programme but only if the mid-term evaluation provided good evidence of 
successful performance against targets.  
Modifications of the Cohesion Fund 
The Cohesion Fund was maintained since its task of further economic and social 
cohesion was still in train. This fund continued to focus on infrastructure and environmental 
projects. 
The eligibility criteria for applicants were maintained, albeit slightly amended. It was 
proposed that, after a 2003 mid-term evaluation, the resources allocated to the Cohesion Fund 
would be reduced in line with GNP per capita improvements measured across eligible 
member states. Where member states did not have a GNP per capita less than 90% of the EU 
average they would see reductions in their Cohesion Fund allocations. 
Maintaining the financial significance of the funds 
In line with Agenda 2000, the Commission considered that one of the challenges for 
the 2000-2006 period was “to honour priorities while enjoying only very modest increases in 
budget income until 2006”281. The Structural Funds and the Cohesion Funds were to be 
allocated 213 billion Euros during this period.  
Out of this sum, 18 billion Euros were to be directed to the Cohesion Fund. The March 
1999 European Council of Berlin indicated that most of this Cohesion Fund (between 61% 
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and 63.5%), should be directed to Spain. Portugal and Greece were each entitled to between 
16% and 18%, while Ireland was only allocated between 2% and 6% of the Cohesion Fund. It 
is worth noting that, whereas the system of quotas and ranges was abandoned for the ERDF in 
the mid-1980s, these still apply to the Cohesion Funds. 
Structural Funds, including transitional assistance, Community Initiatives and 
Innovative Actions, had the lion’s share of resources (some 195 billion Euros). The resources 
were distributed as follows (see Table 7.2): 
Table 7.2. Distribution of the structural assistance (2000-2006)282 
 Total 
(billion Euros) Share (%)
Objective 1+ 135.9 69.70
Objective 2~ 22.5 11.50
Objective 3 24.1 12.30
FIFG (outside Objective 1) 1.1 0.50
Community Initiatives 10.4 5.35
Innovative actions and 
technical assistance 
1.3 0.65
Total Structural Funds 195.3 100.00
Cohesion Fund 18.0
Total 213.3
+ out of which 8.4 billion were for transitional support to former Objective 1 regions; 
~ out of which 2.7 billion were for transitional support to former Objective 2 and 5b regions 
 
Planning for the future enlargements 
Within the next decade the EU will be enlarged to include some of the central and 
eastern European countries which have already started accession negotiations. Negotiations 
were begun in March 1998 for the enlargement of the EU to a first wave of six countries, that 
is Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. This enlargement is 
likely to be followed by a second wave of five countries including Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia. Malta and Turkey have also applied for membership. 
These countries have on average lower levels of development than that of the present 
EU members. For example, their GDP per capita is on average less than half that of the EU 
average. Consequently these new member states will have a great impact on EU development 
fund resources and will affect the definition of the EU averages and thus the eligibility criteria 
for accessing EU Funds. Given the prospect of these future accessions to the EU, the 
Commission has made provision for some additional financial assistance to help applicant 
member states to catch up with the levels of development present in the EU. The value of this 
aid was doubled after the European Council of Berlin of the 24th and 25th of March 1999. 
During the 2000-2006 period the pre-accession assistance to applicant countries will amount 
to 3120 million Euros per year.  
Moreover, at the Berlin Council, two specific instruments were created. These are 
namely the pre-accession structural instrument (ISPA) and the pre-accession agricultural 
instrument (SAPARD). They have respective budgets of 1040 million Euros and 520 million 
Euros per annum from 2000. The IPSA is intended to finance infrastructure investments in 
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environment and transport. The SAPARD aims to improve agricultural conversion structures, 
marketing channels and food quality control. 
In addition to these two new instruments, the PHARE programme remains in force. 
Since 1989 PHARE has aimed to prepare applicant countries for accession by focusing on 
two priorities. The first priority concerns the strengthening of the administrative and 
institutional capacity of applicant countries. The second priority is to finance investment 
projects. These two priorities respectively account for 30% and 70% of total PHARE 
expenditure. From 2000 onward, PHARE has been allocated a budget of 1,560 million Euros 
per annum. 
Finally, applicant countries can participate in Community programmes. Indeed, these 
programmes, covering as they do a wide range of European policies, give new EU member 
states the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the design and delivery of EU policies. A 
particular emphasis has been put on their participation in programmes which support 
cooperation and exchange across borders among citizens and businesses. EU programmes 
such as SOCRATES and LEONARDO in the fields of education and vocational training are 
good examples of these. 
ASSESSING THE EU REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDS  
In spite of the considerable number of projects financed by EU regional development 
funds and of the considerable support they have received from experts and academics, most 
authors have discussed the weaknesses of these funds and of their principles. It is important to 
conclude this chapter on EU regional development funds by discussing these criticisms, to 
highlight their weaknesses so these might serve as lessons for Mercosur. 
Whereas the first sub-section is dedicated to criticisms formulated against the EU 
regional policy in general, the second sub-section is focused on assessing the principal 
principles on which the EU regional development funds are based. Indeed, as argued above in 
Chapter 6, Mercosur should mostly inspire itself from these principles when designing its 
common approach to regional development. 
Before this discussion starts, attention should be drawn to a comment made by 
Kearney on the difficulty of evaluating the impact of EU regional policy:  
“The complexity of the subject matter and the limitations of the existing level of relevant 
information combine to make it impossible to draw definitive conclusions on many points of 
detail. In these circumstances, there is, naturally, a variety of interpretations of these lessons 
learned from this particular experience”283. 
Discussing the EU regional policy  
Two series of criticisms are formulated against EU regional policy. A first series is 
related to its inherent characteristics, namely its objectives, its complexity and its perception 
of development; the second series is related to its implementation, namely that it does not 
sufficiently reduce disparities, does not have a regional impact, might lead to economic 
diversion, and is difficult to evaluate.  
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The EU regional policy has over-ambitious objectives  
Many authors argue that the EU does not give itself the means of its ambitions. On the 
one hand the EU regional policy has been assigned an ambitious objective, namely to reduce 
regional disparities across the EU territory. On the other hand, very few resources, when 
compared to the total GDP of the member states, are dedicated to achieve this objective.  
Therefore, considering the importance of the EU structural funds objectives, the size 
of the territory covered, and the limited resources at their disposal, these funds cannot be 
expected to solve all regional problems by themselves. This view is shared by Bachtler and 
Turok, as well as by Martin and Pearce: 
“It is unrealistic for the EU to meet the objectives of economic convergence or social 
solidarity. The form and scale of regional disparities across the EU are attributable to an 
enormous range of social, economic, political, geographical and cultural factors and forces, 
some of which have defied the efforts of national governments and are beyond the present 
resources or instruments of the EU”284. 
“Given the scale of problems facing disadvantaged regions even recent increases in the level of 
Structural Funds cannot realistically be expected to make more than a marginal contribution to 
strengthening regional economies and therefore the achievement of economic convergence 
within the Union”285. 
Therefore, when considering the establishment of a common approach to regional 
development in Mercosur, it is advisable for Mercosur to design objectives which are 
realistically achievable with the mechanisms created. 
The EU regional policy is too complex 
Most authors agree on the fact that the present EU regional policy is too complex, 
overly bureaucratic and administrative, which renders it difficult to implement. Echoing these 
concerns, Bachtler et al consider that “the current EU regional policy model is a complex one 
[…] Regional policy represents one of the most complex areas of government policy-making 
in terms of definition, policy design and implementation”286.  
Some authors such as Vanhove, or Bachtler and Turok, have even argued in favour of 
having only one Structural Fund competent for all the areas of development since they 
considered, prior to the 2000-6 reforms, that  
“There are too many Funds and objectives with different institutional arrangements. Structural 
policy resources are allocated via five main funding sources, administered by four different 
Directorates General, to four geographic objectives (1, 2, 5b, and 6) and three horizontal 
objectives (3, 4 and 5a), producing a complicated matrix of expenditure allocation”287. 
It can be assumed that, in any case, Mercosur would not adopt an overly complex 
structure to finance regional development. Indeed, its member states will probably in a first 
stage design a common approach with limited competences and resources, thus limiting the 
risks of creating complex structures and mechanisms. 
                                                
284 Bachtler John, Turok Ivan, The coherence of EU regional policy: contrasting perspectives on the structural 
funds, Regional Policy and Development Series n°17, 1997, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, Gateshead, pp.355. 
285 Martin Steve, Pearce Graham, Economic convergence or crisis management: European regional assistance in 
the UK, paper presented to the Regional Studies Association Conference, May 1995, Regional Studies 
Association, Sweden, p.17. 
286 Bachtler John, Downes Ruth, McMaster Irene, Raines Philip, Taylor Sandra, The transfer of EU regional 
policy to the countries of central and eastern Europe: can one size fit all?, Future Governance Paper 10, Lessons 
from Comparative Public Policy, January 2002, University of Strathclyde, Strathclyde, pp.1-3. 
287 Bachtler John, Turok Ivan, The coherence of EU regional policy: contrasting perspectives on the structural 
funds, Regional Policy and Development Series n°17, 1997, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, Gateshead, p.357. 
 220
The EU regional policy has a limited perception of development  
Although the European Commission sometimes refers to unemployment rates, when 
dealing with regional development it mostly considers GDP per capita. Indeed, the relative 
levels of development of the regions and member states are determined according to GDP per 
capita. When defining Objective 1 regions the Commission refers to GDP per capita. 
Likewise, the Commission analyses the evolution of the disparities in GDP per capita to 
conclude that regions are converging.  
As argued earlier in Chapter 4, although GDP per capita is the most commonly used 
indicator to define development, it is extremely limited. This view is shared by Scott who 
points out that events contributing to economic growth might not lead to development: 
“GDP is not sufficiently sensitive to distinguish between the purchase of manufacture of arms 
and the purchase of medicine. The privatisation of essential public services, transport, energy 
or water, and the sale of national assets, art or countryside, contribute positively to GDP but 
tend to undermine access to various basic social or cultural entitlements. GDP measures 
monetary transactions within an economy with no concern as to the social and human or 
environmental context of these”288. 
Such arguments lead her to consider that:  
“it is through its reliance on per capita GDP that the Community most vividly reveals the 
narrowness of its vision of development. Not only does this imply a conception of development 
which is inherently quantifiable and one which is concerned with generalised rather than 
individual acquisition of wealth but also it implies that development is a relative concept, 
shifting continuously in the light of the position of the point of comparison, in this instance the 
other regions of the Community”289. 
 It can therefore be argued that the Commission could and should consider other 
indicators to characterise regional development. This would give a more complete view of the 
levels of development of its regions. This is why Chapter 4 considers twelve different 
statistical indicators, and not just GDP per capita, to highlight the importance of regional 
disparities in Mercosur. Not using GDP per capita as the unique indicator of development is 
certainly something Mercosur needs to consider. 
The EU regional policy does not sufficiently reduce disparities  
When discussing the implementation of the EU regional policy, there are various 
views in the literature on its impact on regional disparities, some authors considering that this 
impact is insufficient or even non-existent. This comment is part of the wider theoretical 
debate on convergence and divergence290. However, the issue of regional convergence is not a 
‘black and white’ picture, but one composed of numerous shades of grey. Indeed, whereas 
some data support convergence, others build a case for divergence. Moreover, similar data 
can be interpreted through different methods and gives entirely different results. Therefore, 
there is a wide range of different interpretations. 
Some authors recognise that there are still significant regional disparities within the 
EU, but that these have been greatly reduced due to EU regional policy. Obviously, the 
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principal defender of this thesis is the European Commission itself. For example, the 
Commission considers that, between 1986 and 1996,  
“GDP per head in the 10 regions where this was lowest increased from 41% of the EU average 
to 50% […] GDP per head in the four Cohesion countries went up from 65% of the EU 
average to 76½% […] This is an unusually rapid pace of convergence, both from an historical 
and international perspective”291. 
 Likewise, the 2001 Commission report on economic and social cohesion states:  
“In the EU today, disparities in income (GDP) per head between member states and, more 
particularly, between regions, remain considerable. The average income per head of the 10% of 
population living in the most prosperous regions is, for example, 2.6 times greater than the 
bottom 10%.  The disparities, however, have narrowed over time. In the three least prosperous 
member states (Greece, Spain and Portugal), average income per head has risen from 68% of 
the EU average in 1988 to 79% in 1999, a reduction of a third in the initial gap”292.  
 Other authors are less positive when analysing the impact of EU regional policy on 
regional disparities. For example, Armstrong and De Kervenoael argue that convergence has 
taken place, but at a slower rate than what had been expected: 
“Most studies suggest that the EU regional GDP per capita disparities have narrowed over time 
(at least since 1950) in the EU. […] The evidence for historical convergence within the EU is 
powerful but not yet overwhelming. […] The rate of regional convergence is very slow. All 
studies are agreed that even in the decades prior to the mid-1970s the rate at which 
convergence has taken place among EU regions has been extremely sluggish. […] The 
sustained convergence witnessed in the 1950s and 1960s in the EU gave way quite quickly to a 
much more confused situation in the late 1970s and 1980s”293. 
 A few authors consider that, although some data support a pattern of convergence,  
some EU regions are diverging. In 1995, Bachtler wrote: “Looking back over the past decade, 
there have been some notable improvements in the differences between EU regions […] But 
the major income disparities between the richest and poorest regions remain extremely wide – 
and are widening”294. This view was also shared in 1995 by Martin and Pearce:  
“It seems clear that the available evidence does point to some convergence between regions 
near the economic centre of the Community […] After a period of economic stagnation, during 
which the prosperity of the regions diverged, economic growth resumed in the Community 
during the late 1980s, leading to a slight reduction in regional disparities. But, following the 
deep recession of the early 1990s, divergence appears to have reasserted itself”295. 
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 Finally, some authors, such as O’Donnel, consider that EU regional policy, in its 
present form, cannot lead to convergence:   
“the Structural Funds as currently constituted will not be sufficient to create convergence let 
alone establish equality in regional economic structures and income. It is important to note that 
this conclusion does not arise only because of the size of the Funds. It reflects also two other 
substantive problems confronting regional policy – first, the limited effectiveness of traditional 
regional policy and, second, our limited knowledge of the determinants of regional 
development”296. 
In spite of these diverging views on the impact of EU regional policy on convergence, 
O’Donnel notes that “we cannot infer from the absence of economic convergence that the 
Community’s structural policies have failed altogether to influence the regional pattern of 
economic activity or income”297. 
The EU regional policy does not have a regional impact 
Another possible criticism which could be formulated against the EU regional policy 
is that some of its instruments have lost their ‘soul’; that they have lost their ‘regional’ 
dimension. For example, Evans considered that the European Social fund encourages national 
rather than regional development298. Similarly, according to Heinelt and Smith, “parts of 
European structural policy can easily be interpreted as hidden agricultural policy or as sectoral 
industrial policy”299. 
As suggested, in the case of prospective policy transfers, it is necessary to consider the 
objectives of policies. When designing Mercosur’s common approach to regional 
development, policy makers should not lose sight that its objective is not development as 
such, but regional development. 
The EU regional policy might lead to economic diversion 
A further criticism of EU policy is that it would lead to economic diversion. Analysing 
regional policy in general, Temple adapts the economic concept of Pareto’s optimum to 
welfare. This leads her to consider that  
“general welfare can only be improved in circumstances where it is possible to make one 
person, or group of people, better off without making another person, or group of people, 
worse off. Much regional policy fails to satisfy this criterion. If an organisation relocates from 
London to Newcastle, the North East region of England is presumably better off but the South 
East is likely to be worse off”300. 
 Developing this idea, EU regional policy could in some cases lead to a transfer of 
economic activities from prosperous regions to priority regions, and not to the creation of new 
activities in priority regions. Referring back to Viner, it seems possible to adapt his concept to 
the present case to conclude that, sometimes, EU regional policy does not achieve ‘economic 
creation’ but ‘economic diversion’301.  
                                                
296 O’Donnel Rory, ‘Policy requirements for regional balance in economic and monetary union’, in Hannequart 
Achille, Economic and social cohesion in Europe: a new objective for integration, 1992, Routledge, London, 
p.37. 
297 O’Donnel Rory, ‘Policy requirements for regional balance in economic and monetary union’, in Hannequart 
Achille, Economic and social cohesion in Europe: a new objective for integration, 1992, Routledge, London, 
p.34. 
298 Evans Andrew, The EU structural funds, 1999, Oxford University Press, New York, p.171. 
299 Heinelt Hubert, Smith Randall, Policy networks and European structural funds, 1996, Avebury, Hants, p.66. 
300 Temple Marion, Regional Economics, 1994, St Martin's Press, New York, p.277. 
301 As discussed above in Chapter 2, Viner developed the concepts of ‘trade diversion’ and ‘trade creation’ in: 
Viner J., The customs union issue, 1950, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York.  
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 This discussion should be kept in mind when policy makers design the Mercosur 
common approach to regional development. Indeed, its objective would obviously be to assist 
regional development not by diverting economic activity from prosperous regions to 
relatively less developed regions, but to create new economic activity in these latter regions. 
The EU regional policy is difficult to evaluate 
A final commentary which is often encountered in the existing literature is that it is 
difficult to evaluate the impact of the EU regional policy, and therefore to determine whether 
it has been successful or not. Generally, authors consider that there is a lack of precise data to 
determine the impact of the EU regional policy. Another reason explaining this difficulty is 
that there is no consensus on the methodology to use to undertake evaluation.  
These two arguments are for example formulated by Bachtler and Turok who consider 
that “the quantitative impact of the Structural Funds is hard to determine because of serious 
methodological and data obstacles to evaluation and the wide range of economic and social 
agencies involved in co-financing and delivering programmes”302. 
A third argument accounting for the difficulty of evaluating the impact of EU regional 
policy is that numerous other factors, such as political, economic or environmental factors, 
might also have an influence on regional development and disparities. It is therefore highly 
problematic, not to say impossible, to determine the exact share of the impact of each factor 
on a region’s economic evolution: “regional policy has not been the only force affecting the 
‘trajectory’ of regions in economic space […] A major problem afflicting the evaluation 
process is, therefore, the identification of changes which can be attributed with certainty to the 
implementation of regional policy”303. 
 It is very likely that the same difficulties of evaluation will be encountered by a 
Mercosur common approach to regional development. However, Mercosur can certainly learn 
from the EU’s mechanisms and their weaknesses when designing its own evaluation 
procedures. 
Assessing the principles underlying the EU regional development funds 
Whatever their opinion on EU regional policy, most authors support on principle the 
EU regional development funds’ underlying principles. However, this does not mean that 
these principles are not criticised nor that they cannot be improved. For example, Kearney 
considers that, “even if definitive quantified evidence of their value is not easily produced, it 
is clear that the principles of the reform of the Structural Funds have served a useful purpose 
in the past and are likely to continue to be used, with some modifications, in the future”304. 
Since the analysis of policy transfers between the EU and Mercosur undertaken in 
Chapter 6 led to the conclusion that these EU principles could successfully be transferred to 
Mercosur, it is now necessary to focus on the six fundamental principles which have been at 
the core of the EU regional development experience. These policy principles relate to 1) 
resources; 2) concentration; 3) partnership and subsidiarity; 4) additionality; 5) programming; 
and 6) effectiveness. 
                                                
302 Bachtler John, Turok Ivan, The coherence of EU regional policy: contrasting perspectives on the structural 
funds, Regional Policy and Development Series n°17, 1997, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, Gateshead, p.350. 
303 Pinder David, Regional economic development and policy, Studies on Contemporary Europe n°5, 1983, 
G.Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, pp.89-90. 
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John, Turok Ivan, The coherence of EU regional policy: contrasting perspectives on the structural funds, 
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Resources  
The size of the financial resources made available by member states for EU regional 
development policy have always been an issue for debate since policy implementation is 
limited by financial constraints. As early as 1977, the MacDougall report on the role of public 
finance in European integration argued “that the ERDF and ESF would need to be increased 
tenfold if they were to have any noticeable impact”305.  
Nearly twenty years later, Amin and Tomaney confirm that one of the limits of EU 
regional policy was that, “despite the changes in the operation and the doubling of the size of 
the Structural Funds, the measures and financial resources involved remain insufficient in 
relation to the scale and nature of the EU’s entrenched regional problems and the threats 
posed by further integration”306. Likewise, Martin and Pearce argue that “given the scale of 
problems facing the disadvantaged regions even recent increases in the level of Structural 
Funds cannot realistically be expected to make more than a marginal contribution to 
strengthening regional economies and therefore the achievement of economic convergence 
within the Union”307. 
At the time of writing, in 2002, it can be argued that these comments remain valid, 
especially at the eve of the enlargement of the EU to include ten new members from Central 
and Eastern Europe which all face relatively low levels of development compared to the 
current EU average. 
Although financial support from the EU to regional development has constantly been 
augmented over the past two decades (see Table 7.3 below), increasing its share of the EU 
budget, these resources still account for an insignificant share of the total GDP of the EU 
fifteen member states. As stated in the 2001 EU Second report on economic and social 
cohesion, finance made available through the Funds accounted for 0.46% of the EU GDP in 
1999308.  
                                                
305 Quoted in Gibney John, Decision-making in the regional policy of the European Economic Community: 
towards an organisational interpretation of the ERDF, 1986, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, p.224. 
306 Amin Ash, Tomaney John, Behind the Myth of European Union: Prospects for cohesion, 1995, Routledge, 
London, p.20. 
307 Martin Steve, Pearce Graham, Economic convergence or crisis management: European regional assistance in 
the UK, paper presented to the Regional Studies Association Conference, May 1995, Regional Studies 
Association, Sweden, p.17. 
308 European Commission, Second report on economic and social cohesion, 2001, European Commission, 
Brussels. Downloaded from internet in 2001. 
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Table 7.3. Twenty years of financing regional development in the EU (1987-2006)309 
 1987 1988 1989-93 1994-1999 2000-2006 
 Total Total Total % of SF Total % of SF Total % of SF 
Objective 1   36,200 53.0 93,429 61.7 135,900 69.7 
Objective 2  6,698 9.8 15,064 9.9 22,500 11.5 
Objective 3  12,896 8.5 24,100 12.3 
Objective 4  7,200* 10.5* 2,285 1.5  
Objective 5a  3,300 4.8 6,311 4.2  
Objective 5b  2,607 3.8 6,934 4.6  
Objective 6   712 0.5  
CI  10,657 15.6 13,773 9.1 10,400 5.4 
Others  1,700 2.5 2,400 1.2 
Total SF  68,362 100.0 151,402 100.0 195,300 100.0 
Cohesion Fund   16,750 18,000  
Pre-accession aid   21,840  
TOTAL 7,200 7,700 68,362 168,152 235,140  
SF stands for Structural Funds, CI for Community Initiatives 
Figures in million Euros, in 1988 prices for 1987-93, 1997 prices for 1994-99, and 1999 prices for 2000-06. 
* Value for Objectives 3 and 4. 
 
However, some authors highlight the fact that these increasing financial resources are 
not a sufficient factor to guarantee regional development. O’Donnel therefore considers that 
“Until more effective regional development plans are designed, further increases in the 
volume of the Structural Funds would be of definite but limited value”310. Martin and Pearce 
also consider that “despite the large sums involved, therefore, it will take many years for the 
Structural Funds and Community Initiatives to have a sufficiently positive impact to secure 
sustainable growth in the poorer regions”311. 
Thus, in the EU case there is a good argument that a lack of resources has seriously 
constrained the efficacy of the regional development policy. This partly explains its mixed 
success over the past few decades. The availability of financial resources are therefore a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition to have a significant impact on regional disparities. 
An important early lesson for Mercosur is that, whichever approach these countries 
adopt in order to reduce their internal regional disparities, they clearly will need to endow 
policy with sufficient financial resources to achieve objectives. In the Mercosur case there are 
two aspects to consider. On the one hand, the scale of regional disparities implies that the 
financial effort that Mercosur countries would have to accommodate will need to be 
significant. On the other hand, this needs to be balanced with the reality of Mercosur, which is 
that Mercosur is composed of developing economies having little resources to spare.  
                                                
309 Sources: Valenciano Eugenio O., Disparidades regionales e integración económica, 1992, BID/INTAL, 
Buenos Aires, p.21. 
EU Commission, Agenda 2000, downloaded in December 2001 from www.europa.eu.int. 
EU Commission, Structural Funds 1997: annual report, downloaded in December 2001 from www.europa.eu.int.  
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p.38. 
311 Martin Steve, Pearce Graham, Economic convergence or crisis management: European regional assistance in 
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Concentration 
Following the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds, the principle of concentration 
became a key aspect of EU regional development policies. Subsequent reforms reaffirmed the 
significance of this principle and aimed to increase the degree of concentration of EU 
financial resources in those regions which were most severely disadvantaged.  
The main reason for giving importance to this principle was that not only was there a 
lack of overall budgetary resources being allocated to regional development policy, but in 
addition monies were being spread very thinly across a broad range of territories. 
This concentration principle was achieved through the definition of priority Objective 
areas. Objective 1 regions were those regions designated as lagging behind, that is to say they 
had a GDP per capita lower than 75% of the EU average, and were thus allocated the larger 
share of the resources. In the current 2000-2006 period, these Objective 1 regions account for 
70% of the Structural Funds. 
During the 1989-1993 and 1994-1999 periods, Objectives 1, 2, 5b and 6 were targeted 
on specific regions312. The other Objectives 3, 4 and 5a, covered the financing of projects 
across the whole of the EU. During the 2000-2006 operational period only Objectives 1 and 2 
are currently directed at specific regions313. 
As shown below by Table 7.4, in spite of this principle of concentration being of key 
importance, throughout the last three operational periods314, the percentage of the EU 
population living in regions eligible for EU regional funds assistance remained high. Between 
40% and 53% of the EU population were living in the Objective areas. Clearly, this is counter 
to the notion of a geographical concentration of resources. 
                                                
312 As a reminder of the fifth section of Chapter 7, between 1989 and 1999 the aims of the Objectives in the EU 
Funds were: 
Objective 1: promoting the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging 
behind.  
Objective 2: converting the regions, frontier regions, or parts of regions, including employment areas and urban 
communities, seriously affected by industrial decline.  
Objective 3: combating long-term unemployment and facilitating entry into working life of young people and of 
people exposed to exclusion from the labour market.  
Objective 4: facilitating the adaptation of workers of either sex to industrial changes and to changes in 
production systems.  
Objective 5a: promoting rural development by speeding up the adjustment of agricultural structures in the 
framework of the reform of the common agricultural policy.  
Objective 5b: promoting rural development by facilitating the development and structural adjustment of rural 
areas.  
Objective 6: development and structural adjustment of regions with an extremely low population density. 
313 As another reminder, for 2000-2006, the number of Objectives was reduced to three (see the sixth section of 
Chapter 7): 
Objective 1: promoting the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging 
behind. 
Objective 2: contributing to the economic and social conversion of regions in structural difficulties other than 
those eligible for the new Objective 1.  
Objective 3: assisting human resource development outside the regions eligible for Objective 1. 
314 These operational periods cover the years 1989-1993, 1994-1999 and 2000-2006. 
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Table 7.4. Percentage of EU population in regions eligible for EU regional assistance315 
 1989 1994 2000
Objective 1&6 21.7 27.3 22.2
Objective 2 16.8 16.4 18.0
Objective 5b 5.0 8.8 N/A
Total 43.5 52.5 40.2
 
This relatively low degree of concentration can be explained by the fact that individual 
member states retained a major say in the definition of eligible territories. For example, 
during the 1994-1999 period, although Objective 1 was in theory restricted to NUTS 2 
regions according to strict technical criteria (GDP per capita), a short list of ‘exceptions’ was 
agreed. Consequently, as noted earlier, a number of regions from the Netherlands (Flevoland), 
the United Kingdom (Merseyside, Highlands, Islands), Belgium (Hainault) and France 
(Hainault) were counted as being Objective 1 regions whereas they would have far more 
appropriately, in purely statistical terms, been characterised as Objective 2 regions. Moreover, 
it should be noted that, apart for Objective 1 regions, there is a lack of clear criteria to 
categorise EU regions in the different Objectives. This leaves more room for interpretation 
and political influence to render eligible regions which otherwise would not have access to the 
Structural Funds.  
It can be argued that there are two main but conflicting trends which exist in relation 
to the concentration of development funds. A first tendency is to consider that resources 
should be as concentrated as far as possible on the regions needing most assistance, so as not 
to spread the resources over too large a territory. The second tendency considers that a larger 
part, if not all, of the population should have access to the assistance of the funds since even 
within prosperous regions there can be severely deprived localities.  
In the end, since the configuration of policy depends on decision-makers, who are 
democratically elected, there is a tendency not to choose the ‘concentration’ option, so that as 
many of the electorate as possible can have access to EU funding to improve their social, 
economic and infrastructural environment. The decision-makers are also often influenced by 
the lobbying done by regions which defend their interests. No doubt this can influence the 
level of support for national governments and EU institutions. In other words, concentration 
can be seen as a purely technical and technocratic solution to the resource problem, but 
regional development policy has a direct political fallout. 
Given the eventuality of a common Mercosur approach to regional development, the 
issue of the concentration of resources is something which will have to be considered. The 
idea of concentration can be especially useful since Mercosur regional disparities are much 
more marked than those of the EU, as shown in Chapter 4, and the resources available to 
Mercosur are much less than those of the EU. Scattering the little resources Mercosur has at 
its disposal across a vast territory might not prove to be efficient. However, since even those 
relatively well developed Mercosur sub-regions are currently facing economic problems, 
certainly compared to European criteria, achieving a workable balance between an overly 
concentrated approach and thinly spread resources will be a real challenge. 
                                                
315 Source: EU Commission, Agenda 2000, downloaded in December 2001 from www.europa.eu.int.  
And Martin Reiner, Regional policy in the European Union, Centre for European Policy Studies, England, p.87. 
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Partnership and subsidiarity 
The principle of partnership, established during the 1988 reform and reinforced during 
the 2000 reform, was initially defined as “close consultation between the Commission, the 
member states concerned and the competent authorities designated by the latter at national, 
regional, local or other level, with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a common 
goal”316. This principle implies that regional development policy needs to be underpinned by 
partnerships at three levels.  
Firstly, the European Commission acknowledged in the 1988 reform of the Structural 
Funds that there was a need to improve upon the degree of coordination between the various 
EU financial instruments impacting on the regions. This was confirmed during the 1993 
reform which required that the Commission ensured coordination and consistency between 
the Funds and assistance from the other financial instruments317. In some ways, this can be 
considered to be a form of partnership between previously disparate financial instruments at 
the strategic policy level.  
Secondly, at a more operational level, EU funds’ administrators were charged with 
setting in place multi-agency partnerships between different levels of authority, at European, 
national, regional and local level.  
A third type of partnership was to be implemented, following the recommendations of 
Agenda 2000, to include in the regional development management process social partners 
such as trade unions, voluntary bodies, and environmental authorities. However, this has not 
been implemented yet at the time of writing. 
A criticism often formulated against partnership is that, even after the latest reforms, it 
is still national governments who designate the ‘appropriate partners’. This can in practice 
lead to the exclusion of some partners. For example, in the early 1990s the UK was often 
criticised by the European Commission and other EU member states for not including trade 
unions within the partnership agreements. 
According to Hooghe, partnership is “a very ambitious goal, given that these uniform 
procedures were expected to work equally well in twelve different political systems, having 
diverse territorial relations and regional policy traditions, in some cases with extremely weak 
subnational authorities”318. “Partnership has allowed the establishment of the European 
identity of the programmes assisted by the Structural Funds while assuring national and 
regional ownership”319. 
 
The principle of partnership goes hand in hand with that of subsidiarity since this latter 
concept implies that the EU Funds should be managed at the most appropriate and efficient 
level of authority, whether local, regional, national, or European.  
Authors such as Bachtler et al highlight the importance of this principle in the EU 
regional policy. “The principle of subsidiarity (ie the allocation of functions to the lowest tier 
                                                
316 Council Regulation [EEC] 2052/88 quoted in Bache Ian, The politics of European Union regional policy: 
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319 Kearney Conor, ‘Development programming, negotiation and evaluation: lessons for the future’, in Bachtler 
John, Turok Ivan, The coherence of EU regional policy: contrasting perspectives on the structural funds, 
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at which they can satisfactorily be achieved) is designed to be central to the way in which 
responsibilities are assigned for the design and delivery of Structural Fund programmes”320. 
The principle of subsidiarity is based on article 3a of the Maastricht Treaty which 
states that the Community shall take action “only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community”. It 
is possible, given this definition, to consider that regional development policies can be 
achieved by member states and that the Commission should therefore not be competent. 
However, as discussed above in Chapter 2, it can also be argued that developing such policies 
at the national level is not sufficient enough to reduce regional disparities and that taking 
action at the Community level would be more efficient. 
 
The coordination of the activities of the various actors, achieved via the principles of 
partnership and subsidiarity, aims to render Structural Funds more effective. It can be argued, 
however, that the desire to involve so many actors in the prioritising of projects, and to 
achieve a consensus between these partners, can result in long delays and bureaucratic 
procedures.  
A positive consequence of the principles of partnership and subsidiarity is that the 
needs, views and aspirations of each agency are taken into account when deciding the priority 
actions of the funds. Bachtler et al consider that partnership ensures “that those most familiar 
with a region have a voice in its development”321. Moreover, the delegation of some 
management procedures for projects to local bodies can streamline procedures, at least in 
theoretical terms. Another positive impact of partnership is that, as noted by Martin and 
Pearce in an UK context, this principle influences local agencies: 
“There is evidence from several parts of the UK that the incentive of EU assistance has 
revitalised local economic strategies and encouraged local agencies to embrace new styles of 
policy making involving intra-regional cooperation, a more pluralist approach, which embraces 
social and economic partners, and the adoption of a more strategic framework for the long-term 
recovery of sub-regional economies”322. 
 
The significance of this principle of partnership is confirmed by the fact that 
international development organisations around the world are increasingly developing their 
actions by taking into account the views of local and national partners. 
As far as Mercosur is concerned, the principle of partnership may prove to be a key to 
the success of a common approach to regional development. Considering the reluctance 
showed by the Mercosur member states to give away some parcels of sovereignty to 
supranational bodies, similar reluctance towards internal regional and local authorities may 
greatly limit the transfer to Mercosur of the principle of subsidiarity. 
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Additionality 
Dating back to the creation of the ERDF in the mid-1970s, the principle of 
additionality aims to ensure that EU resources are used by member states to complement their 
national or regional financial efforts in less developed regions and are not used as a substitute 
for them. 
Consequently, the Funds cannot contribute to the totality of the cost of a development 
project. Depending on the type of project and on the Objective classification of the region 
concerned, the EU can contribute from between 25% and 85% of the project cost. The 
remaining matching funding must come from other sources, whether national, regional, local 
or private. 
Most authors have recognised that additionality is almost impossible to verify, and this 
for two reasons. First, from the outset, additionality has been calculated as “a highly 
aggregate figure in the sense that it does not apply to individual programmes, but to all 
programmes under a single Objective in a given member state”323. Because of this method of 
calculation at the aggregate national level, and according to national Finance Ministry 
protocols, the exact contribution of each state can lack a degree of transparency. One solution 
would be to calculate additionality at the programme level and not at the member state level. 
Second, the European Commission does not have the capacity to determine the levels 
of national expenditures for regional development in the eventuality of the non-existence of 
EU funds. Among other authors, Kearney, and Martin and Pearce highlight this difficulty:  
“Observance of the principle of additionality is notoriously difficult to confirm in practice 
since such confirmation depends on establishing what might have happened if support from the 
Structural Funds had not been available”324. 
“It is virtually impossible for the Commission to determine additionality because it can not be 
sure how much would have been spent in a region in the absence of EU regional policy 
assistance”325. 
The difficulty of calculating additionality has consequences for the assessment of the 
impact of EU funds on regional development. On the one hand, “many of the outcomes 
ascribed to EU assistance may in fact have occurred in the absence of funding ‘from 
Brussels’”326.  
On the other hand, many EU member states have made good use of the difficulty in 
calculating additionality to pay only ‘lip service’ to this principle over the past few decades. 
Member states have therefore used EU resources to cover up for the cost of their regional 
development projects. For example, Bache considers that, “while the reforms of 1979 and 
1984 have failed to convert ERDF from a system of reimbursement to an effective instrument 
of regional policy, they contained the seeds for future policy development as seen in the 1988 
reforms”327. However, even after later reforms, the application of the principle of additionality 
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remained difficult to control. Among the member states which do not fully respect the 
principle of additionality, the UK has often been considered by the European Commission to 
be the member state the least likely to be complying with this principle.  
In 2000 the Court of Auditors published a special report on additionality which 
discussed several issues which needed “to be addressed, such as the absence of penalties for 
non-compliance, methodological weaknesses and organisational difficulties within the 
Commission”328. Although some of these proposals were rejected by member states, more 
stress has been put during the 2000-2006 period on ensuring the effectiveness of this 
additionality principle. For example, all programmes were to be evaluated ex ante, mid-term 
and just before their completion, in order to verify the effective delivery of the programme as 
well as the respect of the principle of additionality. 
There is much that Mercosur can learn from the additionality saga in the EU. Indeed, 
the principle of additionality, when it is genuinely respected, can have at least three direct 
positive consequences. Firstly, Mercosur monies applied additionally enable both the MRDF 
and the development managing agencies to bring on more projects than would otherwise be 
possible since both benefit from the financial support of the other. Furthermore, the 
application of external funding, at least in the emerging economies setting, can bring external 
technical expertise which would otherwise be unavailable or very costly. Thirdly, the 
principle of additionality reinforces the principle of partnership mentioned above since it 
implies a better participation of other partners to finance development projects. This 
contributes to a sense of overall inclusion of the various partners involved in regional 
development. However, a negative aspect likely to be present in Mercosur involves instances 
where indigenous matching funds are lacking or cannot be found. 
Programming 
Programming “allows the integration of different forms of regional support for a 
particular area into an encompassing development plan. The idea is to improve the coherence 
between the individual measures and the co-ordination between the different institutions 
involved at EU, member state and regional level”329. Due to its positive impact on regional 
policy, the share of the EU assistance allocated through programmes, whether of national or 
of EU initiative, has rapidly increased and currently represents most ERDF resources. 
Most of the literature supports this principle of programming since it promotes a 
coherent and coordinated approach to regional development problems through a distinctive 
European regional policy. To quote just a few authors:  
“The Structural Funds have, through successive reforms, become more than pure financial 
assistance provided by the European Commission to support member states regional policies. 
They are now characterised by a distinctive policy approach – generally referred to as 
‘programming’ – and common principles of programme design and implementation to which 
member states are required to adhere”330. 
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“Programming has been useful in both assuring the coherence and complementarity of 
activities assisted by the Structural Funds and developing the abilities of the Commission to 
work effectively with the administrations of the 15 different member states”331. 
“The programming system can be helpful in identifying the real development needs of regions, 
formulating strategies and priorities and as a vehicle for pulling together a wide range of 
partners in a co-operative approach”332. 
According to a Commission official in 1998, “Programming has proven its value. It 
took quite a long learning process but I think everyone agrees that programming is the best 
way to implement the Structural Funds. The current programmes are much better than the 
ones at the beginning, but there is still scope for improvement”333. However, authors such as 
Martin and Pearce are much more critical, especially when analysing the EU Community 
Initiatives, an aspect of EU programming, since they consider that “an assessment of the 
impact of other Community Initiatives might lead to the conclusion that these too provide 
assistance which is largely symbolic and palliative”334. 
The principle of financing regional development through programmes and not projects 
would clearly be a valuable experience to transfer to Mercosur, so as to facilitate a coherent 
and distinctive common Mercosur approach to regional development.  
Effectiveness 
In 1997, before effectiveness was established as a key principle of the EU Structural 
Funds, Kearney wrote that “the effectiveness of the structural policies is determined on three 
distinct levels: 1) the way in which resources are used to deliver the policies through specific 
programmes; 2) the broad nature of the policies themselves; 3) and the overall amount of 
resources allocated to the policies and the broad pattern of the allocation of these resources 
between member states and Objectives”335. 
The literature echoes a considerable number of criticisms about the effectiveness of 
the EU Funds. For example, Bachtler and Taylor argued in 1999 that “the programme 
development process is too complex to be undertaken easily in the time available for it in the 
formal programming calendar”336. 
The European Commission also had some concerns about some of the implementation 
characteristics of the EU funds which were limiting their overall effectiveness. This explains 
why effectiveness officially became in 2000 one of the Structural Funds principles. Agenda 
2000 stated that one of the aims of the reform proposed was “to improve the effectiveness of 
the structural instruments by strengthening concentration through a reduction in both the 
                                                
331 Kearney Conor, ‘Development programming, negotiation and evaluation: lessons for the future’, in Bachtler 
John, Turok Ivan, The coherence of EU regional policy: contrasting perspectives on the structural funds, 
Regional Policy and Development Series n°17, 1997, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, Gateshead, p.319. 
332 Bachtler John, Turok Ivan, The coherence of EU regional policy: contrasting perspectives on the structural 
funds, Regional Policy and Development Series n°17, 1997, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, Gateshead, p.359. 
333 A Commission official in 1998, quoted in Bache Ian, The politics of European Union regional policy: multi-
level governance or flexible gatekeeping?, 2000, Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield, p.128. 
334 Martin Steve, Pearce Graham, Economic convergence or crisis management: European regional assistance in 
the UK, paper presented to the Regional Studies Association Conference, May 1995, Regional Studies 
Association, p.7. 
335 Kearney Conor, ‘Development programming, negotiation and evaluation: lessons for the future’, in Bachtler 
John, Turok Ivan, The coherence of EU regional policy: contrasting perspectives on the structural funds, 
Regional Policy and Development Series n°17, 1997, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, Gateshead, p.320. 
336 Bachtler John, Taylor Sandra, Objective 2: experiences, lessons and policy implications: final report, July 
1999, European Policies Research Centre, Glasgow, p.91. 
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structural policy objectives and the Community Initiatives, by improving management and by 
clarifying the share-out of responsibilities between the various parties involved”337.  
The Commission consequently proposed two main strategies to achieve a better 
effectiveness. The first strategy concerned the simplification of administrative procedures, 
such as promoting the use of the Single Programming Document instead of the Community 
Support Framework, but also streamlined the range of resources available for development 
financing. This strategy went hand in hand with the idea of reducing the number of overall 
Objectives and Community Initiatives in order to increase the concentration of the Funds. The 
second strategy aimed at strengthening evaluation procedures.  
As a ‘carrot’ to drive programme managers to be more efficient in their duties, and 
states to respect the principle of additionality, the Commission established a performance 
reserve – in other words a performance bonus – to be allocated half-way through the 
programming period and only disbursed when and if the programmes were successfully 
implemented.  
Each of these ideas and measures around improved effectiveness can read across to 
any other similar regional initiative. Effectiveness, as a principle, must be a key issue in the 
Mercosur case. 
* 
* * 
The evolution of EU regional development funds, described in this chapter, can in 
some ways be described as a longstanding ‘battle’ between the embryonic supranational 
institutions which are the European Commission and the European Parliament, and member 
states which have been keen to retain national control of a highly politicised policy area, such 
as regional policy. This struggle for control is the origin of some of the inconsistencies and 
complexities in the evolution of the EU regional development funds. 
However, as exposed in the latter section of the chapter, a number of key guiding 
principles have been present throughout this period. The application of these EU Structural 
Funds principles “should result in measures with specific, concentrated objectives being 
combined and implemented through coherent, multi-annual programmes which are negotiated 
and implemented in partnership and clearly additional to pre-existing efforts”338. These 
principles are those which, according to the framework developed in Chapter 6, could 
successfully be transferred to a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. 
Chapter 7 built on the framework developed in Chapter 6 to confirm the second 
hypothesis on which the research is based, which is that “it is possible to design a prospective 
policy transfer framework to determine what lessons and under what circumstances Mercosur 
could learn from the extensive experience of the EU in regional development funds to design 
its own common approach”. 
It is now possible for the thesis to draw together the conclusions of the preceding 
chapters to move on to the fourth part to discuss the priorities and characteristics of the 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund. 
                                                
337 EU Commission, Agenda 2000, downloaded from the EU website in December 2001: www.europa.eu.int. 
338 Kearney Conor, ‘Development programming, negotiation and evaluation: lessons for the future’, in Bachtler 
John, Turok Ivan, The coherence of EU regional policy: contrasting perspectives on the structural funds, 
Regional Policy and Development Series n°17, 1997, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, Gateshead, p.309. 
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Chapter 5 argued that the creation of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund was the 
most appropriate mechanism to deal with regional disparities. Since Chapters 6 and 7 led to 
the conclusion that the Mercosur should take inspiration from the EU principle of 
concentration of development funds on the areas which need most assistance, it is important 
to determine what objectives should be assigned to the MRDF so it is most efficient in 
reducing the regional development gap. Indeed, financial and human factors mean that it is 
not possible to tackle all the aspects of development at the same time.  
Chapter 8  therefore analyses the different priorities which could be selected for the 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund. This chapter is based on the parallel study of two sets 
of information. Firstly there are the conclusions of Chapter 4, which led to the drawing of a 
map of development of Mercosur, and which highlighted the significant disparities of 
development between Mercosur regions. Secondly, there are the responses of Mercosur 
decision-makers interviewed during the fieldtrip phase of the thesis339. The interviewees were 
asked open-ended questions in relation to the priorities for a MRDF, and were not limited by 
a multiple-choice set of possibilities. Although this method renders the analysis of the results 
more difficult and less statistically rigorous, since answers have to be interpreted and 
classified into categories which can then be compared and analysed, it gives more freedom to 
the interviewee to give original answers and comments which would not have been obtained 
otherwise. 
It is important to combine both analyses since one shows what the situation is and the 
other how it is perceived by decision-makers. This enables, from an objective and subjective 
point of view, the definition of the optimal priorities for a Mercosur Regional Development 
Fund to ensure an efficient instrument in reducing regional development disparities. 
It is suggested that priorities for a Mercosur Regional Development Fund can be 
defined according to two criteria. The assistance provided by the Fund can either be 
concentrated on the sectors needing most assistance or on a few regions; setting, in other 
words, thematic or geographic priorities. Both types of priorities are not exclusive but can be 
combined since the MRDF could be designed to assist one category of sector in one type of 
region. 
While defining the priorities for the MRDF it is necessary to remember the actions 
already undertaken in Mercosur by the existing international and national development 
organisations as outlined in Chapter 5. Indeed, it would be more sensible to design a MRDF 
which would be complementary to the funding mechanisms of these existing institutions and 
which would not compete with them.  
This chapter looks first at thematic priorities, then at the geographic priorities in the 
second section. 
                                                
339 See the second section of Chapter 1 and Appendix 1 for more details on the interviews and the questionnaires. 
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THE THEMATIC PRIORITIES OF THE MRDF 
Given the statistical results of Chapter 4 and the opinion of Mercosur and development 
specialists interviewed, it can be argued that there are four categories of development which 
could be considered as thematic priorities for a MRDF. These categories are infrastructural 
development, economic development, social development and research and technology. This 
last category was not analysed previously in Chapter 4 since regional disparities in this field 
could not be accounted for due to the lack of statistical data (and was not accounted for in 
Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4). 
Before analysing the thematic priorities of a MRDF it is necessary to note that it is 
necessary to be cautious when interpreting the responses of the interviewees, especially 
because of the ambiguous meaning of the term ‘infrastructure’ development. This ambiguity 
has been discussed above in Chapter 4. For example, although most interviewees when opting 
for giving priority to infrastructure development meant transport infrastructure, some might 
have also included in this category social aspects. Likewise, respondents choosing a social 
priority might have implicitly included social infrastructure. This means, as a result, that the 
delimitation between the different priorities is somewhat flexible and blurred, and that the 
results should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
Analysis of statistical indicators and results of the interviews 
This section looks at the results of the statistical analyses, as well as the answers of the 
decision-makers interviewed during the fieldtrips in Mercosur countries, to determine the 
thematic priorities for the MRDF. The results and figures presented in this first sub-section 
are discussed in the three following sub-sections which are each dedicated to possible 
priorities, that is research and technology, infrastructure, and economic and social 
development. 
The analysis of statistical indicators 
The thematic priorities can be derived from the statistical information analysed in 
Chapter 4 by considering the average deviations of each of the three development categories. 
These are infrastructure, economy, and social. As noted above, research and technology was 
not considered since it could not be analysed through available regional development 
indicators. As described in Chapter 4, the higher the average deviation, the more significant 
are the regional disparities within Mercosur.  
In considering the hypothesis that a MRDF should aim to diminish regional 
disparities, it could be argued that the priority for the Fund should be the category of 
development with the highest average deviation. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 4, deviations 
represent the distribution of the regional data vis-à-vis the Mercosur 6 average. The higher 
these deviations are, the more significant is the spread of the data for the indicator selected 
and the larger are the regional disparities. Table 8.1 summarises the average deviations of 
each indicator and development categories, and the rank order from the highest to the lowest 
deviation. 
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Table 8.1. Average deviations per indicator and development category  
  Average Deviation 
per indicator340 
Average Deviation per 
development category 
Development category Indicator Value Rank Value Rank 
PIB/capita 44.7 4Economy Occupation rate 6.0 11 28.0 2 
Roads 110.7 1
Electricity 36.4 5
Water 18.1 7
Sewers 18.0 8
Infrastructure 
Telephone 45.6 3
30.8 1 
Hospital Beds 24.6 6
Doctors 54.1 2
Life expectancy 3.6 12
Students 14.0 9
Social 
Alphabetisation 9.1 10
21.9 3 
 
As Table 8.1 shows, the indicator characterised by the most significant disparities is 
by far the road infrastructure network. Likewise, infrastructure development is the category 
with the highest deviation. The social indicator of life expectancy, as well as the social 
development category as a whole, have both the lowest deviations. These figures are 
discussed further in the three following sub-sections, in which these statistical data are 
combined with the results of the interviews to determine the thematic priorities for the 
MRDF.  
The results of the interviews 
Some 122 persons were interviewed during the fieldtrips (see Introduction and 
Appendix A1). Of these, only seven did not answer the question on the issue of the thematic 
priorities of a MRDF. Among these seven, four did not answer, this due to a lack of time 
since the interviewees ran out of time before this point in the questionnaire was reached. Two 
others did not answer this question because they considered that a MRDF would be useless or 
unrealistic, so this specific issue was not raised. The final person, a Brazilian, considered that 
a MRDF should only have a geographic priority, made up of transnational projects, and that 
no thematic priority of any kind should be considered. 
However, since interviewees could propose more than one priority for the MRDF, 
there are a total of 195 responses to the question. The responses can in the first place be 
analysed according to the country of the interviewee to highlight the trends in opinions which 
exist within each country. These results are detailed in Table 8.2 and illustrated in Figure 8.1. 
Table 8.2. The thematic priorities for the MRDF classified by country of interviewee  
 Total responses Percentage 
 Infrastructure Social Economy R & T Total Infrastructure Social Economy R & T Total
AR 17 9 14 2 42 40.4 21.4 33.3 4.8 100
BR 29 22 15 4 70 41.4 31.4 21.4 5.7 100
PY 19 15 21 2 57 33.3 26.3 36.8 3.5 100
UY 9 9 8 0 26 34.6 34.6 30.8 0.0 100
Total 74 55 58 8 195 37.9 28.2 29.7 4.1 100
 
                                                
340 Data combined from Tables 4.5, 4.8, 4.12, 4.15, 4.18, 4.21, 4.24, 4.28, 4.31, 4.34, 4.36, and 4.39 in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 8.1. The thematic priorities for the MRDF classified by country of interviewee 
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These results highlight the predominance given by the interviewees to infrastructure 
development. This did not apply in Paraguay, where interviewees selected economy by a 
slight margin as the priority for the MRDF, that is 37% for economy and 33% for 
infrastructure. Elsewhere, respondents preferred to give priority to infrastructure. However, in 
Uruguay, the answers of the respondents are equally in favour of priority being given to social 
as well as to infrastructure development. Research and technology accounts for the smallest 
share of the responses of the interviewees in each country.  
Table 8.3 shows the results of interviews analysed by the professional position of the 
interviewee. These results are illustrated in Figure 8.2. To facilitate comparison, the 
interviewees have been classified according to ten different categories based on their 
occupation or the institution for which they work: 
1. Central Banks; 
2. Research Institutes (public or private), Universities (‘Research’ in the following table); 
3. International organisations (e.g. the IDB), development banks (e.g. BNDES), 
ministries of development (‘development’ in the following table); 
4. Economy (ministries of economy, industry, trade, trade unions, trade chambers); 
5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA in the following table); 
6. Infrastructure (e.g. ministries of transportation, energy); 
7. Social (e.g. ministries of education, health); 
8. Representatives (i.e. deputies and senators); 
9. Integration (i.e. ministries of integration); 
10. Others  
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Table 8.3. MRDF thematic priorities according to the profession of interviewees (195 
responses) 
N° of Responses Percentages Ranking 
  
In
fr
as
tru
ct
ur
e 
So
ci
al
 
Ec
on
om
y 
R
 &
 T
 
To
ta
l 
In
fr
as
tru
ct
ur
e 
So
ci
al
 
Ec
on
om
y 
R
 &
 T
 
In
fr
as
tru
ct
ur
e 
So
ci
al
 
Ec
on
om
y 
R
 &
 T
 
Central Banks 6 4 1 1 12 50 33 8 8 1 2 3 3
Research 11 10 6 2 29 38 34 21 7 1 2 3 4
Development 9 3 4 0 16 56 19 25 0 1 3 2 4
Economy 20 13 21 3 57 35 23 37 5 2 3 1 4
MFA 8 4 12 0 24 33 17 50 0 2 3 1 4
Infrastructure 7 3 2 0 12 58 25 17 0 1 2 3 4
Social 1 3 1 1 6 17 50 17 17 2 1 2 2
Representatives 4 6 4 1 15 27 40 27 7 2 1 2 3
Integration 5 7 7 0 19 26 37 37 0 2 1 1 3
Others 3 2 0 0 5 60 40 0 0 1 2 3 3
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Total 74 55 58 8 195 38 28 30 4 1 3 2 4
 
Figure 8.2. MRDF thematic priorities according to the profession of interviewees 
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These results are now further analysed under the three following sub-sections: the first 
related to the issue of a research and technology development priority; the second to giving 
priority to infrastructure development; and the third to economic and social development as a 
priority for a MRDF. 
The issue of a research and technology development priority 
Although research and technology development has not been considered in previous 
chapters, it could however be a priority for a MRDF. This choice for a research and 
technology development priority exists but was expressed during only 8 of the 122 interviews 
carried out (see Table 8.2 above). 
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The reasons for this lack of responses in favour of research and technology as a 
priority might be twofold. Firstly, interviewees might not have considered it as a priority for a 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund. While they might have thought it an important option 
for the development of Mercosur countries, they could have thought it should not be the task 
of such a Fund but the task of national or local institutions. Indeed, it can be argued that the 
impact of such development projects is more national than regional. An example would be the 
discovery of a new medical cure which would be applied throughout a country, as well as 
internationally, this improving the situation of the whole population. It is clear that this is a 
contribution to more than just the development of region. This would therefore exclude such 
projects from the scope of action of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. 
A second reason for the low level of support for research and technology development 
from the interviewees might be that respondents have included this theme of development 
within the three other priority themes. For example, the development of communication 
infrastructure allows the transfer of knowledge and the propagation of technologies. 
Economic development goes hand in hand with the development of technologies and allows 
investment in research. Finally, it is through social projects, such as education, that people 
learn and adapt to using new technologies. This suggests that interviewees might not have 
specified that research and technology should be a priority theme because they de facto 
included it in the other theme(s) they considered as priorities. 
Given this, and given the low number of responses in favour of this priority, it does 
not seem appropriate to suggest that research and technology should be a priority for the 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund. 
Infrastructure development: the preferred priority… but already being addressed 
As Table 8.1 above highlights, infrastructure is the category of development where 
regional disparities are the most significant. It is also the category which receives most 
support from the interviewees (see Tables 8.2 and 8.3). Nevertheless, it should be noted that, 
although it is designated as the priority in these tables, there is only a slim gap separating 
infrastructure development from the second preferred priority. Indeed, the average deviation 
for infrastructure is only 2.8 points higher than that for economy. Likewise, the support from 
interviewees for infrastructure development represents 38% of the responses, while economy 
is the second preferred priority with 30%, that is only 8 points behind infrastructure. 
In addition to the impact infrastructures have on other development categories, such as 
economy and social, interviewees are likely to have favoured this priority because of the 
financial advantage of infrastructure projects. Indeed, since such projects generally provide a 
good return, it could be financially less risky for the MRDF to finance infrastructure projects.  
The choice of this priority for Mercosur might also have been influenced by the recent 
project of South American physical integration341 which might have been in the minds of the 
interviewees when pondering about the priorities for the MRDF. This would have especially 
been the case for Brazilian interviewees since they are the main actor in this project of 
physical integration through axes of development. Out of the twelve axes defined, nine cross 
the Brazilian territory. Moreover the support of the Brazilians for infrastructure is inscribed in 
the continuity of existing policies which for the past few decades have emphasised 
infrastructure development, seeking to physically integrate their vast country. 
Infrastructure development was also supported by most of the Argentinians (see Table 
8.2 and Figure 8.1 above). This choice might be explained by the low level of infrastructure 
development within the country, as the analysis of these indicators highlighted in Chapter 
                                                
341 See Frame 4.1 in Chapter 4. 
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4342. Moreover, over the past decade the Argentinian government has reduced public 
financing of such development projects. For example, the fund for constructing roads was 
abandoned, the development bank privatised, and so on. 
Turning to look at the analysis of the responses according to the occupational category 
of the interviewees, infrastructure is the most frequently selected priority among the ten 
professional categories (see Table 8.3 and Figure 8.2 above). Five categories of interviewees 
ranked it first. These interviewees were those working in central banks; research institutes and 
universities; international organisations or on development issues; infrastructure; and the few 
interviewees who were classified as ‘others’. 
 
However, there are three principal disadvantages to giving priority to infrastructure 
development for a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. These are financial issues, the 
possibility of alternative sources of financing, and the need to break with existing 
development strategies. 
Firstly, from a financial point of view, it should be recognised that infrastructure 
projects are often very expensive, especially when they aim at constructing international 
connections between countries. Since Mercosur countries will have a low level of finance to 
allocate to a Mercosur Regional Development Fund, this Fund most certainly will have 
limited resources at its disposal. Moreover, in the early stages of operation, the Fund will have 
to prove its worth before members augment their contributions. Consequently, a MRDF with 
an infrastructure priority would probably imply that most of the resources allocated to the 
MRDF would be utilised by a very limited number of projects and, thus, in a limited number 
of places, a deterrent to popularity. 
Secondly, contrary to other types of projects, such as social development projects, it is 
relatively easier to finance infrastructure development projects through other means than a 
specific MRDF. Indeed, as past experience proves, it is possible to attract the private sector 
into infrastructure building, especially for intra-national and inter-national projects related to 
transport, whether of energy, of goods or of people. This participation of the private sector 
can be promoted by developing systems such as concessions and fiscal incentives. Moreover, 
states and regions can appeal to international development organisations for financial 
assistance to build infrastructure. Indeed, most of these organisations have more financial 
resources than a Mercosur Regional Development Fund will have at its disposal. In such 
conditions, creating a MRDF with infrastructure development as a priority might not seem 
appropriate. Infrastructure projects can be financed through other means while there is a 
considerable number of projects to be carried out in other fields such as the economic and 
social. 
Thirdly, it can be argued that it would be appropriate, from a common sense 
perspective, to adopt a development strategy different from those which have been 
implemented in Mercosur for the past few decades. As detailed in Chapter 5, most of the 
international, Latin American and national development organisations have been dedicating 
the largest part of their resources to infrastructure development. Indeed, through the existing 
institutions, significant financial resources were, are, and will certainly continue to be directed 
towards infrastructure development, while other development themes, although defined also 
as priorities, are allocated a smaller share of the resources by these institutions. 
In suggesting a different type of development strategy, this is not to argue that such 
schemes were not successful or that they should be abandoned altogether. What is implied is 
                                                
342 See for example the indicators of road network and of electricity consumption. 
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that, given the range and amount of resources available to finance infrastructure development 
projects, it would be more beneficial to design a Fund which would focus on other priorities, 
and to leave the task of infrastructure development to alternative existing organisations. A 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund should be designed to build on the existing 
development institutions and to complement the existing array of development financing tools 
by covering other areas of development. 
The thesis now turns to consider the case for an economic and social priority for a 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund.  
An economic and social development priority for the MRDF 
Five principal arguments can be brought forward to support the argument that a 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund ought to be focused jointly on economic and social 
development priorities. These arguments are the equal support shown by the interviewees for 
both priorities; the relative lack of support these priorities have received from existing 
development institutions; the difficulty such development projects have in attracting financial 
support from the private sector; the direct impact of both types of development projects on 
people; and finally the view that both economic and social development are necessary 
components of a process of regional integration. 
 
Firstly, as shown above by Table 8.2, both categories account for similar support from 
the interviewees. The economic priority accounted for 30% of the responses and the social 
priority for 28%.  
Considered by country, the results show that, whereas interviewees in Argentina and 
Brazil favoured the infrastructure priority, Paraguay is the only country where interviewees 
selected economic development as a priority. This choice is not too surprising considering the 
current (2000-2002) Paraguayan economic situation. Indeed, being a traditionally open 
economy which has survived through a system of triangular trade343, Paraguay is certainly the 
country which has lost most from the integration process and the creation of a free trade area. 
The Uruguayan interviewees have an evenly distributed opinion on the thematic priorities for 
the MRDF at a third to each, excluding research and technology. However, social 
development and infrastructure are equally preferred as a priority, slightly ahead of economy. 
Economic and social development each represent the preferred choices of three of the 
ten professional categories of interviewees (Table 8.3). Indeed, social development was the 
priority selected by the most people working as political representatives, in the social sector, 
or on integration issues. This last group of interviewees working on integration also 
considered that economy should be a primary priority, with an equal number supporting social 
development. Interviewees working in the economy category as well as those in foreign 
affairs also gave priority to economy. 
There is one slight difference between economic and social development which can be 
noticed in the statistical analysis. As shown above in Table 8.1, the respective average 
                                                
343 Triangular trade describes a situation in which a country uses the tariffs of its neighbours to import from a 
first country some goods it directly exports, without any transformation, to another country. The benefit is the 
result of the differences of tariffs. In the case of Paraguay, most of this operation is done illegally: imports are 
under-invoiced and re-exports, mostly to Brazil, are mostly contraband. Most of the goods in this trade consist of 
luxury consumer goods, such as watches, electronics, and computers. In Paraguay, it is called "tourist regime" 
since it is supposed that tourists from Brazil and Argentina come to purchase the goods. But it is well known that 
most of the merchandise is not sold to tourists but to distributors in Brazil and in Argentina, mostly illegally. 
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deviations for economic and social development are 28 and 22, which implies that economic 
disparities are slightly more significant than social disparities.  
As highlighted by the two approaches to thematic priorities, the statistical analysis and 
the responses of the interviewees, economy and social priorities display similar character. 
Indeed, both categories of development are characterised by relatively similar levels of 
disparities and receive relatively similar support from the interviewees. 
 
Secondly, although economic development obtained slightly more support from 
international and national development organisations than social development, both have been 
less well regarded by these institutions which preferred to support infrastructure development. 
Table 5.8 above344 shows that the international and national development institutions looked 
at in Chapter 5 have allocated on average as many resources to infrastructure development as 
to both economic and social development, that is respectively 41%, 22% and 21% of their 
total resources.  
 
The third argument that can be brought forward to support an economic and social 
development priority is that it is difficult for both development themes to attract private sector 
finance. Most social projects offer too low a financial return, if any, to be interesting to 
private companies. For example, the creation of a school, or a health campaign giving 
information on vaccination offer little financial return. Some economic development projects, 
such as the creation of economic growth poles, offer a sufficient return to attract private 
investors. However, other projects such as micro-credits to small and medium-size enterprises 
are financially less attractive and consequently have difficulties in finding support from 
private financial institutions. It therefore seems more appropriate to give priority to such 
economic and social projects which otherwise would not be able to find financial resources. 
 
Fourthly, both economic and social development have a direct impact on the lives of 
the people. Improving the economic environment through a MRDF would provide people 
with better employment opportunities and conditions, which would contribute to raising living 
standards. Likewise, a MRDF which would finance social development would contribute to 
endowing people with better access to social services such as health and education, which 
directly impacts on the quality of life. The consequences of this improvement in living 
conditions might well have an useful political side-effect. Indeed, Mercosur decision-makers 
might be interested in supporting the creation of a MRDF which gives priority to economic 
and social development, with the hope that the subsequent improvement of living conditions 
would bring Mercosur and its governments more electoral support from the people. 
 
Finally, both economic and social development are necessary components of a 
regional process of integration. Economic development is at the heart of any process of 
economic integration such as that of Mercosur. A Mercosur Fund could indeed be employed 
to help fight the economic crises resulting from the process of integration. Moreover, it can be 
noted that since 1999 the four Mercosur member states have gone through a considerable 
economic and financial crisis, which led to political instability in Argentina at the end of 
2001. As already mentioned, the reaction of the member states at this time was to adopt 
individual policies to attempt to overcome the crisis, even if these policies imply a regression 
in the process of integration. An alternative would be for the member states to look for some 
                                                
344 See Chapter 5. 
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common solutions at the Mercosur level which could be financed by the MRDF. In this case, 
the Mercosur Fund could help reduce tensions within Mercosur, tensions which are often 
created by disputes on economic and trading issues. Social development, although 
disregarded by Mercosur for the time being, is also a crucial element of the process of 
integration. This is because Mercosur needs to gain the support of the people if the integration 
process is to be pursued. If people do not see the benefits of Mercosur in their daily lives, they 
might not support a government which is pro-integration. 
 
While there are these arguments in favour of economic and social priorities, a few 
arguments were brought forward during the interviews which reject the idea of a Mercosur 
Regional Development Fund giving priority to either economic or social development. 
The main argument, which is often cited by the interviewees to reject the idea that a 
MRDF should give priority to economic development is of liberal origin. Some interviewees 
considered that, in accordance with liberal arguments, state intervention in the economy 
should be limited since the market would automatically regulate the situation. One Uruguayan 
interviewee in particular adopted extremely liberal views rejecting all forms of state 
intervention. Hence, it can be argued, from such a perspective, that if a project offers a good 
guaranteed return, a private investor will be interested in the project. However, the argument 
can be refuted since public institutions, such as a MRDF, can play an important role in 
guiding investments to support economic projects which might be financially risky but are 
beneficial to the development of a sector or of a region. Otherwise, without such public 
institutions, investments would be principally directed towards a limited number of the more 
highly financially attractive projects. 
More arguments were put forward specifically against a social development priority. 
The interviewees used either of the three following arguments to justify the argument that 
social development should not be selected as a priority for the MRDF. 
Firstly, in relation to the suggestion that a MRDF should focus on social development 
issues, the argument was put forward that there would be a risk that the decision-makers could 
become paternalistic. As the past experience of international development organisations 
would highlight, this was considered to have a negative impact since such principles have led 
to the failure of many development projects.  
Secondly, the argument was put forward that it is difficult to evaluate such projects to 
determine their success or failure. The effects generally only appear over the long term, 
examples being improvements in literacy or in life expectancy through better medical care. 
Consequently, since it is difficult to evaluate the success of a project, it is extremely difficult 
for policy-makers to decide whether to implement such projects in other regions. Time scale 
is also a problem since the Mercosur decision-makers are elected. The exigencies of the 
democratic process imply that decision-makers are generally more interested in projects 
having a visible impact in the short-term so politicians can use the positive impacts of these 
projects as electoral arguments.  
Finally, in the eventuality of a MRDF model which entails the award of loans, most 
interviewees opposed a social development priority. These interviewees considered that it 
would be difficult to give priority to social projects because these projects, such as the 
construction of a school, offer in general too low a financial return to reimburse the Fund or 
the financial institution making the loan. For this reason, only a very limited number of social 
development projects have been financed by private financial institutions over the past few 
decades. 
In spite of the arguments against, this thesis favours the idea that the Mercosur 
Regional Development Fund should consider giving priority to both economic and social 
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projects. The intention would be that the MRDF would in this way complement rather than 
compete with the existing array of international, national and private instruments financing 
development projects in Mercosur. 
THE GEOGRAPHIC PRIORITIES FOR A MRDF 
Having analysed in the preceding section the thematic priorities which could be 
assigned to a Mercosur Regional Development Fund, it was concluded that there is a case for 
it supporting economic and social development rather than infrastructure and research and 
technology projects. This section now looks at the geographic priorities of the MRDF. The 
aim would be for the MRDF to adopt the EU principle of concentration345 to concentrate its 
financial resources on the regions which are in most need. 
The opinion of interviewees on geographic priorities for a MRDF 
It first should be noted that many of the interviewees, that is 51 of the 122 interviewed, 
refused to give their opinion on whether or not a Mercosur Regional Development Fund 
should have geographic priorities. In general, these respondents did not feel competent to 
answer, either because they considered it was not their direct field of competence or because 
they had not given sufficient thought to this issue. The reason for this is that, while the idea of 
the creation of a Mercosur development bank or fund has already been part of the agenda of a 
few decision-makers, there has been little publicity and little official reflection on the idea.  
In consequence, whereas 71 of the 122 interviewees agreed to share their opinion on 
the geographic priority for the MRDF, the other 51 considered that the issue should be studied 
in depth before they could give an answer. Among the 71 interviewees answering this 
question, six selected two types of geographic priorities for the MRDF, which means there is 
a total of 77 responses (see Table 8.4 below). 
The responses of the interviewees in relation to the geographic priorities for the 
MRDF are classified into five categories. Firstly, the MRDF should not be given any spatial 
priority. In relation to this, most interviewees (65%) took the contrary view that priority 
should be given to less developed regions (LDR). Three other possible priorities received less 
support from the interviewees. These are the MRDF giving priority to transnational projects 
(13%); to border regions (9%); or to urban areas (1%). The answers of the interviewees are 
presented in Table 8.4 and illustrated in Figure 8.3. This figure superimposes pie-charts, one 
for each country where the interview was done and one for the total, to represent the 
percentage of answers in favour of each geographic priority, with 77 answers taken as 100%. 
It allows comparisons between the different countries.  
Table 8.4. Opinion of interviewees on the geographic priorities of a MRDF 
 Number of respondents Percentage 
 LDR Border 
regions 
Trans- 
national 
Cities No 
priority
Total* LDR Border 
regions
Trans- 
national 
Cities No 
priority 
Total 
AR 13 1 1 1 3 19 69 5 5 5 16 100
BR 18 3 8 0 3 32 57 9 25 0 9 100
PY 11 2 1 0 1 15 73 13 7 0 7 100
UY 8 1 0 0 2 11 73 9 0 0 18 100
Total 50 7 10 1 9 77 65 9 13 1 12 100
* There are 77 answers for 71 interviewees answering the question since more than one answer was possible  
 
                                                
345 As discussed above in the last section of Chapter 7. 
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Figure 8.3. Synthesis of the responses on the geographic priorities of a MRDF 
No geographic priorities 
Among the 77 responses, 9 persons, which represents 12% of the responses, thought 
that a MRDF should not have any type of geographical priority. There were two main reasons 
put forward by the interviewees.  
The first reason is financial. These respondents considered that the MRDF should 
function through loans because such a fund would not have the necessary resources and 
because, as some interviewees said, grants “favour mismanagement since there is no 
responsibility towards the money”346. These respondents also considered that, should the 
MRDF focus its loans on less developed regions, it would limit the scope of the Fund. Indeed, 
due to their limited financial capacities, less developed regions would not be able to put 
forward many projects, since they would not have the scope to reimburse the Fund for the 
loan, and the MRDF would only be used to finance this limited number of projects.  
The second reason advanced is that the Fund should operate only on thematic 
priorities, which would exclude geographical focus altogether. For example, a Brazilian 
respondent considered that the MRDF should be designed principally to help industrial 
restructuring, the region of implementation of the project not being a selection criterion. This 
interviewee even argued that a MRDF should specifically not give priority to less developed 
regions because they generally have very little manufacturing.  
An Argentinian researcher put forward a different argument. This respondent 
considered that choosing less developed regions as a priority would transform the MRDF into 
an arena of political struggle. The requirement of the MRDF, if similar to the European 
Regional Development Fund, would mean that a region would have to establish its degree of 
poverty and its lack of development to access the resources of the Fund. This might penalise 
the good functioning of the MRDF since regional authorities would attempt to prove the 
relative low level of development of their region to access the resources of the MRDF.  
Less developed regions 
Looking at the different possible geographic priorities, less developed regions (LDR) 
had by far the strongest support from the interviewees (see Figure 8.3 above). A large 
majority, 65% of the interviewees, considered that such regions should be a priority for a 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund. However, although in Brazil this response received 
relatively less support from interviewees, less developed regions still account for the majority 
                                                
346 For reasons of confidentiality, most of the quotes extracted from the interviews are kept anonymous. 
LDR
Border regions
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of the responses since 57% of the Brazilian interviewees selected less developed regions as a 
geographic priority (see Table 8.4 above). 
The main reason which underlies the relative support for a MRDF to allocate funds to 
less developed regions is certainly related to the important regional asymmetries which 
characterise Mercosur countries. The interviewees choosing less developed regions as a 
priority considered their choice to be obvious since, according to them, the MRDF should as a 
priority assist the regions which are the most backward. These interviewees often considered 
that a MRDF should concentrate on reducing disparities and on achieving similar 
opportunities and conditions of living throughout the territory. Moreover, projects in less 
developed regions might have a greater impact than in regions which are better off. It can be 
argued that it is sometimes easier and less expensive to help a very backward region to 
progress than a region already relatively well developed. 
Out of the 50 interviewees who were in favour of giving priority to less developed 
regions, five Brazilians and one Paraguayan chose it jointly with another geographic priority. 
Although they did not expressly justify their view, it can be understood from the rest of their 
response that they were concerned about the financial implications of a Fund focusing only on 
less developed regions. Therefore, although it was considered necessary for a MRDF to assist 
the regions most in need, they preferred that the Fund should also be used for other types of 
actions which entail less financial risk. One of these six persons thought that the Fund should 
give priority to less developed regions and to border zones. This interviewee considered that 
the MRDF should give priority to economic development, and consequently that these two 
geographic priorities, less developed regions and border zones, would offer a better ground 
for economic development. The other five interviewees thought that a MRDF should give 
priority both to less developed regions and to transnational projects. 
Transnational projects 
The second spatial priority for a MRDF that was selected by most respondents is 
transnational projects; that is, projects that would have an impact on regions within different 
countries. Ten interviewees, representing 13% of the 77 responses, supported this priority. 
While projects of such magnitude could be of an economic nature, especially those which 
concern production chains that transcend borders, it seems that interviewees often considered 
these as transport or communication infrastructure projects of continental scale. The argument 
was based on the fact that the level of infrastructure is very low throughout Mercosur. As a 
result, infrastructure projects of transnational scale were considered necessary to contribute to 
economic development through the facilitation of goods transportation and communication. 
Moreover, the interviewees favourable to transnational projects as a MRDF priority 
considered such projects necessary since they contribute to the physical integration of the 
region. 
The choice of this priority for Mercosur might also have been influenced by the recent 
talks about South American axes of physical integration which were detailed in Chapter 4 
(Frame 4.1). Some interviewees expressly said that the first task of the MRDF could be to 
contribute to the financing of these projects to complement the work of the IDB, the CAF and 
Fonplata. 
Two arguments were put forward against the adoption of this priority. Firstly, it 
appeared that most respondents believed that a Mercosur Regional Development Fund would 
be of a rather limited size and with few resources, principally because of the financial 
situation in Mercosur countries. In such a situation, transnational projects might be impossible 
to carry out because of the scale of the costs of such projects. Secondly, some interviewees 
considered that there already exist international organisations like the IDB which have been 
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financing such transnational projects of infrastructure development, so a MRDF could be 
more useful supporting projects according to other thematic and geographic priorities.  
Border regions 
After transnational projects, the geographic priority which received support was the 
border regions. Out of the 77 responses, only 7 were in favour of this priority, which 
represents 9% of the total.  
It is worth noting that the respondents most in favour were in Paraguay. Indeed, 13% 
of the responses in this country were in favour of such a priority. This was followed by 
respondents in Brazil and in Uruguay, respectively 9% of the responses in each country. For 
the first two countries the explanation for this priority choice may lie in three words: Ciudad 
del Este. This city, east of Paraguay and bordering the Brazilian city of Foz de Iguaçu, is at 
the centre of contraband trade and the black market. This is a source of illegality and 
criminality, which is consequently an inconvenience for both countries, especially for Brazil 
which, as a Paraguayan interviewee said in 2000, “is having the biggest headaches due to 
contraband in Paraguay”. One way to fight against the trade in contraband would be to 
legalise the production of companies at the frontiers. This could thereby become a priority for 
the Mercosur Regional Development Fund.  
As shown on Map 8.1 below, most Mercosur regions have a border, either with the sea 
or with  another country. Among the 110 Mercosur regions, only 22, that is six Argentinian, 
four Brazilian, six Paraguayan, five Uruguayan and one Bolivian regions are surrounded by 
regions of the same country, which would exclude them from the priority list. If border 
regions were selected as a priority, there would need to be other selection criteria to narrow 
down the number of priority regions. For example, only regions having a border with another 
Mercosur country might be considered, which would slightly reduce their number. 
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Map 8.1. Mercosur border regions 
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Urban areas 
Finally, one interviewee proposed an original and interesting geographical priority and 
suggested that the MRDF should focus on urban areas. The argument put forward by this 
Argentinian public servant was that there has been an increase of poverty in urban areas 
which have traditionally been relatively ‘rich’. Given the high density of poor people in these 
areas, compared to rural areas where people are scattered over large territories, this 
interviewee argued that the MRDF could have a greater impact. 
According to the respondent, there are also two important political factors to support 
such a view. Firstly, the interviewee considered that the urban poor have the most resentment 
against government. Indeed, whereas in rural areas people have traditionally been poor, those 
living in urban areas have generally lived in better conditions until recently when conditions 
have worsened. A second political factor which could be important is that generally electoral 
participation is much weaker in rural areas than in cities. Since most politicians always have 
the elections in mind, it can be seen that tackling the poverty problem in urban areas might 
lead to more electoral support than such action in rural areas. 
Definition of the priority regions for the MRDF 
Given that the results of the survey show that, in the opinion of most interviewees, the 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund should give priority to less developed regions, it is 
possible to use the regional statistical analysis of Chapter 4 to select which regions would be 
included in such a geographic priority. There are two methods which can be used to define the 
Mercosur less developed regions which could be designated as a geographic priority.  
The consideration of the overall development of regions, drawing on the conclusions 
of the statistical analyses undertaken in Chapter 4, is a first approach that could be adopted. 
However, there are two principal problems in selecting the priority regions according to this 
method. A first negative point is that Uruguay and Chile would have no incentive to 
participate in a Mercosur Fund. Both countries are indeed de facto excluded from the benefits 
of such fund since, according to the definition of relatively less developed regions adopted in 
Chapter 4, none of their regions can be defined as such. Creating the MRDF without two of 
the six Mercosur countries would be contrary to the logic of the process of integration.  
A second problem in selecting the priority regions with this method is that regions are 
selected according to the twelve indicators of development analysed. This would result in 
some bias in the priority list since some regions are relatively less developed in respect of one 
category of development, but not according to other categories which would be thematic 
priorities. Consequently, it seems more appropriate to define the priority region according to 
the thematic priorities of the MRDF.  
As suggested in the preceding section, the Mercosur Regional Development Fund 
should focus on economic and social development. Consequently, it can be argued that the 
MRDF should only consider regions which are economically and/or socially relatively less 
developed. It should not include those regions only facing infrastructure problems. 
It has been arbitrarily decided that, to be considered as economically relatively less 
developed, a region needs to have at least one of the two economic indicators below the 
threshold. Likewise, since there is a maximum of three social indicators below the threshold 
for any region, socially relatively less developed regions are those with at least two indicators 
below the threshold347. 
                                                
347 See Chapter 4 for the definition of regions economically or socially less developed. 
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The MRDF priority regions could be those regions which are both economically and 
socially relatively less developed. As shown below in Table 8.5, the list of priority regions 
would be composed of 27 regions, that is a fourth of the Mercosur regions. These regions are 
inhabited by almost 50 million people, that is 22% of the Mercosur 6 population.  
However, such definition is not satisfactory since a region needing assistance on social 
development might be denied MRDF support if the region is not also considered as 
economically less developed. Therefore, a second possibility would be to consider as priority 
regions those which are economically or socially relatively less developed. According to such 
definition, 70% of the Mercosur regions would become priority regions and would qualify for 
access to the resources of the MRDF. This amounts to 78 regions which are inhabited by 
almost 100 million people, equivalent to 44% of the Mercosur population (see Table 8.5).  
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Table 8.5. The priority regions of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund 
 Region Population E S Region Population E S 
AR Catamarca 289,212 X  UY Canelones  443,053  X
AR Corrientes 857,685 X  UY Cerro Largo  82,510  X
AR Chaco 895,900 X  UY Colonia  120,241  X
AR Formosa 447,094 X  UY Durazno  55,716  X
AR Jujuy 555,097 X  UY Florida  66,503  X
AR Salta 958,094 X  UY Lavalleja  61,085  X
AR Santiago del Estero 700,114 X  UY Maldonado  127,502  X
AR Tucumán 1,216,623 X  UY Paysandú  111,509  X
AR Tierra del Fuego Antártica e Islas del Atlántico Sur 89,992  X UY Río Negro  51,713  X
BR Rondônia 1,289,365 X X UY Rivera  98,472  X
BR Acre 504,489 X X UY San José  96,664  X
BR Amapá 402,557 X X UY Tacuarembó  84,919  X
BR Pará 5,724,140 X X BO Chuquisaca 549,835 X X
BR Ceará 7,010,107 X X BO La Paz 2,268,824 X X
BR Roraima 258,088 X X BO Oruro 383,498 X X
BR Maranhão 5,349,575 X X BO Potosí 746,618 X X
BR Alagoas 2,754,697 X X BO Tarija 368,506 X X
BR Sergipe 1,662,168 X X BO Santa Cruz 1,651,951 X X
BR Bahia 12,697,007 X X BO Beni 336,633 X X
BR Tocantins 1,096,967 X  BO Pando 53,124 X X
BR Mato Grosso 2,335,344 X  BO Cochabamba 1,408,071 X X
BR Piauí 2,758,129 X  CL Coquimbo 569,825 X X
BR Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 X  CL Del Libertador 778,801 X X
BR Paraíba 3,433,234 X  CL Del Maule 906,882 X X
BR Pernambuco 7,548,183 X  CL Del Biobío 1,915,844 X X
BR Goiás 4,629,154 X  CL Valparaíso 1,543,566 X  
BR Amazonas 2,460,434  X CL De La Araucanía 864,975 X  
PY Amambay 127,011 X X CL De Los Lagos 1,050,558 X  
PY Pdte. Hayes 77,145 X X CL De Aysén 93,636 X  
PY Boquerón 35,241 X X CL Tarapacá 385,620  X
PY Alto Paraguay 13,831 X X CL Antofagasta 462,286  X
PY Concepción 185,496 X  CL Atacama 269,047  X
PY San Pedro 332,926 X  CL M. de Santiago 6,013,185  X
PY Cordillera 215,663 X            
PY Guairá 173,668 X            
PY Caaguazú 442,161 X            
PY Caazapá 141,559 X            
PY Itapúa 454,757 X            
PY Misiones 98,607 X            
PY Paraguarí 247,675 X            
PY Alto Paraná 595,276 X            
PY Ñeembucú 86,965 X            
PY Canindeyú 133,075 X  Total     60  45 
PY Asunción 550,060 X  E and S 27 regions 49,843,833     
PY Central 1,174,212 X  E or S 78 regions 99,671,304   
An X indicates that the region is a priority according to economic (E) or social (S) indicators. 
It was suggested above in Chapter 7 that the MRDF should adopt the EU principle of 
concentration and therefore focus on the regions which need most assistance. From a 
technical point of view, it would therefore be best to select the first definition of priority 
regions since it concentrates the assistance of the MRDF on the fifth of the Mercosur 
population which needs most assistance.  
However, Argentina and Uruguay would de facto be excluded from a MRDF focusing 
on economically and socially less developed regions since none of their regions can be 
characterised as such. Moreover, from a political perspective, such decision will be difficult to 
adopt for the government of the member states. Indeed, due to electoral constraints, 
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governments generally tend to facilitate access to assistance to a larger share of their 
population, so that more people might benefit and therefore support the government in future 
elections. Such situation has prevailed in the EU since, although concentration has always 
been a key objective, the concentration of EU funds has not been lower than 40% of the EU 
population (in 2000), and even peaked at 53% in 1994. 
It should also be noted that, unless there is a system of quotas ensuring a percentage of 
the resources of the MRDF to each priority region, the creation of a priority list does not 
imply that all priority regions have an automatic access to MRDF assistance, but that they 
have the capacity to present projects to the MRDF to ask for assistance. Therefore, a MRDF 
less concentrated does not imply that more projects will need to be financed, but that a greater 
number of projects will be considered, such competition enabling to finance only the best 
propositions. 
It can therefore be suggested that the MRDF should give priority to regions which are 
economically or socially relatively less developed, in order to have a fund not overly 
concentrated but nevertheless assisting in priority the two fifths of the Mercosur population 
which most need assistance. Table 8.6 below shows, country by country, the share of the 
population which would consequently be eligible for MRDF assistance. 
Table 8.6. Population in regions eligible for MRDF assistance  
 Total 
population 
Population in 
eligible 
regions 
% of national 
population 
living in eligible 
regions* 
% of M6 
population 
living in eligible 
regions+ 
% of eligible 
population to 
M6 eligible 
population~ 
Argentina 34,768,457 6,009,811 17.3 2.7 6.0 
Brazil 160,710,275 64,554,993 40.2 28.5 64.8 
Paraguay 5,085,328 5,085,328 100.0 2.2 5.1 
Uruguay 3,163,763 1,399,887 44.2 0.6 1.4 
Bolivia 7,767,060 7,767,060 100.0 3.4 7.8 
Chile 15,010,755 14,854,225 99.0 6.6 14.9 
Mercosur 6 226,505,638 99,671,304 - 44.0 100.0 
* Percentage of population in eligible regions to total population 
+ Percentage of population in eligible regions to total Mercosur 6 population 
~ Percentage of population in eligible regions to total eligible population in Mercosur 
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Map 8.2. The MRDF priority regions 
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As indicated above in Tables 8.5 and 8.6 and in Map 8.2, the Mercosur Regional 
Development Fund priority regions on this basis include: 
- 9 of the 24 Argentinian provinces, inhabited by 6 million people. They account for 
17% of the population of Argentina and represent 6% of the population eligible for 
assistance.  
- 18 of the 27 Brazilian states, inhabited by 64.6 million people, 40% of the population. 
Thus, Brazil accounts for almost two thirds of the Mercosur population living in 
priority regions.  
- All of the 18 Paraguayan departments, inhabited by 5 million people, which only 
account for 2% of the Mercosur population. 
- 12 of the 19 Uruguayan departments, inhabited by 1.4 million people. These account 
for 44% of the Uruguayan population but represent only 1.4% of the Mercosur eligible 
population. 
- All of the 9 Bolivian departments, inhabited by 7.8 million people. Bolivians represent 
the third largest share of the eligible population with 8% of the Mercosur eligible 
population. 
- 12 of the 13 Chilean regions, inhabited by 14.9 million people. They account for 99% 
of the population of Chile and 15% of the Mercosur population living in priority 
regions. 
 
* 
* * 
In conclusion, this chapter has analysed the possible thematic and geographic priorities 
for the Mercosur Regional Development Fund. Given the opinions of the decision-makers 
interviewed, as well as the regional statistical data analysed, it can be argued that the optimum 
choice for the MRDF would be to focus on economic and social development in the 78 
Mercosur regions facing either type of lesser development. Having defined the objectives of 
the MRDF, that is its operational priorities, the main characteristics of this Fund can now be 
analysed in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 5 justified the choice of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund as the 
optimum choice for Mercosur member states to establish a common approach to regional 
development. The previous chapter argued that the MRDF would be most effective if its 
priority was social and economic development in the 78 regions classified as economically or 
socially less developed. This chapter pursues the examination of the Mercosur Regional 
Development Fund to discuss, in the eventuality of the creation of such Fund, the principal 
characteristics which will have a direct impact on its functioning and therefore on its success. 
This discussion is informed by an analysis of a survey of the opinion of the 137 
Mercosur and development key decision-makers interviewed during the two fieldtrips348. In 
many cases however the interviewees did not want to express their opinion. This was because 
they considered themselves not to be sufficiently informed, because they had not given the 
ideas enough thought, or because they considered themselves prevented by their position in 
the institution in which they were working. Where applicable, the lessons which it was earlier 
considered could be transferred from the EU experience of regional development funds and 
which were discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 are taken into consideration. Moreover, in some 
cases, EU lessons are complemented by references to the CAF and the Fonplata since, 
although they are not regional development agencies, both institutions are examples of Latin 
American supranational financial institutions. 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss nine principal characteristics of a MRDF, in 
order to assess the different possibilities which Mercosur policy makers might consider. This 
should, consequently, offer Mercosur policy makers an indication of what the essential 
characteristics of the MRDF would be and to offer a basis on which to build further studies 
and negotiations. Indeed, this thesis fully supports the view defended by Macrae to “leave 
‘scientific’ comparisons aimed only at understanding, to basic social scientist who believe 
that such explanation automatically eventually aids policy choice, but who often leave to 
others the task of demonstrating this effect”349. Policy transfers should not only be 
retrospective but also prospective to discuss possible futures and assist policy making.  
The nine following sections each discuss one of what are the nine main characteristics 
of a MRDF. These characteristics are:  
1. The genesis of the MRDF; 
2. The membership of the MRDF; 
3. The place of the MRDF in the Mercosur institutional framework;  
4. The MRDF institutional structure;  
5. The financial contribution of MRDF members;  
6. The MRDF decision-making procedures;  
7. The MRDF procedures for selecting development projects;  
8. The financial mechanisms of the MRDF;  
9. The evaluation and supervision of the MRDF. 
                                                
348 See the second section of Chapter 1 and Appendix 1 for more details on the fieldtrips and the interviews. 
349 Macrae Duncan Jr, Cross-national perspectives for aiding policy choice, Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis, vol 1, 1999, Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands, p. 35. 
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Not all the issues related to a MRDF can be accounted for by these nine 
characteristics. However, these other characteristics can be considered of secondary 
importance, such as the process for designating the officials and the representatives of each 
MRDF member or, to be highly technical, such as the currency unit used by the Fund. This 
chapter however focuses on the nine characteristics which are arguably the most crucial 
aspects upon which the success of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund could depend. 
THE GENESIS OF THE MRDF  
The first factor to take into account and which might have an impact on the success of 
a Mercosur Regional Development Fund is what is to be its genesis. There is indeed one 
significant factor to consider when creating a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. This is 
the existence of the Fonplata, the development fund discussed in Chapter 5 whose members 
are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay – the four Mercosur members – and Bolivia, which 
is one of the two associate members of Mercosur.  
The issue is whether to build a MRDF on the Fonplata or to develop a MRDF as a new 
policy initiative. There are therefore two main scenarios possible for the creation of a MRDF. 
The first scenario would involve setting up the MRDF as a completely new institution which 
would take its place in the existing environment of international and Latin American 
development organisations. A second scenario would be to transform substantially the 
Fonplata into a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. 
The decision-makers interviewed in 2000 and 2001 were asked which of these two 
scenarios they would choose in designing a MRDF. Out of the 122 interviewees, 49 did not 
want to choose between the two scenarios. This was because they did not feel competent 
enough to make an enlightened choice, or because they had never reflected on the issue of a 
MRDF. In the latter case, the respondents wanted precise studies of both scenarios to be 
undertaken.  
Among the remaining 73 interviewees who answered the question, there is a clear 
preference for the second scenario (see Figure 9.1), that is the transformation of the Fonplata 
into a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. There are issues following on from this which 
need to be discussed, namely the advantages and disadvantages of each option. 
Figure 9.1. Opinion of the interviewees on the two scenarios for the genesis of a MRDF 
(by country of interviewee) (73 responses) 
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The creation of the MRDF as a new institution 
The first scenario, the creation of the MRDF ‘from a clean slate’, implies the creation 
of a completely new structure that would have no relation whatsoever with the Fonplata. This 
can be considered to be an advantage since the Fonplata suffers from a very poor reputation, 
at least within the decision-making circles in which the interviews were carried out. Indeed, 
the Fonplata has a reputation of having a considerable number of drawbacks, of corruption, of 
being too small to be useful, and so on. A very limited number of people however defended 
the Fonplata as being a successful instrument to finance development projects.  
Whether these rumours are true or false is not what matters in the present case. What 
is significant is that one of the factors of success of a MRDF is its capacity to inspire the 
confidence of the financial institutions and political decision-makers. It is the main reason for 
which the interviewees answering in favour of the first scenario proposed that the MRDF 
should be designed as a new institution, in order to create a clear-cut separation between the 
MRDF and the negative past of the Fonplata. 
According to a few interviewees, however, there is further additional difficulty in 
transforming the Fonplata into a MRDF. If the Fonplata were to become the MRDF it would 
probably have to be based in Bolivia where the Fonplata has its headquarters. If there was a 
political will to establish the MRDF in the least developed member state, as was the case for 
the Fonplata, its location would be too far from financial centres like São Paulo and Buenos 
Aires. This would limit the access of the MRDF to these international financial markets, 
which would reduce the visibility of the MRDF on the international financial scene.  
The transformation of the Fonplata into a MRDF  
However, in spite of these difficulties, the second scenario, that of transforming 
substantially the Fonplata to become a MRDF, appears to offer greater advantages, especially 
from the financial point of view. 
A first point to consider is that if a new fund was set up, it would have a significant 
financial cost. On the one hand, there are costs associated were the member states to maintain 
two parallel institutions, the Fonplata and the MRDF. On the other hand, costs would be 
incurred by closing down the Fonplata to create a MRDF, for example through having to 
make officials redundant. There would also be some difficulties encountered by ending the 
current Fonplata financed projects. The latter would however not be insurmountable since an 
exit strategy could be instituted. 
A second advantage in transforming the Fonplata into a MRDF, is that the MRDF 
could be given, as initial capital, the US$ 300 million of the Fonplata, from which it could 
develop its early actions and make its first loans. It would then be possible to augment this 
initial capital through financial transfers from the member states or through borrowing money 
on international financial markets. 
Moreover, it is possible to reduce the negative aspects of transforming the Fonplata 
into a MRDF, the reasons mentioned above for which 24 interviewees chose the first scenario. 
To limit confusion between the Fonplata and the MRDF, so that the MRDF is not affected by 
the negative image of its predecessor, a communication and information campaign directed 
towards key financial institutions and political decision-makers would need to be put in place, 
to highlight the major transformations of the Fonplata, and to strengthen the image of the 
MRDF. Changing the name of the institution, from the Fonplata to MRDF, would similarly 
contribute to the differentiation of the two. If there was the political will to transfer the 
headquarters of the institution from Bolivia to Argentina or Brazil, it might be easier and less 
expensive to transfer the institution than to create a brand new institution in these countries. 
As a counterpart to this political decision, some regional offices could be left in Bolivia. 
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There is a final consideration to take into account which renders a transformation of 
the Fonplata into a MRDF more attractive than the creation of a new institution. Over the past 
few years, there have been pressures within the governments of the member states to reform 
the Fonplata to give it more financial powers and more visibility on the international scene. A 
key meeting on this issue was to be held at the beginning of 2001. However, because of the 
Argentinian economic and political crisis, the Argentinian delegation could not participate in 
the meeting. It was therefore cancelled the week before it was to take place and was 
postponed to a later date. Given the probable transformation of the Fonplata in the near future, 
whether a MRDF is created or not, it can be argued that it would be more appropriate to take 
this evolution further and transform the Fonplata into a MRDF. 
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE MRDF  
The second issue for discussion is which actors should be the members of a Mercosur 
Fund. The debate on this issue is not as clear cut as it would seem since there are a number of 
options. On the one hand, the MRDF could be restricted to the four Mercosur member states. 
On the other hand, it could also include Chile and/or Bolivia, the associate members. 
Membership might also be opened to extra-regional members, similar to the practice of the 
InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) or of the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF)350.  
Interviewees were asked whether the MRDF should be designed only for the four 
Mercosur countries (M4), or whether it should also include Bolivia and/or Chile. As the 
answers show in Table 9.1 below, 54 of the 122 interviewees could not decide who should be 
members, or did not want to express their opinions. The answers of the other 68 respondents 
were evenly divided between the view that the MRDF should be restricted to the four 
members, and the view that it should include Bolivia and/or Chile. Figure 9.2 presents the 
percentage in favour of each option for membership according to the country of the 
interviewee. The superimposition of pie-charts enables comparisons between the different 
countries. These options are considered in turn. 
Table 9.1. Opinions of interviewees on the MRDF membership 
 Number of respondents Percentage 
 M4 M4 + 
BO 
M4 + 
CL 
M6 Total M4 M4 + 
BO
M4 + 
CL
M6 Total
Argentina 8 0 0 9 17 47 0 0 53 100
Brazil 15 2 0 11 28 54 7 0 39 100
Paraguay 4 1 1 6 12 34 8 8 50 100
Uruguay  8 2 0 1 11 73 18 0 9 100
Total 35 5 1 27 68 52 7 1 40 100
 
                                                
350 For more information on the IDB and the CAF, see the first section of Chapter 5. 
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Figure 9.2. Opinion of interviewees on the MRDF membership (by country of 
interviewee) (68 respondents) 
 
A MRDF restricted to the four Mercosur members 
As illustrated in Figure 9.2, the highest proportion of respondents (52%) were in 
favour of restricting the membership to the four Mercosur member states. Three main reasons 
were put forward by these 35 interviewees to justify their choice. The first reason given was 
that they considered that the consequence of the creation of a MRDF is a new step towards a 
deeper integration between member states. They argued that, consequently, the MRDF should 
be restricted to the states which are already well engaged on the path to integration.  
The second reason given is that these interviewees believe that a MRDF could 
constitute an advantage to full Mercosur member states and should exclude associate 
members. Were the MRDF to include Bolivia and Chile, these countries would have most of 
the advantages of the integration, such as free trade and access to a development fund, but 
would not face the constraints implied by this same process of integration, such as policy 
coordination. The MRDF could therefore be a further argument for Chile and Bolivia, and 
other South American countries, for becoming full Mercosur members and not just associates.  
A third and final argument in favour of restricting the membership of the MRDF is 
that with only four members the Fund would have smaller institutions and would be easier to 
manage than if there were more members. 
A MRDF composed of Mercosur members and associates 
Five of the interviewees said that the MRDF should be established with only the four 
Mercosur members plus Bolivia (see Table 9.1 above). The main reason underlying this 
choice was that they believed the MRDF should be built on the Fonplata, keeping its present 
type of membership. A further argument was that, Bolivia being one of the poorest South 
American countries, it has often been favoured through a number of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, such as those of the CAF, of Mercosur, or agreements signed with Brazil. These 
interviewees also said that their impression is that Chile does not currently show much 
interest in furthering its participation within the Mercosur process of integration. 
Only one of the interviewees, a Paraguayan official, proposed a MRDF composed of 
the four Mercosur members plus Chile. The inclusion of Chile in the MRDF would be an 
advantage for the latter since it could benefit from the relatively good reputation of Chile on 
international financial markets. This interviewee excluded Bolivia from the MRDF because 
he considered that Chile is more involved in Mercosur than Bolivia. Bolivia being a member 
of the Andean Community, the respondent believed that the present association agreements 
linking Bolivia to Mercosur members represented the maximum level of participation within 
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Mercosur desired by the Bolivian government. According to the interviewee, another reason 
for including Chile but not Bolivia is that, considering the low level of development of the 
latter, Bolivia would be using most of the resources of the Fund while its financial 
contribution would have to be small. 
The last group of interviewees, composed of 27 people, considered that the MRDF 
membership should be open to the four Mercosur states and their two associates. In addition 
to the reasons for including Bolivia and Chile as discussed above, there are a few other 
reasons for having a MRDF composed of six members. Firstly, the objective of Mercosur 
being to create a common market between the six countries, it could seem more appropriate to 
incorporate Bolivia and Chile in as many common activities as possible. Moreover, this 
scenario gives more significance to the MRDF since it would represent more countries. From 
a financial point of view, the MRDF could thus offer more and better financial guarantees, 
and would have an initial capital higher than otherwise. A final argument for having six 
members and not four is the impact the number of members has on the decision-making 
procedures. As will be explained in the sixth section below, a higher number of members 
would facilitate the implementation of a decision-making procedure based on majority voting, 
so that the actions of the MRDF are not impeded by any member using a right of veto. 
Given that the MRDF would be a new step towards a deeper integration, it can 
therefore be argued that this Fund should be designed to include the six Mercosur members 
and associates. This would have positive impacts on the financial weight of the Fund and its 
capacities. However, if Mercosur members wish to create an incentive for the associate 
members to become full members, they could establish a system of quotas within the MRDF 
to give more prominence to Mercosur members than to Mercosur associates. 
Opening the MRDF membership to extra-regional members 
In addition to opening the MRDF membership to the six Mercosur states, it would be 
possible to include extra-regional members. These might be either private financial 
institutions, other countries, and/or public organisations. The participation of these third 
parties in the MRDF would increase its financial and political weight. However, such 
participation implies a slight loss of sovereignty since Mercosur countries would have to 
share the decision-making power. 
Private institutions 
From the point of view of private institutions, it could be beneficial to directly 
participate in a MRDF since it is a financial institution which could offer some return. As was 
seen in Chapter 5, among the CAF members there is a number of private banks. However, 
some private companies might be hesitant to transfer financial resources to a public or semi-
public organisation, especially if they are worried about possible mismanagement and 
corruption. 
Non-Mercosur states 
Other Latin American countries might be interested in participating in the MRDF 
since it could be a new source of finance for their development projects. However, these 
countries would not by definition be part of the geographic priorities defined previously for 
the MRDF351. It would therefore be necessary to provide a mechanism for them to have 
access to the resources of the Fund. For example, there could be a system of quotas to ensure 
that, although priority is given to the Mercosur less developed regions, these extra-regional 
countries can use the financing capacities of the MRDF.  
                                                
351 See the second section of Chapter 8. 
 263
Developed non-Latin American countries could also be attracted to participate 
financially in the MRDF. Indeed, through their national development agencies, these 
countries have always been financing development projects in Mercosur countries and have 
supported the Mercosur integration process, two objectives they could pursue through  
financial participation in the MRDF. This could also allow them to improve the coordination 
of their different actions undertaken in the Mercosur area. Moreover, from an economic point 
of view, being inside the decision-making body of the MRDF might facilitate the obtaining of 
contracts for their national enterprises. 
International development organisations 
The last category of non Mercosur members which could participate in the MRDF is 
composed of international development organisations. Interviewees were asked whether they 
considered that international aid organisations would be interested in participating in a MRDF 
and, if so, which organisations would be likely to be the most interested in this initiative. 
Amongst the 91 interviewees responding the question related to this issue, most were 
confident that international organisations would be prepared to participate in a Mercosur 
Regional Development Fund. Whereas 9 interviewees answered that the MRDF should not 
seek participation from these organisations, or that these would not be interested in a MRDF, 
82 respondents considered that it would be positive for both parties. Indeed, like developed 
countries, these international organisations have always financed development projects and 
supported integration processes in Latin America. Participating in a MRDF could be an 
opportunity to pursue these actions while coordinating them.  
The international organisations which could participate in the MRDF are, according to 
the interviewees, the EU, the IDB and the World Bank. The interviewees considered that an 
EU participation would be positive for the MRDF since it could benefit from the significant 
EU experience and expertise in regional development funds. From a geopolitical point of 
view, it would be mutually beneficial for the EU and Mercosur to reinforce the position of the 
former in Mercosur countries, in order to counter-balance the weight of the US. Moreover, the 
participation of the EU in the MRDF could be included within the agenda of the present trade 
negotiations which are taking place between the EU and Mercosur. 
In the case of the possible participation of the IDB in the MRDF, it should be noted 
that four interviewees considered that there was a risk that the IDB could view the MRDF as a 
competitor and would consequently not support its actions. Adopting a geopolitical 
perspective, some interviewees said that the IDB, as well as the World Bank, is under US 
influence. Since the US government is in favour of diluting the Mercosur into a wider Free 
Trade Area of the Americas, these interviewees believed that both the IDB and the World 
Bank would limit their assistance to the Mercosur process of integration. These institutions 
would consequently likewise limit their assistance to the MRDF since it would be a new step 
towards a deeper Mercosur integration. 
The MRDF membership 
To conclude this section on the membership of the Mercosur Regional Development 
Fund, it can be argued that, although the MRDF should be designed principally for the six 
present Mercosur countries, it should leave the door open to extra-regional members, to 
private institutions and international organisations. The MRDF would otherwise rapidly be 
financially limited in pursuing its objectives, and would face some of the criticisms which 
have been made against the Fonplata, that is that the Fonplata has too few resources and is not 
open to non-Mercosur members. 
As has been done by other organisations, such as the CAF, it is possible to design a 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund with four categories of members. The core of the 
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MRDF would consist of the present Mercosur full members, that is Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. A second group of members would be composed of the present 
Mercosur associates, Bolivia and Chile. The third group would include extra-regional 
countries, that is other Latin American countries interested in participating in the MRDF to 
access new sources of development financing. The fourth group of members would be that of 
private institutions, international organisations and developed countries. 
The exact definition of the characteristics, the rights and duties of each group of 
members is a political decision. For example, the first group could be empowered with more 
weight in the decision-making procedures and a better access to the resources of the Fund 
than the members of the second group. Likewise, the second group would in turn have more 
power and access to the Fund than the third or the fourth group. 
Although the MRDF would essentially be established for the development of 
Mercosur regions, it will be necessary to give sufficient weight to the third and fourth groups 
of members. It would otherwise be difficult to convince these actors to participate in the 
MRDF. 
THE PLACE OF THE MRDF IN THE MERCOSUR INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The third characteristic of the Mercosur Regional Development Fund which needs to 
be discussed is its institutional place among the other Mercosur bodies. There are two 
possible scenarios.  
On the one hand the Mercosur Regional Development Fund can be designed as an 
institution, independent from Mercosur common institutions. The only link between the 
MRDF and Mercosur would be its membership and its priorities for development financing. 
Such a MRDF would certainly still be dependent on the governments of the member states 
since its highest decision-making committee would be composed of officials from the 
different member states.  
The Mercosur Regional Development Fund could, on the other hand, be created as a 
new Mercosur institution, included in the existing framework, with different links and 
relations with the other Mercosur institutions like the Common Market Council or the 
Common Market Group. 
The main advantage of the first scenario is the increased independence of the MRDF 
from Mercosur institutions, which would contribute to the allocation of the resources of the 
Fund according to technical criteria and not political criteria. A consequence of this 
independence is that the MRDF would be free of Mercosur negotiations and instability. Given 
that the process of integration is sometimes chaotic, being institutionally independent from 
Mercosur would protect the MRDF from these uncertainties. However, this advantage for the 
MRDF represents a significant obstacle for member states, especially Brazil, which are not 
yet ready for independent supranational institutions, even if their competences were to be very 
limited. 
The key decision-makers interviewed were asked whether the MRDF should be an 
independent institution or if they preferred it to be part of the Mercosur institutional structure. 
Figure 9.3 shows that the majority of the 72 interviewees rejected the idea of an independent 
MRDF in favour of the limited independence as described in the second scenario. Out of the 
total of 122 interviewees, 50 refused to answer, 19 answered in favour of the first scenario 
and 53 in favour of the second, that is a MRDF set within the Mercosur institutional structure. 
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Figure 9.3. Opinion of the interviewees on the place of the MRDF in the Mercosur 
institutional framework (by country of interviewee) (72 responses) 
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This second scenario of creating the MRDF within the Mercosur institutional 
framework is more plausible. Firstly, because of the control member states will directly and 
indirectly exert on the MRDF, the competency transfers to this supranational institution 
would be limited, which member states would regard as an advantage.  
Secondly, considering that a Mercosur Regional Development Fund is by definition a 
fund created by and for Mercosur countries, and would operate according to Mercosur 
priorities, there is little ground to justify the establishment of a MRDF outside the Mercosur 
institutional body. 
Finally, it should be remembered that the MRDF is a new step towards a further 
integration of Mercosur countries. Moreover it contributes to creating a common Mercosur 
identity, especially within a Free Trade Area of the Americas. Consequently, although 
independence could be desirable to limit political pressure from members, excluding the 
MRDF from the Mercosur environment would be negating its impact on the process of 
integration. It would therefore eliminate some of the reasons for which the establishment of a 
MRDF was considered necessary.  
 
Although the above discussion leads to the conclusion that the Mercosur Regional 
Development Fund should be part of the Mercosur institutional structure, it is still necessary 
for the MRDF to have some independence. Designing a MRDF following directives from the 
CMC, the GMC, or member states, would not be consistent with the use of technical criteria 
to independently select the development projects which should be financed. This would 
consequently mean that the financing of projects would reflect political interests.  
It should be possible to design an institutional framework to include a relatively 
independent MRDF within the Mercosur institutional body. In such a case, the MRDF would 
have a duty of providing information on its work to other Mercosur institutions. Mercosur 
institutions, as well as national and local Mercosur authorities, could both request funds to 
finance development projects. However, the final decision should be taken by the Mercosur 
Regional Development Fund according to precise technical criteria, so as not to be influenced 
by political issues. 
 266
THE MRDF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
The thesis now turns to look at a fourth characteristic of a MRDF, that is its own 
institutional structure. In relation to this aspect, it is necessary to keep in mind the discussion 
related to the first criterion for selecting the optimal Mercosur approach to regional 
development352. It was there argued that the institutional structure needs to be relatively small 
and very flexible to be acceptable to Mercosur members. 
However minimal, the structure of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund needs to 
include at least two bodies. The first body should be a Board of Governors353, and would 
represent the members. Although the representation of each member in this assembly should 
be equal, the Governors might not have equal power during the decision-making process since 
some members might be given more weight than others. The Board of Governors would be 
the highest decision-making body of the Mercosur Regional Development Fund and would 
therefore be responsible for defining the priorities and the criteria which would be used to 
finance development projects. It would have the capacity to determine increases in the capital 
of the Fund, as well as the share incumbent on each member. The Board of Governors would 
also have a role of control over the actions of the Fund. The members of this Board do not 
need to be permanent since these different tasks can be achieved through periodic meetings.  
In addition to this decision-making body, it is necessary for the Mercosur Regional 
Development Fund to have a permanent executive institution, such as an Executive 
Secretariat. This institution would be composed of international officials, theoretically 
independent from their states since their salary would be paid by the MRDF, but which would 
allow for a representation of each member. It would be the operational arm of the MRDF 
since it would be responsible for defining which projects should be financed by the MRDF; 
for financing them; for supervising reimbursements of loans when necessary; for supervising 
the implementation of the projects; and for all other practical, technical issues related to the 
operations of the MRDF. Depending on the significance of the resources managed by the 
MRDF and the number of projects financed, these activities could be shared among different 
Departments or Directorates. One such Department could be in charge of selecting the 
projects which should be financed by the Fund, while a second Department would be 
responsible for all the financial aspects and a third Department for the supervision. 
These two bodies are the minimum necessary components of a Mercosur Regional 
Development Fund. However, depending on the will of the members, a third body could be 
set up to complement this structure. This would be a scientific consultative body, whose 
members would meet periodically to formulate recommendations on priorities or on specific 
projects. Although this body would only have a consultative role, it might influence the 
decisions taken by the Board of Governors or the implementation of projects managed by the 
Executive Secretariat. This consultative body could be composed of representatives of each 
member, but could also include delegates from national development institutions, such as the 
Brazilian BNDES. Since economic development is a MRDF priority, this body could also 
include representatives from the private sector, trade unions or entrepreneurial committees. It 
is however necessary to limit the number of representatives within this consultative body, this 
to avoid the creation of an over-sized institution. 
                                                
352 See the second section of Chapter 5. 
353 This name, as are the names given hereafter to other MRDF bodies, are indicative. It is similar to the 
terminology often encountered in international organisations or development funds. 
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THE FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION OF MRDF MEMBERS 
This fifth characteristic, the financial contribution of the Mercosur member states to 
the MRDF354, is a much more technical issue than the four characteristics previously 
discussed, but is of vital importance for the functioning of the MRDF. Moreover, since some 
of the scenarios discussed below might lead to some of the members not participating in the 
MRDF, this is a very sensitive issue. Being such a vital and sensitive issue, the decision will 
in the end depend on the results of negotiations at the highest diplomatic levels. However, it is 
possible to discuss different possible scenarios concerning the financial contribution to the 
initial capital by the member states. 
There are two options on how the burden of the contribution to the initial capital could 
be shared. A first scenario involves the principle of equality, which is a fundamental basis of 
Mercosur. It could be extended to cover the financial contribution to be made by each 
member state, so that each country would contribute the same. The second scenario is based 
not on equality but on equity. This implies that Mercosur member states acknowledge their 
economic and financial differences, and that the contribution of each member is calculated 
according to its financial capacity, a ‘fair’ contribution. 
To illustrate the implications of both scenarios, it is possible to use a quantitative 
example to speculate on the financial contribution of each of the six Mercosur countries to a 
MRDF with an initial capital equivalent to US$ 600 millions (see Table 9.2). This amount has 
been arbitrarily chosen. It is a round figure and sufficiently high to be effective as initial 
capital. To compare this amount with data from existing organisations, it would represent 
approximately twice the capital of the Fonplata as of at the 31st of December 1999355. 
Table 9.2. Indicative quantitative example of the financial contribution of member states 
to a MRDF356 
 Equal contribution to the MRDF Fair contribution to the MRDF 
 
% of total 
M6 eligible 
population* 
GDP 
(US$) 
%  of 
Mercosur  
total GDP US$ %  of GDP % of MRDF US$ %  of GDP % of MRDF
AR 6.0 325,000 25.8 100 0.03 16.7 155 0.05 25.8
BR 64.8 820,400 65.1 100 0.01 16.7 390 0.05 65.1
PY 5.1 10,200 0.8 100 0.98 16.7 5 0.05 0.8
UY 1.4 20,000 1.6 100 0.50 16.7 10 0.05 1.6
BO 7.8 8,000 0.6 100 1.25 16.7 4 0.05 0.6
CL 14.9 77,000 6.1 100 0.05 16.7 37 0.05 6.1
M6 100.0 1,260,600 100.0 600 0.05 100 600 0.05 100.0
* Percentage of the Mercosur eligible population within each member, as calculated in Chapter 8 (see Table 8.5). 
A financial contribution based on the principle of equality 
In the first scenario, a contribution based on equality, the financial contribution of 
each country to the MRDF is the same, that is US$ 100 millions in the present quantitative 
example. According to this example, such a scenario would be highly beneficial for Brazil 
since it would contribute to 16.7% of the capital of the Fund, similar to the other members, 
although it accounts for 65% of the Mercosur population living in eligible regions. 
                                                
354 This section principally focuses on the financial contribution of Mercosur member states to the MRDF, 
although the contribution of other categories of MRDF members is briefly discussed below in the fifth section. 
355 See the first section of Chapter 5. 
356 Amounts in US$ millions in 1997, extracted from the CD-ROM Anuario Estadístico de Argentina 1999. 
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This scenario based on equality is presently used to determine the contribution of 
Mercosur members to the budget of the Administrative Secretariat. In 2002, the financial 
contribution of each of the four Mercosur member states amounted to US$ 245.224357. 
Whereas this solution might be established for relatively small budgets, such as that of 
the SAM, it is more difficult to use this method for a Fund necessitating a few hundred 
million dollars. Indeed, because of the economic disparities inherent to Mercosur, a similar 
sum represents a much bigger share of national resources for smaller economies than for big 
economies. As illustrated in Table 9.2, whereas a contribution of US$ 100 millions represents 
only 0.01% of the GDP of Brazil, it accounts for 1.3% of the GDP of Bolivia. Whereas it can 
be argued that it is feasible for Brazil to set aside this level of resources for a MRDF, it is 
highly improbable that the Bolivian government would be able to do so.  
Were the contribution to the MRDF to be based on equality, it is necessary to 
determine the capital of the Fund according to the financial capacity of the smallest members. 
Pursuing the preceding argument, it might be considered reasonable for Bolivia to contribute 
0.01% of its GDP to a MRDF, as was illustrated above the case for Brazil. Consequently, 
Bolivia would have to contribute approximately US$ 800,000 to the MRDF, and so would the 
other members. The result would be a MRDF with a capital of less than US$ 5 millions. It is 
clear that this amount would be too small to create an effective Mercosur Regional 
Development Fund. 
A financial contribution based on the principle of equity 
It can be seen that, because a fund whose contributions are based on equality is 
determined by the members with the smallest financial capacity, international financial 
institutions prefer a system based on equity. This is because in such a system, a specific 
criterion is used to determine the contribution of each member such that the largest economies 
contribute more than the smaller members. GDP is generally used as a criterion to determine 
the size of the contribution of each country to the Fund. The quantitative example illustrated 
in Table 9.2 shows that, with Brazil accounting for 65% of the Mercosur GDP, it would 
account for 65% of the capital of the MRDF, that is US$ 390 millions. Likewise, the share of 
Bolivia would only represent 0.6% of the MRDF resources, that is US$ 4 millions.  
As the comparison of the share of the contribution of each country to the share of their 
eligible population within the Mercosur eligible population shows (see Table 9.2), it appears 
that only Brazil and Uruguay would obtain an equivalent proportion, respectively 
approximately 65% and 1.5%. Paraguay, Bolivia and Chile would be potential winners, since 
the share of their eligible population is larger than their contribution to the Fund. Argentina 
would lose out in this scenario since it would contribute 26% of the MRDF capital whereas its 
population living in priority regions would only account for 6% of the Mercosur eligible 
population. 
While such a division of the contribution of members takes into consideration their 
inherent differences, it is contrary to the present principle of equality. However, if the 
proportions are exact, equity leads to some degree of equality. Indeed, if the contribution to 
the MRDF is calculated in relation to the share of the GDP of the members, it is equivalent to 
each country contributing the same percentage of their GDP to the MRDF. In this example, 
the contribution of each country to the MRDF represents 0.05% of its GDP. Consequently, in 
such a method, equality and equity coexist. 
There is also a second option for calculating the financial contribution to the MRDF 
that would be fair, without being exactly proportional. The members could negotiate the 
                                                
357 GMC Resolution nº 01/2002. 
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amount of their contribution according to their relative weight, without using proportionality 
to a specific criterion. It is the solution which has been negotiated for the Fonplata, where the 
share of Brazil and Argentina in the budget is equivalent to 33% each, while Uruguay, 
Paraguay and Bolivia each contribute 11%358. 
The opinion of the interviewees on the financial contribution to the MRDF 
The 122 people interviewed during the two fieldtrips were asked which of these 
options should be implemented in a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. Out of the 77 
interviewees who answered, only a Brazilian researcher opted in favour of an equal 
contribution to the MRDF. 
There was a near unanimity of 77 respondents that considered it would be better to 
implement a system in which the contribution to the MRDF would take into account the 
financial capacity of each member. However the respondents all agreed that this would 
involve a very difficult negotiation to convince the government of Argentina, and especially 
that of Brazil, to participate in such a MRDF where their financial contribution would be the 
greatest. Indeed, considering that Brazil faces huge development problems in the North and 
Northeast, the interviewees argued that it would be difficult to persuade the Brazilians to 
contribute to a Fund which will not only help them but also their neighbours.  
There are three possibilities which enable the smaller Mercosur members to negotiate 
and secure the participation of Brazil and Argentina in a MRDF with a fair distribution of the 
contribution. The first is that, because of the capital borrowed by the MRDF on the 
international financial markets, all countries should be able to receive more from the Fund 
than they contributed, even the largest contributors. The second is to provide some 
compensation for Brazil and Argentina. For example, more positions can be made available to 
Brazilians and Argentinian specialists among the MRDF officials, or the headquarters of the 
MRDF could be located in one of these two countries. A third possibility is to give more 
decision-making power to countries with the highest financial contributions. This third issue 
is discussed further in the next section related to the MRDF decision-making procedures. 
Other types of financial contribution 
In addition to the direct financial contribution of the member states to the initial capital 
of the Mercosur Regional Development Fund, a second type of financial contribution can be 
adopted. This does not require further direct transfers of resources from the members, but that 
they agree to act as financial guarantors for the loans the MRDF makes on the international 
scene. Having states as financial guarantors enables the MRDF to borrow money at better 
rates, since on the international financial markets reimbursement is guaranteed, from the 
member states, if not from the MRDF359.  
In such a case, the higher the number of guarantors, the more money the MRDF will 
be able to borrow, and the lower the interest rate. It can be seen that this is an additional 
argument to support opening the MRDF to other members and not to limit it to the four or six 
Mercosur members.  
Finally, each MRDF member would guarantee a share of the borrowings made by the 
Fund, this share being determined either equally or equitably, copying the model established 
for the direct contribution of member states to the capital of the MRDF.  
                                                
358  See the first section of Chapter 5. 
359 Except in a very few exceptional cases, states never becoming bankrupt, they offer a guaranteed return on the 
money they borrow. It has however happened that states declare themselves unwilling to repay their international 
debt, such as Russia in 1917, or that they are unable to do so, such as Mexico in 1982. 
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In the second section it was argued that it would be possible to attract international 
organisations and development agencies of rich countries to participate in the Fund, although 
they would not receive finance for projects through the MRDF360. It is consequently possible 
to establish a MRDF in which the contribution of these members, that is international 
organisations and developed countries, would take the form of guarantees. This implies that, 
in theory, these members would not transfer resources to the MRDF. However, it does mean 
that in the event of the Fund becoming bankrupt, such members would have to repay MRDF 
loans. Such an eventuality implies that the MRDF and its managers must be trustworthy. 
Other MRDF members, that is the Mercosur countries, which will be the main 
borrowers, would have to guarantee part of the loans made by the MRDF and contribute to 
the initial capital.  
THE MRDF DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES  
There are various ways to share the decision-making power within the bodies of the 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund. Two aspects need to be taken into account when 
defining the different possible scenarios. The first aspect is what should be the distribution of 
the voting power among the members. The choice is whether this should be based on equality, 
each member having one vote, or whether the distribution of votes is to be done 
proportionally according to some criterion, such as the financial contribution. The second 
aspect is related to whether decisions should be adopted through unanimity or majority 
voting. Since for each of these two factors there are two possible solutions, there is a total of 
four different scenarios relating to decision-making procedures that need to considered. 
The distribution of votes among MRDF members 
As noted above when the financial contribution to the MRDF was discussed, there are 
two solutions for the distribution of the number of votes, that is equality or equity.  
It first can be argued that, since all Mercosur members are independent sovereign 
states, each has in theory the same significance. For this reason, they should be strictly 
considered as equal. This is the decision-making system currently used within Mercosur 
institutions. Each country is given one vote, whatever its geographic, economic or political 
significance. It should be noted that this system, based on equality, paradoxically creates 
inequality. Indeed, the same weight is given to the 3 million Uruguayans as to the 161 million 
Brazilians, which clearly disadvantages the larger member states. 
A second solution can be considered and is based on an equity principle. This means 
giving more votes to larger countries, according to one or more criteria. For example, the 
criterion could be the population size, which would give a better representation of each 
inhabitant. However, for a financial institution like the MRDF, it can be argued that it would 
be better to use as a criterion the financial contribution of each country. This would imply that 
the financial contributions of the countries should correspondingly be determined on the 
equity principle rather than equality361. If it were defined by equality, it would mean that each 
country would contribute the same amount to the MRDF budget, and as a result would have 
the same number of votes, which would be similar to distributing votes according to the 
principle of equality.  
                                                
360 It would be paradoxical for the US or for an EU country to borrow money from the MRDF even if it 
participates in its financing. 
361 See the fifth section of Chapter 9. 
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A fair distribution of votes can be either strictly proportional or done through a system 
of weighting. In the event that a distribution of the votes proportional to the contribution to 
the MRDF is adopted, using the previous quantitative example (see Table 9.2 above), it would 
mean that Brazil would obtain 65% of the votes while Bolivia and Paraguay would each have 
less than one vote. Such a solution would greatly favour Brazil over all the other members. It 
would also give an almost non-existent role to smaller members, which would clearly be 
unacceptable to them. 
The other system which takes into consideration the differences of size between the 
members without being strictly proportional is the weighting of votes. An agreement would 
have to be reached through negotiation, where each member state would have a certain 
number of votes related to the economic, geographic, demographic, or political importance of 
the country. This is the system chosen by the European Union. Here the highly populated 
countries like France and Germany have 10 votes, a medium-size country such as Austria has 
4, and a small country such as Luxembourg has 2362. This system takes into consideration the 
disparities of size of the member states, without giving the small members too minor a role in 
the decision-making process. 
Unanimity or majority voting? 
The second aspect of the decision-making procedures which needs to be discussed is 
the percentage of votes necessary to adopt a decision. Two possible solutions are suggested 
and are that decisions should be adopted either through unanimity or through majority voting. 
In the first case, decisions are adopted unanimously, that is through “having the 
agreement and consent of all without dissent”363. It is the system that has been established in 
Mercosur since its creation. The advantage is that no decision can be enforced in a country 
without its prior consent, which is a guarantee that their sovereignty is respected. It also 
guarantees that all member states are part of the negotiations, and not just the states which are 
necessary to reach a majority. However, unanimity can sometimes paralyse the process of 
integration if one country, whatever its relative importance and size, votes against a decision.  
The second case is based on majority rule, that is where “a majority usually 
constituted by fifty per cent plus one of the members of a politically organised group shall 
have the power to make decisions binding upon the whole group”364. However, it can also be 
decided that the majority should be qualified, which implies that more than the half of the 
votes is necessary for the adoption of decisions, that is 66% or 75% of the votes. For example, 
at the time of writing, most decisions adopted within the EU are adopted on the basis of 
qualified majority voting, that is by at least 62 of the total of 87 votes. Moreover, an 
additional criterion could be agreed upon. It could for example be decided that to be adopted, 
a decision needs to represent the consent of 75% of the votes, this representing 66% of the 
number of members. 
These different cases of majority voting reduce the risk that the integration process 
could become frozen as a result of difficult negotiations over any matter. However, majority 
voting requires that sovereign states acknowledge the fact that they might have to adopt 
norms which they first rejected. 
                                                
362 As noted in Chapter 2, Germany, UK, Italy and France have 10 votes; Spain 8; Belgium, Portugal, Greece 
and The Netherlands 5; Sweden and Austria 4; Ireland, Denmark and Finland 3; and Luxembourg 2. 
363 Webster’s third new international dictionary of the English language, 3 volumes, 1986, Webster, USA, 
p.2482. 
364 Webster’s third new international dictionary of the English language, 3 volumes, 1986, Webster, USA, 
p.1363. 
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Four scenarios for decision-making procedures 
It is possible to combine these two factors related to decision-making, the distribution 
of the vote and the type of majority required for the adoption, into four different scenarios. 
Each of these scenarios can now be discussed to determine which would be the most 
appropriate for a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. The four possible scenarios are: 1) 
equality and unanimity; 2) equality and majority; 3) equity and unanimity; and 4) equity and 
majority. 
Scenario 1: equality and unanimity 
The first scenario, equality and unanimity, would mean that each member has one vote 
and that it is necessary for all members to reach a consensus since they are all necessary for 
the adoption of the decision. It is the system in force in the present Mercosur bodies. It could 
be extrapolated to a Mercosur Regional Development Fund so there is a similarity between 
the different Mercosur bodies and a continuity of its underlying principles.  
This approach guarantees that the support of each member is necessary for the 
decision. The larger members therefore need to accept the principle of having as much weight 
as the smaller members. There could be some drawbacks to this scenario in the event that a 
MRDF was open to extra-regional members and private institutions. The more members that 
take part in the decision-making process, the higher is the probability that one of the members 
will disagree. 
Moreover, it implies that Mercosur members accept that it is necessary to give as 
much decision-making power to MRDF non-Mercosur members. These would certainly 
outnumber the four Mercosur members. 
Scenario 2: equality and majority 
The second scenario, equality and majority, means that each country has one vote and 
that decisions are adopted on a majority vote. If the membership of the MRDF is limited to 
the four Mercosur members, such a scenario would lead to most decisions being adopted by 
three out of the four countries. This might lead to alliances and exclude de facto a member 
from the decision-making procedures. On the other hand, if the MRDF is open to extra-
regional and private members, as recommended above in the second section, the Mercosur 
countries might soon become a minority. This could lead to some MRDF decisions being 
adopted without the consent of any of the Mercosur members.  
One way to limit such extreme situations would be to design a system of ‘double 
majority’, which means that the adoption of a decision depends on a majority vote from all 
the members, majority which would include the consent of the majority of the Mercosur 
members. Such a decision-making approach procedure was established within the Security 
Council, the highest decision-making body of the United Nations. This body is composed of 
five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA) and ten temporary 
rotating members. According to Article 27 of the UN Charter, each Security Council member  
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has one vote, which is the application of the principle of equality. Whereas for procedural 
issues decisions are adopted by at least nine of the fifteen members, other issues require that 
the nine affirmative votes include the votes of the five permanent members365. 
Scenario 3: equity and unanimity  
The third scenario, equity and unanimity, is meaningless and would be similar to the 
first scenario. This scenario implies that each member is attributed a different number of 
votes, according to its importance, but that the decision should be adopted unanimously. 
However, if unanimity is required, the consent of all members is needed, whether they 
account for 99% or 1% of the votes. There is therefore no justification for distributing votes 
according to equity principles if decisions are adopted unanimously since each member would 
have de facto the same importance. 
Scenario 4: equity and majority 
The fourth scenario, equity and majority, takes into consideration the differences 
between all MRDF members, thus giving a significant role to larger members. Indeed, not 
only do these members have more votes, but the votes have more significance since they are 
necessary to reach a majority vote. This scenario is arguably the most equitable since it gives 
to each country a role in the decision making process in accordance to its relative weight 
compared to other members.  
Such a system would however be almost impossible to implement in a MRDF 
composed of only four members. It is necessary to have more members, such as the fifteen 
states which compose the EU, to give small and medium members the possibility to form 
coalitions to counter-balance the weight of the largest members. 
The MRDF decision-making process 
As discussed in the last sub-section, the majority of interviewees supported a MRDF 
open to non-Mercosur members, whose financial contributions would be based upon the 
equity principle366. Arguably, these characteristics accord best with the fourth decision-
making scenario, that is decision-making procedures based on an equitable distribution of 
votes and on majority voting. This will enable the progress of tasks of the MRDF, whereas 
unanimity might not. 
Indeed, if there is a large number of members within the MRDF, the use of unanimity 
will certainly lead often to a paralysis of the actions undertaken by the MRDF due to a lack of 
consensus between the members. This therefore rules out scenarios 1 and 3. Scenario 2 
proposes that each member should have one vote. Given that the interviewees proposed the 
financial contribution should be calculated equitably according to the importance of the 
member, scenario 2 would imply that, although their financial contribution to the MRDF is 
more significant, the larger countries would have the same decision-making weight as the 
smaller countries. It is highly improbable that either Brazil or Argentina would accept such a 
scenario.  
                                                
365 Article 27 of the UN Charter states that (Charter found in 2001 on www.un.org):  
1. “Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote  
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members 
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members 
including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and 
under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting”.  
366 See respectively the second and the fifth sections of Chapter 9. 
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Therefore, given the influence exerted by Argentina and Brazil within the Mercosur 
process of integration, it is more probable that, if they agree to contribute more to the capital 
of the MRDF, they will require more votes than smaller members. However, the decision-
making system selected should protect the smaller members from a ‘dictatorship’ of Brazil, 
and to a lesser extent of Argentina, which would otherwise impose their will on the MRDF.  
THE MRDF PROCEDURE FOR SELECTING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
The seventh characteristic of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund which should 
be discussed is the procedure by which the Fund will select the development projects it will 
finance.  
There are two subsequent issues which need to be discussed. The first issue, to which 
the answer is relatively straightforward, is related to the decision of whether the MRDF 
executives can be utilised in the selection of a project. It can be argued that the MRDF 
executive body should have the competency to take such a decision. Indeed, given the 
institutional structure proposed in the fourth section, the responsibility to approve the award 
of MRDF to a project would reside in the hands of the Executive Secretariat, the only 
permanent body, since it is the executive and operational arm of the MRDF. Such a 
responsibility would go against traditional organisational structures since, in general, 
secretariats execute decisions but do not adopt them. The decision of the Executive Secretariat 
would however be guided by the priorities and criteria which would be devised by the highest 
decision-making body, namely the Board of Governors. These project selection criteria would 
need to be defined in line with the priorities of the MRDF. Since such issue is too technical to 
be discussed briefly within this thesis, it could be a subject for further studies. 
The second issue is related to the formulation of projects to be financed. This issue is 
more open to discussion than the above issue since there are three possibilities. Indeed, the 
development projects financed by the MRDF could either be formulated by the MRDF 
institutions, by the MRDF member states, or by third parties. These are discussed in turn. 
Development projects formulated by the MRDF institutions 
The first eventuality implies that, within the Executive Secretariat of the MRDF, 
officials would be given the responsibility of designing development projects these to meet 
the priorities and criteria defined by the decision-making body. This would arguably have 
positive outcomes since it would favour the financing of projects taking into account a 
Mercosur common interest. It would also improve the coordination among the different 
projects. For these reasons the European Commission has tried to develop such procedures 
during the past few decades through the establishment of a programmatic approach.  
However, although it was argued in Chapter 7 that the EU principle of programming 
should be transferred to a MRDF, it is very unlikely that such a step would be taken in 
Mercosur in the near future for a number of reasons. 
It can be argued that such a procedure would have two principal disadvantages for 
Mercosur member states. Firstly, it would mean a loss of sovereignty for member states in an 
important policy area, that of regional policy, since the MRDF would not finance projects of 
national interest. Secondly, such a procedure would require the MRDF Executive Secretariat 
to increase its number of officials, to create a body responsible for designing the development 
projects to be financed. This might represent too high a level of institutionalisation to be 
acceptable by member states. In addition to these two disadvantages from the point of view of 
the Member states, there is also the risk that development projects would be designed by 
technocrats who would not be aware of local or regional contexts and necessities. As a 
Paraguayan economist highlighted in 2001 during the interview, “how can we guarantee that a 
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bureaucracy can define priorities and determine what Fullanito367 needs? These bureaucracies 
are often a good idea when they are designed and established, but they then evolve and the 
initial principles and objectives are distorted”. 
Development projects formulated by the MRDF member states  
The second possibility is that MRDF financed development projects would be 
formulated by the governments of member states. As it has been done in the European Union, 
member states would design a series of development projects and then transmit them to the 
MRDF to request financial assistance.  
This is the solution generally preferred by member states since it enables them to keep 
a stronghold over regional policy and to design projects which, although they respect criteria 
defined by the MRDF, accord with national interests. However, the cost of this would be a 
lack of coordination between the different projects financed by the MRDF.  
If the process of a national formulation of projects were adopted, local or regional 
actors, whether public or private, which needed MRDF funds to carry out a project, would 
have to present their proposition to their government. On the approval of the project by the 
government, this adjudged by national criteria, the project would be presented by the member 
states to the MRDF executive body to support the claim for assistance. 
Development projects formulated by agencies 
The third and last possibility is to assign the responsibility for formulating projects to a 
large variety of actors and authorities, which would include regional and local authorities, as 
well as public and private bodies. These actors could be given the capacity to present projects 
to the MRDF directly to obtain financial assistance, which would bypass the national level of 
authority. This would imply an application of the principles of partnership, since different 
partners are implicated into the development of the region, and subsidiarity, since local and 
regional authorities would have some competencies, as learned from the EU experience. 
Indeed, these principles favour the inclusion within the process a wide range of actors, this to 
take account of diverse interests. 
Given the present reluctance of Mercosur member states to share their sovereignty, it 
is highly probable that, at least during the early years of existence of the MRDF, the states 
will not wish to share the responsibility for formulating development projects. Other actors 
might be given a consultative role, and the MRDF would be reduced to approving – or not – 
projects designed by the governments. 
However, it can be argued that Mercosur might follow the EU example for this 
seventh characteristic of the MRDF. Accordingly, once the MRDF has proven itself in the 
first few years of its operational existence, the member states might agree to allow the MRDF 
executive body to propose development projects, these to satisfy the common interest. This 
would imply the development and application of the EU principle of programming. It might 
also allow a group of actors to propose projects to the MRDF – thus putting in practice the EU 
principles of partnership and subsidiarity. 
                                                
367 In Spanish, “Fullanito” represents any Latin American, like “Mr. X” in the English speaking world.  
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THE FINANCIAL MECHANISMS OF THE MRDF 
Another essential characteristic of the Mercosur Regional Development Fund is the 
mechanisms which could be designed to finance development projects. There are two types of 
financing mechanisms which are discussed in the first sub-section. The options to be 
considered are loans or grants, or a mix of the two. In discussing the financial mechanisms of 
the MRDF, it is necessary to note that in the second sub-section the principle of additionality 
is taken into account, since it was argued above in Chapter 7 that the EU principle could be 
transferred to a MRDF. The last sub-section gives an overview of other means through which 
the MRDF could contribute to development projects. 
Financing projects by loans or grants 
Financing development through loans has one principal advantage. The capital loaned 
is eventually returned to the MRDF, thereby replenishing the Fund. The rate of interest needs 
to be as low as possible since, unlike private financial institutions, the aim of the MRDF is not 
to make a profit but to assist development. Some of the interviewees when asked for an 
opinion on this issue, considered that the making of loans would be a better solution for 
development financing. This was because loans financially involve the local actors 
responsible for the implementation of the project. Since these actors need to repay the loan, 
they are much more careful in the management of the finances of the project than if the 
project was financed by a grant. The conditions attached to the loans, such as the rate of 
interest and the repayment instalments, will need to be carefully determined, since it is 
necessary to make loans that are attractive and which will be a use to development projects. 
This issue is however too technical to be analysed in detail in the thesis. 
The financing of development projects through grants, the second option, would 
arguably be more coherent in relation to the objective of a regional development fund. By 
definition, the regions which need most financial assistance from the MRDF are the regions 
with the fewest resources. Consequently, if regional authorities need to finance their 
development by taking out loans, they might not have sufficient resources to repay the loans 
and would therefore not be able to obtain finance for development projects. Moreover, some 
priority regions are already highly indebted and do not have the capacity to borrow any more 
money. Financing development through the award of grants overcomes such obstacles and 
allows the MRDF to assist the regions in the most need. A second reason in support of the 
argument for the award of grants is that some categories of development projects, especially 
those related to social issues, offer little or no financial return. Therefore, since such projects 
would not have the capacity to repay loan capital, they could not be financed by loans but 
only by grants. 
It is clear, however, that were the MRDF to work solely through grants, it would lead 
to the exhaustion of the capital of the Fund, unless it is automatically replenished by 
members. As discussed above, Mercosur members face difficult economic and financial times 
and have little resources to spare for a common development fund. It would thus be 
impossible for these members to replenish the capital of the MRDF every few years. 
It is consequently possible to set up a Mercosur Regional Development Fund where 
both systems of financing would coexist. A share of the resources of the MRDF could be used 
to award grants to development projects offering no return, such as many social projects. 
Another share of the Fund could be directed to making loans to projects which would have the 
capacity to repay the loan, such as assisting the creation of small and medium size enterprises 
or industrial reconversion projects. These shares would be calculated so that the MRDF would 
necessitate little or no replenishment of its capital by the members.  
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For example, the International Fund for Agricultural Research368, created in 1977, 
finances agricultural development projects by awarding grants and loans to the countries 
requiring its financial assistance. Between 1978 and 2000, the IFAD approved 578 loans for a 
total amount of US$ 6,900.2 million and awarded 1,457 grants for a total of US$ 387.9 
million369. Grants therefore accounted for 5.3% of the total IFAD loan and grant operations 
during this period. 
The discussion about whether development should be financed through loans or 
through grants is also taking place within the EU. In a MRDF the issue would be to 
determine, within the projects financed through loans, a list of exceptions which might be 
financed through grants. It is the opposite in the EU since some authors, such as Martin, argue 
in favour of reducing the number of grant-financed projects to finance more projects through 
loans. “Many of the Structural Funds projects that are now grant-financed, especially 
infrastructure investments but also support measures for the productive sector such as the 
construction of business parks, could be financed on the basis of soft or interest-free loans”370.  
The principle of additionality 
A second aspect needs to be taken into account in considering the financial 
mechanisms of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. It concerns what percentage of the 
cost of the project is to be financed by the MRDF. Indeed, it can be seen that a project could 
be entirely financed by the MRDF, or cofinanced by a number of agencies, whether public 
authorities, private institutions or international organisations. 
In the assessment of the EU regional development experience, it was argued in 
Chapter 7 that it would be appropriate to transfer to Mercosur the EU principle of 
additionality, according to which EU funds may contribute to between 25% and 85% to the 
cost of a project. Adapting this principle to Mercosur, the cost of development projects would 
be financed by public authorities, either directly, or indirectly through other financial 
institutions, leaving the rest to the MRDF which would be an additional financial source. It 
can be suggested that the size of the share which could be financed by the MRDF would 
depend on the significance of the project and on how it fits the MRDF priority list and 
selection criteria. 
Other means to finance development projects 
In addition to the funding financing mechanisms discussed above, there are other 
means through which the MRDF could contribute to development. Only two examples are 
given and briefly described. These are technical expertise and a guarantor role. 
Firstly, the MRDF can provide free technical expertise. This would help a local or a 
regional agency to design a development project and to find resources to finance it. This 
service should not be provided by the Executive Secretariat since it should remain neutral and 
independent. Therefore, to provide such a service, it would be necessary for the MRDF to 
create a third body, with enough technical officials to give advice on projects.  
A second method which could assist development is that the MRDF could act as a 
guarantor for other local financial institutions. The MRDF would not directly lend money to 
the agency which finances a project but would guarantee the loans made by this agency. This 
                                                
368 See Chapter 5 for more information on the IFAD. 
369 IFAD 2000 Annual Report, downloaded in 2002 from: www.ifad.org.  
370 Martin Reiner, Regional policy in the European Union, 1999, Centre for European Policy Studies, England, 
pp.128. 
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would help the agency to find loans with better rates since it would have a robust guarantor, 
the MRDF, which itself is guaranteed by its member states.  
Such a mechanism of guaranteeing loans could be used to assist development projects 
which cannot be financed directly by the MRDF. The MRDF could indeed find that some 
projects are useful for regional development although they did not meet the criteria that would 
lead to the award of MRDF financial support. The MRDF could therefore support such 
projects indirectly, by helping the agencies responsible for funding the project. The MRDF 
managers would need to be cautious in acting as a guarantor since mistakes would have a 
double negative impact. There would first be a financial impact on the MRDF since it would 
have to repay the loan made by the agency which managed the project. More importantly, 
such errors would diminish the credibility of the MRDF on the financial scene.  
THE EVALUATION AND SUPERVISION OF THE MRDF 
The final characteristic of a MRDF that needs to be discussed is the evaluation and 
supervision of the activities of the Mercosur Regional Development Fund. It is indeed 
necessary for the members to ensure that confidence is inspired in the MRDF. One way of 
doing this is to guarantee the use of good methods of evaluation and supervision to 
demonstrate the efficient use of the resources of the Fund. 
The evaluation of projects financed by the MRDF 
It could be appropriate for the Mercosur Regional Development Fund to study the EU 
procedures for project evaluation. As in the EU, it can be argued that Mercosur projects 
should be evaluated ex ante, mid-term and at the end of the project. This would permit the 
verification of the bona fides of the project, its functioning from an audit perspective, and in 
respect to the principle of additionality.  
Establishing what can be lengthy evaluation procedures requires that the projects are 
monitored over a mid or long term period. The mid-term evaluation might be excluded for 
very short-term projects since, otherwise, more time would be spent on evaluating a one year 
project than on implementing it. Another consequence of developing such evaluation 
procedures is that, if MRDF members do not wish to depend on external experts, it will be 
necessary to have a specific body of technicians in charge of project evaluations, body which 
should be independent from the Executive Secretariat since the projects are financed by the 
latter. This institutional and bureaucratic cost is necessary to ensure the successful 
implementation of the projects, as well as to strengthen the overall credibility of the MRDF. 
The supervision of the activities of the MRDF 
In relation to the issue of the supervision of the MRDF, that is the scrutiny of its 
activities, three main supervisors can be suggested. These are the MRDF Board of Governors, 
the Mercosur institutions, and the member states.  
Firstly, it would be appropriate for the highest decision-making body of the MRDF to 
have the principal supervising role over the activities supported by the MRDF. As discussed 
in the fourth section, this body would be a Board of Governors, composed of delegates from 
each member. Being hierarchically the highest MRDF body, the Board needs to verify that the 
Executive Secretariat, the operational body responsible for financing development projects, 
acts according to the policy guidelines, the priorities and the criteria set out by the Board. 
Although the Board would have the responsibility for supervising the activities of the MRDF, 
it would be more appropriate if it did not undertake the task of supervision itself but delegated 
it to a third party, such as private consultants or international organisations. The Board of 
Governors would however remain solely responsible for taking the necessary measures in 
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relation to the suggestions made by this third party. The participation of a third independent 
and objective party in the supervision process would contribute to the guarantee that the 
MRDF is transparent and well managed. 
Secondly, since it was argued above in the third section that the MRDF should be part 
of the Mercosur institutional structure, it can be suggested that the Fund should also be 
supervised by the Mercosur Common Market Council (CMC), the supreme Mercosur body. It 
might be appropriate for the CMC to have a lesser role in the supervision process than the 
Board of Governors. Indeed, whereas the CMC only includes representatives from the 
Mercosur members, the Board of Governors would be composed of all the MRDF 
contributors, that is Mercosur members, other member states, international organisations and 
private institutions371. If more importance was given to the CMC than to the MRDF Board, 
non Mercosur members might feel that they were not given enough consideration within the 
MRDF procedures. This might lead non-Mercosur members to opt out of the Fund.  
Thirdly and finally, it can be argued that all MRDF members will supervise closely the 
activities supported by the Fund, this because of their financial participation in it.  
                                                
371 See the second section of this chapter. 
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* 
* * 
The fourth part of the thesis, composed of Chapters 8 and 9, tested the third and last 
hypothesis on which the thesis is based, namely that “it is possible to adapt the lessons 
learned from the EU within the Mercosur context to define the priorities and main 
characteristics of the Mercosur Regional Development Fund”. 
To conclude this chapter, and to draw together the results of the analysis of the nine 
principal characteristics of the Mercosur Regional Development Fund it can be argued that, to 
efficiently reduce regional disparities, it would be advisable for the MRDF to: 
1. Be created through a substantial transformation of the Fonplata; 
2. Be composed principally of the four Mercosur members, that is Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay, and the two Mercosur associate members, that is Bolivia and 
Chile. However, the membership of the MRDF might also be opened to non-Mercosur 
states, to private institutions, and to international organisations; 
3. Be independent, but to be included within the Mercosur institutional structure; have a 
light flexible institutional structure, which could be composed of a decision-making 
body, such as a Board of Governors, and an operational body, such as an Executive 
Secretariat; 
4. Determine the financial contribution of its members according to their financial 
capacities. The MRDF could also ask its members to act as guarantors for loans that it 
makes; 
5. Establish decision-making procedures based on an equitable distribution of votes, 
which means that some MRDF members would have more weight in decision-making 
than others, and on the basis of qualified majority voting. However, the distribution of 
votes and the threshold for the adoption of decisions needs to be carefully determined 
so that large members have a greater representation than small ones, but that the 
smaller members nevertheless have an influence on decision-making; 
6. Have the capacity, in the short term, to select among development projects presented 
by members those which will be financed by the MRDF. In the long term, it might be 
advisable to also give to local and regional agencies the opportunity to design or bring 
forward development projects, and for the MRDF to propose projects of common 
interest; 
7. Finance development projects both through loans, for projects which can offer a 
financial return, and through grants, for those projects which do not have the capacity 
to repay capital. The MRDF might also consider other opportunities for assisting 
development through technical advice and guarantees; 
8. Establish robust evaluation procedures and be well supervised, so that the MRDF 
members and international financial actors can have trust in the sound and efficient 
management of the Fund. 
 
The following chapter, Chapter 10, draws together the findings of the thesis and 
suggests future directions for research. 
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CHAPTER  10..   CONCLUSII ON  
 
The thesis examines three hypotheses:  
1. It is possible for Mercosur to reduce significant regional disparities by complementing 
the activities of existing development agencies through the establishment of a 
Mercosur Regional Development Fund. 
2. It is possible to design a prospective policy transfer framework to determine what 
lessons and under which circumstances Mercosur could transfer the extensive 
experience of the EU in regional development funds to design its own common 
approach. 
3. It is possible to adapt the lessons learned from the EU within the Mercosur context to 
define the priorities and main characteristics of the Mercosur Regional Development 
Fund. 
To conclude the thesis, Chapter 10 briefly revisits each of these three hypotheses by 
looking at how far the findings of the thesis support them and contribute to the literature. This 
chapter also suggests directions for future research. 
Firstly, the statistical analysis undertaken in Chapter 4 has highlighted the nature and 
extent of regional disparities within Mercosur. The analysis of regional development in 
Mercosur has enabled the production of a number of development maps. These maps and the 
commentary have served to enhance the understanding of the scale and variety of the 
Mercosur regional development ‘problem’. A basic statistical method which combined 
various indicators was used and this has enabled a list of regions to be drawn up, to 
characterise the regions as economically, infrastructurally and/or socially relatively less 
developed compared with the rest of Mercosur.  
The statistical findings of this research need to be viewed with a degree of caution 
since the regional data that are available from Mercosur countries are somewhat imperfect. 
Further statistical studies on Mercosur regional disparities clearly need to be carried out, 
based on additional indicators, such as poverty rates and child mortality for example, as well 
as on up to date and harmonised data.  
Because of the breadth and scope of these regional disparities, developing an efficient 
response to reduce these disparities is a real challenge. Although Mercosur countries have at 
their disposal a considerable number of mechanisms to sustain development, it is apparent 
that they lack a common approach at the Mercosur level that would focus specifically on 
regional development and that would complement and support their national actions.  
Amongst the different options Mercosur has at its disposal to reduce regional 
disparities through a common approach, the research has suggested in Chapter 5 that the 
creation of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund would be the most appropriate choice 
given the present circumstances. However, future research might serve to deepen the 
understanding of other Mercosur options to reduce regional disparities, since clearly a MRDF 
is only one possible solution. 
The conclusions reached after the analyses undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5 support the 
first hypothesis which stated that “it is possible for Mercosur to reduce significant regional 
disparities by complementing the activities of existing development agencies through the 
establishment of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund”. 
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Secondly, the thesis has suggested that, when designing a MRDF, it would be of 
interest for Mercosur decision-makers to consider the experience of another supranational 
association in regional development, namely that of the European Union.  
As a consequence, since the current literature focused principally on policy transfers 
that have already taken place between states, the thesis developed in Chapter 6 a framework 
to analyse prospective policy transfers between supranational associations. In addition to 
suggesting the factors which should be taken into account when considering a policy transfer 
between supranational associations, this framework also discusses whether these factors are 
likely to contribute to the success or the failure of the transfer. 
This is however only a first attempt at designing a framework for the analysis of 
prospective policy transfers. Before it can be used by policy-makers, to learn from the 
experience of others, further research must be undertaken. A first direction for research would 
be to examine case-studies other than those which relate specifically to the transfer of the EU 
regional development fund experience to Mercosur. For example, as suggested in this thesis, 
Mercosur might also consider learning from the experience of the Corporación Andina de 
Fomento. It would also be valuable to use the framework to consider EU – CAF transfers 
since both have an experience in regional development funding and could learn from one 
another.  
A second direction for further research would be to employ this framework, as well as 
the current literature on retrospective policy transfers, to develop a more comprehensive 
framework which would include all the factors that need to be considered in analysing 
whether a policy might successfully be transferred, whether between supranational 
associations or between states. 
The framework developed in Chapter 6 was applied to the specific case under 
consideration in the thesis. This led Chapter 7 to discuss the fundamental principles of the EU 
regional development fund experience – namely concentration, partnership, subsidiarity, 
additionality, programming and effectiveness – since these could most successfully be 
transferred to Mercosur. Critically, however, and as suggested in the thesis, Mercosur should 
not copy and transfer ‘lock, stock and barrel’ these principles. On the contrary, Mercosur 
should consider them essentially as a source of inspiration as it moves on to define its own 
principles. Ultimately, the instruments which Mercosur sets in place for regional development 
must be appropriate to its specific political, social, economic and physical environment and 
circumstances. 
This thesis, having initiated the debate, also suggests that it would be valuable to 
further research the principles underlying the EU regional development funds, in order to 
discuss their transferability to other supranational associations. Indeed, such research might 
lead to the definition of a set of ‘generic’ guiding principles which could be transferred not 
only to Mercosur, but to any other supranational association wishing to establish a common 
approach to regional development. 
The conclusions reached after the research undertaken in Chapters 6 and 7 support the 
second hypothesis of the thesis, namely that “it is possible to design a prospective policy 
transfer framework to determine what lessons and under which circumstances Mercosur could 
transfer the extensive experience of the EU in regional development funds to design its own 
common approach”. 
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The research undertaken in the first seven chapters of the thesis lead a consideration of 
the issue that there are some lessons that Mercosur can learn from the EU regional 
development experience. Chapters 8 and 9 considered these lessons, as well as the specific 
context of Mercosur, and discussed the nature of a MRDF by suggesting its priorities as well 
as its principal characteristics. This research confirms the third and last hypothesis of the 
thesis, namely that “it is possible to adapt the lessons learned from the EU within the 
Mercosur context to define the priorities and main characteristics of the Mercosur Regional 
Development Fund”. 
It would however clearly be valuable for future research to test the suggestions made 
within the thesis about the creation of a Mercosur Regional Development Fund. 
 
This thesis has exposed the nature and scale of the regional development challenge 
faced by Mercosur. It has suggested that the creation of a Mercosur Regional Development 
Fund, although not the sole solution, is one way forward. It has proposed a framework which 
could be employed to account for prospective policy transfers between two supranational 
associations such as the EU and Mercosur. The analysis of the EU regional development fund 
experience has led to the proposal that there are some key EU principles from which 
Mercosur could learn. At a time when Mercosur decision-makers are looking at the EU 
experience to develop a common approach to regional development, the thesis has considered 
these EU lessons and the Mercosur situation, and has suggested some priorities and main 
characteristics of the MRDF. 
Looking to the future, what Mercosur needs is a well-informed, coherent, and 
commonly agreed policy response to its regional development disparities. However, the ‘jury’ 
is still out in terms whether Mercosur can effectively meet this challenge. Nonetheless, this 
thesis provides much case study material for further academic research in the coming years. 
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A1.1. List of interviewees by country: profession, fieldtrip (F1/F2), date and duration of interview 
 
 Name Title Institution F1 F2 Date Time 
AR  Economist Dirección de Mercosur e Integración, Subsecretaría de 
Comercio Exterior 
 X 09/03/01 0:30 
AR  Coordinador de Asuntos Internacionales and for SGT 5 Secretaría de Transporte de la Nación  X 09/03/01 1:00 
AR  Director Maestria Relaciones Internacionales Fundación Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales 
(FLACSO) 
 X 13/03/01 0:50 
AR  Professor, Head of the Master on Mercosur Centro de Estudios Avanzados, University of Buenos 
Aires 
 X 07/03/01 1:10 
AR  Economista en Relaciones Internacionales, Gerencia de 
Economia y Finanzas, Miembro adjunto del GMC 
Banco Central de la República Argentina X  11/07/00 1:20 
AR  Researcher for the Instituto de Politica Exterior Fundación Novum Millenium X  11/07/00 0:50 
AR  Researcher for the Instituto de Politica Exterior Fundación Novum Millenium  X 08/03/01 1:00 
AR  Jefe del Sector Financiero e Infrastructura Embajada de Brasil  X 12/03/01 1:15 
AR  Asesora de la Secretaría de Políticas y Regulación 
Sanitaria 
Ministerio de Salud y Acción Social  X 12/03/01 0:35 
AR  Directora Nacional de Asuntos Regionales SEPYME  X 13/03/01 0:40 
AR  Asesor para el Subsecretaria de Indústria, member of the 
SGT7 
Secretaria de Indústria, Comercio y Minería X  30/06/00 0:50 
AR  Asesor para el Subsecretaria de Indústria, member of the 
SGT7 
Secretaria de Indústria, Comercio y Minería  X 08/03/01 0:50 
AR  Dirección Mercosur, Coordinator CCM Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio 
Internacional y Culto 
 X 09/03/01 0:30 
AR  Consultora Principal, member of the SGT4 Ministerio de Economía y de Obras y Servicios Públicos X  28/06/00 1:00 
AR  Asesor, Coordinator for SGT N°9 Secretaría de Energia y Mineria, Ministerio de Economia  X 09/03/01 1:00 
AR  Coordinator SGT and Meetings of Health Ministries Ministerio de Salud y Acción Social  X 09/03/01 0:20 
AR  Diputado, Presidente de la Comisión del Mercosur Cámara de Diputados de la Nación  X 12/03/01 0:35 
AR  Economist IDB/INTAL X  26/06/00 1:00 
AR  Economist IDB/INTAL  X 08/03/01 1:00 
A
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List of interviewees (continued) 
 Name Title Institution F1 F2 Date Time 
AR  Coordinadora de Estudios Agroalimentarios Instituto Interamericano de Cooperación para la 
Agricultura (IICA) 
X  10/07/00 0:45 
AR  Subgerente de Relaciones Internacionales, member of 
the GMC 
Banco Central de la República de Argentina X  29/06/00 0:40 
AR  Subgerente de Relaciones Internacionales, member of 
the GMC 
Banco Central de la República de Argentina  X 12/03/01 0:50 
AR  Ex Ambassador for Mercosur Consejo Argentino para Relaciones Exteriores (CARI), 
Fondation Bank Boston 
 X 16/03/01 0:40 
AR  Asesor de la Secretaría de Asuntos Internacionales, 
member of the FCES 
Federación Argentina de Empleados de Comercio y 
Servicios (FAECYS) 
 X 09/03/01 0:50 
AR  Asesora en Coordinación de Asuntos Internacionales Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Formación de Recursos 
Humanos 
 X 12/03/01 1:00 
AR  Economic consultant Consultores en Económia y Organisación (CEO) X  27/06/00 0:25 
AR  Sub-Director de la Dirección del Mercosur Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores X  11/07/00 0:30 
AR  Ambassador to the Mercosur-EU Business Forum, 
Director Instituto de Política Exterior 
Minesterio de Relaciones Exteriores / Fundación Novum 
Millenium 
 X 13/03/01 0:25 
BR  Senator, Member of the Mercosur Joint Parliamentary 
Committee 
Senado Federal X  07/06/00 0:30 
BR  Diretora del Departamento de Micro, Pequena e Mèdia 
Empresa 
Secretaria do Desenvolvimento da Produção, Ministerio 
do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior 
X  09/06/00 0:50 
BR  Diretora del Departamento de Micro, Pequena e Mèdia 
Empresa 
Secretaria do Desenvolvimento da Produção, Ministerio 
do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior 
 X 02/04/01 0:50 
BR  Diretor de Programa de Recursos para o 
Desenvolvimento 
Secretaria de Planejamento e Investimentos Estratégicos, 
Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão 
 X 29/03/01 0:55 
BR  Researcher, Area de Planejamento BNDES X  26/05/00 1:00 
BR  Coordenador-Geral de Políticas de Organismos e 
Conjuntura, Director of Fonplata for Brazil 
Secretaria de Assuntos Internacionais, Ministério de 
Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão 
 X 30/03/01 0:55 
BR  Jefe de la División del Mercado Común (DMC) Ministerio das Relações Exteriores X  09/06/00 0:50 
BR  Jefe de la División del Mercado Común (DMC) Ministerio das Relações Exteriores  X 02/04/01 0:30 
BR  Professor in Economy Instituto de Economia of the University of Rio de 
Janeiro, also works for FUNCEX 
 X 22/02/01 0:45 
A
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List of interviewees (continued) 
 Name Title Institution F1 F2 Date Time 
BR  Professor, Coordenador Executivo del Núcleo de 
Estudos do Mercosul 
Universidade de Brasília (UNB) X  06/06/00 1:30 
BR  Secretária de Integração Nacional e Desenvolvimento 
Regional 
Ministério da Integração Nacional  X 30/03/01 0:20 
BR  Secretário de programas regionais integrados Ministerio da Integração Nacional X  08/06/00 0:45 
BR  Secretário de programas regionais integrados Ministerio da Integração Nacional  X 29/03/01 0:55 
BR  Coordenadora Geral de Assuntos Econômico-
Comercials 
Secretaria de Assuntos Internacionais,  
Ministerio da Fazenda 
X  09/06/00 0:45 
BR  Coordenadora-Geral de Integração Regional (DEINT), 
Departamento de Negociações Internacionais 
Secretaria de Comércio Exterior, Ministerio do 
Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior 
 X 02/04/01 0:20 
BR  Economist, Member of the FCES Confederação Nacional de Comercio, CNC X  26/05/00 1:00 
BR  Consultora Legislativa do Senado Federal para 
Mercosul e Relações Exteriores 
Consultoria Legislativa, Senado Federal  X 27/03/01 0:40 
BR  Assessora Especial do Gabinete do Ministro, SGT 11 y 
Reunião de Ministros da Saúde 
Ministério da Saúde  X 03/04/01 1:00 
BR  Brazilian Delegate to the Comité de Cooperação 
Técnica (CCT) do Mercosul 
Agencia Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC), Ministerio das 
Relações Exteriores 
 X 02/04/01 0:45 
BR  Economist Gerência de Estudos e Planejamento, Secretária de 
Desenvolviemento Regional, Ministério da Integração 
Nacional 
 X 03/04/01 2:30 
BR  First Secretary Representation of Brazil’s President to Mercosur, 
Ministério das Relações Exteriores 
 X 03/04/01 1:30 
BR  Terceiro Secretario de la División del Mercado Común 
(DMC) 
Ministerio das Relações Exteriores X  09/06/00 0:50 
BR  Gerente - Area de Planejamento BNDES X  26/05/00 1:00 
BR  Gerente - Area de Planejamento BNDES  X 20/02/01 1:15 
BR  Economist Diretoria de Estudios Macroeconômicos, 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) 
X  30/05/00 1:00 
BR  Gerente de los programas Corredor Mercosul e Leste de 
Avança Brasil 
Secretaria de Desenvolvimiento,  
Ministerio dos Transportes 
X  07/06/00 0:20 
BR  Analista de Comércio Exterior,  
Departamento de Negociações Internacionais 
Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio 
Exterior 
X  06/06/00 1:15 
A
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List of interviewees (continued) 
 Name Title Institution F1 F2 Date Time 
BR  Analista de Comércio Exterior,  
Departamento de Negociações Internacionais 
Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio 
Exterior 
 X 27/03/01 0:45 
BR  Ex-Director of the Department of Economic Integration 
(MRE), Consejero Económico 
Embajada del Paraguay in Brasil  X 23/03/01 0:50 
BR  Secretária de programas regionais integrados Ministerio da Integração Nacional X  08/06/00 0:45 
BR  Economist for the Unit of International Integration Confederação Nacional de Industria (CNI) X  30/05/00 1:00 
BR  Director de Politica Regional e Urbana Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)  X 28/03/01 0:30 
BR  Director Fundaçao Centro de Estudos  do Comércio Exterior 
(FUNCEX) 
 X 20/02/01 1:30 
BR  Gerente - Area de Planejamento BNDES X  26/05/00 1:00 
BR  Gerente de la Gerência de Estudos e Planejamento Secretária de Desenvolvimento Regional, Ministério da 
Integração Nacional 
 X 03/04/01 2:30 
BR  Gerente de la Gerência de Estudos e Planejamento Secretária de Desenvolvimento Regional, Ministério da 
Integração Nacional 
 X 30/03/01 1:25 
BR  Economist, Member of the FCES Confederação Nacional de Comercio, CNC X  26/05/00 1:00 
BR  Adviser Comissão Parlamentar Conjunta do Mercosul - 
Representação Brasileira 
 X 29/03/01 1:00 
BR  Deputado, Presidente Comissão Brasileira do Mercosul Camara dos Deputados  X 29/03/01 0:30 
BR  Economist Diretoria de Estudios Macroeconômicos, 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) 
X  30/05/00 1:00 
BR  Assessor Department of External Debt and International Relations, 
Banco Central do Brasil 
 X 28/03/01 1:00 
BR  Mathematician, Statistician Gerência de Estudos e Planejamento, Secretária de 
Desenvolviemento Regional, Ministério da Integração 
Nacional 
 X 03/04/01 2:30 
BR  Subdivision Manager Department of External Debt and International Relations, 
Banco Central do Brasil 
 X 28/03/01 1:00 
BR   Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)  X 28/03/01 0:55 
BR  Coordenadora Geral de Assuntos Econômico-
Comercials 
Secretaria de Assuntos Internacionais, Ministério da 
Fazenda 
 X 27/03/01 0:40 
BR  Coordenador Geral de Integração Energética Secretaria de Energia, Ministério de Minas e Energia  X 27/03/01 0:35 
BR  Analista de Comércio Exterior, Departamento de 
Negociações Internacionais 
Secretaria de Comércio Exterior, Ministerio do 
Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior 
 X 02/04/01 0:30 
BR  Economist, Member of the FCES Confederação Nacional de Comercio, CNC X  26/05/00 1:00 
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List of interviewees (continued) 
 Name Title Institution F1 F2 Date Time 
BR  Coordenadora de Projetos Instituto Brasileiro de Economia (IBRE) X  02/06/00 0:30 
BR  Adviser for Foreign Affairs for the Partido de los 
Trabalhadores (PT) 
Camara dos Deputados X  08/06/00 0:45 
BR  Adviser for Foreign Affairs for the Partido de los 
Trabalhadores (PT) 
Camara dos Deputados  X 30/03/01 0:30 
PY  Asesor – Asuntos Internacionales, SGT 5 Dirección Nacional de Transporte (DINATRAN), 
Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Comunicación 
 X 22/03/01 1:00 
PY  Consultor for the Direction of Economic Integration Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores X  04/08/00 1:00 
PY  Ex-Viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores para Asuntos 
Económicos (1996-98) 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores  X 19/03/01 1:00 
PY  Senador, Presidente de la Comisión Parlamentaria 
Paraguaya del Mercosur 
  X 20/03/01 1:40 
PY  Directora del Departamento de Integración Subsecretaría de Economía e Integración, 
Ministerio de Hacienda 
X  17/05/00 0:45 
PY  Directora del Departamento de Integración Subsecretaría de Economía e Integración, 
Ministerio de Hacienda 
 X 21/03/01 0:40 
PY  Directora del Departamento de Integración Subsecretaría de Economía e Integración, 
Ministerio de Hacienda 
 X 23/03/01 0:40 
PY  Director Interino del Departamento de Económia 
Internacional, SGT 4, GMC 
Gerencia de Estudios Económicos,  
Banco Central del Paraguay 
 X 21/03/01 1:15 
PY  Works for the Departamento de Integration, on 
Common External Tarrifs 
Subsecretaría de Economía e Integración, 
Ministerio de Hacienda 
X  17/05/00 1:20 
PY  Represents the BCP at the SGT 4 for financial issues Banco Central del Paraguay X  18/05/00 1:30 
PY  Vice Ministro de Asuntos Económicos Exteriores Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores X  17/05/00 0:15 
PY  Directora General Dirección General de Política Industrial, Minesterio de 
Industria y Comercio 
 X 22/03/01 0:50 
PY  President du Centro de Importadores del Paraguay,  
Membre du FCES 
Centro de Importadores del Paraguay X  11/05/00 1:00 
PY  Asesor, Gabinete Técnico Ministerio de Industria y Comercio X  02/08/00 1:30 
PY  Director Ejecutivo Centro Paraguayo para la Promoción de la Libertad 
Económica y de la Justicia Social (CEPPRO) 
 X 21/03/01 0:50 
PY  Ex-Viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores para Asuntos 
Económicos (1992-96), Ex-Ambassadeur, négotiateur 
Mercosur pour le Paraguay 
 X  16/05/00 0:30 
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List of interviewees (continued) 
 Name Title Institution F1 F2 Date Time 
PY  Ex-Viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores para Asuntos 
Económicos (1992-96), Ex-Ambassadeur, négotiateur 
Mercosur pour le Paraguay 
  X 19/03/01 0:25 
PY  Jefe de Departamento de Energia No Convencional Dirección de Recursos Energeticos, Viceministerio de 
Minas y Energia 
 X 21/03/01 0:30 
PY  Director Alterno Centro de Análisis y Difusión de Economía Paraguaya 
(CADEP) 
X  12/05/00 1:30 
PY  Director Alterno Centro de Análisis y Difusión de Economía Paraguaya 
(CADEP) 
X  03/08/00 1:15 
PY  Director Alterno Centro de Análisis y Difusión de Economía Paraguaya 
(CADEP) 
 X 17/03/01 2:30 
PY  Works for the Dirección de Negociaciones Económicas Ministry of External Relations X  12/05/00 0:30 
PY  Directora del Departamento de Económia Internacional Gerencia de Estudios Económicos,  
Banco Central del Paraguay 
X  04/05/00 1:00 
PY  Directora del Departamento de Económia Internacional Gerencia de Estudios Económicos,  
Banco Central del Paraguay 
X  18/05/00 1:30 
PY  Consultor Oficina de Distorciones Comerciales, 
Ministerio de Industria y Comercio 
X  02/08/00 1:30 
PY  Director Estudios Económicos Subsecretaría de Economía e Integración, 
Ministerio de Hacienda 
X  10/05/00 1:00 
PY  Director of the Direction for External Technical 
Cooperation 
Secretaría Técnica de Planificación X  11/05/00 0:30 
PY  Director of the Direction for External Technical 
Cooperation 
Secretaría Técnica de Planificación  X 22/03/01 0:35 
PY  Directora de Servicios Nacionales de Empleo y de 
Relaciones Internacionales 
Ministerio de Trabajo  X 21/03/01 0:50 
PY  Viceministro Viceministerio de Minas y Energia  X 21/03/01 0:10 
PY  Viceministro de Economía e Integración Ministerio de Hacienda  X 23/03/01 0:40 
PY  Director of the Department of Economic Studies Banco Central del Paraguay X  10/05/00 0:45 
PY  Director of the Department of Economic Studies Banco Central del Paraguay X  18/05/00 1:30 
PY  Viceministro de Industria Ministerio de Industria y Comercio  X 22/03/01 0:10 
PY  Works for the Direction of Economic Integration Ministry of External Relations X  12/05/00 0:15 
PY  Director del Gabinete Técnico Ministerio de Industria y Comercio X  04/05/00 0:45 
PY  Director del Gabinete Técnico Ministerio de Industria y Comercio  X 20/03/01 1:50 
PY  Director of the Economic Sector Embassy of Brazil X  10/05/00 0:45 
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List of interviewees (end) 
 Name Title Institution F1 F2 Date Time 
UY  Professor, Mercosur Coordinator for CLACSO (Consejo 
Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales) 
Departamento de Sociologia, Universidad de la 
República 
 X 06/03/01 2:20 
UY  Director Nacional de Industria Ministerio de Industria, Energia y Mineria  X 01/03/01 0:45 
UY  Researcher FAS  X 06/03/01 0:15 
UY  Director Secretaría Administrativa del Mercosur  X 05/03/01 0:05 
UY  Analista / Investigador por la Area de Investigaciones 
Economicas 
Banco Central del Uruguay X  14/06/00 0:45 
UY  Subdirector Política Comercial y de Integración, Oficina de 
Planeamiento y Presupuesto 
 X 06/03/01 0:20 
UY  Ministro Consejero, Director General Adjunto para 
Asuntos de Integración y Mercosur 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores X  06/07/00 0:40 
UY  Ministro Consejero, Director General Adjunto para 
Asuntos de Integración y Mercosur 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores  X 06/03/01 0:30 
UY  Jefe Sector Normativa del Mercosur Secretaria Administrativa del Mercosur X  15/06/00 0:30 
UY  Asesor Economico – Financiero, Dirección de 
Integración 
Minesterio de Economia y Finanzas  X 06/03/01 0:45 
UY  Asesora, Centro de Comunicación Institutional Banco Central del Uruguay  X 06/03/01 1:00 
UY  Economist Editor Newspaper “El País”  X 01/03/01 1:10 
UY  Abogada, Dirección Nacional del Empleo Minesterio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social  X 06/03/01 0:45 
UY  Directora, member of the GMC Política Comercial y de Integración, Oficina de 
Planeamiento y Presupuesto 
 X 06/03/01 1:05 
UY  Jefe Documentación y Divulgación Secretaría Administrativa del Mercosur  X 05/03/01 0:50 
UY  Coordinador de la Divisió de Estudios y Estadísticas Asociación Latino-Americana De Integración (ALADI) X  05/07/00 1:00 
UY  Directora Departamento de Información sobre las 
PYMEs, miembro SGT7 
Ministerio de Industria, Energia y Mineria X  04/07/00 0:45 
UY  Directora Departamento de Información sobre las 
PYMEs, miembro SGT7 
Ministerio de Industria, Energia y Mineria  X 05/03/01 1:10 
UY  Coordinador nacional del SGT5 Transporte e 
Infraestructura del Mercosur 
Ministerio de Transporte y Obras Públicas X  05/07/00 1:00 
UY  Director de la Direccion General de la Salud Ministerio de Salud Publica  X 05/03/01 0:20 
 Total   57 80  122:55 
 
A1.2. Questionnaires of interviews 
The questionnaires used at the beginning of each of the two fieldtrip are presented 
hereafter. As the process of interviewing went on, questions were added while others, less 
relevant, were abandoned. Consequently, the two questionnaires presented below are 
indicative and only suggest the type of questions asked to the interviewees. 
A1.2.1. Initial questionnaire for first fieldtrip (April – August 2000) 
Questions on the support of the present government to Mercosur 
1. Is the government supporting a furthering of the process of integration? 
2. Does the government support an increase of the existing regional administrative structure? 
3. Does the government support an increase of powers to Mercosur institutions? 
4. What do you think of these three aspects? 
5. What is the position of the political parties of the opposition on these themes? 
6. Would a change of government endanger the process of integration or is it taken for 
granted? 
7. Does the population know about Mercosur? Does it support this process of integration? 
Questions on regional economic development policies adopted within this country 
8. How is the territory divided in regions? 
9. How significant are regional disparities in the country? 
10. What are national regional economic development policies? 
11. How are they evaluated? According to which criteria? By whom? 
12. Is there a national development bank? 
13. Importance of relations with international development organisations (IOs) and NGOs? 
14. Are there reliable statistics on regional development? 
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Questions on regional economic development policies in Mercosur 
15. Is a regional development policy (RDP) of topicality now for Mercosur?  
16. Who should propose the adoption of such policies? National bodies (from which countries 
in particular?) or common bodies (Mercosur Council, Parliament)? 
17. Would the present government support the adoption of RDP by Mercosur? And you? 
18. What would be the pre-requisites for the adoption of RDP? 
19. Who would oppose such adoption: parties, syndicates, pressure groups, other members? 
20. What would be the main obstacles to such adoption? 
21. What forms should these common RDP take? 
22. Which body should be responsible for administrating these RDP?  
23. Should there be a Mercosur regional development fund? Should it be developed from 
Fonplata? 
24. How should these RDP be evaluated? According to which criteria? By whom? 
25. What criteria to use for the definition of regions lagging behind? 
26. Should there be quotas for regions/countries? According to which criteria? 
27. Which regions of this country should be considered as priority for such policies and why?  
28. Which regions of other member states should be priority areas for such policies and why?  
29. Should these Mercosur policies complement or replace national policies? 
30. How to finance those policies? Public (development bank, international funds) or private? 
Questions on the transferability of EU’s experience 
31. Do you know any of the regional policies developed by the EU? 
32. According to you, would any of them be of interest for Mercosur? 
33. How could this transfer be done?  
34. What would be the main obstacles to this adoption? 
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35. Could Mercosur’s territory be divided like EU’s in objectives? According to which 
criteria? 
36. Do you know any of the regional development policy of other Mercosur members?  
37. Have they influenced the ones adopted within your country? 
38. Are there any existing attempts of coordination of the different members’ RDP?  
39. Are there any attempts of transmitting experience in RDP from one member to another? 
A1.2.2. Initial questionnaire for second fieldtrip (February – April 2001) 
General evolution of Mercosur 
1. What has been achieved since last August and the relanzamiento process? 
2. What are the relations with Chile and Bolivia? And with the FTAA? 
3. Has any action been taken towards a common approach to regional development? 
Common approach to regional development 
4. Is it useful, necessary? Why? 
5. What institutional form should it take and why?  
6. What would be the best choice to implement now? In the future (5 years)? 
MRDF: General 
7. Who would oppose its creation (government, institutions, population)? Why? How? 
8. What reform of Mercosur and/or the states needs to be undertaken before it can be 
created? 
9. How long would it take before a MRDF can be created? Is Mercosur ready now? 
10. What would be the steps towards this creation? 
11. Should this MRDF be conceived for a Mercosur 4 or a Mercosur 6? Why? 
12. Should the MRDF be conceived as a form of compensation for countries negatively 
affected by the Mercosur process of integration? 
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13. Should it be created from Fonplata or from scratch? 
MRDF: Structure 
14. Should it be rather rigid (eg a Development Bank) or flexible (eg a forum of discussion)? 
15. Should it be inscribed within Mercosur or established as something separate? 
16. From which institutions should the people working for the MRDF come from? 
MRDF: Financial aspects 
17. What would you consider as an appropriate budget size? 
18. What form of contribution of the members? Equal or proportional?  
19. From which budget should this contribution come from? Ministries? Central Banks? 
20. Other sources of financial support: would NGOs/IOs support financially a MRDF?  
MRDF: Control 
21. What types of control should be installed so there is no mismanagement? 
22. Who should do it? Ministry, NGO, IOs? 
23. How can the independence of this fund be guaranteed? 
MRDF: actions 
24. Fund distribution? By regions or by priority? Only to transnational projects? 
25. If by geographic priority, how should the priority regions be determined? 
26. If by thematic priority, what would be the priorities for this fund?  
27. If transnational, which priority? Industrial, infrastructure, education (cultural exchanges) 
28. Should there be a system of quota (by priority or by region)? 
29. How concentrated should this fund be? What % of the population should be eligible? 
30. What should be the fund’s first actions? 
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A1.3. Examples of interviews 
The followings are examples of notes taken for different interviews. For reasons of 
confidentiality, the name and institution of these interviewees are not given. The only 
indication is the nationality of the interviewee and its professional category. The numbers at 
the beginning of some paragraphs refer to the question number in the original questionnaires. 
A1.3.1. Argentinian researcher, first fieldtrip 
The EU and Mercosur are two customs unions, but they are very different. The main 
difference is that Mercosur has no supranationality, which makes that negotiations are often 
blocked because there is no institution for conflict solving. Also there is a difference of 
origins: the EU was created with the back up of the US (Marshall Plan), and then to 
counterbalance the bipolarity of the world. Mercosur, on its side, was imposed on its members 
by the opening of the world and the process of globalisation: it is their only way to survive. 
Moreover, Brazil and Argentina are two different models of economic development. On the 
one hand Brazil tries to produce all the industrial goods it needs, while Argentina is on the 
contrary trying to import everything. As a consequence the latter is more open to the world, 
and more technologically advanced than the former. Moreover, they have two different views 
of Mercosur: Brazil sees it more from a political point of view whereas Argentina sees it more 
from the commercial point of view. 
Because of the economic crisis of last year, trade went down (reduction of Argentina’s import 
from Brazil) and it blocked the negotiation process. 
During the relanzamiento process, the member states need to discuss on the institutional 
theme with the possibility of having supranational organisations, the completion of the 
customs union, and the coordination of macro policies. Mercosur needs to be re-launched 
politically by the Presidents, the technical side will follow later as a consequence. 
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Different positions for the FTAA: Brazil wants to present itself as a regional leader, while 
Argentina prefers to work on its bilateral relation with the US to counterbalance the position 
of Brazil. 
15. A Mercosur Development Bank is necessary. For the time being it would not be necessary 
to create a new SGT, since it would create new bureaucracy, but maybe just a Commission 
within the GMC. 
22. Representatives: Ministry of Economy, Central Banks. 
23. Institutional form: for Argentina it would be better to have a supranational institution (to 
counterbalance the weight of Brazil). But Brazil is reticent. It would be interesting to study 
the possibility of creating an independent but non supranational Development Bank. Also 
need to study Fonplata and why it failed. 
26. Quotas: it would be interesting and would help to the development of the poorest regions. 
27. Priorities: development of an equilibrated economy in the Mercosur, through a policy of 
incentives for agriculture and industrial sectors. For the time being, apart from Brazil through 
the SEBRAEE, none of the member states have a good policy for Small and Medium sized 
Enterprises. 
30. It would be difficult to get funds from international organisations. In first place they take 
into account the interest of the EU and the US. It is necessary to invent a new model of 
development because, for the time being, the development of Latin America is tied to the one 
of the First world. 
35. Objectives: it would be interesting, but very difficult to implement. Especially because 
Brazil and Argentina have different objectives for Mercosur. 
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A1.3.2. Brazilian official, first fieldtrip 
The process of relanzamiento is just a political declaration: there are too many differences to 
have any kind of political coordination for the time being. 
Brazil has an economy which is more diversified and more technologically advanced than that 
of its neighbours. 
One of the main problems of Mercosur is that there is no mobility of workers. 
15. Each Mercosur country has its own problems with different causes (which have not been 
studied): right now they cannot have common programmes with common solutions. 
22. Representatives: Ministries of economy, of finance, BNDES, Central Banks, private 
sector…  
23. It could be possible to coordinate the national policies of development. But the problem is 
that governments cannot invest for Mercosur, nor can they relaunch the process. 
Creating a MRDF would be very interesting, there should then be some common objectives 
defined so has to be more efficient. Just coordination would not work well because there is a 
problem of how to inscribe these in the local agendas.  
Mercosur needs to create its own structures to be independent from national interests. A fund 
or a Bank? No idea. 
26. Quotas: if there is a process of integration, we cannot think in national terms. So there 
should be some quotas by region. But it might be necessary to define new geographical 
‘regions’ different from the administrative ones, so as to go across the borders when 
necessary. These quotas should be defined in a flexible way to allow changes in specific cases 
of emergencies. 
27. 28. Priorities: all of them. But fight poverty (especially in Brazil). Supporting SME could 
be a good idea since no country has a true policy of this kind. For infrastructure, everything 
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will gradually be managed by the private sector, but there could be a plan of investment with 
governmental aids. 
30. Resources: in Brazil there is money ready to be invested. The contribution should be 
proportional by country. Use of international organisations would also be positive.it could be 
useful to also use funds from the private sector: investment funds of banks (e.g. Banco do 
Brasil). 
It would be better to have a direct source of revenue (like a percentage of revenues from 
imports): otherwise, a member state can always make difficulties to pay (i.e. the USA in the 
UN). 
32. The experience of the EU can be very useful. 
35. Objectives: it would be the best solution, compared to quotas. But it would be difficult for 
the governments to do something at the Mercosur level without being able to do something at 
the national level before. 
It is difficult to speak of a Mercosur project in the Northeast of Brazil. 
A1.3.3. Paraguayan official, first fieldtrip 
1. Mercosur is starting a new stage in its process of integration. There is a will to “re-launch” 
Mercosur: create a local Maasticht, but in lesser importance. Themes in discussion: access to 
the market (technical standards), increase across frontier trade, incentives to investment, free 
competition (anti-trust laws), environment, individual security, development of common 
institutions, common positions in negotiations with third countries/organisations. 
2. 3. Paraguay fully supports an increase of Mercosur’s competences: it supports Mercosur 
and would like to see it become a common market as soon as possible. Within the next 3 or 4 
years, there will be a need to develop a coordination of the fiscal policies, and this will 
generate more common institutions. There is a need to pursue the Mercosur process of 
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integration. Otherwise all will fall apart. The member states are now at a cross-roads: either 
they go further and consolidate Mercosur, or do nothing and progressively regress. Brazil is 
the country which is the most reluctant, but it realises the needs which exist. 
5. The people who criticised most Mercosur are of the faction of the Colorado party (principal 
party of government) which is now in power. 
6. Paraguay does not see itself outside of Mercosur. There is no other alternative for it: no 
stability (whether economic or political) nor development. Mercosur helped to stabilise 
Paraguay’s democracy a few times over the past ten years by “de-stimulating the 
authoritarians”. 
Of course, there exist many criticisms since Paraguay is the member state which benefited 
less from Mercosur (ie it was the only one which had to increase some of its tariffs to reach 
the CET). However, these criticisms do not ask for Paraguay to opt out of Mercosur, but plead 
for a reform of the negative aspects and the furthering of the positive ones: “es necesario de 
reformar lo malo y profundisar lo bueno”. 
15. Good theme. Especially now with the new step of integration. 
16. 17. Paraguay is the most backward country of Mercosur. Therefore, it is the one which 
needs to give a body to this idea of Mercosur regional development policies, and not Brazil. 
Therefore, they would need all the help they can get (especially from the EU) to help them 
define such policies. 
19. 20. Since it is not even yet a project which has been thought about, nor any proposal 
having been made, it is difficult to say who would oppose such a project or what would be the 
obstacles. But, the lack of financing could be a main problem to developing RDP at Mercosur 
level. 
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22. 23. It would be a good idea to have a Mercosur Development Bank to help the backward 
regions. It would need to be created from ex nihilo, but could also be created from a 
strengthened and reformed Fonplata. It mostly depends on Brazil since it is the motor of the 
Mercosur process and nothing can be done without it. Similarity with the EU: EU RDP were 
adopted only because France and Germany decided to help the less developed regions of 
Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
27. 28. Examples of regions which should benefit from Mercosur help: Tucuman and Pampa 
in Argentina, the Nord Este of Brazil… 
33. It is necessary to study the EU’s experience. 
35. The idea of using objectives seems great. 
Recipe for success in Mercosur: for any policy, the first project needs to be successful. It is 
important to have a first project with limited objectives, which can be achieved in a very short 
term (one to two years maximum), and which can be seen by all and shown as an example. If 
it has too long-term objectives, people will get tired of the project and progressively abandon 
it. If it is not a complete success, people will consider the whole as a bad idea and reject 
everything. 
A1.3.4. Uruguayan official, first fieldtrip 
Need to consider Mercosur in the global context. In August there will be a meeting of the 
Presidents in Brasilia, since Brazil would like to promote the idea of a FTASA (Free Trade 
Area of South America). If the FTAA is created (and it seems likely since, whichever 
candidate is elected in the USA, the Congress seems ready to accept the fast-track to facilitate 
the negotiations process for the USA), it will start reducing the tariffs after 2005 (date agreed 
upon for the end of negotiations) or even before if the USA put pressure. So if before 2005 
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Mercosur has not strengthened itself and completed its evolution, it will be disintegrated and 
disappear within the FTAA. 
Mercosur (mostly Brazil) is also trying to renegotiate its agreements with ALADI countries so 
as to conclude them on a quadripartite mode (negotiate them as Mercosur) and not at the 
bilateral level. This is especially the case for the agreement with the Andean Community: for 
the time being there are bilateral agreements between the member states of these two groups, 
but Mercosur member states would like an agreement between the two blocs. Since the 
Andean Community is reticent, Mercosur pressured them by declaring that after June 2003 all 
the ALADI agreements which have not been renegotiated will become obsolete and the 
concerned countries would be considered as any other third country. 
Zona Franca de Manaus: it was created before Mercosur, and now faces problems because of 
it, since it should pay the customs for the products sent to Mercosur. The problem is now 
being settled. 
15. In theory, a development bank should have been created from the start, in 1991, to support 
the economic sectors which would have been threatened by the integration process (like in 
EU). But it was not done and, for example, Uruguay lost many of its industries which went to 
Brazil, and nothing was done to help it. 
When talking about Mercosur, it is necessary to consider its actual state: for the time being it 
is just an imperfect free trade area and a very imperfect customs union. Thus, there is a big 
difference between what should exist and what can be done. 
Decision 5/94 “Programa 2000 del Mercosur”: it listed the objectives Mercosur should have 
reached before 2000. Most of them have not even been talked about until the recent 
relanzamiento process. 
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17. Uruguay would be interested in having any type of policy coordination, especially some at 
the development policies level, since it is a small country. But the problem is mostly from the 
big ones, especially Brazil, which refuse to loose any small parcel of sovereignty.  
20. In Uruguay it is difficult to speak of regional policies: it is a small, centralised, non 
federal, homogeneous state. In Brazil it can be the case since it is big and there are huge 
differences between the state of Sao Paulo and the Nordeste: it would be the same as 
comparing the region of Madrid to Siberia. 
Moreover, in Argentina there does not exist a policy of regional development, but policies of 
regional incentives to attract private investments. This is a problem for Mercosur (Uruguay is 
now analysing all these policies to try to raise the point in a future meeting). But the 
Argentinian Federal State says it can do nothing to prevent the provinces from developing 
policies to attract private investment since it is part of their domain of action and policy. The 
same goes for Brazil. 
23. There was the idea of transforming Fonplata and using funds from the IDB and the CAF, 
but it stayed just an idea, nothing being studied or written about it. 
The interviewee does not know if it should be created from Fonplata, but in any case it should 
be an independent institution, similar to Central Banks. 
26. Quotas: no if it is for transnational projects, yes for smaller scale projects. 
27. Priorities: infrastructure (like trains, especially in a country as big as Brazil) to support 
great projects like the “Corredor Cono Sur” going from Sao Paolo to Valparaiso via Uruguay  
and Argentina.   
30. International Organisations should be interested in participating and supporting such an 
initiative since they have more trust now in the member states: the economic situation is really 
improving after the 1999 crisis, the political situation is rather stable (apart from Paraguay). 
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Therefore, investment is coming back: Mercosur is one of the parts of the world with the 
greatest investments. 
31-35. The reality in Mercosur is really different from the one in the EU. There are cultural, 
physical, political, economic differences. Western Europe is an homogeneous, monolithic 
region, with countries very similar to each other, with numerous interconnections. This is not 
the case in Mercosur: the countries are really isolated (not only in Mercosur, but in Latin 
America in general) with great regional disparities. Thus it is very difficult to transfer the 
EU’s experience to Mercosur. 
A1.3.5. Argentinian official in foreign affairs, second fieldtrip  
1. 3. Relanzamiento: some important aspects are part of this agenda (macro-policy 
coordination), but not a Development Fund. In 2000 there was a GMC meeting on financing 
development, with the idea of merging in the mid-term the CAF with Fonplata. This therefore 
implied the need to transform Fonplata. This idea of merger would be very difficult in the 
present situation. Since the voting system in the CAF is proportional, Brazil and Argentina 
would have little powers within it if their financial contribution is only through the 350 
millions of the Fonplata: they would each need to put around 300 or 400 millions to have the 
same decisional power as Colombia. But where to get the money from? There could also be a 
problem for Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia since they would not have as much power in the 
CAF (vote is proportional to contribution) as in the Fonplata (consensus). But it would be the 
opportunity for them to participate to a much bigger fund at no new expenses. 
4. A Development Bank would be useful but is not that necessary. If it existed it would need 
to be established in Sao Paulo or Buenos Aires, close to the most important financial places of 
Latin America. Nowadays Brazil would support a Development Bank, but it would depend on 
its form. 
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5. Form: it should be a Mercosur Development Bank (MDB) 
8. No need for reforms. A Development Bank would be a step further towards more 
integration. 
10. 13. The first step would be to improve Fonplata, and then, in a second step, transform it in 
a MDB. This solution would be the one with the lowest cost. The Fonplata could then be one 
of this MDB’s specific funds… And in a third stage this MDB could be merged with the 
CAF. 
Fonplata was not good so there is a need for restructuration to resuscitate it (meeting of the 
governors of the Fonplata on the 21st of March 2001 to change it and maybe give it a new 
opportunity to find resources on the international scene). Now it has about US$ 350 millions, 
which is very small (the CAF has about US$ 1,200 millions, the IDB US$7,000 and the 
World Bank and the BNDES US$12,000 each). Its aim was to develop the Plata River basin, 
and has nothing to do with Mercosur. 
11. Mercosur 6: Chile would be invited to participate, and it should be interested in this 
institution, but first it is necessary to transform Fonplata (it does not make sense to invite 
Chile in the existing Fonplata). 
15. It should be part of Mercosur. 
16b. Vote: proportional. 
18. Contribution: proportional. 
20. International Organisations: they could co-finance some specific projects, but they would 
have no interest in participating directly (moreover it would be difficult to include them in the 
decision-making system). Need to make sure that the MDB does not compete with the IDB. 
22. Control: both. 
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24. The IDB started by supporting infrastructure development, then social, and now both, as 
well as assistance to the private sector. The MDB should work principally on infrastructure 
and economic production. It is difficult to imagine a MDB focusing only on social 
development. First help economic restructuration (ie Sugar production in North of Argentina), 
then help the social. 
25. Priority to poorest regions and integrating projects. But problem if all the investments go 
to the poorest since they do not have that much capacity to get into debt. It would also 
diminish the rating on the international financial scene from AAA to maybe B+, which would 
make it more expensive to borrow money on the international scene.  
28. Quotas: no. Need to look for the good quality of the projects, since there is the need for a 
return on investments. 
Concept of “Productive chains”: for example, from cattle raising to shoe commercialisation. 
In Brazil a few chains were recently given priority (in function of unemployment, exports, 
impact and investment). A global vision of the chain is important to have a strategy of 
development. This could be done at Mercosur level to identify a few integrative chains (like 
shoes) to identify projects of investment. 
A1.3.6. Brazilian researcher, second fieldtrip 
1.-3. The relanzamiento is a “disaster” since not much has been done. But at least the tensions 
between Brazil and Argentina were reduced, even if there was no clear sign of this. 
Mercosur does not have any type of regional development policy. There exists an asymmetry, 
a schizophrenia in its relations with the US in the FTAA: in the FTAA negotiations they ask 
for preferential treatments in relations to the US arguing that they are less developed, but they 
do not do anything within Mercosur towards the poorest countries (Brazil and Argentina have 
not been generous within Mercosur). 
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Within Mercosur there is no community vision, no technical body which only thinks of the 
common Mercosur good (like the EU Commission). Brazil only thinks in terms of Mercosur 
for international negotiations: for the rest it only thinks of Brazilian interests. 
Paraguay does not have the image of being a serious country, which limits the enthusiasm of 
Brazil when negotiating with them.  
1991-97: the increase of intra-Mercosur trade was not due to integration but to the 
liberalisation and the opening of the countries to the world. Now that this boosting effect took 
place, for once and for all, the increase will be limited and will depend only on integration. 
In September 2000 there was a meeting organised by Brazil to talk about a SAFTA (South 
American Free Trade Area), and during these it was talked about creating a South American 
Development Bank with the CAF and BNDES. But no much support. 
4. A MRDF is necessary. But the problem is to determine who would pay for it and who 
would gain from it. It is a problem for Brazil since, considering its size, population, GDP, it is 
so big that it already has issues of integrating internally and needs to care about its own poor 
regions: politically it cannot explain to its people that they are diverting funds towards other 
countries. 
5. It should be a MRDF because it is more flexible and light, which is more in the Mercosur 
way of thinking. There is no time to pass by intermediary steps (create a SGT and wait for it 
to evolve): if the Mercosur wants to survive in a FTAA it needs to progress in its integration 
and make a difference with the other countries: there is a need to act quickly and strongly. 
7. For the time being, nobody bothered about this topic, so there are no obstacles. 
9. The timing is quite good. Now that the FTAA negotiations are becoming more difficult, 
Brazil is realising it needs to give concessions to its partners if it wants their support within 
these negotiations: external pressures are important for Brazil.  
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Brazil needs to bet on the future, to think a long time ahead. If it aims at being one of the 
leading countries of Latin America and of the world in the coming decades, it will need the 
support of its associates: it cannot do it alone. 
11. The MRDF should be for the 4 members only: there is too much free riding on the part of 
Chile. It has already taken a lot from Mercosur without giving much. There should be some 
advantages of joining the full members and not being just associates: this could act as an 
incentive. 
13. No opinion. Need to study the juridical structure of Fonplata to determine if it can be 
modified (no need for two similar institutions) or not. 
18. The financing should be proportional since the contribution of Paraguay and that of Brazil 
cannot be equal. 
20. International Organisations should be interested. It would be useful to check the financing 
procedures of the CAF. This MRDF should be able to borrow money on the international 
scene. 
21-22. “We do not need a supervision: we are serious countries” (“no necesitamos tutela, 
somos serios”). But may be there could be a representative of International Organisations in 
the Board… 
23. This Fund needs to be independent. Thus there needs to develop the Mercosur institutional 
structure.  
24. Transnational projects would be better since they are the ones which would offer less 
political resistance: all the countries see what they can gain through such projects. These 
projects could be either of infrastructures, or projects of industrial nature if they help to solve 
Mercosur conflicts. For example, problem nowadays on sugar production where no agreement 
has been reached because it is helped in Tucuman by Argentina. But since it would never be 
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competitive (even with help), there could be some Mercosur help for industrial restructuration 
to solve the problem.  
Each possibility has its advantages. It is necessary to analyse them. 
25. Need to create indicators. 
26. The priority might be education in Brazil, but different for Argentina… May be 
technologies too. But creating a hierarchy of priorities would not be the best solution.  
28. Quotas no. Objectives and targets yes. There could be some common Mercosur targets of 
levelling. Quotas would be too rigid whereas there needs to be a certain dose of flexibility in 
Mercosur… But not too much! 
There is a limit in the help BNDES can bring at the Mercosur level: most of its funds come 
from the FAT (Fund for the Workers): legally it is bound and these funds need to be used for 
Brazilian workers. That is why for the time being they only think of helping Brazilian 
companies which desire to establish themselves in Argentina (and may be Paraguay too) or 
those of other Mercosur countries being established in Brazil. 
Need to be extra careful at the repartition of the votes. Whatever way it is done, Brazil would 
surely have a right of veto, but it should not have a right of imposition. 
A1.3.7. Paraguayan official, second fieldtrip 
1. Relanzamiento: it is something which was planned from the beginning, since Mercosur’s 
work planning was made in two periods 1991-1995 and 1996-2000. Thus it implied defining a 
new program of work and negotiations for the next years.  
2. Verify the website of the ITHO (hemispheric organisation for transport infrastructure). For 
Transport there exist already seven fora of negotiations at different levels: Mercosur, South 
America, Latin America, ALCA, Hemispheric, Iberian America, etc… There is a 
multiplication of fora which implies lots of discussions but little actions. 
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4. A MRDF is important. 
5. This institution should be a MRDF. 
8. Many reforms are needed before a MRDF can be established. 
11. The MRDF should be designed for a Mercosur 6 membership. 
13. Fonplata: no opinion. 
15. This institution should be independent, not part of Mercosur. 
16. The officials of the MRDF should be independent technicians. 
16b. Vote distribution: no opinion. 
18. Financial contribution distribution: proportional. 
20. International Organisations: they would be interested in participating in the MRDF if the 
fund is serious and trustworthy. The IDB would not see it as a competition because it would 
be smaller and more specific. 
22. Control: both types of control are necessary. 
24. Thematic priorities: 1) education, 2) SME, 3) infrastructure, 4) agriculture. 
28. Quotas are necessary so the funding of projects is rigid. Otherwise it is useless to 
determine priorities. 
A1.3.8. Uruguayan official, second fieldtrip 
1. Relanzamiento: Decisions 1 to 28 in 2000 have been adopted, but still need to be 
implemented. The whole process was essentially a declaration of intentions and a redefinition 
of the agenda. The automobile sector agreement is the only concrete thing which has been 
done. Uruguay liberalised its sugar sector (it got rid of a 80% tariff), but it was unilateral and 
was not followed by the others. 
Mercosur is a geopolitical project for Brazil, not an economic one. Uruguay needs Mercosur 
for geographical reasons and for negotiating with the USA: it has no choice and nowadays 
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Uruguay has more doubts than certitudes about Mercosur. Mercosur only crystallised a 
situation which existed de facto before. This is not Mercosur but Mercosour. 
3. A MRDF is still not part of the agenda. 
4. It is not useful. The interviewee does not like bureaucracies which manage funds for the 
good of the people. Especially since there already exist many International Organisations on 
this topic. Very pessimistic about a MRDF.  
The interviewee considered that everybody should have told me the same thing, and that if 
they did not, it was because they were politicians who were expecting to win elections or get 
some money by supporting such idea, or that they said so to take the easy way out of the 
question without having to justify themselves. 
Need to take into account the high heterogeneity of the four Mercosur countries. The case of 
Uruguay is more systematic: there are no zones of extremely high poverty, but more a general 
poverty. 
Moreover, need to consider which theory of development is behind this fund, especially since 
in this part of the world there are some economists who believe in mercantilism and 
protectionism. 
A MRDF would not be of much interest for the member states. There has already been some 
past experiences which have not been negative but tragic. The experience of the IDB and the 
World Bank is not too bad because they financed projects to help increasing production and 
the efficiency of the economy. Moreover the IDB is not interventionist. 
In Uruguay 27% of the population economically active is working for public administration. 
People in Uruguay are expecting everything from the state: increasing their expectations 
telling them about a Fund which will help them would be worse than anything: “we’d be 
dead” (“seriamos fritos”). 
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It is necessary to give the poor people the same opportunities, but without passing through 
voluntarism nor paternalism. 
8. Need for more supranationality. It is more important to reinforce the structure of the private 
financial sector and let them decide which projects support. 
20. International Organisations would not support a MRDF. Being bureaucracies, why would 
they transfer some of their powers and decision making, especially in areas where they are 
experts? They can subcontract their secretary services, but not the area where they are experts. 
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This Appendix presents the detailed tables for the Mercosur regional statistics 
analysed in Chapter 4. 
In these tables, AR stands for Argentina, BR for Brazil, PY for Paraguay, UY for 
Uruguay, BO for Bolivia, CL for Chile, M4 for Mercosur composed of its four members 
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), and M6 for Mercosur including the four members 
and the two associates (Bolivia and Chile). 
The Mercosur maps presented in this thesis were drawn up using the Philcarto 
software designed by Philippe Waniez.  
So as not to repeat similar technical details at the end of each table, and to facilitate the 
reading of the statistics presented in this Appendix, it is necessary to first enumerate the 
principal sources used, as well as the dates of the data presented (see Table 1 below). The 
regional data analysed in Chapter 4, and detailed in the present Appendix, come from the 
following sources, classified by country: 
 
Argentinian sources  
- Anuario Estadístico de la República Argentina, CD-Rom published by the INDEC in 1999 
- Consejo Nacional de la Vivienda : www.cnvivienda.org.ar   
- Instituto Nacional De Estadística y Censo (INDEC): www.indec.mecon.ar  
- Minesterio de Economia: www.mecon.gov.ar 
- Minesterio de Salud: http://www.msal.gov.ar/minis_e.htm 
- Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Medio Ambiente: www.desarrollosocial.gov.ar  
- Sistema Permanente de Información de Saneamiento: www.enohsa.gov.ar/SPIDES/ 
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Brazilian sources  
- Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica - Aneel: www.aneel.gov.br  
- DATASUS: www.datasus.gov.br  
- Instituto Brazileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE): www.ibge.gov.br   
- Ministério da Educação: www.mec.gov.br  
- Ministério da Fazenda: www.fazenda.gov.br  
- Ministério da Previdência Social: www.previdenciasocial.gov.br 
- Ministério da Saúde: www.saude.gov.br  
- Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior: www.mdic.gov.br  
- Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão: www.planejamento.gov.br  
- Ministério dos Transportes: www.transportes.gov.br  
- SIDRA: www.sidra.ibge.gov.br/bda/acervo/acervo6.asp  
 
Paraguayan sources 
- Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas y Censos (DGEEC): 
www.dgeec.gov.py/index.htm  
- Indicadores para focalizar el gasto social en Paraguay: Mapas de pobreza, DGEEC, 1999 
- Ministerio de Educación y cultura: www.mec.gov.py  
- Ministerio de Industria y comercio: www.mic.gov.py  
- Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Comunicaciones: www.mopc.gov.py  
- Ministerio de Salud Pública y Bienestar Social: www.mspbs.gov.py   
- Sistema Estadístico Nacional, CD-Rom published by the DGEEC in 1997 
 
 
 A2.3
Uruguayan sources 
- Dirección Nacional de Comunicaciones: www.dnc.gub.uy  
- Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE): www.ine.gub.uy  
- Ministerio de Educacion y Cultura: www.mec.gub.uy  
- Ministerio de Salud Publica: www.msp.gub.uy  
- Ministerio de Transporte y Obras Publicas: www.presidencia.gub.uy  
 
Bolivian sources 
- Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE): www.ine.gov.bo  
- Ministerio de Energía e Hidrocarburos : www.energia.gov.bo 
 
Chilean sources 
- Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE): www.ine.cl 
- Ministerio de Salud: www.minsal.cl  
- Ministerio de Transportes y Telecomunicaciones : www.mtt.cl  
- Ministro de Economía, Minería y Energía : www.minecon.cl  
 
Other sources 
- InterAmerican Development Bank: www.iadb.org  
- International Monetary Fund: www.imf.org 
- OECD: www.oecd.org/std  
- Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS): www.ops.org.ar  
- Secretaria Administrativo del Mercosur: www.mercosur.org.uy 
- World Bank: www.worldbank.org 
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Table 1. Dates of the regional data analysed, by indicator and by country. 
 Indicators AR BR PY UY BO CL 
General Population 1995 1997 1997 1996 1997 1999 
GDP per capita 1995 1997 1999 1999 1997 1999 Economy 
Occupation rate 1991 1998 1992 1996 1995 1999 
Access to drinking water 1998 1997 1996 1996 1997 1992 
Connection to telephone 1997 1996 1992 2000 1996 1999 
Access to waste removal 
facilities 
1998 1998 1996 1996 1997 1992 
Electricity consumption 1996/1995* 1999 1997 2000 1999 1999 
Infrastructure 
Road network 1999 1997 1997 1998 1997 1997 
Life expectancy at birth 1998 1997 1997 2000 1999 1995 
N° of doctors  1998 1997 1997 1998 1997 1997 
Health 
N° of hospital beds  1995 1997 1997 1998/1993* 1998 1997 
Literacy rate 1991 1997 1992 1996 N/A** 1992 Education 
N° of students 1997 1999 1996 1998 1997 1997 
* The information found included data of two different years, depending on the regions. 
** The document including these data did not give any indication concerning the date of these 
statistics. 
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A2.1. Mercosur population and territory 
 
  Territory as a % of  Population as a % of 
 Region 
Territory 
(km²) 
Population
 
Density 
(pop/km²) Nation M 4 M 6 Nation M 4 M 6
AR Ciudad de Buenos Aires 200 3,027,886 15,139.43 0.01 0.00 0.00 8.71 1.49 1.34
 Buenos Aires 307,571 13,379,401 43.50 8.18 2.39 2.09 38.48 6.57 5.91
 Catamarca 102,602 289,212 2.82 2.73 0.80 0.70 0.83 0.14 0.13
 Córdoba 165,321 2,929,734 17.72 4.40 1.28 1.12 8.43 1.44 1.29
 Corrientes 88,199 857,685 9.72 2.34 0.68 0.60 2.47 0.42 0.38
 Chaco 99,633 895,900 8.99 2.65 0.77 0.68 2.58 0.44 0.40
 Chubut 224,686 399,125 1.78 5.97 1.74 1.52 1.15 0.20 0.18
 Entre Ríos 78,781 1,069,102 13.57 2.09 0.61 0.53 3.07 0.52 0.47
 Formosa 72,066 447,094 6.20 1.92 0.56 0.49 1.29 0.22 0.20
 Jujuy 53,219 555,097 10.43 1.41 0.41 0.36 1.60 0.27 0.25
 La Pampa 143,440 282,356 1.97 3.81 1.11 0.97 0.81 0.14 0.12
 La Rioja 89,680 247,575 2.76 2.38 0.70 0.61 0.71 0.12 0.11
 Mendoza 148,827 1,508,959 10.14 3.96 1.15 1.01 4.34 0.74 0.67
 Misiones 29,801 884,291 29.67 0.79 0.23 0.20 2.54 0.43 0.39
 Neuquén 94,078 463,266 4.92 2.50 0.73 0.64 1.33 0.23 0.20
 Río Negro 203,013 559,590 2.76 5.40 1.57 1.38 1.61 0.27 0.25
 Salta 155,488 958,094 6.16 4.13 1.21 1.05 2.76 0.47 0.42
 San Juan 89,651 555,223 6.19 2.38 0.70 0.61 1.60 0.27 0.25
 San Luis 76,748 321,890 4.19 2.04 0.60 0.52 0.93 0.16 0.14
 Santa Cruz 243,943 181,198 0.74 6.49 1.89 1.65 0.52 0.09 0.08
 Santa Fe 133,007 2,949,050 22.17 3.54 1.03 0.90 8.48 1.45 1.30
 Santiago del Estero 136,351 700,114 5.13 3.63 1.06 0.92 2.01 0.34 0.31
 Tierra del Fuego. Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
1,002,445 89,992 0.09 26.65 7.78 6.80 0.26 0.04 0.04
 Tucumán 22,524 1,216,623 54.01 0.60 0.17 0.15 3.50 0.60 0.54
 Total Argentina 3,761,274 34,768,457 9.24 100.00 29.18 25.51 100.00 17.07 15.35
BR NORTH 3,869,637 11,736,040 3.03 45.27 30.02 26.25 7.30 5.76 5.18
 Rondônia 238,512 1,289,365 5.41 2.79 1.85 1.62 0.80 0.63 0.57
 Acre 153,149 504,489 3.29 1.79 1.19 1.04 0.31 0.25 0.22
 Amazonas 1,577,820 2,460,434 1.56 18.46 12.24 10.70 1.53 1.21 1.09
 Roraima 225,116 258,088 1.15 2.63 1.75 1.53 0.16 0.13 0.11
 Pará 1,253,164 5,724,140 4.57 14.66 9.72 8.50 3.56 2.81 2.53
 Amapá 143,453 402,557 2.81 1.68 1.11 0.97 0.25 0.20 0.18
 Tocantins 278,420 1,096,967 3.94 3.26 2.16 1.89 0.68 0.54 0.48
 NORTHEAST 1,561,177 45,854,455 29.37 18.26 12.11 10.59 28.53 22.51 20.24
 Maranhão 333,365 5,349,575 16.05 3.90 2.59 2.26 3.33 2.63 2.36
 Piauí 252,378 2,758,129 10.93 2.95 1.96 1.71 1.72 1.35 1.22
 Ceará 146,348 7,010,107 47.90 1.71 1.14 0.99 4.36 3.44 3.09
 Rio Grande do Norte 53,306 2,641,355 49.55 0.62 0.41 0.36 1.64 1.30 1.17
 Paraíba 56,584 3,433,234 60.67 0.66 0.44 0.38 2.14 1.69 1.52
 Pernambuco 98,937 7,548,183 76.29 1.16 0.77 0.67 4.70 3.71 3.33
 Alagoas 27,933 2,754,697 98.62 0.33 0.22 0.19 1.71 1.35 1.22
 Sergipe 22,050 1,662,168 75.38 0.26 0.17 0.15 1.03 0.82 0.73
 Bahia 567,295 12,697,007 22.38 6.64 4.40 3.85 7.90 6.23 5.61
 SOUTHEAST 927,286 68,331,524 73.69 10.85 7.19 6.29 42.52 33.54 30.17
 Minas Gerais 588,383 17,024,849 28.93 6.88 4.56 3.99 10.59 8.36 7.52
 Espirito Santo 46,184 2,916,530 63.15 0.54 0.36 0.31 1.81 1.43 1.29
 Rio de Janeiro 43,909 13,490,380 307.23 0.51 0.34 0.30 8.39 6.62 5.96
 São Paulo 248,808 34,899,765 140.27 2.91 1.93 1.69 21.72 17.13 15.41
 SOUTH 577,214 23,963,075 41.52 6.75 4.48 3.91 14.91 11.76 10.58
 Paraná 199,709 9,154,360 45.84 2.34 1.55 1.35 5.70 4.49 4.04
 Santa Catarina 95,442 5,032,175 52.72 1.12 0.74 0.65 3.13 2.47 2.22
 Rio Grande do Sul 282,062 9,776,540 34.66 3.30 2.19 1.91 6.08 4.80 4.32
 CENTRAL WEST 1,612,077 10,825,181 6.72 18.86 12.51 10.93 6.74 5.31 4.78
 Mato Grosso do Sul 358,158 1,985,579 5.54 4.19 2.78 2.43 1.24 0.97 0.88
Mato Grosso 906,806 2,335,344 2.58 10.61 7.03 6.15 1.45 1.15 1.03
 Goiás 341,289 4,629,154 13.56 3.99 2.65 2.31 2.88 2.27 2.04
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Mercosur population and territory (continued) 
  Territory as a % of  Population as a % of 
 Region 
Territory 
(km²) 
Population
 
Density 
(pop/km²) Nation M 4 M 6 Nation M 4 M 6
 Federal District 5,822 1,875,104 322.07 0.07 0.05 0.04 1.17 0.92 0.83
 Total Brazil 8,547,403 160,710,275 18.80 100.00 66.31 57.97 100.00 78.88 70.95
PY Asunción 117 550,060 4,701.37 0.03 0.00 0.00 10.82 0.27 0.24
 Concepción 18,051 185,496 10.28 4.44 0.14 0.12 3.65 0.09 0.08
 San Pedro 20,002 332,926 16.64 4.92 0.16 0.14 6.55 0.16 0.15
 Cordillera 4,948 215,663 43.59 1.22 0.04 0.03 4.24 0.11 0.10
 Guairá 3,846 173,668 45.16 0.95 0.03 0.03 3.42 0.09 0.08
 Caaguazú 11,474 442,161 38.54 2.82 0.09 0.08 8.69 0.22 0.20
 Caazapá 9,496 141,559 14.91 2.33 0.07 0.06 2.78 0.07 0.06
 Itapúa 16,525 454,757 27.52 4.06 0.13 0.11 8.94 0.22 0.20
 Misiones 9,556 98,607 10.32 2.35 0.07 0.06 1.94 0.05 0.04
 Paraguarí 8,705 247,675 28.45 2.14 0.07 0.06 4.87 0.12 0.11
 Alto Paraná 14,895 595,276 39.96 3.66 0.12 0.10 11.71 0.29 0.26
 Central 2,465 1,174,212 476.35 0.61 0.02 0.02 23.09 0.58 0.52
 Ñeembucú 12,147 86,965 7.16 2.99 0.09 0.08 1.71 0.04 0.04
 Amambay 12,933 127,011 9.82 3.18 0.10 0.09 2.50 0.06 0.06
 Canindeyú 14,667 133,075 9.07 3.61 0.11 0.10 2.62 0.07 0.06
 Pdte. Hayes 72,907 77,145 1.06 17.92 0.57 0.49 1.52 0.04 0.03
 Boquerón 91,669 35,241 0.38 22.54 0.71 0.62 0.69 0.02 0.02
 Alto Paraguay 82,349 13,831 0.17 20.25 0.64 0.56 0.27 0.01 0.01
 Total Paraguay 406,752 5,085,328 12.50 100.00 3.16 2.76 100.00 2.50 2.25
UY Montevideo 530 1,344,839 2,537.43 0.30 0.00 0.00 42.51 0.66 0.59
 Artigas  11,928 75,059 6.29 6.82 0.09 0.08 2.37 0.04 0.03
 Canelones  4,536 443,053 97.67 2.59 0.04 0.03 14.00 0.22 0.20
 Cerro Largo  13,648 82,510 6.05 7.80 0.11 0.09 2.61 0.04 0.04
 Colonia  6,106 120,241 19.69 3.49 0.05 0.04 3.80 0.06 0.05
 Durazno  11,643 55,716 4.79 6.65 0.09 0.08 1.76 0.03 0.02
 Flores  5,144 25,030 4.87 2.94 0.04 0.03 0.79 0.01 0.01
 Florida  10,417 66,503 6.38 5.95 0.08 0.07 2.10 0.03 0.03
 Lavalleja  10,016 61,085 6.10 5.72 0.08 0.07 1.93 0.03 0.03
 Maldonado  4,793 127,502 26.60 2.74 0.04 0.03 4.03 0.06 0.06
 Paysandú  13,922 111,509 8.01 7.95 0.11 0.09 3.52 0.05 0.05
 Río Negro  9,282 51,713 5.57 5.30 0.07 0.06 1.63 0.03 0.02
 Rivera  9,370 98,472 10.51 5.35 0.07 0.06 3.11 0.05 0.04
 Rocha  10,551 70,292 6.66 6.03 0.08 0.07 2.22 0.03 0.03
 Salto  14,163 117,597 8.30 8.09 0.11 0.10 3.72 0.06 0.05
 San José  4,992 96,664 19.36 2.85 0.04 0.03 3.06 0.05 0.04
 Soriano  9,008 81,557 9.05 5.15 0.07 0.06 2.58 0.04 0.04
 Tacuarembó  15,438 84,919 5.50 8.82 0.12 0.10 2.68 0.04 0.04
 Treinta y Tres  9,529 49,502 5.19 5.44 0.07 0.06 1.56 0.02 0.02
 Total Uruguay 175,016 3,163,763 18.08 100.00 1.36 1.19 100.00 1.55 1.40
BO Chuquisaca 51,524 549,835 10.67 4.69 N/A 0.35 7.08 N/A 0.24
 La Paz 133,985 2,268,824 16.93 12.20 N/A 0.91 29.21 N/A 1.00
 Cochabamba 55,631 1,408,071 25.31 5.06 N/A 0.38 18.13 N/A 0.62
 Oruro 53,588 383,498 7.16 4.88 N/A 0.36 4.94 N/A 0.17
 Potosí 118,218 746,618 6.32 10.76 N/A 0.80 9.61 N/A 0.33
 Tarija 37,623 368,506 9.79 3.42 N/A 0.26 4.74 N/A 0.16
 Santa Cruz 370,621 1,651,951 4.46 33.74 N/A 2.51 21.27 N/A 0.73
 Beni 213,564 336,633 1.58 19.44 N/A 1.45 4.33 N/A 0.15
 Pando 63,827 53,124 0.83 5.81 N/A 0.43 0.68 N/A 0.02
 Total Bolivia 1,098,581 7,767,060 7.07 100.00 N/A 7.45 100.00 N/A 3.43
CL Tarapacá 59,099 385,620 6.52 7.83 N/A 0.40 2.57 N/A 0.17
 Antofagasta 126,049 462,286 3.67 16.70 N/A 0.85 3.08 N/A 0.20
 Atacama 75,176 269,047 3.58 9.96 N/A 0.51 1.79 N/A 0.12
 Coquimbo 40,580 569,825 14.04 5.38 N/A 0.28 3.80 N/A 0.25
 Valparaíso 16,396 1,543,566 94.14 2.17 N/A 0.11 10.28 N/A 0.68
 Del Libertador 16,387 778,801 47.53 2.17 N/A 0.11 5.19 N/A 0.34
 Del Maule 30,296 906,882 29.93 4.01 N/A 0.21 6.04 N/A 0.40
 Del Biobío 37,063 1,915,844 51.69 4.91 N/A 0.25 12.76 N/A 0.85
 A2.7
 
Mercosur population and territory (end) 
  Territory as a % of  Population as a % of 
 Region 
Territory 
(km²) 
Population
 
Density 
(pop/km²) Nation M 4 M 6 Nation M 4 M 6
CL De La Araucanía 31,842 864,975 27.16 4.22 N/A 0.22 5.76 N/A 0.38
 De Los Lagos 67,013 1,050,558 15.68 8.88 N/A 0.45 7.00 N/A 0.46
 De Aysén 107,567 93,636 0.87 14.25 N/A 0.73 0.62 N/A 0.04
 De Magallanes 132,033 156,530 1.19 17.49 N/A 0.90 1.04 N/A 0.07
 Metropolitana de Santiago 15,403 6,013,185 390.39 2.04 N/A 0.10 40.06 N/A 2.65
 Total Chile 754,905 15,010,755 19.88 100.00 N/A 5.12 100.00 N/A 6.63
 MERCOSUR 4 12,890,445 203,727,823 15.80 N/A 100.00 87.43 N/A 100.00 89.94
 MERCOSUR 6 14,743,931 226,505,638 15.36 N/A N/A 100.00 N/A N/A 100.00
 
 A2.8
Map A2.1. Population density: regional data compared to the Mercosur 6 average (%) 
 A2.9
A2.2. Economic development regional statistics 
A2.2.1. Gross Domestic Product per capita 
 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population
GDP/cap 
(US$) Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Ciudad de Buenos Aires 3,027,886 21,672 275.90 412.80 428.47 
 Buenos Aires 13,379,401 7,145 90.96 136.10 141.26 
 Catamarca 289,212 3,873 49.30 73.77 76.57 
 Córdoba 2,929,734 6,861 87.35 130.68 135.65 
 Corrientes 857,685 3,259 41.49 62.07 64.43 
 Chaco 895,900 2,947 37.51 56.13 58.26 
 Chubut 399,125 10,373 132.06 197.59 205.09 
 Entre Ríos 1,069,102 4,881 62.13 92.96 96.49 
 Formosa 447,094 2,031 25.85 38.68 40.15 
 Jujuy 555,097 2,830 36.03 53.90 55.95 
 La Pampa 282,356 8,333 106.09 158.73 164.75 
 La Rioja 247,575 7,999 101.83 152.36 158.15 
 Mendoza 1,508,959 4,488 57.13 85.48 88.72 
 Misiones 884,291 4,764 60.64 90.73 94.18 
 Neuquén 463,266 8,794 111.96 167.51 173.86 
 Río Negro 559,590 7,006 89.19 133.45 138.51 
 Salta 958,094 3,826 48.71 72.88 75.65 
 San Juan 555,223 4,905 62.44 93.43 96.97 
 San Luis 321,890 13,344 169.88 254.17 263.82 
 Santa Cruz 181,198 14,662 186.66 279.28 289.88 
 Santa Fe 2,949,050 7,175 91.34 136.66 141.85 
 Santiago del Estero 700,114 1,979 25.19 37.70 39.13 
 Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
89,992 14,049 178.86 267.60 277.76 
 Tucumán 1,216,623 3,611 45.97 68.78 71.39 
 Total Argentina 34,768,457 7,855 100.00 149.62 155.30 
BR NORTH 11,736,040 2,895 60.56 55.15 57.24 
 Rondônia 1,289,365 2,872 60.08 54.71 56.78 
 Acre 504,489 2,296 48.04 43.74 45.40 
 Amazonas 2,460,434 5,171 108.18 98.50 102.24 
 Roraima 258,088 2,126 44.46 40.49 42.02 
 Pará 5,724,140 2,268 47.44 43.20 44.83 
 Amapá 402,557 3,344 69.95 63.69 66.11 
 Tocantins 1,096,967 1,384 28.94 26.35 27.35 
 NORTHEAST 45,854,455 2,192 45.86 41.76 43.34 
 Maranhão 5,349,575 1,222 25.56 23.28 24.16 
 Piauí 2,758,129 1,352 28.27 25.75 26.72 
 Ceará 7,010,107 2,214 46.31 42.17 43.77 
 Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 2,228 46.60 42.43 44.04 
 Paraíba 3,433,234 1,796 37.57 34.21 35.51 
 Pernambuco 7,548,183 2,740 57.31 52.19 54.17 
 Alagoas 2,754,697 1,843 38.56 35.11 36.44 
 Sergipe 1,662,168 2,570 53.76 48.96 50.81 
 Bahia 12,697,007 2,572 53.81 49.00 50.86 
 SOUTHEAST 68,331,524 6,586 137.76 125.44 130.20 
 A2.10
Gross Domestic Product per capita (end) 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population
GDP/cap 
(US$) Nation M 4 M 6 
BR Minas Gerais 17,024,849 4,519 94.52 86.07 89.34 
 Espirito Santo 2,916,530 4,904 102.59 93.42 96.96 
 Rio de Janeiro 13,490,380 6,389 133.66 121.70 126.32 
 São Paulo 34,899,765 7,810 163.37 148.76 154.41 
 SOUTH 23,963,075 5,668 118.56 107.96 112.06 
 Paraná 9,154,360 5,093 106.54 97.01 100.69 
 Santa Catarina 5,032,175 5,589 116.92 106.46 110.50 
 Rio Grande do Sul 9,776,540 6,247 130.67 118.99 123.50 
 CENTRAL WEST 10,825,181 4,430 92.66 84.38 87.58 
 Mato Grosso do Sul 1,985,579 4,128 86.35 78.63 81.61 
 Mato Grosso 2,335,344 3,459 72.36 65.89 68.39 
 Goiás 4,629,154 3,055 63.91 58.19 60.40 
 Federal District 1,875,104 9,352 195.63 178.13 184.89 
 Total Brazil 160,710,275 4,781 100.00 91.06 94.51 
PY Total Paraguay 5,085,328 1,652 100.00 31.47 32.66 
UY Total Uruguay 3,163,763 6,240 100.00 118.86 123.37 
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 677 76.71 N/A 13.38 
 La Paz 2,268,824 777 88.05 N/A 15.36 
 Cochabamba 1,408,071 885 100.28 N/A 17.50 
 Oruro 383,498 1,107 125.44 N/A 21.89 
 Potosí 746,618 483 54.73 N/A 9.55 
 Tarija 368,506 954 108.10 N/A 18.86 
 Santa Cruz 1,651,951 1,203 136.32 N/A 23.78 
 Beni 336,633 865 98.02 N/A 17.10 
 Pando 53,124 1,090 123.51 N/A 21.55 
 Total Bolivia 7,767,060 882 100.00 N/A 17.45 
CL Tarapacá 379,700 5,752 125.05 N/A 113.73 
 Antofagasta 449,800 10,292 223.74 N/A 203.48 
 Atacama 259,800 5,368 116.69 N/A 106.12 
 Coquimbo 553,400 2,463 53.55 N/A 48.70 
 Valparaíso 1,507,100 3,148 68.43 N/A 62.24 
 Del Libertador 758,400 3,287 71.46 N/A 64.99 
 Del Maule 889,800 2,616 56.86 N/A 51.71 
 Del Biobío 1,874,100 2,568 55.83 N/A 50.78 
 De La Araucanía 846,000 1,575 34.23 N/A 31.13 
 De Los Lagos 1,028,200 2,229 48.46 N/A 44.07 
 De Aysén 90,800 3,073 66.80 N/A 60.75 
 De Magallanes 154,000 7,457 162.12 N/A 147.44 
 Metropolitana de Santiago 5,831,300 4,515 98.15 N/A 89.26 
 Non regionalised GDP N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 Total Chile 14,622,400 4,600 100.00 N/A 90.95 
 MERCOSUR 4 203,727,823 5,250 N/A 100.00 103.79 
 MERCOSUR 6 226,117,283 5,058 N/A N/A 100.00 
 
 A2.11
Map A2.2. GDP per capita: regional data compared to the Mercosur 6 average (%) 
 
 A2.12
A2.2.2. Activity rate 
 
  Region compared to 
 Region 
Population in 
age of economic 
activity* 
Population 
economically 
active 
% of 
activity
Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Ciudad de Buenos Aires 2,441,140 1,407,149 57.64 101.68 97.07 97.16
 Buenos Aires 9,194,813 5,213,477 56.70 100.02 95.49 95.57
 Catamarca 173,337 96,400 55.61 98.10 93.66 93.74
 Córdoba 2,014,620 1,153,114 57.24 100.97 96.39 96.47
 Corrientes 517,670 278,266 53.75 94.82 90.52 90.60
 Chaco 534,996 324,520 60.66 107.00 102.15 102.24
 Chubut 238,497 147,835 61.99 109.34 104.39 104.48
 Entre Ríos 709,845 382,698 53.91 95.10 90.79 90.87
 Formosa 248,900 147,717 59.35 104.69 99.95 100.03
 Jujuy 324,272 177,987 54.89 96.82 92.44 92.51
 La Pampa 183,839 110,993 60.38 106.50 101.68 101.76
 La Rioja 145,640 84,352 57.92 102.17 97.54 97.62
 Mendoza 989,502 555,183 56.11 98.97 94.49 94.57
 Misiones 490,019 309,910 63.24 111.56 106.51 106.60
 Neuquén 253,082 158,117 62.48 110.21 105.21 105.30
 Río Negro 337,907 208,148 61.60 108.66 103.74 103.82
 Salta 553,320 308,825 55.81 98.45 93.99 94.07
 San Juan 362,103 193,948 53.56 94.48 90.20 90.28
 San Luis 197,750 116,405 58.86 103.84 99.13 99.22
 Santa Cruz 107,328 70,380 65.57 115.67 110.43 110.53
 Santa Fe 2,024,674 1,096,280 54.15 95.51 91.19 91.26
 Santiago del Estero 429,471 229,035 53.33 94.07 89.81 89.89
 Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
45,671 33,186 72.66 128.18 122.37 122.47
 Tucumán 769,846 398,275 51.73 91.26 87.12 87.20
 Total Argentina 23,288,242 13,202,200 56.69 100.00 95.47 95.55
BR NORTH 5,851,449 3,347,029 57.20 95.02 96.33 96.41
 Rondônia 638,315 387,457 60.70 100.83 102.22 102.31
 Acre 254,541 150,179 59.00 98.01 99.36 99.44
 Amazonas 1,454,597 754,936 51.90 86.21 87.40 87.48
 Roraima 144,288 76,761 53.20 88.37 89.59 89.67
 Pará 2,404,986 1,423,752 59.20 98.34 99.70 99.78
 Amapá 280,929 138,779 49.40 82.06 83.19 83.26
 Tocantins 854,215 549,260 64.30 106.81 108.29 108.38
 NORTHEAST 35,772,865 21,535,265 60.20 100.00 101.38 101.47
 Maranhão 4,030,338 2,849,449 70.70 117.44 119.06 119.16
 Piauí 2,119,156 1,292,685 61.00 101.33 102.73 102.81
 Ceará 5,364,657 3,250,982 60.60 100.66 102.05 102.14
 Rio Grande do Norte 2,056,518 1,108,463 53.90 89.53 90.77 90.85
 Paraíba 2,663,815 1,510,383 56.70 94.19 95.49 95.57
 Pernambuco 5,976,790 3,442,631 57.60 95.68 97.00 97.08
 Alagoas 2,082,610 1,112,114 53.40 88.70 89.93 90.01
 Sergipe 1,310,612 816,511 62.30 103.49 104.92 105.01
 Bahia 10,168,673 6,152,047 60.50 100.50 101.89 101.97
 SOUTHEAST 57,277,334 33,392,686 58.30 96.84 98.18 98.26
 Minas Gerais 13,805,904 8,352,572 60.50 100.50 101.89 101.97
 A2.13
Activity rate (continued) 
  Region compared to 
 Region 
Population in 
age of economic 
activity* 
Population 
economically 
active 
% of 
activity
Nation M 4 M 6 
BR Espirito Santo 2,333,015 1,437,137 61.60 102.33 103.74 103.83
 Rio de Janeiro 11,483,139 6,258,311 54.50 90.53 91.78 91.86
 São Paulo 29,699,771 17,344,666 58.40 97.01 98.35 98.43
 SOUTH 19,729,490 12,843,898 65.10 108.14 109.63 109.73
 Paraná 7,470,047 4,765,890 63.80 105.98 107.44 107.53
 Santa Catarina 4,087,989 2,685,809 65.70 109.14 110.64 110.74
 Rio Grande do Sul 8,157,638 5,392,199 66.10 109.80 111.32 111.41
 CENTRAL WEST 8,884,478 5,632,759 63.40 105.32 106.77 106.86
 Mato Grosso do Sul 1,587,828 1,035,264 65.20 108.31 109.80 109.89
 Mato Grosso 1,867,794 1,243,951 66.60 110.63 112.16 112.25
 Goiás 3,855,029 2,417,103 62.70 104.15 105.59 105.68
 Federal District 1,576,500 936,441 59.40 98.67 100.03 100.12
 Total Brazil 127,717,163 76,885,732 60.20 100.00 101.38 101.47
PY Asunción 400,975 220,927 55.10 116.34 92.79 92.87
 Concepción 111,513 46,231 41.46 87.54 69.82 69.88
 San Pedro 186,500 81,051 43.46 91.76 73.19 73.25
 Cordillera 141,038 59,230 42.00 88.67 70.72 70.78
 Guairá 112,699 50,128 44.48 93.92 74.91 74.97
 Caaguazú 260,225 114,510 44.00 92.91 74.11 74.17
 Caazapá 86,280 35,937 41.65 87.95 70.14 70.20
 Itapúa 254,392 116,305 45.72 96.53 76.99 77.06
 Misiones 62,111 25,225 40.61 85.75 68.39 68.45
 Paraguarí 147,817 63,189 42.75 90.26 71.99 72.05
 Alto Paraná 284,066 144,476 50.86 107.39 85.65 85.72
 Central 632,449 315,998 49.96 105.50 84.14 84.21
 Ñeembucú 51,617 22,378 43.35 91.54 73.01 73.07
 Amambay 69,222 32,054 46.31 97.77 77.98 78.05
 Canindeyú 71,639 34,917 48.74 102.91 82.08 82.15
 Pdte. Hayes 46,324 21,325 46.03 97.20 77.53 77.59
 Boquerón 21,534 9,192 42.69 90.13 71.89 71.95
 Alto Paraguay 8,698 3,660 42.08 88.85 70.86 70.92
 Total Paraguay 2,949,099 1,396,733 47.36 100.00 79.76 79.83
UY Montevideo 1,108,641 644,244 58.11 101.90 97.86 97.95
 Artigas  55,192 28,191 51.08 89.56 86.02 86.09
 Canelones  349,975 200,594 57.32 100.50 96.53 96.61
 Cerro Largo  64,183 33,278 51.85 90.91 87.32 87.39
 Colonia  96,288 55,509 57.65 101.09 97.08 97.17
 Durazno  42,451 23,044 54.28 95.18 91.42 91.49
 Flores  19,855 10,948 55.14 96.69 92.86 92.94
 Florida  52,699 28,612 54.29 95.20 91.43 91.51
 Lavalleja  49,090 30,650 62.44 109.48 105.15 105.24
 Maldonado  100,537 62,701 62.37 109.36 105.03 105.12
 Paysandú  85,459 52,761 61.74 108.26 103.97 104.06
 Río Negro  39,241 20,435 52.08 91.31 87.70 87.77
 Rivera  74,660 39,225 52.54 92.12 88.48 88.55
 Rocha  55,795 30,521 54.70 95.92 92.12 92.20
 Salto  88,354 44,796 50.70 88.90 85.38 85.46
 San José  76,881 43,305 56.33 98.77 94.86 94.94
 A2.14
Activity rate (end) 
  Region compared to 
 Region 
Population in 
age of economic 
activity* 
Population 
economically 
active 
% of 
activity
Nation M 4 M 6 
UY Soriano  63,424 33,568 52.93 92.80 89.13 89.21
 Tacuarembó  64,708 33,427 51.66 90.58 87.00 87.07
 Treinta y Tres  38,149 20,221 53.01 92.94 89.26 89.34
 Total Uruguay 2,525,651 1,440,489 57.03 100.00 96.05 96.13
BO Chuquisaca 252,733 185,360 73.34 102.84 N/A 123.62
 La Paz 1,149,511 793,292 69.01 96.76 N/A 116.32
 Cochabamba 653,584 483,988 74.05 103.83 N/A 124.81
 Oruro 199,638 126,562 63.40 88.89 N/A 106.85
 Potosí 361,245 247,817 68.60 96.19 N/A 115.63
 Tarija 166,205 129,131 77.69 108.94 N/A 130.95
 Santa Cruz 774,013 561,488 72.54 101.71 N/A 122.27
 Beni 145,078 107,638 74.19 104.03 N/A 125.05
 Pando 20,692 19,685 95.13 133.39 N/A 160.35
 Total Bolivia 3,722,699 2,654,960 71.32 100.00 N/A 120.21
CL Tarapacá 281,300 158,400 56.31 103.59 N/A 94.91
 Antofagasta 327,800 165,500 50.49 92.88 N/A 85.10
 Atacama 188,710 110,380 58.49 107.60 N/A 98.59
 Coquimbo 399,970 206,980 51.75 95.20 N/A 87.22
 Valparaíso 1,121,700 577,500 51.48 94.71 N/A 86.78
 Del Libertador 558,300 281,500 50.42 92.75 N/A 84.98
 Del Maule 642,900 336,200 52.29 96.20 N/A 88.14
 Del Biobío 1,352,000 672,300 49.73 91.48 N/A 83.81
 De La Araucanía 606,800 289,300 47.68 87.70 N/A 80.36
 De Los Lagos 742,800 382,000 51.43 94.60 N/A 86.68
 De Aysén 64,800 38,300 59.10 108.73 N/A 99.62
 De Magallanes 116,200 66,400 57.14 105.12 N/A 96.31
 Metropolitana de Santiago 4,316,900 2,542,200 58.89 108.33 N/A 99.26
 Total Chile 10,720,180 5,826,960 54.36 100.00 N/A 91.61
 MERCOSUR 4 156,480,155 92,925,154 59.38 N/A 100.00 100.09
 MERCOSUR 6 170,923,034 101,407,074 59.33 N/A N/A 100.00
* Population older than 14 for Argentina, 10 for Brazil and Paraguay, 12 for Uruguay, 15 for Bolivia and Chile. 
The Brazilian data for the North regions excludes rural population. 
 A2.15
Map A2.3. Activity rate: regional data compared to the Mercosur 6 average (%) 
 
 A2.16
A2.3. Infrastructure development regional statistics 
A2.3.1. Road networks density 
 
  Region compared to 
 Region 
Territory
(km²) 
Total 
(km) 
% Paved 
roads 
Km per 
1000 Km² Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Buenos Aires 307,771 4,690 100.0 15.24 149.40 11.36 12.07 
 Catamarca 102,602 891 82.0 8.68 85.14 6.47 6.88 
 Córdoba 165,321 2,526 100.0 15.28 149.80 11.39 12.10 
 Corrientes 88,199 1,761 100.0 19.97 195.75 14.88 15.81 
 Chaco 99,633 1,112 70.3 11.16 109.42 8.32 8.84 
 Chubut 224,686 2,275 64.7 10.13 99.27 7.55 8.02 
 Entre Ríos 78,781 1,460 100.0 18.53 181.69 13.81 14.68 
 Formosa 72,066 1,310 55.0 18.18 178.21 13.55 14.40 
 Jujuy 53,219 754 61.9 14.17 138.90 10.56 11.22 
 La Pampa 143,440 1,589 85.5 11.08 108.61 8.26 8.77 
 La Rioja 89,680 1,727 78.1 19.26 188.80 14.36 15.25 
 Mendoza 148,827 1,727 90.9 11.60 113.77 8.65 9.19 
 Misiones 29,801 839 76.3 28.15 276.01 20.99 22.30 
 Neuquén 94,078 1,568 87.6 16.67 163.40 12.42 13.20 
 Río Negro 203,013 2,382 66.0 11.73 115.03 8.75 9.29 
 Salta 155,488 1,889 61.2 12.15 119.11 9.06 9.62 
 San Juan 89,651 827 88.6 9.22 90.44 6.88 7.31 
 San Luis 76,748 1,294 100.0 16.86 165.30 12.57 13.35 
 Santa Cruz 243,943 2,392 43.3 9.81 96.13 7.31 7.77 
 Santa Fe 133,007 2,479 96.2 18.64 182.73 13.89 14.76 
 Santiago del Estero 136,351 1,464 90.8 10.74 105.26 8.00 8.50 
 Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
1,002,445 908 24.3 0.91 8.88 0.68 0.72 
 Tucumán 22,524 507 89.2 22.51 220.68 16.78 17.83 
 Total Argentina 3,761,274 38,371 81.0 10.20 100.00 7.60 8.08 
BR NORTH 3,869,637 96,723 9.8 25.00 12.88 18.63 19.80 
 Rondônia 238,512 22,433 6.3 94.05 48.47 70.11 74.49 
 Acre 153,149 2,266 21.2 14.80 7.62 11.03 11.72 
 Amazonas 1,577,820 6,034 28.2 3.82 1.97 2.85 3.03 
 Roraima 225,116 4,868 15.3 21.62 11.14 16.12 17.13 
 Pará 1,253,164 34,344 9.9 27.41 14.12 20.43 21.70 
 Amapá 143,453 2,012 11.1 14.03 7.23 10.46 11.11 
 Tocantins 278,420 24,766 6.0 88.95 45.84 66.31 70.45 
 NORTHEAST 1,561,177 396,859 10.5 254.21 130.99 189.49 201.32 
 Maranhão 333,365 52,686 8.0 158.04 81.44 117.81 125.16 
 Piauí 252,378 52,735 6.8 208.95 107.67 155.76 165.48 
 Ceará 146,348 48,084 13.0 328.56 169.31 244.92 260.20 
 Rio Grande do Norte 53,306 26,921 13.9 505.03 260.24 376.46 399.96 
 Paraíba 56,584 33,190 9.0 586.56 302.26 437.24 464.53 
 Pernambuco 98,937 41,263 13.1 417.06 214.91 310.89 330.29 
 Alagoas 27,933 12,989 17.2 465.01 239.62 346.63 368.26 
 Sergipe 22,050 9,510 18.1 431.29 222.25 321.50 341.56 
 Bahia 567,295 119,481 9.7 210.62 108.53 157.00 166.80 
 SOUTHEAST 927,286 479,585 11.0 517.19 266.51 385.53 409.59 
 Minas Gerais 588,383 232,534 8.2 395.21 203.65 294.60 312.99 
 A2.17
Road networks density (continued) 
  Region compared to 
 Region 
Territory
(km²) 
Total 
(km) 
% Paved 
roads 
Km per 
1000 Km² Nation M 4 M 6 
BR Espirito Santo 46,184 29,956 10.1 648.62 334.24 483.51 513.68 
 Rio de Janeiro 43,909 22,069 23.5 502.61 259.00 374.66 398.04 
 São Paulo 248,808 195,026 13.0 783.84 403.92 584.30 620.77 
 SOUTH 577,214 460,557 6.5 797.90 411.16 594.78 631.90 
 Paraná 199,709 260,833 5.8 1 306.07 673.02 973.59 1,034.34 
 Santa Catarina 95,442 61,363 8.8 642.93 331.31 479.27 509.17 
 Rio Grande do Sul 282,062 138,361 6.7 490.53 252.77 365.66 388.48 
 CENTRAL WEST 1,612,077 224,953 7.6 139.54 71.91 104.02 110.51 
 Mato Grosso do Sul 358,158 53,915 8.6 150.53 77.57 112.21 119.22 
 Mato Grosso 906,806 82,875 4.8 91.39 47.09 68.13 72.38 
 Goiás 341,289 86,700 9.0 254.04 130.91 189.37 201.19 
 Federal District 5,822 1,463 50.3 251.29 129.49 187.32 199.01 
 Total Brazil 8,547,403 1,658,677 9.1 194.06 100.00 144.66 153.68 
PY Concepción 18,051 2,222 12.1 123.07 212.89 91.74 97.47 
 San Pedro 20,002 3,241 8.6 162.03 280.28 120.78 128.32 
 Cordillera 4,948 702 23.0 141.84 245.36 105.73 112.33 
 Guairá 3,846 736 17.8 191.37 331.03 142.65 151.55 
 Caaguazú 11,474 1,611 18.3 140.42 242.90 104.67 111.20 
 Caazapá 9,496 793 2.0 83.46 144.37 62.22 66.10 
 Itapúa 16,525 2,455 15.3 148.56 256.99 110.74 117.66 
 Misiones 9,556 614 22.3 64.26 111.15 47.90 50.89 
 Paraguarí 8,705 974 29.3 111.91 193.59 83.42 88.63 
 Alto Paraná 14,895 1,207 7.6 81.04 140.18 60.41 64.18 
 Central (inc. Asunción) 2,582 412 60.9 159.75 276.33 119.08 126.51 
 Ñeembucú 12,147 657 3.4 54.05 93.50 40.29 42.81 
 Amambay 12,933 1,289 10.1 99.66 172.39 74.29 78.93 
 Canindeyú 14,667 1,056 0.0 72.01 124.57 53.68 57.03 
 Pdte. Hayes 72,907 2,066 27.7 28.33 49.01 21.12 22.44 
 Boquerón 91,669 2,678 4.5 29.22 50.54 21.78 23.14 
 Alto Paraguay 82,349 802 0.0 9.74 16.85 7.26 7.71 
 Total Paraguay 406,752 23,515 13.3 57.81 100.00 43.09 45.78 
UY Montevideo 530 88 94.3 166.04 335.57 123.77 131.49 
 Artigas  11,928 394 26.4 33.03 66.76 24.62 26.16 
 Canelones  4,536 1,099 34.6 242.28 489.66 180.61 191.88 
 Cerro Largo  13,648 485 0.8 35.54 71.82 26.49 28.14 
 Colonia  6,106 531 20.7 86.96 175.76 64.83 68.87 
 Durazno  11,643 362 34.3 31.09 62.84 23.18 24.62 
 Flores  5,144 279 29.7 54.24 109.62 40.43 42.95 
 Florida  10,417 686 15.2 65.85 133.09 49.09 52.15 
 Lavalleja  10,016 288 68.1 28.75 58.11 21.43 22.77 
 Maldonado  4,793 382 41.6 79.70 161.07 59.41 63.12 
 Paysandú  13,922 431 14.8 30.96 62.57 23.08 24.52 
 Río Negro  9,282 447 24.8 48.16 97.33 35.90 38.14 
 Rivera  9,370 438 0.0 46.74 94.47 34.85 37.02 
 Rocha  10,551 682 25.1 64.64 130.64 48.18 51.19 
 Salto  14,163 328 30.5 23.16 46.80 17.26 18.34 
 San José  4,992 389 74.3 77.92 157.49 58.09 61.71 
 Soriano  9,008 513 25.0 56.95 115.10 42.45 45.10 
 Tacuarembó  15,438 558 15.4 36.14 73.05 26.94 28.62
 A2.18
Road networks density (end) 
  Region compared to 
 Region 
Territory
(km²) 
Total 
(km) 
% Paved 
roads 
Km per 
1000 Km² Nation M 4 M 6 
UY Treinta y Tres  9,529 280 41.1 29.38 59.39 21.90 23.27 
 Total Uruguay 175,016 8,660 27.8 49.48 100.00 36.88 39.19 
BO Chuquisaca 51,524 5,876 2.8 114.04 234.32 N/A 90.32 
 La Paz 133,985 9,096 6.4 67.89 139.49 N/A 53.76 
 Cochabamba 55,631 6,134 10.0 110.26 226.55 N/A 87.32 
 Oruro 53,588 4,580 6.9 85.47 175.60 N/A 67.69 
 Potosí 118,218 11,384 1.2 96.30 197.86 N/A 76.26 
 Tarija 37,623 2,694 9.3 71.61 147.12 N/A 56.71 
 Santa Cruz 370,621 9,134 9.9 24.65 50.64 N/A 19.52 
 Beni 213,564 3,294 2.2 15.42 31.69 N/A 12.22 
 Pando 63,827 1,276 2.6 19.99 41.08 N/A 15.83 
 Total Bolivia 1,098,581 53,468 5.7 48.67 100.00 N/A 38.54 
CL Tarapacá 59,099 4,621 23.7 78.19 74.65 N/A 61.92 
 Antofagasta 126,049 5,563 26.2 44.13 42.13 N/A 34.95 
 Atacama 75,176 6,366 15.4 84.68 80.84 N/A 67.06 
 Coquimbo 40,580 4,957 18.1 122.15 116.61 N/A 96.74 
 Valparaíso 16,396 3,318 35.0 202.37 193.19 N/A 160.26 
 Del Libertador 16,387 4,089 20.3 249.53 238.21 N/A 197.61 
 Del Maule 30,296 7,359 14.5 242.90 231.89 N/A 192.37 
 Del Biobío 37,063 11,530 14.7 311.10 296.99 N/A 246.37 
 De La Araucanía 31,842 12,379 8.7 388.76 371.13 N/A 307.88 
 De Los Lagos 67,013 10,605 14.6 158.25 151.08 N/A 125.33 
 De Aysén 107,567 2,552 6.2 23.72 22.65 N/A 18.79 
 De Magallanes 132,033 3,250 12.9 24.62 23.50 N/A 19.49 
 Metropolitana de Santiago 15,403 2,488 46.8 161.52 154.20 N/A 127.92 
 Total Chile 754,905 79,077 17.2 104.75 100.00 N/A 82.96 
 MERCOSUR 4 12,890,445 1,729,223 10.8 134.15 N/A 100.00 106.24 
 MERCOSUR 6 14,743,931 1,861,768 11.0 126.27 N/A N/A 100.00 
 
 A2.19
Map A2.4. Road networks density: regional data compared to the Mercosur 6 average 
(%) 
 A2.20
A2.3.2. Electricity consumption per capita 
 
  Electricity consumption Region compared to 
 Region Population Total 
(Mwh) 
Per cap 
(kwh) 
% of 
residential 
consumption Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Ciudad de Buenos Aires 3,027,886 7,642,330 2,523.98 34.95 193.80 168.87 166.27
 Buenos Aires 13,379,401 20,038,682 1,497.73 38.28 115.00 100.21 98.67
 Catamarca 289,212 2,941 10.17 3.13 0.78 0.68 0.67
 Córdoba 2,929,734 3,345,182 1,141.80 26.38 87.67 76.39 75.22
 Corrientes 857,685 608,650 709.64 N/A 54.49 47.48 46.75
 Chaco 895,900 685,880 765.58 49.87 58.78 51.22 50.43
 Chubut 399,125 571,737 1,432.48 30.63 109.99 95.84 94.37
 Entre Ríos 1,069,102 1,128,432 1,055.50 30.16 81.04 70.62 69.53
 Formosa 447,094 248,374 555.53 N/A 42.66 37.17 36.60
 Jujuy (1) 555,097 247,542 445.94 54.02 34.24 29.84 29.38
 La Pampa 282,356 300,256 1,063.39 46.45 81.65 71.15 70.05
 La Rioja 247,575 172,829 698.09 59.87 53.60 46.71 45.99
 Mendoza 1,508,959 2,707,751 1,794.45 18.13 137.78 120.06 118.21
 Misiones 884,291 667,790 755.17 27.32 57.98 50.53 49.75
 Neuquén (1) 463,266 901,529 1,946.03 22.28 149.42 130.20 128.20
 Río Negro 559,590 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
 Salta 958,094 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
 San Juan 555,223 576,487 1,038.30 40.85 79.72 69.47 68.40
 San Luis 321,890 540,287 1,678.48 25.76 128.88 112.30 110.57
 Santa Cruz (1) 181,198 144,530 797.63 47.38 61.24 53.37 52.55
 Santa Fe 2,949,050 3,741,330 1,268.66 31.71 97.41 84.88 83.58
 Santiago del Estero 700,114 344 0.49 57.81 0.04 0.03 0.03
 Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
89,992 127,079 1,412.11 41.35 108.43 94.48 93.03
 Tucumán 1,216,623 881,514 724.56 44.03 55.63 48.48 47.73
 Total Argentina 34,768,457 45,281,477 1,302.37 34.02 100.00 87.14 85.80
BR NORTH 11,736,040 13,407,000 1,142.38 26.88 73.70 76.43 75.26
 Rondônia 1,289,365 853,000 661.57 57.68 42.68 44.26 43.58
 Acre 504,489 261,000 517.36 66.28 33.38 34.61 34.08
 Amazonas 2,460,434 2,053,000 834.41 43.98 53.83 55.83 54.97
 Roraima 258,088 202,000 782.68 72.28 50.50 52.37 51.56
 Pará 5,724,140 9,281,000 1,621.38 15.29 104.61 108.48 106.81
 Amapá 402,557 290,000 720.39 68.62 46.48 48.20 47.46
 Tocantins 1,096,967 467,000 425.72 58.24 27.47 28.48 28.05
 NORTHEAST 45,854,455 39,680,000 865.35 30.11 55.83 57.90 57.01
 Maranhão 5,349,575 7,477,000 1,397.68 12.37 90.17 93.51 92.08
 Piauí 2,758,129 948,000 343.71 62.76 22.18 23.00 22.64
 Ceará 7,010,107 4,681,000 667.75 41.94 43.08 44.68 43.99
 Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 2,044,000 773.85 39.92 49.93 51.78 50.98
 Paraíba 3,433,234 2,021,000 588.66 41.42 37.98 39.39 38.78
 Pernambuco 7,548,183 5,777,000 765.35 43.52 49.38 51.21 50.42
 Alagoas 2,754,697 2,871,000 1,042.22 23.06 67.24 69.73 68.66
 Sergipe 1,662,168 1,737,000 1,045.02 29.76 67.42 69.92 68.84
 Bahia 12,697,007 12,124,000 954.87 25.73 61.60 63.89 62.90
 SOUTHEAST 68,331,524 146,665,000 2,146.37 32.24 138.48 143.61 141.40
 Minas Gerais 17,024,849 32,718,000 1,921.78 24.22 123.99 128.58 126.60
 Espirito Santo 2,916,530 5,379,000 1,844.31 27.18 118.99 123.40 121.50
 A2.21
Electricity consumption per capita (continued) 
  Electricity consumption Region compared to 
 Region Population Total 
(Mwh) 
Per cap 
(kwh) 
% of 
residential 
consumption Nation M 4 M 6 
BR Rio de Janeiro 13,490,380 27,516,000 2,039.68 40.15 131.59 136.47 134.37
 São Paulo 34,899,765 81,052,000 2,322.42 33.12 149.83 155.39 153.00
 SOUTH 23,963,075 37,291,000 1,556.19 33.97 100.40 104.12 102.52
 Paraná 9,154,360 13,352,000 1,458.54 33.32 94.10 97.59 96.08
 Santa Catarina 5,032,175 9,284,000 1,844.93 31.41 119.03 123.44 121.54
 Rio Grande do Sul 9,776,540 14,655,000 1,499.00 36.18 96.71 100.29 98.75
 CENTRAL WEST 10,825,181 12,056,000 1,113.70 48.34 71.85 74.51 73.37
 Mato Grosso do Sul 1,985,579 2,136,000 1,075.76 46.58 69.40 71.98 70.87
 Mato Grosso 2,335,344 2,367,000 1,013.56 49.43 65.39 67.81 66.77
 Goiás 4,629,154 4,857,000 1,049.22 46.45 67.69 70.20 69.12
 Federal District 1,875,104 2,696,000 1,437.79 52.19 92.76 96.20 94.72
 Total Brazil 160,710,275 249,099,000 1,549.99 32.65 100.00 103.70 102.11
PY Concepción 185,496 87,402 471.18 26.90 64.10 31.53 31.04
 San Pedro 332,926 65,102 195.54 61.21 26.60 13.08 12.88
 Cordillera 215,663 92,238 427.70 67.17 58.19 28.62 28.18
 Guairá 173,668 73,201 421.50 22.78 57.35 28.20 27.77
 Caaguazú 442,161 148,565 336.00 47.10 45.71 22.48 22.13
 Caazapá 141,559 20,265 143.16 67.78 19.48 9.58 9.43
 Itapúa 454,757 191,893 421.97 51.57 57.41 28.23 27.80
 Misiones 98,607 82,125 832.85 27.99 113.31 55.72 54.87
 Paraguarí 247,675 61,335 247.64 61.39 33.69 16.57 16.31
 Alto Paraná 595,276 419,769 705.17 47.31 95.94 47.18 46.45
 Central (inc. Asunción) 1,724,272 2,268,785 1,315.79 46.86 179.01 88.04 86.68
 Ñeembucú 86,965 45,778 526.40 29.54 71.62 35.22 34.68
 Amambay 127,011 57,670 454.06 48.99 61.77 30.38 29.91
 Canindeyú 133,075 39,203 294.59 42.45 40.08 19.71 19.41
 Pdte. Hayes 77,145 80,735 1,046.54 15.26 142.38 70.02 68.94
 Boquerón 35,241 2,001 56.78 31.58 7.73 3.80 3.74
 Alto Paraguay 13,831 1,761 127.32 55.82 17.32 8.52 8.39
 Total Paraguay 5,085,328 3,737,828 735.02 46.00 100.00 49.18 48.42
UY Montevideo 1,344,839 3,033,691 2,255.80 47.02 111.89 150.93 148.61
 Artigas  75,059 77,975 1,038.85 49.48 51.53 69.51 68.44
 Canelones  443,053 944,965 2,132.85 44.94 105.79 142.70 140.51
 Cerro Largo  82,510 99,028 1,200.19 45.02 59.53 80.30 79.07
 Colonia  120,241 304,262 2,530.44 36.04 125.52 169.30 166.70
 Durazno  55,716 59,135 1,061.36 57.87 52.65 71.01 69.92
 Flores  25,030 42,671 1,704.81 41.77 84.56 114.06 112.31
 Florida  66,503 97,218 1,461.86 49.48 72.51 97.81 96.30
 Lavalleja  61,085 120,903 1,979.25 33.63 98.18 132.43 130.39
 Maldonado  127,502 405,219 3,178.14 52.55 157.64 212.64 209.37
 Paysandú  111,509 222,873 1,998.70 35.37 99.14 133.73 131.67
 Río Negro  51,713 64,007 1,237.73 57.24 61.39 82.81 81.54
 Rivera  98,472 123,184 1,250.95 40.71 62.05 83.70 82.41
 Rocha  70,292 110,125 1,566.67 48.88 77.71 104.82 103.21
 Salto  117,597 139,922 1,189.85 54.13 59.02 79.61 78.38
 San José  96,664 228,463 2,363.48 33.17 117.23 158.13 155.70
 Soriano  81,557 124,477 1,526.26 44.90 75.71 102.12 100.55
 Tacuarembó  84,919 95,913 1,129.46 50.01 56.02 75.57 74.41
 A2.22
Electricity consumption per capita (end) 
  Electricity consumption Region compared to 
 Region Population Total 
(Mwh) 
Per cap 
(kwh) 
% of 
residential 
consumption Nation M 4 M 6 
UY Treinta y Tres  49,502 84,252 1,701.99 32.24 84.42 113.87 112.12
 Total Uruguay 3,163,763 6,378,284 2,016.04 45.46 100.00 134.89 132.81
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 103,969 189.09 37.96 42.93 N/A 12.46
 La Paz 2,268,824 938,444 413.63 49.00 93.91 N/A 27.25
 Cochabamba 1,408,071 519,365 368.85 41.91 83.75 N/A 24.30
 Oruro 383,498 190,867 497.70 21.68 113.00 N/A 32.79
 Potosí 746,618 82,328 110.27 24.76 25.04 N/A 7.26
 Santa Cruz 1,651,951 1,032,518 625.03 42.34 141.91 N/A 41.18
 Beni-Tarija-Pando 758,263 553,418 729.85 18.92 165.71 N/A 48.08
 Total Bolivia 7,767,060 3,420,910 440.44 38.61 100.00 N/A 29.01
CL Total Chile 15,010,755 35,911,000 2,392.35 16.23 100.00 N/A 157.60
 MERCOSUR 4 203,727,823 304,496,588 1,494.62 33.29 N/A 100.00 98.46
 MERCOSUR 6 226,505,638 343,828,498 1,517.97 31.56 N/A N/A 100.00
Argentina data of 1996, except for (1) which are from 1995 
 
 A2.23
Map A2.5. Electricity consumption per capita: regional data compared to the Mercosur 
6 average (%) 
 A2.24
A2.3.3. Telephone lines per 1000 people 
 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population
Telephone lines 
in service 
Telephone lines 
per 1000 people Nation M 4 M 6
AR Buenos Aires (inc. Capital) 16,407,287 4,436,591 270.40 137.76 213.76 209.44
 Catamarca 289,212 24,333 84.14 42.87 66.51 65.17
 Córdoba 2,929,734 504,089 172.06 87.66 136.02 133.27
 Corrientes 857,685 74,099 86.39 44.02 68.30 66.92
 Chaco 895,900 59,935 66.90 34.08 52.88 51.82
 Chubut 399,125 75,035 188.00 95.78 148.62 145.61
 Entre Ríos 1,069,102 148,143 138.57 70.60 109.54 107.33
 Formosa 447,094 18,444 41.25 21.02 32.61 31.95
 Jujuy 555,097 32,166 57.95 29.52 45.81 44.88
 La Pampa 282,356 54,204 191.97 97.80 151.76 148.69
 La Rioja 247,575 27,236 110.01 56.05 86.97 85.21
 Mendoza 1,508,959 243,076 161.09 82.07 127.34 124.77
 Misiones 884,291 68,878 77.89 39.68 61.57 60.33
 Neuquén 463,266 61,969 133.77 68.15 105.74 103.61
 Río Negro 559,590 78,764 140.75 71.71 111.27 109.02
 Salta 958,094 74,036 77.27 39.37 61.09 59.85
 San Juan 555,223 76,788 138.30 70.46 109.33 107.12
 San Luis 321,890 41,254 128.16 65.30 101.31 99.27
 Santa Cruz 181,198 24,628 135.92 69.25 107.44 105.27
 Santa Fe 2,949,050 522,110 177.04 90.20 139.96 137.13
 Santiago del Estero 700,114 40,815 58.30 29.70 46.09 45.15
 Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
89,992 23,318 259.11 132.01 204.83 200.69
 Tucumán 1,216,623 114,514 94.12 47.95 74.41 72.90
 Total Argentina 34,768,457 6,824,425 196.28 100.00 155.16 152.03
BR NORTH 11,736,040 679,319 57.88 52.00 45.76 44.83
 Rondônia 1,289,365 70,188 54.44 48.90 43.03 42.16
 Acre 504,489 36,352 72.06 64.74 56.96 55.81
 Amazonas 2,460,434 191,676 77.90 69.99 61.58 60.34
 Roraima 258,088 27,716 107.39 96.48 84.89 83.18
 Pará 5,724,140 278,306 48.62 43.68 38.43 37.66
 Amapá 402,557 36,579 90.87 81.63 71.83 70.38
 Tocantins 1,096,967 38,502 35.10 31.53 27.75 27.19
 NORTHEAST 45,854,455 2,628,698 57.33 51.50 45.32 44.40
 Maranhão 5,349,575 172,482 32.24 28.97 25.49 24.97
 Piauí 2,758,129 128,359 46.54 41.81 36.79 36.05
 Ceará 7,010,107 503,816 71.87 64.57 56.81 55.67
 Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 165,262 62.57 56.21 49.46 48.46
 Paraíba 3,433,234 206,945 60.28 54.15 47.65 46.69
 Pernambuco 7,548,183 374,712 49.64 44.60 39.24 38.45
 Alagoas 2,754,697 151,377 54.95 49.37 43.44 42.56
 Sergipe 1,662,168 105,327 63.37 56.93 50.09 49.08
 Bahia 12,697,007 820,418 64.62 58.05 51.08 50.05
 SOUTHEAST 68,331,524 10,249,778 150.00 134.76 118.58 116.18
 Minas Gerais 17,024,849 1,952,286 114.67 103.02 90.65 88.82
 Espirito Santo 2,916,530 297,625 102.05 91.68 80.67 79.04
 Rio de Janeiro 13,490,380 1,851,699 137.26 123.31 108.51 106.31
 São Paulo 34,899,765 6,148,168 176.17 158.27 139.26 136.45
 A2.25
Telephone lines per 1000 people (continued) 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population
Telephone lines 
in service 
Telephone lines 
per 1000 people Nation M 4 M 6
BR SOUTH 23,963,075 2,768,191 115.52 103.78 91.32 89.47
 Paraná 9,154,360 1,095,867 119.71 107.55 94.63 92.72
 Santa Catarina 5,032,175 648,249 128.82 115.73 101.83 99.78
 Rio Grande do Sul 9,776,540 1,024,075 104.75 94.10 82.80 81.13
 CENTRAL WEST 10,825,181 1,562,225 144.31 129.65 114.08 111.78
 Mato Grosso do Sul 1,985,579 216,062 108.82 97.76 86.02 84.28
 Mato Grosso 2,335,344 202,999 86.92 78.09 68.72 67.33
 Goiás 4,629,154 452,994 97.86 87.91 77.36 75.79
 Federal District 1,875,104 690,170 368.07 330.67 290.96 285.08
 Total Brazil 160,710,275 17,888,211 111.31 100.00 87.99 86.21
PY Total Paraguay 5,085,328 127,894 25.15 100.00 19.88 19.48
UY Montevideo 1,344,839 497,855 370.20 125.70 292.65 286.73
 Artigas  75,059 11,924 158.86 53.94 125.58 123.04
 Canelones  443,053 122,056 275.49 93.54 217.78 213.38
 Cerro Largo  82,510 14,363 174.08 59.11 137.61 134.83
 Colonia  120,241 29,787 247.73 84.12 195.83 191.87
 Durazno  55,716 9,967 178.89 60.74 141.41 138.56
 Flores  25,030 5,190 207.35 70.41 163.91 160.60
 Florida  66,503 14,379 216.22 73.42 170.92 167.47
 Lavalleja  61,085 14,231 232.97 79.11 184.17 180.44
 Maldonado  127,502 63,324 496.65 168.64 392.61 384.67
 Paysandú  111,509 21,364 191.59 65.06 151.45 148.39
 Río Negro  51,713 8,940 172.88 58.70 136.66 133.90
 Rivera  98,472 18,452 187.38 63.63 148.13 145.13
 Rocha  70,292 17,735 252.30 85.67 199.45 195.42
 Salto  117,597 20,471 174.08 59.11 137.61 134.83
 San José  96,664 21,763 225.14 76.45 177.98 174.38
 Soriano  81,557 15,466 189.63 64.39 149.91 146.88
 Tacuarembó  84,919 14,668 172.73 58.65 136.54 133.78
 Treinta y Tres  49,502 9,778 197.53 67.07 156.15 152.99
 Total Uruguay 3,163,763 931,713 294.50 100.00 232.80 228.10
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 13,108 23.84 50.86 N/A 18.46
 La Paz 2,268,824 138,228 60.92 129.99 N/A 47.19
 Cochabamba 1,408,071 36,481 25.91 55.28 N/A 20.07
 Oruro 383,498 19,680 51.32 109.49 N/A 39.75
 Potosí 746,618 23,991 32.13 68.56 N/A 24.89
 Tarija 368,506 17,010 46.16 98.48 N/A 35.75
 Santa Cruz 1,651,951 101,768 61.60 131.44 N/A 47.71
 Beni 336,633 12,958 38.49 82.13 N/A 29.81
 Pando 53,124 851 16.02 34.18 N/A 12.41
 Total Bolivia 7,767,060 364,075 46.87 100.00 N/A 36.31
CL Tarapacá 385,620 73,585 190.82 92.14 N/A 147.80
 Antofagasta 462,286 98,329 212.70 102.70 N/A 164.74
 Atacama 269,047 31,217 116.03 56.03 N/A 89.87
 Coquimbo 569,825 75,942 133.27 64.35 N/A 103.22
 Valparaíso 1,543,566 342,248 221.73 107.06 N/A 171.73
 Del Libertador 778,801 89,925 115.47 55.75 N/A 89.43
 Del Maule 906,882 83,896 92.51 44.67 N/A 71.65
 Del Biobío 1,915,844 254,254 132.71 64.08 N/A 102.79
 A2.26
Telephone lines per 1000 people (end) 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population
Telephone lines 
in service 
Telephone lines 
per 1000 people Nation M 4 M 6
CL De La Araucanía 864,975 95,662 110.60 53.40 N/A 85.66
 De Los Lagos 1,050,558 137,990 131.35 63.42 N/A 101.73
 De Aysén 93,636 15,099 161.25 77.86 N/A 124.90
 De Magallanes 156,530 36,245 231.55 111.81 N/A 179.35
 Metropolitana de Santiago 6,013,185 1,774,407 295.09 142.48 N/A 228.55
 Total Chile 15,010,755 3,108,799 207.10 100.00 N/A 160.41
 MERCOSUR 4 203,727,823 25,772,243 126.50 N/A 100.00 97.98
 MERCOSUR 6 226,505,638 29,245,117 129.11 N/A N/A 100.00
 
 A2.27
Map A2.6. Telephone lines per 1000 persons: regional data compared to the Mercosur 6 
average (%) 
 A2.28
A2.3.4. Access to drinking water (percent of population or households with access) 
 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population
N° of 
houses 
Population / 
houses 
connected 
% of pop / 
houses 
connected Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Ciudad de Buenos Aires 3,027,886 N/A 3,025,464 99.92 142.11 136.72 134.64 
 Buenos Aires 13,379,401 N/A 7,570,065 56.58 80.47 77.42 76.24 
 Catamarca 289,212 N/A 253,465 87.64 124.65 119.92 118.10 
 Córdoba 2,929,734 N/A 2,289,001 78.13 111.12 106.90 105.28 
 Corrientes 857,685 N/A 602,867 70.29 99.97 96.18 94.72 
 Chaco 895,900 N/A 544,259 60.75 86.40 83.12 81.86 
 Chubut 399,125 N/A 371,426 93.06 132.36 127.33 125.40 
 Entre Ríos 1,069,102 N/A 842,345 78.79 112.06 107.81 106.17 
 Formosa 447,094 N/A 264,903 59.25 84.27 81.07 79.84 
 Jujuy 555,097 N/A 483,934 87.18 123.99 119.29 117.48 
 La Pampa 282,356 N/A 190,308 67.40 95.86 92.22 90.82 
 La Rioja 247,575 N/A 220,466 89.05 126.65 121.85 120.00 
 Mendoza 1,508,959 N/A 1,221,955 80.98 115.18 110.80 109.12 
 Misiones 884,291 N/A 348,764 39.44 56.09 53.97 53.15 
 Neuquén 463,266 N/A 416,476 89.90 127.86 123.01 121.14 
 Río Negro 559,590 N/A 468,713 83.76 119.13 114.61 112.87 
 Salta 958,094 N/A 809,973 84.54 120.24 115.68 113.92 
 San Juan 555,223 N/A 476,492 85.82 122.06 117.43 115.64 
 San Luis 321,890 N/A 260,506 80.93 115.10 110.74 109.06 
 Santa Cruz 181,198 N/A 172,845 95.39 135.67 130.52 128.54 
 Santa Fe 2,949,050 N/A 2,102,378 71.29 101.39 97.55 96.07 
 Santiago del Estero 700,114 N/A 404,386 57.76 82.15 79.03 77.83 
 Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
89,992 N/A 85,933 95.49 135.81 130.66 128.68 
 Tucumán 1,216,623 N/A 1,011,865 83.17 118.29 113.80 112.07 
 Total Argentina 34,768,457 N/A 24,445,702 70.31 100.00 96.20 94.74 
BR NORTH 11,736,040 N/A 5,123,663 43.66 59.08 59.74 58.83 
 Rondônia 1,289,365 N/A 443,206 34.37 46.51 47.03 46.32 
 Acre 504,489 N/A 212,342 42.09 56.96 57.59 56.72 
 Amazonas 2,460,434 N/A 1,579,642 64.20 86.88 87.85 86.51 
 Roraima 258,088 N/A 179,455 69.53 94.09 95.14 93.70 
 Pará 5,724,140 N/A 1,760,543 30.76 41.62 42.08 41.45 
 Amapá 402,557 N/A 243,361 60.45 81.80 82.72 81.46 
 Tocantins 1,096,967 N/A 705,114 64.28 86.98 87.95 86.62 
 NORTHEAST 45,854,455 N/A 27,852,051 60.74 82.19 83.11 81.85 
 Maranhão 5,349,575 N/A 2,273,979 42.51 57.52 58.16 57.28 
 Piauí 2,758,129 N/A 1,573,708 57.06 77.21 78.07 76.89 
 Ceará 7,010,107 N/A 3,484,160 49.70 67.26 68.01 66.97 
 Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 N/A 2,017,665 76.39 103.37 104.52 102.93 
 Paraíba 3,433,234 N/A 2,199,344 64.06 86.69 87.65 86.32 
 Pernambuco 7,548,183 N/A 5,222,194 69.18 93.62 94.66 93.23 
 Alagoas 2,754,697 N/A 1,713,253 62.19 84.16 85.10 83.81 
 Sergipe 1,662,168 N/A 1,209,366 72.76 98.46 99.55 98.04 
 Bahia 12,697,007 N/A 8,158,382 64.25 86.95 87.92 86.58 
 SOUTHEAST 68,331,524 N/A 59,541,515 87.14 117.91 119.23 117.42 
 Minas Gerais 17,024,849 N/A 13,446,495 78.98 106.88 108.07 106.43 
 Espirito Santo 2,916,530 N/A 2,120,179 72.70 98.37 99.47 97.96 
 A2.29
Access to drinking water (continued) 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population
N° of 
houses 
Population / 
houses 
connected 
% of pop / 
houses 
connected Nation M 4 M 6 
BR Rio de Janeiro 13,490,380 N/A 11,551,880 85.63 115.87 117.17 115.39 
 São Paulo 34,899,765 N/A 32,422,961 92.90 125.71 127.12 125.19 
 SOUTH 23,963,075 N/A 18,509,337 77.24 104.52 105.69 104.08 
 Paraná 9,154,360 N/A 7,448,353 81.36 110.10 111.33 109.64 
 Santa Catarina 5,032,175 N/A 3,488,375 69.32 93.80 94.85 93.41 
 Rio Grande do Sul 9,776,540 N/A 7,572,609 77.46 104.81 105.98 104.38 
 CENTRAL WEST 10,825,181 N/A 7,732,268 71.43 96.66 97.73 96.25 
 Mato Grosso do Sul 1,985,579 N/A 1,520,526 76.58 103.62 104.78 103.19 
 Mato Grosso 2,335,344 N/A  1,437,644 61.56 83.30 84.23 82.95 
 Goiás 4,629,154 N/A 3,032,411 65.51 88.64 89.63 88.27 
 Federal District 1,875,104 N/A 1,741,687 92.88 125.69 127.09 125.16 
 Total Brazil 160,710,275 N/A 118,758,834 73.90 100.00 101.11 99.58 
PY Total Paraguay 5,085,328 N/A 3,051,197 60.00 100.00 82.10 80.85 
UY Montevideo 1,344,839 425,280 400,035 94.06 112.88 128.71 126.75 
 Artigas  75,059 19,537 16,316 83.51 100.22 114.27 112.54 
 Canelones  443,053 132,845 111,428 83.88 100.66 114.77 113.03 
 Cerro Largo  82,510 25,122 19,519 77.70 93.24 106.31 104.70 
 Colonia  120,241 37,156 28,363 76.33 91.61 104.45 102.86 
 Durazno  55,716 16,047 12,849 80.07 96.09 109.56 107.90 
 Flores  25,030 7,846 6,524 83.15 99.78 113.77 112.05 
 Florida  66,503 20,573 14,832 72.09 86.52 98.65 97.15 
 Lavalleja  61,085 19,639 15,248 77.64 93.17 106.24 104.62 
 Maldonado  127,502 41,420 36,589 88.34 106.01 120.87 119.04 
 Paysandú  111,509 31,239 24,990 80.00 96.00 109.46 107.80 
 Río Negro  51,713 14,367 11,210 78.03 93.63 106.76 105.14 
 Rivera  98,472 28,679 21,713 75.71 90.86 103.59 102.02 
 Rocha  70,292 23,804 19,573 82.23 98.67 112.51 110.80 
 Salto  117,597 30,885 24,222 78.43 94.12 107.31 105.68 
 San José  96,664 29,104 17,533 60.24 72.29 82.43 81.18 
 Soriano  81,557 23,969 19,193 80.07 96.09 109.56 107.90 
 Tacuarembó  84,919 24,811 18,283 73.69 88.43 100.83 99.30 
 Treinta y Tres  49,502 15,526 12,466 80.29 96.35 109.86 108.19 
 Total Uruguay 3,163,763 970,037 808,355 83.33 100.00 114.02 112.29 
BO  Chuquisaca 549,835 120,054 65,550 54.60 76.78 N/A 73.58 
 La Paz 2,268,824 560,609 446,170 79.59 111.92 N/A 107.25 
 Cochabamba 1,408,071 348,681 223,960 64.23 90.33 N/A 86.55 
 Oruro 383,498 103,070 74,774 72.55 102.02 N/A 97.76 
 Potosí 746,618 189,939 96,905 51.02 71.75 N/A 68.75 
 Tarija 368,506 76,104 56,500 74.24 104.40 N/A 100.04 
 Santa Cruz 1,651,951 349,509 292,637 83.73 117.74 N/A 112.83 
 Beni 336,633 62,412 35,615 57.06 80.25 N/A 76.90 
 Pando 53,124 12,407 4,069 32.80 46.12 N/A 44.19 
 Total Bolivia 7,767,060 1,822,785 1,296,180 71.11 100.00 N/A 95.82 
CL Tarapacá 385,620 75,101 66,703 88.82 97.46 N/A 119.68 
 Antofagasta 462,286 90,616 85,010 93.81 102.94 N/A 126.42 
 Atacama 269,047 53,929 48,143 89.27 97.96 N/A 120.30 
 Coquimbo 569,825 115,986 103,944 89.62 98.34 N/A 120.76 
 Valparaíso 1,543,566 347,494 317,572 91.39 100.28 N/A 123.15 
 A2.30
Access to drinking water (end) 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population
N° of 
houses 
Population / 
houses 
connected 
% of pop / 
houses 
connected Nation M 4 M 6 
CL Del Libertador 778,801 158,358 142,406 89.93 98.68 N/A 121.18
 Del Maule 906,882 190,108 171,157 90.03 98.79 N/A 121.32 
 Del Biobío 1,915,844 390,263 356,454 91.34 100.23 N/A 123.08 
 De La Araucanía 864,975 179,525 159,825 89.03 97.69 N/A 119.97 
 De Los Lagos 1,050,558 217,443 196,660 90.44 99.25 N/A 121.87 
 De Aysén 93,636 19,005 17,378 91.44 100.34 N/A 123.22 
 De Magallanes 156,530 36,730 35,364 96.28 105.65 N/A 129.74 
 Metropolitana de Santiago 6,013,185 1,226,798 1,125,682 91.76 100.69 N/A 123.65 
 Total Chile 15,010,755 3,101,356 2,826,298 91.13 100.00 N/A 122.80 
 MERCOSUR 4 203,727,823 N/A 148,892,172 73.08 N/A 100.00 98.48 
 MERCOSUR 6 226,505,638 N/A 168,094,776 74.21 N/A N/A 100.00 
Data for Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile were only available by houses and not by population. To allow comparisons 
with the other members, and to calculate the Mercosur average, the percentage of houses connected is 
extrapolated and applied to the total regional population to calculate how many people in each region are 
connected.  
For example, in Chile, 2.8 million of the 3.1 million houses are connected, that is 91.13%. Since Chile has a 
population of 15 million, it is assumed that 91.13% of the population is connected, that is 13.7 million people. 
 
 
 A2.31
Map A2.7. Access to drinking water: regional data compared to the Mercosur 6 average 
(%) 
 A2.32
A2.3.5. Access to waste disposal systems (percent of population or households with 
access) 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population
N° of 
houses 
Population / 
houses 
connected 
% of pop / 
houses 
connected 
Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Ciudad de Buenos Aires 3,027,886 N/A 2,935,535 96.95 268.93 151.77 148.88 
 Buenos Aires 13,379,401 N/A 4,400,485 32.89 91.23 51.49 50.51 
 Catamarca 289,212 N/A 67,444 23.32 64.69 36.51 35.81 
 Córdoba 2,929,734 N/A 461,140 15.74 43.66 24.64 24.17 
 Corrientes 857,685 N/A 260,565 30.38 84.27 47.56 46.65 
 Chaco 895,900 N/A 119,961 13.39 37.14 20.96 20.56 
 Chubut 399,125 N/A 198,884 49.83 138.22 78.01 76.52 
 Entre Ríos 1,069,102 N/A 385,091 36.02 99.92 56.39 55.31 
 Formosa 447,094 N/A 89,642 20.05 55.62 31.39 30.79 
 Jujuy 555,097 N/A 207,773 37.43 103.83 58.59 57.48 
 La Pampa 282,356 N/A 91,653 32.46 90.04 50.81 49.85 
 La Rioja 247,575 N/A 57,388 23.18 64.30 36.29 35.60 
 Mendoza 1,508,959 N/A 581,402 38.53 106.88 60.32 59.17 
 Misiones 884,291 N/A 66,322 7.50 20.80 11.74 11.52 
 Neuquén 463,266 N/A 159,039 34.33 95.23 53.74 52.72 
 Río Negro 559,590 N/A 195,185 34.88 96.75 54.60 53.56 
 Salta 958,094 N/A 439,286 45.85 127.18 71.78 70.41 
 San Juan 555,223 N/A 70,125 12.63 35.03 19.77 19.39 
 San Luis 321,890 N/A 93,284 28.98 80.39 45.37 44.50 
 Santa Cruz 181,198 N/A 88,515 48.85 135.51 76.47 75.02 
 Santa Fe 2,949,050 N/A 862,302 29.24 81.11 45.77 44.90 
 Santiago del Estero 700,114 N/A 103,547 14.79 41.03 23.15 22.71 
 Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
89,992 N/A 70,581 78.43 217.56 122.78 120.44 
 Tucumán 1,216,623 N/A 419,370 34.47 95.62 53.96 52.93 
 Total Argentina 34,768,457 N/A 12,534,029 36.05 100.00 56.43 55.36 
BR Total Brazil 160,710,275 N/A 112,497,193 70.00 100.00 109.58 107.49 
PY Total Paraguay 5,085,328 N/A 2,084,984 41.00 100.00 64.18 62.96 
UY Montevideo 1,344,839 425,280 412,709 97.04 101.47 151.92 149.02 
 Artigas  75,059 19,537 15,335 78.49 82.07 122.87 120.53 
 Canelones  443,053 132,845 125,458 94.44 98.74 147.84 145.02 
 Cerro Largo  82,510 25,122 23,460 93.38 97.64 146.19 143.40 
 Colonia  120,241 37,156 36,627 98.58 103.07 154.31 151.38 
 Durazno  55,716 16,047 15,186 94.63 98.95 148.14 145.32 
 Flores  25,030 7,846 7,568 96.46 100.85 151.00 148.12 
 Florida  66,503 20,573 19,543 94.99 99.32 148.71 145.87 
 Lavalleja  61,085 19,639 18,395 93.67 97.94 146.63 143.84 
 Maldonado  127,502 41,420 39,850 96.21 100.60 150.61 147.74 
 Paysandú  111,509 31,239 29,675 94.99 99.32 148.71 145.87 
 Río Negro  51,713 14,367 13,656 95.05 99.38 148.80 145.96 
 Rivera  98,472 28,679 26,791 93.42 97.68 146.24 143.45 
 Rocha  70,292 23,804 22,649 95.15 99.49 148.95 146.11 
 Salto  117,597 30,885 28,963 93.78 98.05 146.80 144.01 
 San José  96,664 29,104 27,289 93.76 98.04 146.78 143.99 
 Soriano  81,557 23,969 22,994 95.93 100.31 150.18 147.32 
 Tacuarembó  84,919 24,811 23,138 93.26 97.51 145.99 143.21 
 A2.33
 
Access to waste disposal systems (end) 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population
N° of 
houses 
Population / 
houses 
connected 
% of pop / 
houses 
connected 
Nation M 4 M 6 
UY Treinta y Tres  49,502 15,526 14,575 93.87 98.15 146.95 144.16 
 Total Uruguay 3,163,763 970,037 927,761 95.64 100.00 149.72 146.87 
BO  Chuquisaca 549,835 120,054 47,610 39.66 67.05 N/A 60.90 
 La Paz 2,268,824 560,609 308,177 54.97 92.94 N/A 84.42 
 Cochabamba 1,408,071 348,681 220,844 63.34 107.08 N/A 97.26 
 Oruro 383,498 103,070 32,634 31.66 53.53 N/A 48.62 
 Potosí 746,618 189,939 45,518 23.96 40.51 N/A 36.80 
 Tarija 368,506 76,104 53,515 70.32 118.88 N/A 107.98 
 Santa Cruz 1,651,951 349,509 309,099 88.44 149.51 N/A 135.81 
 Beni 336,633 62,412 52,382 83.93 141.89 N/A 128.88 
 Pando 53,124 12,407 8,375 67.50 114.12 N/A 103.66 
 Total Bolivia 7,767,060 1,822,785 1,078,154 59.15 100.00 N/A 90.83 
CL Tarapacá 385,620 N/A 317,776 82.41 96.93 N/A 126.55 
 Antofagasta 462,286 N/A 389,986 84.36 99.22 N/A 129.55 
 Atacama 269,047 N/A 217,519 80.85 95.09 N/A 124.15 
 Coquimbo 569,825 N/A 464,723 81.56 95.92 N/A 125.24 
 Valparaíso 1,543,566 N/A 1,337,741 86.67 101.94 N/A 133.09 
 Del Libertador 778,801 N/A 669,448 85.96 101.10 N/A 132.00 
 Del Maule 906,882 N/A 785,590 86.63 101.89 N/A 133.02 
 Del Biobío 1,915,844 N/A 1,674,366 87.40 102.79 N/A 134.21 
 De La Araucanía 864,975 N/A 739,915 85.54 100.61 N/A 131.36 
 De Los Lagos 1,050,558 N/A 904,937 86.14 101.32 N/A 132.28 
 De Aysén 93,636 N/A 73,336 78.32 92.12 N/A 120.27 
 De Magallanes 156,530 N/A 132,815 84.85 99.80 N/A 130.30 
 Metropolitana de Santiago 6,013,185 N/A 5,054,394 84.06 98.87 N/A 129.08 
 Total Chile 15,010,755 N/A 12,762,546 85.02 100.00 N/A 130.56 
 MERCOSUR 4 203,727,823 N/A 130,142,086 63.88 N/A 100.00 98.10 
 MERCOSUR 6 226,505,638 N/A 147,498,749 65.12 N/A N/A 100.00 
As for access to water, data for Uruguay and Bolivia were only available by houses and not 
by population. To allow comparisons with the other members, and to calculate the Mercosur 
average, the percentage of houses connected is extrapolated and applied to the total regional 
population to calculate how many people in each region are connected.  
 A2.34
Map A2.8. Access to waste removal facility: regional data compared to the Mercosur 6 
average (%) 
 A2.35
A2.4. Social development regional statistics 
A2.4.1. Hospital beds per 1000 persons 
 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population
N° of 
beds 
Beds per 
1000 persons Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Ciudad de Buenos Aires 3,027,886 23,152 7.65 170.68 234.55 245.07 
 Buenos Aires 13,379,401 50,155 3.75 83.68 114.99 120.15 
 Catamarca 289,212 1,344 4.65 103.73 142.55 148.95 
 Córdoba 2,929,734 17,958 6.13 136.82 188.02 196.46 
 Corrientes 857,685 3,433 4.00 89.34 122.78 128.29 
 Chaco 895,900 4,184 4.67 104.24 143.26 149.68 
 Chubut 399,125 1,976 4.95 110.51 151.87 158.68 
 Entre Ríos 1,069,102 6,650 6.22 138.84 190.80 199.36 
 Formosa 447,094 1,689 3.78 84.32 115.88 121.08 
 Jujuy 555,097 3,169 5.71 127.43 175.12 182.98 
 La Pampa 282,356 1,189 4.21 94.00 129.17 134.97 
 La Rioja 247,575 1,231 4.97 110.99 152.52 159.37 
 Mendoza 1,508,959 4,646 3.08 68.73 94.45 98.68 
 Misiones 884,291 2,985 3.38 75.35 103.55 108.19 
 Neuquén 463,266 1,393 3.01 67.12 92.24 96.38 
 Río Negro 559,590 1,989 3.55 79.34 109.03 113.92 
 Salta 958,094 4,014 4.19 93.52 128.51 134.28 
 San Juan 555,223 1,750 3.15 70.35 96.68 101.02 
 San Luis 321,890 1,256 3.90 87.10 119.69 125.06 
 Santa Cruz 181,198 1,188 6.56 146.35 201.12 210.14 
 Santa Fe 2,949,050 12,148 4.12 91.95 126.36 132.03 
 Santiago del Estero 700,114 4,271 6.10 136.17 187.13 195.53 
 Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
89,992 222 2.47 55.06 75.67 79.07 
 Tucumán 1,216,623 3,830 3.15 70.27 96.57 100.90 
 Total Argentina 34,768,457 155,822 4.48 100.00 137.48 143.64 
BR NORTH 11,736,040 23,553 2.01 64.95 61.56 64.32 
 Rondônia 1,289,365 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 Acre 504,489 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 Amazonas 2,460,434 4,011 1.63 52.76 50.01 52.25 
 Roraima 258,088 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 Pará 5,724,140 10,067 1.76 56.92 53.95 56.37 
 Amapá 402,557 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 Tocantins 1,096,967 3,109 2.83 91.72 86.94 90.84 
 NORTHEAST 45,854,455 130,986 2.86 92.45 87.62 91.56 
 Maranhão 5,349,575 24,786 4.63 149.94 142.12 148.50 
 Piauí 2,758,129 8,756 3.17 102.74 97.38 101.75 
 Ceará 7,010,107 17,060 2.43 78.76 74.65 78.00 
 Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 7,393 2.80 90.58 85.86 89.71 
 Paraíba 3,433,234 11,700 3.41 110.29 104.54 109.23 
 Pernambuco 7,548,183 21,944 2.91 94.08 89.18 93.18 
 Alagoas 2,754,697 7,702 2.80 90.48 85.77 89.61 
 Sergipe 1,662,168 3,415 2.05 66.49 63.02 65.85 
 Bahia 12,697,007 28,230 2.22 71.95 68.20 71.26 
 A2.36
Hospital beds per 1000 persons (continued) 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population
N° of 
beds 
Beds per 
1000 persons Nation M 4 M 6 
BR SOUTHEAST 68,331,524 226,194 3.31 107.13 101.54 106.10 
 Minas Gerais 17,024,849 52,287 3.07 99.39 94.21 98.44 
 Espirito Santo 2,916,530 6,999 2.40 77.66 73.61 76.92 
 Rio de Janeiro 13,490,380 60,224 4.46 144.47 136.94 143.08 
 São Paulo 34,899,765 106,684 3.06 98.93 93.77 97.98 
 SOUTH 23,963,075 76,884 3.21 103.83 98.42 102.83 
 Paraná 9,154,360 30,456 3.33 107.67 102.05 106.63 
 Santa Catarina 5,032,175 15,210 3.02 97.82 92.72 96.88 
 Rio Grande do Sul 9,776,540 31,218 3.19 103.34 97.95 102.34 
 CENTRAL WEST 10,825,181 39,123 3.61 116.96 110.86 115.84 
 Mato Grosso do Sul 1,985,579 5,959 3.00 97.12 92.06 96.19 
 Mato Grosso 2,335,344 6,596 2.82 91.41 86.64 90.53 
 Goiás 4,629,154 22,548 4.87 157.63 149.41 156.12 
 Federal District 1,875,104 4,020 2.14 69.38 65.76 68.71 
 Total Brazil 160,710,275 496,740 3.09 100.00 94.81 99.07 
PY Asunción 550,060 176 0.32 47.76 9.81 10.26 
 Concepción 185,496 145 0.78 116.67 23.98 25.05 
 San Pedro 332,926 146 0.44 65.45 13.45 14.06 
 Cordillera 215,663 125 0.58 86.51 17.78 18.58 
 Guairá 173,668 137 0.79 117.74 24.20 25.28 
 Caaguazú 442,161 170 0.38 57.38 11.79 12.32 
 Caazapá 141,559 154 1.09 162.37 33.37 34.87 
 Itapúa 454,757 213 0.47 69.91 14.37 15.01 
 Misiones 98,607 71 0.72 107.47 22.09 23.08 
 Paraguarí 247,675 168 0.68 101.24 20.81 21.74 
 Alto Paraná 595,276 177 0.30 44.38 9.12 9.53 
 Central 1,174,212 161 0.14 20.46 4.21 4.39 
 Ñeembucú 86,965 86 0.99 147.60 30.33 31.70 
 Amambay 127,011 74 0.58 86.96 17.87 18.67 
 Canindeyú 133,075 61 0.46 68.42 14.06 14.69 
 Pdte. Hayes 77,145 63 0.82 121.89 25.05 26.17 
 Boquerón 35,241 32 0.91 135.53 27.85 29.10 
 Alto Paraguay 13,831 29 2.10 312.95 64.32 67.20 
 Specialised Hospitals N/A 1,238 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 Total Paraguay 5,085,328 3,426 0.67 100.00 20.67 21.59 
UY Montevideo 1,344,839 4,100 3.05 131.41 93.52 97.71 
 Artigas  75,059 146 1.95 83.84 59.67 62.34 
 Canelones  443,053 106 0.24 10.31 7.34 7.67 
 Cerro Largo  82,510 201 2.44 105.00 74.73 78.08 
 Colonia  120,241 211 1.75 75.64 53.83 56.24 
 Durazno  55,716 114 2.05 88.19 62.76 65.58 
 Flores  25,030 154 6.15 265.20 188.73 197.20 
 Florida  66,503 141 2.12 91.39 65.04 67.96 
 Lavalleja  61,085 141 2.31 99.49 70.81 73.98 
 Maldonado  127,502 201 1.58 67.95 48.36 50.53 
 Paysandú  111,509 267 2.39 103.21 73.45 76.74 
 Río Negro  51,713 109 2.11 90.85 64.66 67.56 
 A2.37
Hospital beds per 1000 persons (end) 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population
N° of 
beds 
Beds per 
1000 persons Nation M 4 M 6 
UY Rivera  98,472 171 1.74 74.85 53.27 55.66 
 Rocha  70,292 193 2.75 118.35 84.22 88.00 
 Salto  117,597 335 2.85 122.79 87.38 91.30 
 San José  96,664 143 1.48 63.77 45.38 47.42 
 Soriano  81,557 246 3.02 130.01 92.52 96.68 
 Tacuarembó  84,919 169 1.99 85.78 61.05 63.79 
 Treinta y Tres  49,502 194 3.92 168.92 120.22 125.61 
 Total Uruguay 3,163,763 7,342 2.32 100.00 71.19 74.38 
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 814 1.48 99.36 N/A 47.45 
 La Paz 2,268,824 3,292 1.45 97.38 N/A 46.51 
 Cochabamba 1,408,071 1,687 1.20 80.41 N/A 38.40 
 Oruro 383,498 685 1.79 119.88 N/A 57.25 
 Potosí 746,618 1,056 1.41 94.92 N/A 45.33 
 Tarija 368,506 796 2.16 144.97 N/A 69.23 
 Santa Cruz 1,651,951 2,560 1.55 104.01 N/A 49.67 
 Beni 336,633 604 1.79 120.42 N/A 57.51 
 Pando 53,124 54 1.02 68.22 N/A 32.58 
 Total Bolivia 7,767,060 11,548 1.49 100.00 N/A 47.65 
CL Tarapacá 385,620 778 2.02 97.94 N/A 64.66 
 Antofagasta 462,286 1,048 2.27 110.05 N/A 72.66 
 Atacama 269,047 480 1.78 86.61 N/A 57.18 
 Coquimbo 569,825 1,107 1.94 94.31 N/A 62.27 
 Valparaíso 1,543,566 3,997 2.59 125.70 N/A 83.00 
 Del Libertador 778,801 1,438 1.85 89.63 N/A 59.18 
 Del Maule 906,882 2,086 2.30 111.66 N/A 73.72 
 Del Biobío 1,915,844 4,319 2.25 109.43 N/A 72.26 
 De La Araucanía 864,975 2,327 2.69 130.59 N/A 86.23 
 De Los Lagos 1,050,558 2,613 2.49 120.74 N/A 79.72 
 De Aysén 93,636 287 3.07 148.79 N/A 98.24 
 De Magallanes 156,530 532 3.40 164.99 N/A 108.93 
 Metropolitana de Santiago 6,013,185 9,945 1.65 80.28 N/A 53.01 
 Total Chile 15,010,755 30,957 2.06 100.00 N/A 66.10 
 MERCOSUR 4 203,727,823 663,330 3.26 N/A 100.00 104.36 
 MERCOSUR 6 226,505,638 705,835 3.12 N/A N/A 100.00 
 
 A2.38
Map A2.9. Hospital beds per 1000 persons: regional data compared to the Mercosur 6 
average (%) 
 A2.39
A2.4.2. Doctors per 1000 persons 
 
   Region compared to 
 Region Population Doctors
Doctors per 
1000 persons Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Ciudad de Buenos Aires 3,027,886 32,100 10.60 338.81 604.42 650.40
 Buenos Aires 13,379,401 26,876 2.01 64.20 114.52 123.24
 Catamarca 289,212 653 2.26 72.16 128.73 138.52
 Córdoba 2,929,734 11,642 3.97 127.00 226.55 243.79
 Corrientes 857,685 1,740 2.03 64.84 115.66 124.46
 Chaco 895,900 1,630 1.82 58.15 103.73 111.62
 Chubut 399,125 870 2.18 69.66 124.27 133.73
 Entre Ríos 1,069,102 2,610 2.44 78.02 139.18 149.77
 Formosa 447,094 544 1.22 38.89 69.37 74.65
 Jujuy 555,097 1,306 2.35 75.19 134.14 144.34
 La Pampa 282,356 653 2.31 73.91 131.85 141.88
 La Rioja 247,575 544 2.20 70.22 125.27 134.80
 Mendoza 1,508,959 4,460 2.96 94.46 168.51 181.33
 Misiones 884,291 1,197 1.35 43.26 77.17 83.04
 Neuquén 463,266 979 2.11 67.54 120.48 129.65
 Río Negro 559,590 1,306 2.33 74.59 133.06 143.18
 Salta 958,094 1,849 1.93 61.68 110.03 118.40
 San Juan 555,223 1,521 2.74 87.55 156.18 168.06
 San Luis 321,890 762 2.37 75.66 134.96 145.23
 Santa Cruz 181,198 326 1.80 57.50 102.57 110.38
 Santa Fe 2,949,050 10,226 3.47 110.82 197.69 212.73
 Santiago del Estero 700,114 1,197 1.71 54.64 97.48 104.89
 Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
89,992 109 1.21 38.71 69.05 74.31
 Tucumán 1,216,623 3,700 3.04 97.19 173.39 186.58
 Total Argentina 34,768,457 108,800 3.13 100.00 178.41 191.98
BR NORTH 11,736,040 7,104 0.61 45.86 34.51 37.14
 Rondônia 1,289,365 581 0.45 34.14 25.69 27.64
 Acre 504,489 189 0.37 28.38 21.36 22.98
 Amazonas 2,460,434 1,462 0.59 45.02 33.88 36.45
 Roraima 258,088 222 0.86 65.16 49.04 52.77
 Pará 5,724,140 3,881 0.68 51.36 38.65 41.60
 Amapá 402,557 209 0.52 39.33 29.60 31.85
 Tocantins 1,096,967 560 0.51 38.67 29.10 31.32
 NORTHEAST 45,854,455 33,357 0.73 55.11 41.47 44.63
 Maranhão 5,349,575 2,023 0.38 28.65 21.56 23.20
 Piauí 2,758,129 1,513 0.55 41.56 31.27 33.65
 Ceará 7,010,107 5,056 0.72 54.64 41.12 44.25
 Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 2,433 0.92 69.78 52.52 56.51
 Paraíba 3,433,234 327 0.10 7.22 5.43 5.84
 Pernambuco 7,548,183 8,644 1.15 86.76 65.29 70.26
 Alagoas 2,754,697 2,661 0.97 73.18 55.07 59.26
 Sergipe 1,662,168 1,571 0.95 71.60 53.89 57.98
 Bahia 12,697,007 9,129 0.72 54.47 40.99 44.11
 SOUTHEAST 68,331,524 126,902 1.86 140.69 105.88 113.94
 Minas Gerais 17,024,849 22,222 1.31 98.88 74.42 80.08
 Espirito Santo 2,916,530 4,023 1.38 104.50 78.64 84.62
 Rio de Janeiro 13,490,380 32,578 2.41 182.95 137.68 148.15
 A2.40
Doctors per 1000 persons (continued) 
   Region compared to 
 Region Population Doctors
Doctors per 
1000 persons Nation M 4 M 6 
BR São Paulo 34,899,765 68,079 1.95 147.78 111.21 119.67
 SOUTH 23,963,075 32,402 1.35 102.44 77.09 82.95
 Paraná 9,154,360 10,496 1.15 86.86 65.37 70.34
 Santa Catarina 5,032,175 4,809 0.96 72.40 54.48 58.63
 Rio Grande do Sul 9,776,540 17,097 1.75 132.48 99.70 107.29
 CENTRAL WEST 10,825,181 13,167 1.22 92.15 69.35 74.62
 Mato Grosso do Sul 1,985,579 2,062 1.04 78.67 59.21 63.71
 Mato Grosso 2,335,344 1,381 0.59 44.80 33.71 36.28
 Goiás 4,629,154 4,504 0.97 73.71 55.47 59.69
 Federal District 1,875,104 5,220 2.78 210.90 158.71 170.79
 Total Brazil 160,710,275 212,932 1.32 100.00 75.54 81.28
PY Total Paraguay 5,085,328 23,393 4.60 100.00 262.26 282.21
UY Montevideo 1,344,839 9,225 6.86 178.63 391.08 420.83
 Artigas  75,059 99 1.32 34.35 75.20 80.92
 Canelones  443,053 763 1.72 44.85 98.18 105.65
 Cerro Largo  82,510 92 1.12 29.04 63.57 68.41
 Colonia  120,241 191 1.59 41.37 90.56 97.45
 Durazno  55,716 85 1.53 39.73 86.98 93.59
 Flores  25,030 37 1.48 38.50 84.28 90.69
 Florida  66,503 117 1.76 45.82 100.30 107.93
 Lavalleja  61,085 103 1.69 43.91 96.13 103.45
 Maldonado  127,502 282 2.21 57.60 126.10 135.69
 Paysandú  111,509 191 1.71 44.61 97.65 105.08
 Río Negro  51,713 67 1.30 33.74 73.87 79.49
 Rivera  98,472 123 1.25 32.53 71.21 76.63
 Rocha  70,292 108 1.54 40.01 87.60 94.26
 Salto  117,597 224 1.90 49.60 108.60 116.86
 San José  96,664 111 1.15 29.90 65.47 70.45
 Soriano  81,557 136 1.67 43.43 95.07 102.30
 Tacuarembó  84,919 137 1.61 42.01 91.98 98.98
 Treinta y Tres  49,502 68 1.37 35.77 78.32 84.27
 Total Uruguay 3,163,763 12,159 3.84 100.00 219.11 235.78
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 330 0.60 103.48 N/A 36.82
 La Paz 2,268,824 1,437 0.63 109.20 N/A 38.86
 Cochabamba 1,408,071 618 0.44 75.67 N/A 26.93
 Oruro 383,498 212 0.55 95.31 N/A 33.91
 Potosí 746,618 310 0.42 71.59 N/A 25.47
 Tarija 368,506 260 0.71 121.65 N/A 43.29
 Santa Cruz 1,651,951 1,009 0.61 105.31 N/A 37.47
 Beni 336,633 257 0.76 131.63 N/A 46.84
 Pando 53,124 39 0.73 126.57 N/A 45.04
 Total Bolivia 7,767,060 4,472 0.58 100.00 N/A 35.32
CL Tarapacá 385,620 220 0.57 107.64 N/A 35.00
 Antofagasta 462,286 183 0.40 74.69 N/A 24.29
 Atacama 269,047 107 0.40 75.04 N/A 24.40
 Coquimbo 569,825 246 0.43 81.45 N/A 26.49
 Valparaíso 1,543,566 888 0.58 108.55 N/A 35.29
 Del Libertador 778,801 270 0.35 65.41 N/A 21.27
 Del Maule 906,882 346 0.38 71.99 N/A 23.41
 A2.41
Doctors per 1000 persons (end) 
   Region compared to 
 Region Population Doctors
Doctors per 
1000 persons Nation M 4 M 6 
CL Del Biobío 1,915,844 940 0.49 92.57 N/A 30.10
 De La Araucanía 864,975 426 0.49 92.92 N/A 30.21
 De Los Lagos 1,050,558 574 0.55 103.09 N/A 33.52
 De Aysén 93,636 74 0.79 149.11 N/A 48.48
 De Magallanes 156,530 101 0.65 121.74 N/A 39.59
 Metropolitana de Santiago 6,013,185 3,513 0.58 110.23 N/A 35.84
 Total Chile 15,010,755 7,888 0.53 100.00 N/A 32.24
 MERCOSUR 4 203,727,823 357,284 1.75 N/A 100.00 107.59
 MERCOSUR 6 226,505,638 369,644 1.63 N/A N/A 100.00
 
 A2.42
Map A2.10. Number of doctors per 1000 persons: regional data compared to the 
Mercosur 6 average (%) 
 A2.43
A2.4.3. Life expectancy at birth 
 
  Life expectancy at birth Region compared to 
 Region Population Male Female Total Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Ciudad de Buenos Aires 3,027,886 69.17 76.45 72.72 101.10 105.96 105.64
 Buenos Aires 13,379,401 68.53 75.78 72.09 100.22 105.04 104.72
 Catamarca 289,212 67.40 73.96 70.61 98.16 102.89 102.57
 Córdoba 2,929,734 69.15 76.60 72.79 101.20 106.06 105.74
 Corrientes 857,685 67.16 73.16 70.09 97.44 102.13 101.82
 Chaco 895,900 65.64 72.55 69.02 95.95 100.57 100.26
 Chubut 399,125 67.26 74.04 70.58 98.12 102.84 102.53
 Entre Ríos 1,069,102 68.13 75.26 71.61 99.56 104.34 104.02
 Formosa 447,094 66.27 72.62 69.37 96.44 101.08 100.77
 Jujuy 555,097 65.24 71.65 68.37 95.05 99.62 99.32
 La Pampa 282,356 68.15 75.15 71.57 99.50 104.28 103.97
 La Rioja 247,575 67.04 73.89 70.38 97.85 102.55 102.24
 Mendoza 1,508,959 69.80 75.75 72.72 101.10 105.96 105.64
 Misiones 884,291 66.45 72.65 69.49 96.61 101.25 100.94
 Neuquén 463,266 68.30 74.67 71.39 99.25 104.02 103.70
 Río Negro 559,590 67.54 74.36 70.87 98.53 103.26 102.95
 Salta 958,094 66.13 71.84 68.92 95.82 100.42 100.12
 San Juan 555,223 68.10 74.30 71.13 98.89 103.64 103.33
 San Luis 321,890 67.64 74.07 70.79 98.42 103.15 102.83
 Santa Cruz 181,198 67.11 73.90 70.41 97.89 102.59 102.28
 Santa Fe 2,949,050 68.50 76.28 72.29 100.50 105.33 105.01
 Santiago del Estero 700,114 67.13 72.73 69.83 97.08 101.75 101.44
 Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
89,992 66.85 73.64 70.16 97.54 102.23 101.92
 Tucumán 1,216,623 68.08 74.13 71.01 98.72 103.47 103.15
 Total Argentina 34,768,457,00 68.44 75.59 71.93 100.00 104.81 104.49
BR NORTH 11,736,040 64.77 70.77 67.55 99.66 98.43 98.13
 Rondônia 1,289,365 64.41 70.41 67.35 99.37 98.13 97.84
 Acre 504,489 64.49 70.33 67.35 99.37 98.13 97.84
 Amazonas 2,460,434 65.11 70.89 67.94 100.24 98.99 98.69
 Roraima 258,088 63.58 69.72 66.59 98.24 97.03 96.73
 Pará 5,724,140 64.83 70.99 67.85 100.10 98.86 98.56
 Amapá 402,557 65.15 71.24 68.13 100.52 99.27 98.97
 Tocantins 1,096,967 64.71 70.38 67.49 99.57 98.34 98.04
 NORTHEAST 45,854,455 61.81 67.89 64.83 95.65 94.46 94.17
 Maranhão 5,349,575 60.45 67.55 63.93 94.32 93.15 92.87
 Piauí 2,758,129 61.49 68.11 64.72 95.49 94.30 94.02
 Ceará 7,010,107 62.24 68.78 65.44 96.55 95.35 95.06
 Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 62.36 68.73 65.49 96.62 95.42 95.13
 Paraíba 3,433,234 60.71 66.36 63.48 93.66 92.50 92.21
 Pernambuco 7,548,183 60.10 65.45 62.72 92.53 91.39 91.11
 Alagoas 2,754,697 59.32 65.20 62.20 91.77 90.63 90.35
 Sergipe 1,662,168 63.40 69.30 66.29 97.80 96.59 96.30
 Bahia 12,697,007 63.82 69.82 66.76 98.50 97.28 96.98
 SOUTHEAST 68,331,524 64.63 73.61 68.97 101.76 100.50 100.19
 Minas Gerais 17,024,849 66.07 73.16 69.55 102.61 101.34 101.03
 Espirito Santo 2,916,530 65.73 73.36 69.47 102.49 101.22 100.92
 A2.44
Life expectancy at birth (end) 
  Life expectancy at birth Region compared to 
 Region Population Male Female Total Nation M 4 M 6 
BR Rio de Janeiro 13,490,380 61.71 72.78 67.14 99.06 97.83 97.53
 São Paulo 34,899,765 65.07 74.21 69.55 102.61 101.34 101.03
 SOUTH 23,963,075 66.67 74.27 70.34 103.78 102.49 102.18
 Paraná 9,154,360 66.18 72.93 69.49 102.52 101.25 100.94
 Santa Catarina 5,032,175 66.98 74.58 70.70 104.31 103.02 102.70
 Rio Grande do Sul 9,776,540 66.98 75.24 71.03 104.79 103.50 103.18
 CENTRAL WEST 10,825,181 65.56 72.18 68.67 101.31 100.06 99.75
 Mato Grosso do Sul 1,985,579 66.46 72.73 69.53 102.58 101.31 101.00
 Mato Grosso 2,335,344 65.28 71.42 68.29 100.75 99.50 99.20
 Goiás 4,629,154 65.66 72.14 68.84 101.56 100.31 100.00
 Federal District 1,875,104 64.61 72.61 68.53 101.11 99.85 99.55
 Total Brazil 160,710,275 64.09 71.70 67.78 100.00 98.76 98.46
PY Total Paraguay 5,085,328 N/A N/A 69.80 100.00 101.70 101.39
UY Montevideo 1,344,839 70.41 78.63 74.44 100.89 108.47 108.13
 Artigas  75,059 69.69 78.91 74.21 100.58 108.13 107.80
 Canelones  443,053 71.36 78.84 75.03 101.69 109.33 108.99
 Cerro Largo  82,510 69.35 77.90 73.54 99.67 107.15 106.83
 Colonia  120,241 71.91 79.91 75.83 102.78 110.49 110.15
 Durazno  55,716 71.40 78.76 75.01 101.67 109.30 108.96
 Flores  25,030 72.24 80.44 76.26 103.36 111.12 110.78
 Florida  66,503 72.25 78.84 75.48 102.30 109.98 109.65
 Lavalleja  61,085 71.05 79.58 75.23 101.97 109.62 109.28
 Maldonado  127,502 71.39 79.64 75.43 102.24 109.91 109.57
 Paysandú  111,509 71.87 78.44 75.09 101.78 109.41 109.08
 Río Negro  51,713 71.75 78.76 75.19 101.91 109.56 109.22
 Rivera  98,472 69.07 77.46 73.18 99.19 106.63 106.30
 Rocha  70,292 68.88 78.38 73.54 99.67 107.15 106.83
 Salto  117,597 70.89 77.43 74.10 100.43 107.97 107.64
 San José  96,664 69.41 77.82 73.53 99.66 107.14 106.81
 Soriano  81,557 70.95 78.24 74.52 101.00 108.58 108.25
 Tacuarembó  84,919 69.39 77.63 73.43 99.53 106.99 106.67
 Treinta y Tres  49,502 69.83 76.73 73.21 99.23 106.67 106.35
 Total Uruguay 3,163,763 69.90 77.68 73.78 100.00 107.50 107.18
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 59.06 62.51 60.74 97.85 N/A 88.24
 La Paz 2,268,824 60.48 64.14 62.26 100.29 N/A 90.45
 Cochabamba 1,408,071 60.07 63.45 61.72 99.41 N/A 89.65
 Oruro 383,498 55.90 59.32 57.57 92.74 N/A 83.63
 Potosí 746,618 55.37 58.75 57.02 91.84 N/A 82.82
 Tarija 368,506 64.08 67.67 65.84 106.05 N/A 95.63
 Santa Cruz 1,651,951 64.60 68.12 66.31 106.82 N/A 96.33
 Beni 336,633 58.81 62.21 60.46 97.40 N/A 87.83
 Pando 53,124 59.57 62.78 61.14 98.48 N/A 88.81
 Total Bolivia 7,767,060 60.42 63.81 62.08 100.00 N/A 90.17
CL Total Chile 15,010,755 72.28 78.26 75.21 100.00 N/A 109.25
 MERCOSUR 4 203,727,823 N/A N/A 68.63 N/A 100.00 99.70
 MERCOSUR 6 226,505,638 N/A N/A 68.84 N/A N/A 100.00
 
 A2.45
Map A2.11. Life expectancy at birth: regional data compared to the Mercosur 6 average 
(%) 
 A2.46
A2.4.4. Students registered in primary and secondary education per 1000 people 
 
  Students in Primary and 
Secondary school Region compared to 
 Region Population Total n° of students 
N° of students 
per 1000 people Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Ciudad de Buenos Aires 3,027,886 479,458 158.3 72.27 60.69 61.69
 Buenos Aires 13,379,401 2,812,918 210.2 95.96 80.58 81.90
 Catamarca 289,212 77,639 268.5 122.52 102.89 104.58
 Córdoba 2,929,734 621,543 212.1 96.83 81.31 82.65
 Corrientes 857,685 229,253 267.3 122.00 102.45 104.13
 Chaco 895,900 226,683 253.0 115.48 96.98 98.57
 Chubut 399,125 96,450 241.7 110.29 92.62 94.14
 Entre Ríos 1,069,102 247,821 231.8 105.80 88.85 90.30
 Formosa 447,094 128,258 286.9 130.93 109.95 111.75
 Jujuy 555,097 151,827 273.5 124.84 104.83 106.55
 La Pampa 282,356 60,784 215.3 98.25 82.51 83.86
 La Rioja 247,575 63,674 257.2 117.39 98.58 100.19
 Mendoza 1,508,959 330,722 219.2 100.03 84.01 85.38
 Misiones 884,291 232,820 263.3 120.17 100.91 102.57
 Neuquén 463,266 114,681 247.5 112.98 94.88 96.44
 Río Negro 559,590 133,165 238.0 108.61 91.21 92.70
 Salta 958,094 263,319 274.8 125.44 105.34 107.07
 San Juan 555,223 129,649 233.5 106.58 89.50 90.97
 San Luis 321,890 76,489 237.6 108.45 91.08 92.57
 Santa Cruz 181,198 44,986 248.3 113.31 95.16 96.72
 Santa Fe 2,949,050 619,211 210.0 95.83 80.48 81.80
 Santiago del Estero 700,114 178,953 255.6 116.66 97.97 99.57
 Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
89,992 23,126 257.0 117.29 98.50 100.11
 Tucumán 1,216,623 273,435 224.7 102.58 86.14 87.55
 Total Argentina 34,768,457 7,616,864 219.1 100.00 83.97 85.34
BR NORTH 11,736,040 3,821,020 325.6 119.39 124.79 126.83
 Rondônia 1,289,365 363,490 281.9 103.38 108.05 109.82
 Acre 504,489 167,116 331.3 121.47 126.97 129.04
 Amazonas 2,460,434 763,306 310.2 113.76 118.91 120.85
 Roraima 258,088 98,832 382.9 140.43 146.78 149.18
 Pará 5,724,140 1,853,697 323.8 118.75 124.12 126.15
 Amapá 402,557 155,739 386.9 141.87 148.28 150.71
 Tocantins 1,096,967 418,840 381.8 140.01 146.35 148.74
 NORTHEAST 45,854,455 14,224,725 310.2 113.76 118.90 120.85
 Maranhão 5,349,575 1,819,203 340.1 124.70 130.34 132.48
 Piauí 2,758,129 865,592 313.8 115.08 120.29 122.26
 Ceará 7,010,107 2,129,934 303.8 111.42 116.46 118.36
 Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 772,597 292.5 107.26 112.11 113.95
 Paraíba 3,433,234 1,003,277 292.2 107.16 112.01 113.84
 Pernambuco 7,548,183 2,150,306 284.9 104.47 109.19 110.98
 Alagoas 2,754,697 779,957 283.1 103.83 108.52 110.30
 Sergipe 1,662,168 496,578 298.8 109.55 114.51 116.38
 Bahia 12,697,007 4,207,281 331.4 121.51 127.01 129.08
 SOUTHEAST 68,331,524 16,943,687 248.0 90.93 95.04 96.60
 A2.47
Students registered in primary and secondary education per 1000 people (continued) 
  Students in Primary and 
Secondary school Region compared to 
 Region Population Total n° of students 
N° of students 
per 1000 people Nation M 4 M 6 
BR Minas Gerais 17,024,849 4,676,952 274.7 100.74 105.29 107.02
 Espirito Santo 2,916,530 778,082 266.8 97.83 102.26 103.93
 Rio de Janeiro 13,490,380 3,115,957 231.0 84.70 88.53 89.98
 São Paulo 34,899,765 8,372,696 239.9 87.97 91.95 93.46
 SOUTH 23,963,075 5,677,996 236.9 86.89 90.82 92.31
 Paraná 9,154,360 2,250,682 245.9 90.16 94.23 95.78
 Santa Catarina 5,032,175 1,216,829 241.8 88.67 92.68 94.20
 Rio Grande do Sul 9,776,540 2,210,485 226.1 82.91 86.66 88.08
 CENTRAL WEST 10,825,181 3,161,513 292.1 107.10 111.94 113.77
 Mato Grosso do Sul 1,985,579 549,031 276.5 101.40 105.98 107.72
 Mato Grosso 2,335,344 697,674 298.7 109.55 114.51 116.38
 Goiás 4,629,154 1,379,808 298.1 109.30 114.25 116.12
 Federal District 1,875,104 535,000 285.3 104.63 109.36 111.15
 Total Brazil 160,710,275 43,828,941 272.7 100.00 104.53 106.24
PY Asunción 550,060 143,858 261.5 113.86 100.24 101.88
 Concepción 185,496 49,328 265.9 115.77 101.93 103.59
 San Pedro 332,926 82,258 247.1 107.56 94.70 96.25
 Cordillera 215,663 56,682 262.8 114.42 100.74 102.39
 Guairá 173,668 44,685 257.3 112.02 98.62 100.23
 Caaguazú 442,161 111,519 252.2 109.80 96.67 98.25
 Caazapá 141,559 39,217 277.0 120.61 106.18 107.92
 Itapúa 454,757 108,474 238.5 103.84 91.43 92.92
 Misiones 98,607 28,384 287.8 125.32 110.33 112.13
 Paraguarí 247,675 53,351 215.4 93.78 82.56 83.91
 Alto Paraná 595,276 120,965 203.2 88.47 77.89 79.16
 Central 1,174,212 236,055 201.0 87.52 77.05 78.31
 Ñeembucú 86,965 17,763 204.3 88.92 78.29 79.57
 Amambay 127,011 22,798 179.5 78.14 68.80 69.92
 Canindeyú 133,075 32,440 243.8 106.13 93.44 94.96
 Pdte. Hayes 77,145 13,746 178.2 77.57 68.30 69.41
 Boquerón 35,241 4,237 120.2 52.34 46.08 46.84
 Alto Paraguay 13,831 2,536 183.4 79.82 70.28 71.43
 Total Paraguay 5,085,328 1,168,296 229.7 100.00 88.06 89.50
UY Montevideo 1,344,839 218,700 162.6 94.60 62.33 63.35
 Artigas  75,059 15,872 211.5 123.01 81.05 82.38
 Canelones  443,053 75,937 171.4 99.71 65.69 66.77
 Cerro Largo  82,510 14,548 176.3 102.57 67.58 68.69
 Colonia  120,241 19,807 164.7 95.83 63.14 64.17
 Durazno  55,716 10,370 186.1 108.27 71.34 72.51
 Flores  25,030 4,234 169.2 98.40 64.84 65.90
 Florida  66,503 10,928 164.3 95.59 62.98 64.01
 Lavalleja  61,085 9,988 163.5 95.12 62.67 63.70
 Maldonado  127,502 23,024 180.6 105.05 69.21 70.35
 Paysandú  111,509 20,314 182.2 105.98 69.83 70.97
 Río Negro  51,713 9,815 189.8 110.41 72.75 73.94
 Rivera  98,472 19,123 194.2 112.97 74.43 75.65
 Rocha  70,292 12,277 174.7 101.60 66.94 68.04
 A2.48
Students registered in primary and secondary education per 1000 people (end) 
  Students in Primary and 
Secondary school Region compared to 
 Region Population Total n° of students 
N° of students 
per 1000 people Nation M 4 M 6 
UY Salto  117,597 23,110 196.5 114.32 75.32 76.56
 San José  96,664 15,588 161.3 93.81 61.81 62.82
 Soriano  81,557 14,817 181.7 105.69 69.63 70.77
 Tacuarembó  84,919 16,649 196.1 114.05 75.15 76.38
 Treinta y Tres  49,502 8,810 178.0 103.53 68.21 69.33
 Total Uruguay 3,163,763 543,911 171.9 100.00 65.89 66.97
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 116,275 211.5 87.35 N/A 82.38
 La Paz 2,268,824 537,091 236.7 97.78 N/A 92.22
 Cochabamba 1,408,071 324,787 230.7 95.28 N/A 89.86
 Oruro 383,498 106,558 277.9 114.77 N/A 108.24
 Potosí 746,618 180,405 241.6 99.81 N/A 94.13
 Tarija 368,506 86,494 234.7 96.95 N/A 91.44
 Santa Cruz 1,651,951 419,938 254.2 105.00 N/A 99.03
 Beni 336,633 97,413 289.4 119.53 N/A 112.73
 Pando 53,124 11,593 218.2 90.14 N/A 85.01
 Total Bolivia 7,767,060 1,880,554 242.1 100.00 N/A 94.32
CL Tarapacá 385,620 90,361 234.3 112.87 N/A 91.28
 Antofagasta 462,286 102,425 221.6 106.73 N/A 86.31
 Atacama 269,047 58,973 219.2 105.58 N/A 85.39
 Coquimbo 569,825 127,356 223.5 107.66 N/A 87.07
 Valparaíso 1,543,566 324,892 210.5 101.39 N/A 82.00
 Del Libertador 778,801 162,528 208.7 100.53 N/A 81.30
 Del Maule 906,882 193,090 212.9 102.56 N/A 82.94
 Del Biobío 1,915,844 404,174 211.0 101.62 N/A 82.18
 De La Araucanía 864,975 188,743 218.2 105.11 N/A 85.00
 De Los Lagos 1,050,558 219,416 208.9 100.61 N/A 81.36
 De Aysén 93,636 20,559 219.6 105.76 N/A 85.53
 De Magallanes 156,530 31,005 198.1 95.41 N/A 77.16
 Metropolitana de Santiago 6,013,185 1,192,624 198.3 95.54 N/A 77.26
 Total Chile 15,010,755 3,116,146 207.6 100.00 N/A 80.87
 MERCOSUR 4 203,727,823 53,158,012 260.9 N/A 100.00 101.65
 MERCOSUR 6 226,505,638 58,154,712 256.7 N/A N/A 100.00
 
 A2.49
Map A2.12. Primary and secondary school students per 1000 people: regional data 
compared to the Mercosur 6 average (%) 
 A2.50
A2.4.5. Literacy rate 
 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population Pop >15yrs* Alphabets
% of 
alphabets Nation M 4 M 6 
AR Ciudad de Buenos Aires 3,027,886 2,398,341 2,378,455 99.17 103.35 113.51 113.27 
 Buenos Aires 13,379,401 8,947,528 8,711,800 97.37 101.46 111.44 111.21 
 Catamarca 289,212 167,143 158,778 95.00 98.99 108.73 108.50 
 Córdoba 2,929,734 1,962,034 1,893,078 96.49 100.55 110.43 110.21 
 Corrientes 857,685 500,129 448,463 89.67 93.44 102.63 102.42 
 Chaco 895,900 515,710 451,681 87.58 91.27 100.25 100.04 
 Chubut 399,125 230,597 218,853 94.91 98.90 108.63 108.40 
 Entre Ríos 1,069,102 688,638 651,363 94.59 98.57 108.26 108.04 
 Formosa 447,094 239,147 216,740 90.63 94.45 103.73 103.52 
 Jujuy 555,097 311,487 286,817 92.08 95.96 105.39 105.17 
 La Pampa 282,356 178,806 170,719 95.48 99.50 109.28 109.05 
 La Rioja 247,575 140,454 134,318 95.63 99.66 109.46 109.23 
 Mendoza 1,508,959 961,055 912,503 94.95 98.95 108.67 108.45 
 Misiones 884,291 471,363 428,019 90.80 94.63 103.93 103.72 
 Neuquén 463,266 244,332 229,539 93.95 97.90 107.53 107.31 
 Río Negro 559,590 327,170 306,669 93.73 97.68 107.28 107.06 
 Salta 958,094 532,885 492,071 92.34 96.23 105.69 105.47 
 San Juan 555,223 350,440 333,983 95.30 99.32 109.08 108.86 
 San Luis 321,890 191,928 182,907 95.30 99.31 109.08 108.85 
 Santa Cruz 181,198 104,195 101,600 97.51 101.61 111.61 111.38 
 Santa Fe 2,949,050 1,971,421 1,892,440 95.99 100.04 109.87 109.64 
 Santiago del Estero 700,114 412,812 373,212 90.41 94.21 103.48 103.26 
 Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
89,992 44,463 43,918 98.77 102.93 113.05 112.82 
 Tucumán 1,216,623 744,767 703,906 94.51 98.49 108.18 107.95 
 Total Argentina 34,768,457 22,636,845 21,721,832 95.96 100.00 109.83 109.60 
BR NORTH 11,736,040 4,837,220 4,183,078 86.48 101.39 98.98 98.77 
 Rondônia 1,289,365 522,585 469,016 89.75 105.23 102.72 102.51 
 Acre 504,489 209,555 171,258 81.72 95.82 93.54 93.35 
 Amazonas 2,460,434 1,161,829 1,050,742 90.44 106.04 103.51 103.30 
 Roraima 258,088 113,244 99,593 87.95 103.11 100.66 100.45 
 Pará 5,724,140 1,930,510 1,678,332 86.94 101.93 99.50 99.30 
 Amapá 402,557 223,072 197,148 88.38 103.62 101.15 100.95 
 Tocantins 1,096,967 676,425 516,989 76.43 89.61 87.48 87.30 
 NORTHEAST 45,854,455 29,581,619 20,883,488 70.60 82.77 80.80 80.64 
 Maranhão 5,349,575 3,210,312 2,061,852 64.23 75.30 73.51 73.36 
 Piauí 2,758,129 1,728,094 1,162,892 67.29 78.90 77.02 76.86 
 Ceará 7,010,107 4,391,629 3,040,353 69.23 81.17 79.24 79.08 
 Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 1,720,503 1,254,783 72.93 85.51 83.47 83.30 
 Paraíba 3,433,234 2,246,361 1,579,278 70.30 82.43 80.47 80.30 
 Pernambuco 7,548,183 5,008,029 3,682,623 73.53 86.22 84.16 83.99 
 Alagoas 2,754,697 1,716,599 1,094,599 63.77 74.76 72.98 72.83 
 Sergipe 1,662,168 1,078,533 80,562 7.47 8.76 8.55 8.53 
 Bahia 12,697,007 8,481,559 6,201,488 73.12 85.73 83.69 83.51 
 SOUTHEAST 68,331,524 49,373,954 45,141,012 91.43 107.20 104.64 104.43 
 Minas Gerais 17,024,849 11,828,976 10,272,883 86.85 101.82 99.40 99.19 
 Espirito Santo 2,916,530 1,971,353 1,697,787 86.12 100.98 98.57 98.37 
 Rio de Janeiro 13,490,380 10,227,028 9,549,266 93.37 109.48 106.87 106.65 
 A2.51
Literacy rate (continued) 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population Pop >15yrs* Alphabets
% of 
alphabets Nation M 4 M 6 
BR São Paulo 34,899,765 25,346,597 23,621,076 93.19 109.27 106.66 106.44 
 SOUTH 23,963,075 16,819,272 15,426,238 91.72 107.54 104.98 104.76 
 Paraná 9,154,360 6,320,815 5,650,453 89.39 104.81 102.32 102.11 
 Santa Catarina 5,032,175 3,433,489 3,206,543 93.39 109.50 106.89 106.67 
 Rio Grande do Sul 9,776,540 7,064,968 6,569,242 92.98 109.02 106.42 106.21 
 CENTRAL WEST 10,825,181 7,421,562 6,502,793 87.62 102.73 100.29 100.08 
 Mato Grosso do Sul 1,985,579 1,332,830 1,171,916 87.93 103.09 100.64 100.43 
 Mato Grosso 2,335,344 1,541,748 1,320,446 85.65 100.42 98.03 97.83 
 Goiás 4,629,154 3,222,134 2,764,976 85.81 100.61 98.22 98.01 
 Federal District 1,875,104 1,324,850 1,245,455 94.01 110.22 107.60 107.38 
 Total Brazil 160,710,275 108,033,627 92,136,609 85.29 100.00 97.61 97.41 
PY Asunción 550,060 352,112 337,104 95.74 106.42 109.58 109.35 
 Concepción 185,496 87,359 76,345 87.39 97.15 100.03 99.82 
 San Pedro 332,926 146,870 131,324 89.42 99.39 102.34 102.13 
 Cordillera 215,663 114,803 104,395 90.93 101.08 104.08 103.87 
 Guairá 173,668 91,682 79,681 86.91 96.61 99.47 99.27 
 Caaguazú 442,161 207,409 185,871 89.62 99.62 102.57 102.36 
 Caazapá 141,559 67,738 57,874 85.44 94.97 97.79 97.59 
 Itapúa 454,757 202,819 178,213 87.87 97.67 100.57 100.36 
 Misiones 98,607 49,976 43,460 86.96 96.67 99.53 99.33 
 Paraguarí 247,675 120,270 107,470 89.36 99.33 102.27 102.06 
 Alto Paraná 595,276 232,759 204,284 87.77 97.56 100.45 100.25 
 Central 1,174,212 532,890 501,395 94.09 104.59 107.69 107.47 
 Ñeembucú 86,965 42,923 37,055 86.33 95.96 98.81 98.61 
 Amambay 127,011 55,763 44,616 80.01 88.94 91.58 91.39 
 Canindeyú 133,075 58,140 45,321 77.95 86.65 89.22 89.04 
 Pdte. Hayes 77,145 38,449 29,354 76.35 84.87 87.38 87.20 
 Boquerón 35,241 18,460 14,503 78.56 87.33 89.92 89.74 
 Alto Paraguay 13,831 7,063 5,396 76.40 84.92 87.44 87.26 
 Total Paraguay 5,085,328 2,427,485 2,183,661 89.96 100.00 102.96 102.75 
UY Montevideo 1,344,839 1,147,332 1,127,432 98.27 101.38 112.47 112.24 
 Artigas  75,059 58,583 55,383 94.54 97.53 108.20 107.98 
 Canelones  443,053 364,854 353,154 96.79 99.86 110.79 110.56 
 Cerro Largo  82,510 67,169 63,069 93.90 96.87 107.47 107.25 
 Colonia  120,241 100,344 97,444 97.11 100.19 111.15 110.92 
 Durazno  55,716 44,531 42,531 95.51 98.53 109.32 109.09 
 Flores  25,030 20,679 19,879 96.13 99.18 110.03 109.80 
 Florida  66,503 55,052 52,782 95.88 98.91 109.74 109.51 
 Lavalleja  61,085 51,043 48,843 95.69 98.72 109.52 109.30 
 Maldonado  127,502 104,800 102,200 97.52 100.61 111.62 111.39 
 Paysandú  111,509 89,615 86,415 96.43 99.48 110.37 110.14 
 Río Negro  51,713 41,171 39,371 95.63 98.66 109.45 109.23 
 Rivera  98,472 78,393 73,093 93.24 96.19 106.72 106.50 
 Rocha  70,292 58,196 55,396 95.19 98.20 108.95 108.72 
 Salto  117,597 93,153 89,023 95.57 98.59 109.38 109.16 
 San José  96,664 80,215 77,015 96.01 99.05 109.89 109.66 
 Soriano  81,557 66,583 63,883 95.94 98.98 109.81 109.59 
 Tacuarembó  84,919 68,016 64,216 94.41 97.40 108.06 107.84 
 Treinta y Tres  49,502 39,925 37,925 94.99 98.00 108.72 108.50 
 A2.52
Literacy rate (end) 
  Region compared to 
 Region Population Pop >15yrs* Alphabets
% of 
alphabets Nation M 4 M 6 
UY Total Uruguay 3,163,763 2,629,654 2,549,054 96.93 100.00 110.95 110.72 
BO Chuquisaca 549,835 252,733 152,948 60.52 75.66 N/A 69.12 
 La Paz 2,268,824 1,149,511 955,543 83.13 103.92 N/A 94.95 
 Cochabamba 1,408,071 653,584 515,106 78.81 98.53 N/A 90.02 
 Oruro 383,498 199,638 168,907 84.61 105.77 N/A 96.64 
 Potosi 746,618 361,245 223,271 61.81 77.27 N/A 70.60 
 Tarija 368,506 166,205 130,938 78.78 98.49 N/A 89.98 
 Santa Cruz 1,651,951 774,013 688,344 88.93 111.18 N/A 101.58 
 Beni 336,633 145,078 126,454 87.16 108.97 N/A 99.56 
 Pando 53,124 20,692 16,342 78.98 98.73 N/A 90.21 
 Total Bolivia 7,767,060 3,722,699 2,977,853 79.99 100.00 N/A 91.37 
CL Tarapacá 385,620 269,646 263,221 97.62 105.65 N/A 111.50 
 Antofagasta 462,286 323,551 316,731 97.89 105.94 N/A 111.81 
 Atacama 269,047 180,266 172,474 95.68 103.55 N/A 109.28 
 Coquimbo 569,825 397,314 369,884 93.10 100.75 N/A 106.33 
 Valparaíso 1,543,566 1,116,678 1,074,771 96.25 104.16 N/A 109.93 
 Del Libertador 778,801 554,425 506,916 91.43 98.95 N/A 104.43 
 Del Maule 906,882 665,111 596,413 89.67 97.05 N/A 102.42 
 Del Biobío 1,915,844 1,375,751 1,253,706 91.13 98.62 N/A 104.09 
 De La Araucanía 864,975 616,533 555,271 90.06 97.47 N/A 102.87 
 De Los Lagos 1,050,558 753,018 691,703 91.86 99.41 N/A 104.92 
 De Aysén 93,636 62,543 58,377 93.34 101.02 N/A 106.61 
 De Magallanes 156,530 114,786 109,563 95.45 103.30 N/A 109.02 
 Metropolitana de Santiago 6,013,185 4,164,046 3,819,845 91.73 99.28 N/A 104.78 
 Total Chile 15,010,755 10,593,668 9,788,875 92.40 100.00 N/A 105.54 
 MERCOSUR 4 203,727,823 135,727,611 118,591,156 87.37 N/A 100.00 99.80 
 MERCOSUR 6 226,505,638 150,043,978 131,357,884 87.55 N/A N/A 100.00 
* In Uruguay and in Chile the population for which statistics were available is that over 10 
years and not 15. 
 
 A2.53
Map A2.13. Literacy rate: regional data compared to the Mercosur 6 average (%) 
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A2.5. Synthesising table: the 12 indicators of development compared to the Mercosur 6 average (%)  
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AR Ciudad de Buenos Aires 3,027,886 428.5 97.6 12.1 166.3 134.6 148.9 209.0 245.1 650.4 105.6 61.7 113.3
AR Buenos Aires 13,379,401 141.3 96.0 12.1 98.7 76.2 50.5 209.0 120.1 123.2 104.7 81.9 111.2
AR Catamarca 289,212 76.6 94.2 6.9 0.7 118.1 35.8 65.0 148.9 138.5 102.6 104.6 108.5
AR Córdoba 2,929,734 135.6 96.9 12.1 75.2 105.3 24.2 133.0 196.5 243.8 105.7 82.6 110.2
AR Corrientes 857,685 64.4 91.0 15.8 46.7 94.7 46.7 66.8 128.3 124.5 101.8 104.1 102.4
AR Chaco 895,900 58.3 102.7 8.8 50.4 81.9 20.6 51.7 149.7 111.6 100.3 98.6 100.0
AR Chubut 399,125 205.1 105.0 8.0 94.4 125.4 76.5 145.3 158.7 133.7 102.5 94.1 108.4
AR Entre Ríos 1,069,102 96.5 91.3 14.7 69.5 106.2 55.3 107.1 199.4 149.8 104.0 90.3 108.0
AR Formosa 447,094 40.1 100.5 14.4 36.6 79.8 30.8 31.9 121.1 74.6 100.8 111.8 103.5
AR Jujuy 555,097 55.9 92.9 11.2 29.4 117.5 57.5 44.8 183.0 144.3 99.3 106.6 105.2
AR La Pampa 282,356 164.8 102.2 8.8 70.1 90.8 49.8 148.3 135.0 141.9 104.0 83.9 109.1
AR La Rioja 247,575 158.1 98.1 15.3 46.0 120.0 35.6 85.0 159.4 134.8 102.2 100.2 109.2
AR Mendoza 1,508,959 88.7 95.0 9.2 118.2 109.1 59.2 124.5 98.7 181.3 105.6 85.4 108.5
AR Misiones 884,291 94.2 107.1 22.3 49.7 53.1 11.5 60.2 108.2 83.0 100.9 102.6 103.7
AR Neuquén 463,266 173.9 105.8 13.2 128.2 121.1 52.7 103.4 96.4 129.6 103.7 96.4 107.3
AR Río Negro 559,590 138.5 104.3 9.3 85.8 112.9 53.6 108.8 113.9 143.2 102.9 92.7 107.1
AR Salta 958,094 75.6 94.5 9.6 85.8 113.9 70.4 59.7 134.3 118.4 100.1 107.1 105.5
AR San Juan 555,223 97.0 90.7 7.3 68.4 115.6 19.4 106.9 101.0 168.1 103.3 91.0 108.9
AR San Luis 321,890 263.8 99.7 13.4 110.6 109.1 44.5 99.0 125.1 145.2 102.8 92.6 108.9
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Synthesising table (continued) 
  Economy Infrastructure Social 
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AR Santa Cruz 181,198 289.9 111.0 7.8 52.5 128.5 75.0 105.0 210.1 110.4 102.3 96.7 111.4
AR Santa Fe 2,949,050 141.8 91.7 14.8 83.6 96.1 44.9 136.8 132.0 212.7 105.0 81.8 109.6
AR Santiago del Estero 700,114 39.1 90.3 8.5 0.0 77.8 22.7 45.0 195.5 104.9 101.4 99.6 103.3
AR Tierra del Fuego, Antártica 
e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
89,992 277.8 123.0 0.7 93.0 128.7 120.4 772.7 79.1 74.3 101.9 100.1 112.8
AR Tucumán 1,216,623 71.4 87.6 17.8 47.7 112.1 52.9 72.7 100.9 186.6 103.2 87.6 108.0
AR Total Argentina 34,768,457 155.3 96.0 8.1 85.8 94.7 55.4 153.2 143.6 192.0 104.5 85.3 109.6
BR NORTH 11,736,040 57.2 96.9 19.8 75.3 58.8 107.5 44.7 64.3 37.1 98.1 126.8 98.8
BR Rondônia 1,289,365 56.8 102.8 74.5 43.6 46.3 107.5 42.1 64.3 27.6 97.8 109.8 102.5
BR Acre 504,489 45.4 99.9 11.7 34.1 56.7 107.5 55.7 64.3 23.0 97.8 129.0 93.3
BR Amazonas 2,460,434 102.2 87.9 3.0 55.0 86.5 107.5 60.2 52.3 36.5 98.7 120.9 103.3
BR Roraima 258,088 42.0 90.1 17.1 51.6 93.7 107.5 83.0 64.3 52.8 96.7 149.2 100.5
BR Pará 5,724,140 44.8 100.2 21.7 106.8 41.4 107.5 37.6 56.4 41.6 98.6 126.2 99.3
BR Amapá 402,557 66.1 83.6 11.1 47.5 81.5 107.5 70.2 64.3 31.9 99.0 150.7 100.9
BR Tocantins 1,096,967 27.4 108.9 70.4 28.0 86.6 107.5 27.1 90.8 31.3 98.0 148.7 87.3
BR NORTHEAST 45,854,455 43.3 101.9 201.3 57.0 81.8 107.5 44.3 91.6 44.6 94.2 120.8 80.6
BR Maranhão 5,349,575 24.2 119.7 125.2 92.1 57.3 107.5 24.9 148.5 23.2 92.9 132.5 73.4
BR Piauí 2,758,129 26.7 103.3 165.5 22.6 76.9 107.5 36.0 101.8 33.7 94.0 122.3 76.9
BR Ceará 7,010,107 43.8 102.6 260.2 44.0 67.0 107.5 55.5 78.0 44.2 95.1 118.4 79.1
BR Rio Grande do Norte 2,641,355 44.0 91.3 400.0 51.0 102.9 107.5 48.3 89.7 56.5 95.1 113.9 83.3
BR Paraíba 3,433,234 35.5 96.0 464.5 38.8 86.3 107.5 46.6 109.2 5.8 92.2 113.8 80.3
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BR Pernambuco 7,548,183 54.2 97.5 330.3 50.4 93.2 107.5 38.4 93.2 70.3 91.1 111.0 84.0
BR Alagoas 2,754,697 36.4 90.4 368.3 68.7 83.8 107.5 42.5 89.6 59.3 90.4 110.3 72.8
BR Sergipe 1,662,168 50.8 105.5 341.6 68.8 98.0 107.5 49.0 65.9 58.0 96.3 116.4 8.5
BR Bahia 12,697,007 50.9 102.4 166.8 62.9 86.6 107.5 49.9 71.3 44.1 97.0 129.1 83.5
BR SOUTHEAST 68,331,524 130.2 98.7 409.6 141.4 117.4 107.5 115.9 106.1 113.9 100.2 96.6 104.4
BR Minas Gerais 17,024,849 89.3 102.4 313.0 126.6 106.4 107.5 88.6 98.4 80.1 101.0 107.0 99.2
BR Espirito Santo 2,916,530 97.0 104.3 513.7 121.5 98.0 107.5 78.9 76.9 84.6 100.9 103.9 98.4
BR Rio de Janeiro 13,490,380 126.3 92.3 398.0 134.4 115.4 107.5 106.1 143.1 148.2 97.5 90.0 106.7
BR São Paulo 34,899,765 154.4 98.9 620.8 153.0 125.2 107.5 136.1 98.0 119.7 101.0 93.5 106.4
BR SOUTH 23,963,075 112.1 110.2 631.9 102.5 104.1 107.5 89.3 102.8 83.0 102.2 92.3 104.8
BR Paraná 9,154,360 100.7 108.0 1,034.3 96.1 109.6 107.5 92.5 106.6 70.3 100.9 95.8 102.1
BR Santa Catarina 5,032,175 110.5 111.2 509.2 121.5 93.4 107.5 99.5 96.9 58.6 102.7 94.2 106.7
BR Rio Grande do Sul 9,776,540 123.5 111.9 388.5 98.8 104.4 107.5 80.9 102.3 107.3 103.2 88.1 106.2
BR CENTRAL WEST 10,825,181 87.6 107.3 110.5 73.4 96.3 107.5 111.5 115.8 74.6 99.8 113.8 100.1
BR Mato Grosso do Sul 1,985,579 81.6 110.4 119.2 70.9 103.2 107.5 84.1 96.2 63.7 101.0 107.7 100.4
BR Mato Grosso 2,335,344 68.4 112.8 72.4 66.8 83.0 107.5 67.2 90.5 36.3 99.2 116.4 97.8
BR Goiás 4,629,154 60.4 106.2 201.2 69.1 88.3 107.5 75.6 156.1 59.7 100.0 116.1 98.0
BR Federal District 1,875,104 184.9 100.6 199.0 94.7 125.2 107.5 284.4 68.7 170.8 99.5 111.1 107.4
BR Total Brazil 160,710,275 94.5 101.9 153.7 102.1 99.6 107.5 86.0 99.1 81.3 98.5 106.2 97.4
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PY Asunción 550,060 32.7 93.3 126.5 86.7 80.9 63.0 19.4 10.3 282.2 101.4 101.9 109.4
PY Concepción 185,496 32.7 70.2 97.5 31.0 80.9 63.0 19.4 25.1 282.2 101.4 103.6 99.8
PY San Pedro 332,926 32.7 73.6 128.3 12.9 80.9 63.0 19.4 14.1 282.2 101.4 96.3 102.1
PY Cordillera 215,663 32.7 71.1 112.3 28.2 80.9 63.0 19.4 18.6 282.2 101.4 102.4 103.9
PY Guairá 173,668 32.7 75.3 151.6 27.8 80.9 63.0 19.4 25.3 282.2 101.4 100.2 99.3
PY Caaguazú 442,161 32.7 74.5 111.2 22.1 80.9 63.0 19.4 12.3 282.2 101.4 98.3 102.4
PY Caazapá 141,559 32.7 70.5 66.1 9.4 80.9 63.0 19.4 34.9 282.2 101.4 107.9 97.6
PY Itapúa 454,757 32.7 77.4 117.7 27.8 80.9 63.0 19.4 15.0 282.2 101.4 92.9 100.4
PY Misiones 98,607 32.7 68.8 50.9 54.9 80.9 63.0 19.4 23.1 282.2 101.4 112.1 99.3
PY Paraguarí 247,675 32.7 72.4 88.6 16.3 80.9 63.0 19.4 21.7 282.2 101.4 83.9 102.1
PY Alto Paraná 595,276 32.7 86.1 64.2 46.5 80.9 63.0 19.4 9.5 282.2 101.4 79.2 100.2
PY Central 1,174,212 32.7 84.6 126.5 86.7 80.9 63.0 19.4 4.4 282.2 101.4 78.3 107.5
PY Ñeembucú 86,965 32.7 73.4 42.8 34.7 80.9 63.0 19.4 31.7 282.2 101.4 79.6 98.6
PY Amambay 127,011 32.7 78.4 78.9 29.9 80.9 63.0 19.4 18.7 282.2 101.4 69.9 91.4
PY Canindeyú 133,075 32.7 82.5 57.0 19.4 80.9 63.0 19.4 14.7 282.2 101.4 95.0 89.0
PY Pdte. Hayes 77,145 32.7 77.9 22.4 68.9 80.9 63.0 19.4 26.2 282.2 101.4 69.4 87.2
PY Boquerón 35,241 32.7 72.3 23.1 3.7 80.9 63.0 19.4 29.1 282.2 101.4 46.8 89.7
PY Alto Paraguay 13,831 32.7 71.2 7.7 8.4 80.9 63.0 19.4 67.2 282.2 101.4 71.4 87.3
PY Total Paraguay 5,085,328 32.7 80.2 45.8 48.4 80.9 63.0 19.4 21.6 282.2 101.4 89.5 102.7
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UY Montevideo 1,344,839 123.4 98.4 131.5 148.6 126.8 149.0 286.1 97.7 420.8 108.1 63.4 112.2
UY Artigas  75,059 123.4 86.5 26.2 68.4 112.5 120.5 122.8 62.3 80.9 107.8 82.4 108.0
UY Canelones  443,053 123.4 97.0 191.9 140.5 113.0 145.0 212.9 7.7 105.7 109.0 66.8 110.6
UY Cerro Largo  82,510 123.4 87.8 28.1 79.1 104.7 143.4 134.5 78.1 68.4 106.8 68.7 107.2
UY Colonia  120,241 123.4 97.6 68.9 166.7 102.9 151.4 191.4 56.2 97.5 110.2 64.2 110.9
UY Durazno  55,716 123.4 91.9 24.6 69.9 107.9 145.3 138.2 65.6 93.6 109.0 72.5 109.1
UY Flores  25,030 123.4 93.4 43.0 112.3 112.0 148.1 160.2 197.2 90.7 110.8 65.9 109.8
UY Florida  66,503 123.4 91.9 52.2 96.3 97.1 145.9 167.1 68.0 107.9 109.6 64.0 109.5
UY Lavalleja  61,085 123.4 105.7 22.8 130.4 104.6 143.8 180.0 74.0 103.4 109.3 63.7 109.3
UY Maldonado  127,502 123.4 105.6 63.1 209.4 119.0 147.7 383.8 50.5 135.7 109.6 70.3 111.4
UY Paysandú  111,509 123.4 104.5 24.5 131.7 107.8 145.9 148.0 76.7 105.1 109.1 71.0 110.1
UY Río Negro  51,713 123.4 88.2 38.1 81.5 105.1 146.0 133.6 67.6 79.5 109.2 73.9 109.2
UY Rivera  98,472 123.4 89.0 37.0 82.4 102.0 143.5 144.8 55.7 76.6 106.3 75.7 106.5
UY Rocha  70,292 123.4 92.6 51.2 103.2 110.8 146.1 195.0 88.0 94.3 106.8 68.0 108.7
UY Salto  117,597 123.4 85.8 18.3 78.4 105.7 144.0 134.5 91.3 116.9 107.6 76.6 109.2
UY San José  96,664 123.4 95.4 61.7 155.7 81.2 144.0 174.0 47.4 70.4 106.8 62.8 109.7
UY Soriano  81,557 123.4 89.6 45.1 100.5 107.9 147.3 146.5 96.7 102.3 108.3 70.8 109.6
UY Tacuarembó  84,919 123.4 87.5 28.6 74.4 99.3 143.2 133.5 63.8 99.0 106.7 76.4 107.8
UY Treinta y Tres  49,502 123.4 89.7 23.3 112.1 108.2 144.2 152.6 125.6 84.3 106.3 69.3 108.5
UY Total Uruguay 3,163,763 123.4 96.6 39.2 132.8 112.3 146.9 227.6 74.4 235.8 107.2 67.0 110.7
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BO Chuquisaca 549,835 13.4 123.6 90.3 12.5 73.6 60.9 18.4 47.5 36.8 88.2 82.4 69.1
BO La Paz 2,268,824 15.4 116.3 53.8 27.2 107.2 84.4 47.1 46.5 38.9 90.4 92.2 94.9
BO Cochabamba 1,408,071 17.5 124.8 87.3 24.3 86.6 97.3 20.0 38.4 26.9 89.7 89.9 90.0
BO Oruro 383,498 21.9 106.9 67.7 32.8 97.8 48.6 39.7 57.2 33.9 83.6 108.2 96.6
BO Potosí 746,618 9.5 115.6 76.3 7.3 68.7 36.8 24.8 45.3 25.5 82.8 94.1 70.6
BO Tarija 368,506 18.9 131.0 56.7 48.1 100.0 108.0 35.7 69.2 43.3 95.6 91.4 90.0
BO Santa Cruz 1,651,951 23.8 122.3 19.5 41.2 112.8 135.8 47.6 49.7 37.5 96.3 99.0 101.6
BO Beni 336,633 17.1 125.1 12.2 48.1 76.9 128.9 29.7 57.5 46.8 87.8 112.7 99.6
BO Pando 53,124 21.6 160.3 15.8 48.1 44.2 103.7 12.4 32.6 45.0 88.8 85.0 90.2
BO Total Bolivia 7,767,060 17.4 120.2 38.5 29.0 95.8 90.8 36.2 47.7 35.3 90.2 94.3 91.4
CL Tarapacá 385,620 113.7 95.3 61.9 157.6 119.7 126.5 147.5 64.7 35.0 109.3 91.3 111.5
CL Antofagasta 462,286 203.5 85.5 35.0 157.6 126.4 129.5 164.4 72.7 24.3 109.3 86.3 111.8
CL Atacama 269,047 106.1 99.0 67.1 157.6 120.3 124.2 89.7 57.2 24.4 109.3 85.4 109.3
CL Coquimbo 569,825 48.7 87.6 96.7 157.6 120.8 125.2 103.0 62.3 26.5 109.3 87.1 106.3
CL Valparaíso 1,543,566 62.2 87.2 160.3 157.6 123.1 133.1 171.3 83.0 35.3 109.3 82.0 109.9
CL Del Libertador 778,801 65.0 85.4 197.6 157.6 121.2 132.0 89.2 59.2 21.3 109.3 81.3 104.4
CL Del Maule 906,882 51.7 88.5 192.4 157.6 121.3 133.0 71.5 73.7 23.4 109.3 82.9 102.4
CL Del Biobío 1,915,844 50.8 84.2 246.4 157.6 123.1 134.2 102.6 72.3 30.1 109.3 82.2 104.1
CL De La Araucanía 864,975 31.1 80.7 307.9 157.6 120.0 131.4 85.5 86.2 30.2 109.3 85.0 102.9
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CL De Los Lagos 1,050,558 44.1 87.1 125.3 157.6 121.9 132.3 101.5 79.7 33.5 109.3 81.4 104.9
CL De Aysén 93,636 60.8 100.1 18.8 157.6 123.2 120.3 124.6 98.2 48.5 109.3 85.5 106.6
CL De Magallanes 156,530 147.4 96.8 19.5 157.6 129.7 130.3 178.9 108.9 39.6 109.3 77.2 109.0
CL Metropolitana de Santiago 6,013,185 89.3 99.7 127.9 157.6 123.6 129.1 228.0 53.0 35.8 109.3 77.3 104.8
CL Total Chile 15,010,755 90.9 92.0 83.0 157.6 122.8 130.6 160.0 66.1 32.2 109.3 80.9 105.5
 MERCOSUR 4 203,727,823 103.8 100.5 106.2 98.5 98.5 98.1 98.0 104.4 107.6 99.7 101.6 99.8
 MERCOSUR 6 226,505,638 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(a) Regions <75% 44.1 72.3 22.0 50.6 56.2 47.8 44.1 60.7 45.3 N/A 64.3 62.4
(b) Population <75% 88.4 1.2 58.0 77.9 22.1 38.0 80.2 63.6 104.4 0.0 6.4 11.0
(c) % of population <75% 39.0 0.5 25.6 34.4 9.8 16.8 35.4 28.1 46.1 N/A 2.8 4.9
(a) Regions < 75%: for each indicator, average value for the group of regions being under the 75% threshold 
(b) Population <75%: total population (in millions) living in regions under the 75% threshold for each indicator 
(c) % of population <75%: percentage of the Mercosur 6 population living in regions under the 75% threshold 
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MOST  FREQUENTLY  USED  INTERNET  WEBSITESI I   
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social: www.bndes.gov.br 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research: www.cgiar.org 
Corporación Andina de Fomento: www.caf.com 
Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas y Censos (Paraguay): www.dgeec.gov.py  
European Union: www.europa.eu.int 
Fonplata: www.fonplata.org 
Instituto Brazileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazil): www.ibge.gov.br   
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Bolivia): www.ine.gov.bo  
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Uruguay): www.ine.gub.uy  
Instituto Nacional De Estadística y Censo (Argentina): www.indec.mecon.ar 
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (Chile): www.ine.cl 
Inter-American Development Bank: www.iadb.org 
International Monetary Fund: www.imf.org 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development : www.oecd.org  
Organisation of American States: www.oas.org 
Pan American Health Organization: www.paho.org  
Secretaria Administrativo del Mercosur: www.mercosur.org.uy 
United Nations: www.un.org 
World Bank: www.worldbank.org 
For internet sites related to statistics please see the list at the beginning of Annex 2. 
 
 
 
 
